People v. Geary CA2/1

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Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Geary CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B340003

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA119175)
v.

MARCO ANTONIO GEARY,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller, Charles S. Lee, and John
Yang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on September 23, 2018, a group
of people—including 19-year-old Jay Espinoza—left a nightclub
near the Fox Theater in Pomona. As the group was crossing the
street, a dark blue sports utility vehicle (SUV) drove through the
intersection at a high rate of speed. The SUV nearly struck the
pedestrians, and one or more people in the group gestured and
yelled at the vehicle’s occupants. The SUV circled the block and
stopped next to the group. Espinoza approached the SUV and
confronted the passenger sitting in the front seat. One of the SUV’s
occupants then opened the vehicle’s rear passenger-side door and
fired several shots. Espinoza suffered three gunshot wounds, two
of which proved fatal.
Surveillance footage and eyewitness accounts implicated
three purported members of the South Side Pomona gang—
appellant Marco Geary, Gabriel Cervantez, and Gabriel’s brother,
Everette Cervantez1—in the shooting. And when officers arrested
and interviewed Gabriel, he identified Geary as the shooter. The
district attorney charged all three men with Espinoza’s murder, but
Gabriel and Everette resolved their cases by pleading no contest to
charges of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)).2
Geary proceeded to trial on the murder charge. Gabriel testified at
the trial, albeit unwillingly. Following several days of deliberations
and supplemental closing arguments by the prosecution and
defense, the jurors convicted Geary of second degree murder. The
court sentenced him to 40 years to life in prison.
Geary now asks us to reverse his conviction, arguing that
(1) insufficient evidence corroborates the statements from Gabriel,

1 Because Gabriel and Everette share a last name, we refer to
them by their first names.
2 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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an accomplice to the crime, (2) the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting gang expert testimony because, in doing so, it relied
on the prosecutor’s mistaken representation that Gabriel had
identified Geary as a South Side Pomona gang member, (3) the
gang expert introduced racial bias into the trial, in violation of the
Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317) (RJA), (4) the court
coerced the verdict by providing an improper “Allen”3 charge to the
jury during deliberations, and (5) the cumulative effect of the trial
errors mandates reversal.
We, however, conclude that Geary is not entitled to relief:
Substantial evidence in the form of videos, photographs, and
eyewitness testimony corroborates Gabriel’s statements. The
record does not support that the court relied on the prosecutor’s
incorrect representation in deciding to admit the gang expert’s
testimony. Geary fails to demonstrate the gang expert’s comments
violated the RJA. And the court’s mid-deliberation instructions to
the jurors accurately stated the law and did not coerce their verdict.
Finally, the absence of any individual errors defeats Geary’s
cumulative error argument.
Accordingly, we affirm with directions to the trial court to
correct an error in the calculation of Geary’s custody credits.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.

A. The Charges and the Codefendants’ Pleas
In 2019, the district attorney charged Geary, Gabriel,
and Everette with Espinoza’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) (count 1).
The district attorney further alleged that Geary “personally and

3 Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492 (Allen).

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intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun, which proximately
caused” Espinoza’s death (see § 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that the
defendants committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). In addition, the district attorney
charged Geary with possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)) (count 2) in connection with the incident.
In 2021, Gabriel and Everette each pleaded no contest
to assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) in exchange for
dismissal of the murder charge pending against them. In addition,
Gabriel and Everette admitted they committed the assault for
the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)).
Pursuant to the plea agreements, the trial court imposed a
seven-year prison sentence on each of them.
Geary elected to proceed to trial.

B. Pretrial Hearing Concerning the Admissibility
of Gang-Related Evidence
At the January 2024 final pretrial hearing, defense counsel
moved to bifurcate the gang allegation from the remainder of the
case and moved to exclude all gang-related evidence from the initial
phase of the trial. The court granted the bifurcation motion and
heard argument concerning the admissibility of gang evidence in
the first phase of the trial.4
The prosecutor argued, in pertinent part: “Our theory of the
case is [Geary] along with [Gabriel and Everette] are all members
of South Side Pomona. They were hanging out at the Flying J bar
here in downtown Pomona on the night of the incident. As they

4 Following Geary’s conviction for murder, the prosecution
moved to dismiss the gang allegation in the interest of justice. The
court granted the motion, and the trial therefore never proceeded to
a second phase.

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departed, the three of them in an SUV traveled at a high rate of
speed southbound [on] Garey nearly striking some pedestrians who
were crossing in the crosswalk area. Some of these pedestrians,
based on the video and witness statements, verbally expressed
their distaste for the near strike and almost immediately [Geary,
Gabriel, and Everette] circled the block at a high rate of speed,
approached the group that had just crossed the crosswalk, and
then immediately there was a confrontation. It’s our theory that
defendant Geary was the rear passenger who exited and, without
any provocation, produced a handgun and shot the victim, Jay
Espinoza, approximately five times.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“So what we’re seeking to do is we’re seeking to introduce
evidence of defendant Geary’s gang membership in South Side
Pomona along with [Gabriel’s and Everette’s] membership and
show that the reason for the shooting was to back up a fellow gang
member and to address the disrespect shown to South Side Pomona
by this group of pedestrians.”
In support of Geary’s alleged gang affiliation, the prosecution
proffered that Geary “ha[d] self-admitted his membership in
South Side Pomona to several Pomona police officers,” and had
disclosed his gang membership and moniker, “Little Bam Bam”
to an undercover agent in the Pomona jail. The prosecution further
proffered: “When the detectives interview[ed] Gabriel . . . , who
was the driver, the . . . day [after the shooting] . . . , Gabriel . . .
admitted his membership in South Side Pomona [and] identified
defendant Geary as a member of South Side Pomona with the
moniker Bam Bam or Bams.” (Italics added.)
Defense counsel did not dispute the veracity of the
prosecutor’s proffer, but as set forth, post, the prosecutor was

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incorrect that Gabriel expressly had identified Geary as a South
Side Pomona gang member in his interview with detectives.
At the conclusion of argument, the court ruled that gang
evidence “[would] be permitted to be introduced for purposes of
motive, but . . . only in that limited way.”

C. Trial Evidence
At trial, the prosecution introduced several categories
of evidence in support of its theory that Geary shot and killed
Espinoza, including: (1) testimony from four eyewitnesses,
(2) surveillance camera footage, (3) live testimony from Gabriel, as
well as recordings of his interview with detectives and several jail
calls he made to Everette, (4) testimony from Greg Freeman, one
of the lead detectives on the case, and (5) testimony from Officer
Rodney Cavanaugh, a gang expert.
The defense introduced two still images taken from the
prosecution’s surveillance footage, but did not otherwise present
an affirmative case.

1. Eyewitness Testimony
J.B., R.G., P.C.G., and S.E. testified as eyewitnesses to the
shooting.
J.B. testified that, near the time of the incident, he and his
friends were attempting to gain entrance to a night club near the
Fox Theater. He saw an SUV drive rapidly down the street and
stop near a group of people. A person on the street took his shirt
off, “like [he] [was] squaring off to fight.” The SUV’s “passenger
door opened first; and then, . . . the door right behind the passenger,
the rear passenger seat—they opened their door, and then they got
out. It was kind of loud for a second and then, . . . [he] just hear[d]
gunshots instantly.” J.B. saw the shooter holding “a black
handgun” and saw “the spark from the gun.” He described the

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shooter as “male” and “Mexican or Latino.” J.B. further testified
that he had “a clear line of sight from where [he was] standing
on the corner to where the SUV stopped[,] and [he saw] the front
passenger and rear passenger get out just before the shooting
[began].”
R.G. testified she witnessed the shooting while standing next
to her brother’s car. She and her brother had spent the prior two
hours at a nearby nightclub, and she was waiting for him to return
with the car keys. She had consumed two alcoholic drinks while at
the club and “was a little buzzed.” She saw “a car kind of just go a
little fast in the middle of the street” as a group of people “[were]
walking on the crosswalk.” “It looked like” one of the cars came
close to striking the people. It was “a black SUV or a van.” The
vehicle then “circled” and reappeared in the middle of the street,
“maybe a parking space [distance] in front of ” R.G. A man, who
R.G. later learned was Espinoza, approached the vehicle, and R.G.
“[thought] he threw a punch at the passenger, the guy that was
sitting in the front passenger [seat].” “[T]hen someone opened the
back door and kind of reached out, didn’t fully exit, but he reached
out and he had a handgun and then he shot [Espinoza].” R.G.
further testified there was nothing between the vehicle and where
she was standing that would have blocked her view of the incident.
On cross-examination, R.G. testified that she originally told police
she saw four people in the vehicle, but she clarified: That “was an
assumption I believe I made. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . But I don’t know
where I’m getting . . . you know, I was also drinking, and I don’t
know where the fourth person came from.”
P.C.G. testified that, at the time of the shooting, she was
sitting in her car in a nearby Bank of America parking lot. She
was waiting for her boyfriend to deposit or withdraw money. While
waiting, she saw a black SUV stop “directly near where [a] group of

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pedestrians [was] walking.” She observed “[m]ore than two people”
in the SUV, including “two heads in the rear seat.” The driver’s
side of the car was closest to her, and she did not see any of the
doors open on that side of the vehicle. She then heard several
gunshots, followed by a woman screaming and a young man crying.
She saw a male body on the floor. After hearing the shots, she told
her boyfriend “to come inside the car and . . . go to the nearest police
[officer].”
Finally, S.E. testified that she was part of the group that had
crossed the street with Espinoza. She had met Espinoza for the
first time that night. She testified that, as the group crossed the
street, she heard the sound of a vehicle traveling through the
crosswalk at a high rate of speed. She heard one or more people in
the group “shout” in response. S.E. continued walking forward and
then “hear[d] a commotion and then [she] remember[ed] hearing
gunshots.” She further testified: “Sounded like a fight, a quick one,
and then gunshots right after.” S.E. did not turn around to observe
the vehicle or the fight. Immediately after the shooting, she jumped
in her friend’s car, and the friend retrieved Espinoza’s body and
drove him to the emergency room five minutes away. Although
on direct examination, S.E. testified she did not see the SUV, she
confirmed on cross-examination that she previously told detectives
that she had seen “a dark-colored SUV[,] probably a Chevy Tahoe
type SUV[,] with at least four people inside of it” and that “all the
windows in the SUV were rolled down” at the time of the incident.

2. Surveillance Camera Footage and Still
Images
Surveillance camera footage introduced by the prosecution
appears to capture Geary, Gabriel, and Everette on the sidewalk
near the Fox Theater shortly before the shooting. Geary is wearing
a dark gray shirt and a wristband, Gabriel is wearing a light gray

8
shirt, and Everette is wearing a baseball cap. The surveillance
footage also shows a dark SUV driving down the street a few
minutes later. The front and back passenger-side windows of the
SUV are rolled down, and a passenger is visible in each window.
The driver appears to be wearing a light gray shirt, and the front
passenger is wearing a baseball cap. The back passenger’s face
also is visible, although his clothing is not visible.
The defense introduced as exhibits two still images—
one of Geary, Gabriel, and Everette on the street and one of the
individuals visible in the SUV—taken from the prosecution’s
surveillance footage.

3. Gabriel’s Testimony, Prior Recorded
Interview with Detectives, and Jail Calls
Gabriel did not wish to testify, and initially, the prosecution
was unsure it would be able to present live testimony from him.
In the middle of trial, however, officers arrested Gabriel on a parole
violation and transported him to the courthouse to testify. Gabriel
answered most of the prosecution’s background questions on direct
examination. He testified, for example, that he had been released
from prison a year and a half earlier after serving approximately
three years in prison for assault with a firearm in connection with
Espinoza’s death. Gabriel also confirmed that the surveillance
footage captured him, Geary, and Everette walking on the street
near the Fox Theater shortly before the shooting. In addition,
Gabriel confirmed that he was driving his girlfriend’s dark-colored
SUV on the date of the incident, and that the surveillance footage
captured Everette as the front passenger and Geary as the rear
passenger in the SUV.
But when the prosecution began asking further questions
about the shooting, Gabriel replied, “I really don’t want to answer
these questions.” The court then ruled Gabriel a hostile witness

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and allowed the prosecution to play the recording of Gabriel’s
interview with detectives (including Detective Freeman) and
recordings of three jail calls Gabriel had placed to Everette.
During his recorded interview with detectives, Gabriel said
he had been a member of the South Side Pomona gang since he
was 15 years old. He did not make any representations concerning
Geary’s gang status. But he did identify “Bam-Bam,” i.e., Geary,
as the shooter during the following exchanges with the detectives:
“[Detective]: . . . [W]ho was in the car[?]
“[Gabriel]: There was three of us.
“[Detective]: I know. Who was in the car?
“[Gabriel]: Um, who was that? I think Bam-Bam.
“[Detective]: And who else?
“[Gabriel]: That’s it.
“[Detective]: Just you, Everette, and Bam-Bam?
“[Gabriel]: Yeah.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Detective]: Let me ask you this. You were driving. Your
brother was where[?]
“[Gabriel]: Passenger.
“[Detective]: Where was Bam-Bam?
“[Gabriel]: Backseat.
“[Detective]: Behind your brother?
“[Gabriel]: Yeah.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Detective]: . . . Who shot him, your brother or Bam-Bam?
“[Gabriel]: Like I said, my brother didn’t do nothing.
“[Detective]: Why would Bam-Bam shoot him?
“[Gabriel]: I don’t know. . . .
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Detective]: Why would Bam-Bam get out of the car?

10
“[Gabriel]: He seen my brother probably. And then he seen
him hit my brother, you know?
“[Detective]: Felt disrespected and fucken got mad?
“[Gabriel]: I guess. I don’t know. Probably he was drunk or
something. I don’t know. Like, I don’t know.”
“[Detective]: . . . Bam-Bam, what do you know his real name
to be? I already know who he is, but what—what do you know him,
his real name—his real name to be?
“[Gabriel]: Well, Marco[, i.e., Geary].”
Gabriel likewise implicated Geary as the shooter in the
following jail call exchanges with Everette:
“[Gabriel]: . . . Fool, that fool—that fool, whatever happened
he was sons—his dad’s a cop,[5] fool, so we’re fucked. Tell him he’s
fucked. We’re—fucken Bam-Bam’s—you gotta tell Bam-Bam, fool.
I don’t know what the fuck, fool.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Gabriel]: . . . [T]hey got a court date set up for me.
“[Everette]: Okay. And then what? And then what? What’s
gonna happen?
“[Gabriel]: I don’t know, bro.
“[Everette]: All right. Well, they’re gonna fucken—because,
look, if they—if they do that, dog, what you said, Gabriel, then
fucken Flaco said he already talked to what’s his name. And if they
do, then he’s just gonna say something that’s gonna clear us, you
know, us that we don’t know, you know?”
“[Gabriel]: I know, fool. But you fucken talk to Bam-Bam,
fool, because I’m gonna be in here all day, dog, and I didn’t even do
shit, fool, and you know it.

5 As a “ruse,” detectives had told Gabriel that Espinoza was
the son of a police chief.

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“[Everette]: Yeah, fool. Well, what do I do? What am I
supposed to do? What do I tell him?
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Everette]: Well, what do I do? What should I tell fucken
what’s his name? What if he says it’s just him?
“[Gabriel]: Then tell him.
“[Everette]: I don’t know. I need to call you back.”
“[Gabriel]: . . . [T]hey are looking for Bam-Bam. They want
Bam-Bam, fool.
“[Everette]: They want Bam-Bam?
“[Gabriel]: Yeah. They want Bam-Bam bad, fool. They’re
looking for him.
“[Everette]: Why though?
“[Gabriel]: Just because—I don’t know, fool, but they said
that they’re looking for him, and that maybe I can get—I get to
leave, but I don’t know, fool. Like, I’m—I don’t know, fool.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Everette]: . . . They’re looking for him; right? That’s what
they told you; right?
“[Gabriel]: Yeah.
“[Everette]: Then you’re good, fool.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Gabriel]: I’m probably just waiting here until they catch
Bam-Bam, or I don’t know what the fuck, bro.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Gabriel]: Tell Bam-Bam to fucken do something quick, fool.
“[Everette]: That fool, he—I don’t know, fool. He’s on his own
shit right now, fool. Flaco, like—I talked to Flaco right now, and,
fucken, I don’t know. But how do they know it’s him?
“[Gabriel]: I don’t know, bro, but I—they—I’m—if anything,
they’re gonna let me go down for everyone.”

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4. Detective Freeman’s Testimony
Detective Freeman testified that, prior to being assigned to
investigate Espinoza’s death, he knew Geary through “personal”
“contacts with [him] in the past on different investigations and
on the streets, on stops, and stuff like that,” dating back to 2013.
Based on those prior contacts, he knew Geary’s nickname to be
“Bams or Little Bams or Bam Bam.” Detective Freeman further
testified that, “[b]efore the interview with Gabriel,” he reviewed
surveillance footage from the Fox Theater and identified Geary as
the rear passenger in the SUV captured in the footage.

5. Gang Expert’s Testimony
Immediately before the prosecution called Officer Cavanaugh
to testify as its gang expert, defense counsel renewed his objection
to the testimony. Defense counsel “ask[ed] [the court] to reconsider
the issue based on the evidence as it’s been presented because it is
different [from] what was told to the court initially”—including
because Gabriel did not testify concerning “respect or disrespect.”
Defense counsel further argued: “On top of that, Your Honor, I
want to ensure that no hearsay with regards to membership or
information is actually presented in front of the jury. . . . [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . Officer Cavanaugh testified [at the preliminary hearing]
that [Geary] had never admitted to him in the past that he was a
gang member. However, he had reviewed databases or something
along those lines that confirmed him as a gang member. Those
databases, that information, that’s hearsay.”
The trial court agreed, and the prosecutor explained that
he intended to demonstrate Geary’s gang membership not via any
hearsay, but through “photographs of . . . Geary’s tattoos that were
taken shortly after arrest pursuant to . . . booking.” The trial court
then ruled the gang expert testimony admissible.

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Officer Cavanaugh testified, in pertinent part, that he had
“had personal contact with [Gabriel] before this case” and knew him
to be a member of South Side Pomona with the nickname “ ‘Little
G’ ” or “ ‘G Man.’ ” He likewise knew Everette, a “self-admitted[ ]”
member of South Side Pomona, based on “[s]everal contacts,
arrests, investigations and involve[ment] in an arrest of his within
the last two and a half months from today’s court proceeding.”
Officer Cavanaugh further testified that Gabriel’s and Everette’s
tattoos—which included the letter S, an image consisting of six Ps
surrounded by a hexagon, and the word “Pomona”—“represent[ed]
South Side Pomona” gang.
The prosecutor then introduced photographs of Geary’s
tattoos taken at the time of his arrest in October 2018. The tattoos
included (1) the word “Pomona” across his abdomen, (2) six Ps in a
hexagon shape on his back, and (3) a large letter S on the upper
portion of each of his arms. Officer Cavanaugh testified that
Geary’s tattoos, like those of Gabriel and Everette, were “significant
as [they] relate[d] to Pomona South Side.” Officer Cavanaugh
further testified that if nonmembers of the Pomona South Side
gang were to put similar tattoos on their body, they would suffer
“[p]hysical violence leading up to murder . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [by]
members of [the] gang.” And he opined that a gang member might
murder someone who merely assaulted a fellow gang member
because the assault would be a sign of disrespect.
Finally, Officer Cavanaugh’s testimony included the following
two exchanges referencing race or ethnicity:
“[Prosecutor]: Let me ask you this. South Side Pomona, are
they a predominantly Hispanic street gang?
“[Officer Cavanaugh]: Yes.
“[Prosecutor]: In the—

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“[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, there’s an objection.
It would be pursuant to [the RJA]. I’ll submit at this time.
“[The court]: All right. Overruled.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Prosecutor]: Does [the rule against ‘snitching,’ i.e.,
cooperating with law enforcement,] apply to all criminal street
gangs that you’re aware of or just the South Side Pomona gang?
“[Officer Cavanaugh]: Every gang I’ve investigated.
“[Prosecutor]: That rule seems to be transcendent, meaning
it’s the same throughout criminal street gangs here in Los Angeles
County or outside of [Los Angeles] County. Is that true?
“[Officer Cavanaugh]: Yes. Not only Hispanic but African
American, Asian, all of them have the code of silence they are
referring to as far as not snitching as you said.
“[Prosecutor]: Understood.”

D. The Jury’s Deliberations
The jury began deliberating on a Wednesday and returned
their verdicts on the following Monday. During deliberations,
the jury requested to re-review portions of the surveillance footage.
The jury then informed the court that it was split and believed
it could not reach a verdict. To aid the jury, the court permitted
the prosecution and the defense to make supplemental closing
arguments.
After the supplemental arguments, the jurors informed
the court, “We’ve reached another impasse of a split jury 11 to 1.”
But when polled, one of the 12 jurors indicated that further
deliberations might be fruitful, and the court ordered the jurors to
take a short break and “give it one last shot for the balance of the
afternoon.”

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Following the break, the jury sent the following
communication indicating it still was deadlocked: “ ‘We’ve
reached another impasse where [the] jury is still split 11 to 1,
with in mind a juror is adamant of not being able to decide and
another that refuses to agree and wishes to continue to deliberate.’ ”
One juror again indicated that further deliberations might be
fruitful, and the court concluded it therefore “[had] no other choice”
but to order the jury to return the next business day (Monday) for
further deliberations.
When the jury returned to continue deliberations, the court
provided the following additional instructions:
“Ladies and gentlemen, a couple of things have surfaced
as a result of this communication which I can only address by
referencing certain jury rules or jury instructions that may be
beneficial.
“The first and foremost that I see from this communication
is that one of the jurors is undecided and there’s nothing wrong
with being undecided or indecisive as long as that opinion is based
solely upon the evidence that was presented to you during the trial,
consideration of the arguments of the lawyers, certainly reliance
upon the law that the court provided and even most importantly
the opinions of fellow jurors that have been communicated during
deliberations. And sometimes jurors are simply unable to reach
[a] unanimous decision. There’s nothing wrong with that, and
I don’t want you to think there is, but you should understand
indecisiveness, what does that truly mean. It means that if you
are in that position, in other words, that you have considered all
the evidence in the case, you have listened to the opinions of your
fellow jurors communicated to you during deliberations, you’re
relying upon the instructions [about] the rules of law that the court
has provided and certainly considering the arguments of all counsel

16
involved[,] and after consideration of all that information you’re
still undecided or indecisive.
“What that translates into is that you have a reasonable
doubt because you are not convinced by that information that
there’s proof beyond a reasonable doubt that would pave the way
to a verdict.
“But indecisiveness alone in and of itself is not a third verdict.
It’s not an alternative verdict. It is just simply reasonable doubt
if in fact you’re in that position. But before you consider your
indecisiveness as your final decision, please, please understand that
it should be based upon all those factors and not simply a position
that you took at an early stage of the case. Because if in fact that
occurred[,] that a sense of pride may be aroused and that you may
hesitate to change your opinion even if you are shown that it’s
wrong.
“You have to understand that you are not a partisan in this
case. You are not an advocate. You are an independent, impartial
judge of the facts. You’re not taking a side for one side over the
other. Your decision is going to rest solely upon facts that you
extract from the evidence and the law that the court has provided
and based on no other information including sympathy for one side
over the other, empathy. Any type of emotion that may have been
generated during your experience in this trial cannot be used as
evidence. All of that must be factored out. Your decision must be
based on the cold, hard evidence and the law that you have received
and not from anything else. And that’s really all I can say to
perhaps further assist you.”
The court then ordered the jurors to “go back and try one last
time this morning and if things do not change, then the court will
take action, what [the court] think[s] is appropriate action at that
point because you have given it your all.”

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E. The Verdicts and Sentence
After engaging in the final round of deliberations, the jury
found Geary guilty of the second degree murder of Espinoza and
of possession of a firearm by a felon. In addition, the jury found
true that Geary “personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
a handgun, which proximately caused death to . . . Espinoza.”
The trial court sentenced Geary to 40 years to life in prison
and awarded him 2,017 days of presentence custody credits.
We granted Geary’s motion to file a belated notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
A. Sufficient Evidence Corroborates Gabriel’s
Statements Implicating Geary
Geary contends we must reverse his convictions because
insufficient evidence corroborates the testimony of Gabriel, an
accomplice, identifying Geary as the shooter. We disagree.
“A conviction can be based on an accomplice’s testimony
only if other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense corroborates that testimony.” (People v.
McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 985–986, citing § 1111.) “The
corroborating evidence may be circumstantial or slight and entitled
to little consideration when standing alone, and it must tend to
implicate the defendant by relating to an act that is an element of
the crime. The corroborating evidence need not by itself establish
every element of the crime, but it must, without aid from the
accomplice’s testimony, tend to connect the defendant with the
crime. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 986.) “The question is whether
there was evidence to corroborate [Gabriel’s] testimony that
was legally sufficient. ‘ “ ‘The trier of fact’s determination on the
issue of corroboration is binding on the reviewing court unless the
corroborating evidence should not have been admitted or does not

18
reasonably tend to connect the defendant with the commission
of the crime.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] As the trial court was
required to do, we make this determination without weighing the
evidence and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the judgment.” (People v. Pedroza (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 635, 650.)
Here, sufficient evidence corroborates Gabriel’s testimony
identifying Geary as the shooter: Two eyewitnesses testified
that the rear passenger of the SUV fired the shots. Surveillance
cameras captured footage of the rear passenger’s face as the SUV
traveled down the street. And upon reviewing the surveillance
footage, Detective Freeman identified the rear passenger as Geary.
Geary insists that Detective Freeman’s identification lacks
evidentiary value because “Freeman was not a percipient witness”
and “did not claim personal familiarity with [Geary].” Geary,
however, is mistaken. Detective Freeman testified he had
“personally” interacted with Geary “in the past on different
investigations and on the streets, [and] on stops” dating back to
2013. Geary also is mistaken in arguing that we should discount
Detective Freeman’s identification because Gabriel “first identified
[Geary] as the rear seat passenger shown in the video.” Detective
Freeman testified that he identified Geary in the surveillance
footage before he interviewed Gabriel.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Geary’s argument that
Detective Freeman’s identification is suspect merely because
he is part of the law enforcement agency that “arrested [Gabriel],
interrogated him, and participated in negotiating a plea bargain for
his testimony.” Geary fails to support this argument with any legal
authority.
Accordingly, we reject Geary’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence corroborating Gabriel’s statements.

19
B. The Record Belies Geary’s Challenge to
Admission of the Gang Expert’s Testimony
We likewise reject Geary’s contention that the court
abused its discretion by relying on the prosecution’s incorrect
characterization of Gabriel’s statements in deciding to admit the
gang expert’s testimony. (See People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th
155, 201 [appellate court reviews trial court’s ruling concerning
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion].)
The record does not support Geary’s claim. He is correct that,
at the final pretrial hearing, the prosecutor mistakenly represented
that Gabriel had told detectives that Geary was a member of the
South Side Pomona gang. But Geary ignores that, immediately
before the gang expert testified, defense counsel renewed his
objection to the testimony and argued the prosecution could not
use any hearsay statements to establish Geary’s gang affiliation.
In response, the prosecutor proffered evidence of Geary’s tattoos
as supporting his gang affiliation, and the court permitted the
gang expert’s testimony in light of that proffer. The record thus
does not support that the court relied on the prosecutor’s erroneous
description of Gabriel’s statements in admitting the testimony.
Nor are we persuaded that the testimony was irrelevant or
otherwise inadmissible because it purportedly failed to support
that Geary “was a member of South Side Pomona, or . . . that he
had embraced the gang’s policies, practices and culture.” The gang
expert testified, in pertinent part, that (1) Gabriel and Everette
were South Side Pomona gang members with tattoos reflecting
their allegiance to the gang, (2) Geary had similar such tattoos, and
(3) Geary’s tattoos were “significant” with respect to the South Side
Pomona gang.
Finally, Geary is wrong that “[n]either [the gang expert] nor
any other witness gave testimony about how restrictive South Side

20
Pomona was with regard to non-members getting tattoos of letters
and the name of their hometown.” The gang expert expressly
testified that nonmembers of the gang cannot display such tattoos
on their body without risking physical injury or death at the hands
of the gang’s members.
Geary thus demonstrates no abuse of discretion by the court
in admitting the gang expert’s testimony.

C. Geary’s RJA Claim Fails
Geary next contends we must reverse his convictions because
the gang expert introduced racial bias into the trial in violation
of the RJA when he testified that (1) South Side Pomona is “a
predominantly Hispanic street gang,” and (2) “[n]ot only Hispanic
but African American, Asian, all of them [i.e., criminal street gangs]
have the code of silence.” Geary argues that, by “conspicuously
omitting mention of ‘white’ gangs . . . from the universe of ‘all’
criminal street gangs in California,” the expert’s testimony
“implicitly represent[ed] that Caucasians largely do not engage
in violent street gang conduct, and that, as a Latino, [Geary] is a
member of an ethnic group that does.” We conclude, however, that
the first comment does not constitute a violation of the RJA and
that Geary forfeited his challenge to the second comment.
“The Legislature passed the RJA in 2020 with a stated aim
‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’
and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining
convictions or in sentencing.’ [Citation.] To that end, the RJA
prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction,
or seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national original. [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2024)
16 Cal.5th 874, 944–945 (Wilson).)

21
Section 745, “[t]he central provision of the RJA” (Wilson,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 945), sets forth several “categories of conduct
which, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, establish a
violation.” (People v. Stubblefield (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 896, 911
(Stubblefield), review granted Mar. 12, 2025, S289152; see § 745,
subd. (a)(1)-(4).) As relevant here, a violation occurs when “an
expert witness . . . exhibit[s] bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
(§ 745, subd. (a)(1).) A violation likewise occurs when “[d]uring
the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, . . . an
expert witness . . . use[s] racially discriminatory language about
the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national original, or otherwise
exhibit[s] bias or animus towards the defendant because of the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not
purposeful.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) But “[t]his paragraph does not
apply if the person speaking is relating language used by another
that is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a
racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.”
(Ibid.)
“ ‘Racially discriminatory language’ means language that,
to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial
bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded
language, language that compares the defendant to an animal,
or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance,
culture, ethnicity, or national origin. Evidence that particular
words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in
cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or
national origin is relevant to determining whether language is
discriminatory.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)
Geary fails to demonstrate the expert exhibited improper
bias or used racially discriminatory language when he testified

22
that South Side Pomona is “a ‘predominantly Hispanic [street]
gang.’ ” Although Geary contends the “characterization of South
Side Pomona as a ‘Hispanic’ gang” was “gratuitous,” the testimony
was directly relevant to the prosecution’s theory of motive and
to the disputed issue of the identity of the shooter, whom a lay
eyewitness had described as “Mexican or Latino.” (Cf. Stubblefield,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 919 [concluding the prosecutor’s
comments in that case violated the RJA and observing “[t]he
prosecutor did not use [the defendant’s] race as an incidental fact
that might make it relevant under a racially neutral theory—for
example, as evidence supporting a witness’s identification of a
suspect”].)
And Geary forfeited his challenge to the expert’s comment
concerning “Hispanic[,] . . . African American, [and] Asian” gangs
by failing to raise the challenge before the trial court. (See People v.
Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 812, review den. Apr. 17, 2024,
S283852; id. at pp. 816 & 812 [rejecting argument that the
defendant’s claim under the RJA presented a “pure question of
law,” and concluding that review of an RJA claim “like any other
appellate claim, is subject to the general appellate rules of
preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been but were
not made in the trial court”]; People v. Lawson (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 990, 1000–1001 [collecting appellate decisions agreeing
with Lashon and observing that no published case has disagreed
with the decision].) We are not persuaded that any exception to the
forfeiture rule applies here. Geary urges an objection “would have
been futile given that the trial court overruled [his] objection [under
the RJA] to the prosecutor’s question about the ethnicity of the
South Side Pomona gang.” But defense counsel made the earlier
objection during a line of questioning on an entirely different topic,
and Geary concedes that nothing in the court’s demeanor suggested

23
it would overrule all objections under the RJA as a matter of course.
(Cf. People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 287 [claims not forfeited
where trial court’s demeanor “suggest[ed] that [it] would have
rejected any objection to the [challenged] testimony”].)
We therefore are not persuaded that the RJA requires
reversal of Geary’s convictions.

D. The Trial Court Did Not Coerce the Jury’s Verdict
We also are unpersuaded that the instruction the court
provided before ordering the jury to engage in a final round
of deliberations (see ante, at pp. 17–18) amounted to an
impermissible, coercive Allen charge.
In People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835 (Gainer), “our
Supreme Court addressed the instruction commonly called the
‘ “Allen charge” ’ or the ‘ “dynamite charge,” ’ which was approved
by the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United States[,
supra,] 164 U.S. 492 . . . and subsequently adopted in many
states. [Citation.] The California Supreme Court found that the
‘first and most questionable feature’ of the Allen charge was ‘the
discriminatory admonition directed to minority jurors to rethink
their position in light of the majority’s views.’ [Citation.] As
paraphrased in part by the United States Supreme Court, the
admonition stated, ‘a dissenting juror should consider whether his
doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the
minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with
himself.’ [Citation.] [¶] The Gainer court disapproved the Allen
charge because the instruction violated the defendant’s right to a
jury decision based upon the evidence and arguments presented at
trial. [Citation.] As the California Supreme Court later reiterated,
the ‘principal flaw in the Allen charge at issue in Gainer was
that, by counseling minority jurors to consider the majority view,

24
whatever it might be, the instruction encouraged jurors to abandon
a focus on the evidence as the basis of their verdict.’ [Citation.]
Additionally, the court determined that the defendant’s right under
the California Constitution [citation] to a unanimous verdict of
a jury of 12 persons was violated by the Allen charge, because it
encouraged the minority jurors to acquiesce in the verdict reached
by the majority without exercising their independent judgment.
[Citation.]
“In disapproving the Allen charge, our Supreme Court
ruled that ‘it is error for a trial court to give an instruction
which either (1) encourages jurors to consider the numerical
division or preponderance of opinion of the jury in forming or
reexamining their views on the issues before them; or (2) states
or implies that if the jury fails to agree the case will necessarily
be retried. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Whaley (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 968, 980–981, fns. omitted.)
Here, the instruction the court provided did not display the
offending features of an Allen charge. The court did not encourage
the juror in the minority to consider the numerical division of the
jury or to abandon a focus on the evidence. To the contrary, the
court instructed that the juror’s decision must be “based solely upon
the evidence that was presented . . . during the trial, consideration
of the arguments of the lawyers, certainly reliance upon the law
that the court provided and even most importantly the opinions of
fellow jurors that have been communicated during deliberations. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] . . . Your decision must be based on the cold, hard
evidence and the law that you have received and not from anything
else.” Further, the court emphasized that “sometimes jurors are
simply unable to reach [a] unanimous decision,” and “[t]here’s
nothing wrong with that.”

25
We therefore reject Geary’s contention that the court’s
instruction coerced the jury’s verdict.

E. Geary’s Cumulative Error Claim Fails
Because Geary has failed to establish any individual errors,
his cumulative error argument necessarily fails. (See People v.
Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 885 [no finding of cumulative error
where there were no substantial individual errors].)

F. Geary Is Entitled to One Additional Day of
Custody Credit
Finally, we agree with the parties that the trial court must
correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that Geary is entitled
to 2,018 days of presentence credit. The court granted Geary only
2,017 days of credit. Geary, however, was arrested on October 2,
2018, and sentenced on April 10, 2024. He therefore is entitled to
2,018 days of presentence custody credit. (See People v. Fuentes
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 681 [“ ‘[a] defendant is entitled to credit
for all days in presentence custody including the day of arrest and
the day of sentencing’ ”].)

26
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. On remand, the trial court is
directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that awards
Geary 2,018 days of presentence custody credit. The court shall
forward the amended abstract of judgment to the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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