CourtListener 10851385•People v. White CA4/3
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Filed 4/30/26 P. v. White CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064912
v. (Super. Ct. No. 17WF2455)
VERNELL WHITE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part and
remanded with directions.
Marcia R. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Tami Falkenstein Hennick and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Penal Code Section 654 prohibits a trial court from imposing
multiple punishments when a defendant commits multiple offenses during an
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indivisible course of conduct directed toward a single objective. (Neal v. State
of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 (Neal) [“If all of the offenses were
incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such
offenses but not for more than one”].)
Defendant Vernell White and two accomplices carjacked a truck
driver delivering medical supplies. The group held him at gunpoint and drove
to a parking lot. The group then moved the driver to the back of the truck and
continued to hold him at gunpoint while the group stole pharmaceutical
drugs. After stealing the drugs, the group left the driver locked in the truck.
White was convicted of three crimes: kidnapping for the purpose
of robbery, carjacking, and robbery. The trial court imposed concurrent
sentences for each crime (25 years to life), plus 10 years for priors, for a total
term of 35 years to life. In an earlier appeal we affirmed the judgment, but
remanded the matter so the court could make clear its section 654 ruling.
(People v. White (Apr. 3, 2024, G061707) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court imposed multiple punishments. We
disagree with the court’s section 654 ruling because the three crimes were all
committed as part of an indivisible course of conduct with one objective: the
theft of the drugs from the truck. (See Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 19.)
Thus, we reverse White’s sentence. On remand, the trial court is
directed to resentence White by imposing a sentence for only one of the three
crimes, and then the court is to stay the sentence on the other two crimes. In
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 24, 2017, Miguel Z. was driving a box truck for Fox
Transportation (Fox), a company that delivers medicines to pharmacies and
hospitals. Miguel started his day at a pharmaceutical plant by loading boxes
and plastic totes into the box truck. Fox drivers were not told what was in the
containers. After the truck was loaded, Miguel drove to his first delivery
location, and then to a hospital. Miguel arrived a little early at the hospital
before it accepted deliveries, so Miguel parked the truck and waited.
While Miguel was on his phone, he noticed a man (later identified
as White) approach the truck with a gun in his hand. Miguel recognized
White because he had previously worked at Fox, but Miguel did not know his
name. White ordered Miguel to open the truck and entered on the driver’s
side. Another man with a gun (later identified as Carl DeLoach) entered
through the passenger door. Miguel was told to sit in the middle seat.
White drove the truck while DeLoach held the gun to Miguel’s
ribs. Video surveillance evidence later revealed the truck was being followed
by a black car. White was in contact on his phone with the driver of the black
car (later identified as Michael Robinson). Miguel heard Robinson telling
White, “‘Not here. There’s cameras.’” White eventually parked the truck in
the parking lot of a church.
Miguel was ordered to get out and unlock the back door of the
truck. After doing so, Miguel was then ordered to go into the back of the truck
and sit down. While Miguel was sitting in the back of the truck, he could feel
a handgun on the back of his neck. Miguel saw the black car approach the
truck and noticed Robinson out of the corner of his eye. White began rifling
through plastic totes in the back of the truck and pulling out gray bags, while
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handing them to Robinson. At one point, Robinson asked, ‘“Where’s the juice
at?’” or something like that. White responded, “‘He doesn’t know.’” Miguel
understood “juice” to mean controlled medications.
After about five or 10 minutes, the three men finished removing
items from the plastic totes in the back of the truck. Robinson asked White if
Miguel’s cell phone and wallet had been taken from him. The group then told
Miguel not to turn around and then locked him inside. Miguel heard the
black car leave. Miguel began banging on the truck and yelling for help. After
about 15 minutes, police arrived.
Court Proceedings
The People filed an amended information charging White and his
two accomplices with (1) kidnapping to commit robbery, (2) carjacking, and
(3) second degree robbery. As to White, the information further alleged he
had two strike priors and two prior serious felony convictions (nickel priors).
During the jury trial (a retrial), a Fox manager positively
identified White as a former employee. Another Fox employee testified that
the value of the stolen drugs was $7,710.29. Miguel testified that his phone,
but not his wallet was taken at some point during the encounter. The jury
found Robinson and White guilty of the charged crimes (DeLoach had earlier
pleaded guilty). White admitted the prior conviction allegations. The trial
court sentenced White to concurrent terms of 25 years to life for each of the
three crimes, plus 10 years for the two nickel priors.
On direct appeal, this court reversed White’s sentence. We
directed the trial court to make clear its section 654 ruling. On remand, the
court imposed concurrent sentences (the court’s ruling will be covered in
greater detail in the discussion section of this opinion).
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II.
DISCUSSION
White argues that the trial court erred under section 654 because
all three of White’s convictions were “incidental to a singular plan to steal the
pharmaceuticals in the truck.” We agree.
In this part of the discussion, we will: (A) review relevant legal
principles; (B) summarize the proceedings in the trial court on remand; and
(C) apply the facts in this case to the relevant laws.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions,
but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).)
The purpose of section 654 is to ensure a defendant’s punishment
is commensurate with his or her culpability. (People v. Latimer (1993) 5
Cal.4th 1203, 1211.) That is, a jury can convict a defendant of multiple crimes
arising from a single act, but a court can only punish the defendant for one of
those crimes. (Ibid.) If a court imposes concurrent sentences, then that
sentence constitutes double punishment within the meaning of section 654.
(People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 887.)
The Supreme Court has held that a course of criminal conduct is
a single “act” for purposes of section 654 if all of the offenses committed
during the course of conduct were incident to one objective. (Neal, supra, 55
Cal.2d at p. 19.) In Neal, defendant “threw gasoline into the bedroom of Mr.
and Mrs. Theodore R. Raymond and ignited it.” (Id. at p. 15.) The jury
convicted defendant of two counts of attempted murder and one count of
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arson. (Ibid.) “Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore
gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on
the intent and objective of the actor.” (Id. at p. 19.) The Court reasoned that
punishing defendant for both the arson and the attempted murder counts
would violate “section 654, since the arson was merely incidental to the
primary objective of killing Mr. and Mrs. Raymond.” (Id. at p. 20.)
The Supreme Court later clarified: “It is defendant’s intent and
objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine
whether the transaction is indivisible. [Citations.] We have traditionally
observed that if all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the
means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found
to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.”
(People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
“When a trial court sentences a defendant to separate terms
without making an express finding the defendant entertained separate
objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an implied finding each
offense had a separate objective.” (People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116,
129.) We review for substantial evidence a trial court’s implied finding that a
defendant had separate intents and objectives for different offenses. (People
v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1414.)
““Substantial evidence” means that evidence which, when viewed
in light of the entire record, is of solid probative value, maintains its
credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has
been justly determined.’” (People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 795, 804.)
B. Proceedings on Remand
At the hearing on remand, the trial court stated: “So the
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clarification sought by the Court of Appeal was whether or not . . . Penal
Code section 654 applied to the counts. At the time of sentencing, this court --
at the time that I sentenced him to 35 years to life in prison, I was somewhat
unclear, perhaps vague, on the 654 point.”
After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial court ruled
that section “654 does not apply to these counts. These are all separate and
distinct acts, in the court’s mind. Though close in time, I would point out.
[¶] . . . [¶] So at this time, I would formally make the ruling that 654 does not
apply to counts 2 and 3 for the reasons I’ve stated on the record. And at this
time Mr. White is to resume serving his state prison sentence.”
C. Application and Analysis
Under section 654, a defendant cannot be punished for both a
robbery, and a kidnapping for the purpose of that same robbery. (People v.
Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639 (Beamon).) In Beamon, a driver made a
delivery of liquor to a customer. (Id. at p. 630.) When the driver “returned to
the cab of the truck but before he started the motor defendant entered from
the passenger side with a gun in his hand.” The driver “was ordered to lie
face down on the floor of the cab. Defendant took the keys from the victim’s
hand, started the motor and drove away.” (Ibid.) After about 20 minutes of
driving, and a brief struggle, the injured driver was able to escape. (Id. at pp.
630–631.) Police later arrested defendant. (Id. at p. 631.)
In Beamon, defendant was convicted of robbery and kidnapping
2
for the purpose of robbery. (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 629.) On appeal,
2
Carjacking did not become a crime in California until 1993. (See
§ 215, added by Stats.1993, ch. 611, § 6, eff. Oct. 1, 1993.)
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defendant claimed “that sentencing him on both the robbery and
kidnap[p]ing convictions constitutes multiple punishment in violation of
section 654.” (Id. at p. 636.) The Supreme Court agreed. (Id. at pp. 636–640.)
Quoting its opinion in Neal, the Court noted: “‘Whether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the
meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all
of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished
for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’” (Beamon, at p. 637.)
“The initial inquiry in any section 654 application is to ascertain
the defendant’s objective and intent.” (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 639.)
“We have little difficulty in applying the foregoing rules in the instant case.
Defendant was convicted of kidnap[p]ing for the purpose of robbery and for
the commission of that very robbery. We are compelled to the conclusion as a
matter of law that on the record here both crimes were committed pursuant
to a single intent and objective, i.e., to rob [the driver] of the truck or its
contents. [Citations.] Pursuant to section 654, defendant may therefore be
punished for only one of such crimes.” (Id. at pp. 639–640, fn. omitted.)
Similar to Beamon, we also “have little difficulty” in finding that
White’s three convictions were committed pursuant to a single intent and
objective: the theft of the pharmaceutical drugs. (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at
pp. 639–640.) That is, if a group of criminals kidnaps and carjacks a truck
driver in order to rob him of the merchandise in his truck, then the robbery of
the merchandise is the whole point of the endeavor.
Here, under a plain analysis of the facts, the record reveals that
White and his accomplices formed the intent a to commit a theft of
pharmaceutical drugs from the delivery truck, and the crimes of robbery,
carjacking, and kidnapping were the means of accomplishing the overriding
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objective of committing the theft. (See People v. Harrison supra, 48 Cal.3d at
p. 335 [“It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of
his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible”].)
In its section 654 ruling, the trial court found that White
committed “separate and distinct acts.” And while that is correct—White, in
fact, committed multiple crimes—the court bypassed the gravamen of the
analysis. That is, the court did not analyze White’s objective and intent. (See
Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 639 [“The initial inquiry in any section 654
application is to ascertain the defendant’s objective and intent”].)
In short, we find there is not substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s implied (unstated) finding that White formed (1) a separate
intent and objective to commit a kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, and
then (2) formed a separate intent and objective to commit a carjacking, and
then (3) formed a separate intent and objective to commit a robbery of the
pharmaceuticals. (See People v. Green (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1085
[“‘“there must be evidence to support a finding the defendant formed a
separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced”’”].)
Thus, we reverse White’s concurrent sentences and remand for
resentencing. On remand, the trial court is directed to impose a sentence for
only one of the three convictions, and then stay the sentence on the other two
crimes under section 654. (See, e.g., People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th
1463, 1469 [“to implement section 654, the trial court must impose sentence
on all counts, but stay execution of sentence as necessary to prevent multiple
punishment”].) In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
The Attorney General argues that People v. Porter (1987) 194
Cal.App.3d 34 (Porter), compels a different result. We disagree.
In Porter, a victim was parked on a busy street at night when two
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people entered his car. (Porter, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 36.) Defendant
entered the backseat and held a knife to the victim’s throat, while his
accomplice entered the car and sat in the front seat. Defendant directed the
victim to drive to a nearby side street and to stop. After finding only $7 or $8
in the victim’s wallet, defendant “insisted the victim must have more money
than that.” (Ibid.) The defendant and his accomplice then found a credit card
in the victim’s wallet, “which they believed was a bank automated teller
card.” (Ibid.) While continuing to hold the knife to the victim’s throat,
defendant then directed the victim to drive to a nearby bank, where he told
the victim he was going to “‘make me use my card to get him some money and
I better hope that I had some money in the bank.’” (Id. at p. 36.) While at the
bank, the victim was able to run away and call the police. (Id. at p. 37.)
At trial, defendant was found guilty of robbery, kidnapping for
the purpose of robbery, and receiving stolen property. (Porter, supra, 194
Cal.App.3d at p. 36.) The trial court imposed a prison sentence for the
kidnapping conviction (life), and concurrent sentences for the remaining
convictions. (Ibid.) On appeal, defendant argued that the concurrent sentence
for the robbery conviction violated section 654. (Id. at p. 37.) But the Court of
Appeal disagreed: “The record in this case supports the trial court’s implied
finding that the two crimes for which appellant was sentenced involved
multiple objectives, were not merely incidental to each other, and were not
part of an indivisible course of conduct.” (Id. at p. 38, italics added.)
The Porter court stated: “A reasonable inference from the record
is that [defendant] and his companion initially planned only to rob the victim
of the contents of his wallet, but thereafter came up with a new idea:
kidnapping the victim to his bank to compel him to withdraw money from his
account by means of what they thought was an automated teller card.”
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(Porter, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 38.) “What began as an ordinary robbery
turned into something new and qualitatively very different.” (Id. at p. 38.)
The court held: “In the unusual circumstances of this case, [defendant] could
be punished both for the robbery he committed and the kidnapping for the
purpose of a distinctly different type of robbery.” (Id. at p. 39.)
Here, unlike the multiple objectives in Porter, White’s convictions
(kidnapping for robbery, carjacking, and robbery) were all directed toward a
singular objective: the theft of the drugs from the Fox delivery truck driven
by the victim Miguel. (See Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 19 [“If all of the
offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for
any one of such offenses but not for more than one”].)
The Attorney General analogizes to Porter and claims that White
and his two accomplices DeLoach and Robinson “expanded and escalated
their crimes by also demanding Miguel’s cell phone.” But as accurately stated
in White’s reply brief, “that claim misstates the evidence.”
Miguel never testified that anyone “demanded” his cell phone.
The only evidence about the cell phone was that Robinson, the codefendant
who followed in a separate car, asked his cohorts towards the end of the
encounter whether Miguel’s phone had been taken. Based on the record, a
reasonable inference is that Robinson wanted to ensure that Miguel had no
ability to contact the police once they left him alone in the truck. Indeed, the
group could have also easily taken Miguel’s wallet, but they did not do so.
Given Miguel’s limited testimony, we simply do not know if the
taking of the cell phone established all the elements of a robbery. (See § 211
[“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear”].) Indeed, the prosecutor never
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argued to the jury that the theft of Miguel’s phone constituted any part of the
charged robbery. This argument simply never came up during the trial.
In sum, the record establishes that the taking of the cell phone
was just another act incidental to accomplishing the primary objective of
stealing the pharmaceuticals. (See People v. Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p.
335 [“if all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of
accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have
harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once”].)
III.
DISPOSITION
We reverse White’s sentence. On remand, we direct the trial
court to resentence White by imposing a sentence for only one of the three
convictions, and then staying the sentence on the other two convictions. We
further direct the court to modify the abstract of judgment as needed and to
send a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
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