People v. Pineda CA4/1

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Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Pineda CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085673

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD304687)

TOMAS DAVID PINEDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Aaron H. Katz, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Charles C. Ragland,
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Donald W. Ostertag and Robin Urbanski,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this case, appellant Tomas David Pineda seeks, for the first time on
appeal, to challenge the court’s imposition of various fines and fees as part of
his sentence based on his inability to pay. We conclude the issue has been
forfeited by his failure to raise inability to pay at the sentencing hearing, and
we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pineda pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors, resisting an officer (Pen.
Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11364). On one count of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds.
(a), (b)(1)), Pineda proceeded to trial. Following testimony at trial that
Pineda damaged the window of a residence by throwing heavy objects at it, a
jury convicted him of vandalism.
The trial court sentenced Pineda to two years in county jail on the
vandalism count and gave him credit for time served on the misdemeanor
counts. The court additionally imposed the following fines and fees: a
restitution fine of $600 (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)); restitution to the
victim of $4,799.51 (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)); a theft fine (Pen. Code,
§ 1202.5) and penalty assessments of $41; a laboratory analysis fee (Health
and Saf. Code, § 11372.5, subd. (a)) and penalty assessments of $205; a drug
program fee (Health and Saf. Code, § 11372.7, subd. (a)) and penalty
assessments of $615; a court operations assessment of $120 (Pen. Code,

§ 1465.8); and a conviction assessment of $90 (Gov. Code, § 70373).1 At the

1 While it is not specified on the record how the penalty assessments
were calculated, the penalties on the theft, laboratory, and drug program
fines are commonly ordered sums that derive from: Penal Code section 1464,
subdivision (a)(1) ($10 penalty assessment for every $10 in fines);
Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a)(1) ($7 penalty assessment
for every $10 in fines); Government Code section 76000.5, subdivision (a)(1)
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sentencing hearing, the court orally pronounced each fine. The court noted
the victim restitution order would be collected prior to the restitution fine
under Penal Code section 2085.5, subdivision (i). Counsel for Pineda did not
object to any of the fines and fees and submitted on the victim restitution
amount matching that determined at trial.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Pineda contests the $300 discretionary amount of the
restitution fine, $41 theft fine and penalties, $205 laboratory analysis fee and
penalties, and $615 drug program fee and penalties, requesting that this
court strike those amounts or remand for the limited purpose of considering
his ability to pay. Specifically, Pineda argues: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering a restitution fine over the minimum required,
explaining “[i]t is obvious Mr. Pineda had no ability to pay additional fines
and fees because he was required first to pay $4799 in direct restitution”;
(2) the court erred by ordering the theft fine, laboratory analysis fee, and the
drug program fee because it was unclear how the court calculated them and
because of his inability to pay; and (3) the court’s imposition of fines beyond
the mandatory minimum were unconstitutionally excessive and violated his
due process rights.

($2 penalty assessment for every $10 in fines); Penal Code section 1465.7,
subdivision (a) (20 percent surcharge on base fine); Government Code section
70372, subdivision (a)(1) ($5 penalty assessment for every $10 in fines);
Government Code section 76104.6, subdivision (a)(1) ($1 penalty assessment
for every $10 in fines); and Government Code section 76104.7, subdivision (a)
($4 penalty assessment for every $10 in fines).

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Pineda acknowledges he did not object to these fines and fees in the
trial court. The Attorney General contends Pineda forfeited his challenges to
the fines and fees by failing to object, and we agree.
A. Forfeiture
“In general, a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of fines,
fees, and assessments at sentencing forfeits the right to challenge those fines,
fees, and assessments on appeal.” (People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
609, 624 (Greeley), citing People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862 and People
v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850.) This general rule applies when the
relevant statute includes an ability to pay component, including when the
defendant makes a constitutional argument. (See e.g., Trujillo, at pp. 856–
858; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729.) Before imposing a
restitution fine above the $300 minimum set by Penal Code section 1202.4,
subdivision (b), section 1202.4, subdivision (d), requires the court to “consider
any relevant factors, including . . . the defendant’s inability to pay.” Still, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a defendant must object below to the
imposition of a restitution fine above the minimum under section 1202.4 to
preserve the issue for appeal. (Avila, at p. 729; People v. Nelson (2011) 51
Cal.4th 198, 227.) In the context of other statutory fines and fees, the
Supreme Court has similarly concluded that this forfeiture rule applies to
statutes that require the court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay and
when the challenge implicates constitutional rights. (Trujillo, at pp. 855–858
[finding forfeiture under a statute entitling the defendant a hearing for the
court to determine ability to pay and dictating that the defendant could waive
the right to the court’s determination of ability to pay only by a knowing and
intelligent waiver]; People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 592, 597
[finding forfeiture under a statute requiring the court to order payment of a

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fee “ ‘[i]f the person has the ability to pay’ ”].) Courts of appeal have applied
forfeiture principles to the theft fine statute, which likewise involves the

consideration of ability to pay.2 (Greeley, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 624; People v.
Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368, 371.) “Given that the defendant is in the
best position to know whether he has the ability to pay, it is incumbent on
him to object to the fine and demonstrate why it should not be imposed.”
(People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1154.) Ability to pay is a
factual determination that is properly raised and determined first in the trial
court. (McCullough, at p. 597.)
Based on this authority, we conclude Pineda forfeited his statutory and
constitutional challenges to the restitution fine, theft fine, laboratory analysis
fee, and drug program fee by failing to object below. It is well established
that the defendant forfeits a claim regarding a Penal Code section 1202.4
restitution fine by failing to object based on ability to pay, and courts have
applied the same rule of forfeiture to Penal Code section 1202.5, subdivision
(a), theft fines and in other contexts. We see no reason why these principles
should not likewise apply to Health and Safety Code sections 11372.5,

2 Penal Code section 1202.5, subdivision (a), establishing the theft fine,
states: “In any case in which a defendant is convicted of any of the offenses
enumerated in Section . . . 594, the court shall order the defendant to pay a
fine of ten dollars ($10) in addition to any other penalty or fine imposed. If
the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay all or part of
the fine, the court shall set the amount to be reimbursed and order the
defendant to pay that sum to the county in the manner in which the court
believes reasonable and compatible with the defendant’s financial ability. . . .”

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subdivision (a), and 11372.7, subdivision (a).3 Pineda had the opportunity to
object to each of these fines and fees based on inability to pay when the court
orally pronounced them at his sentencing hearing, but he failed to do so.
Nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kopp, changed its
prior decisions regarding forfeiture. In Kopp, the defendant asserted his
inability to pay various fines at the time of sentencing, but the trial court
declined to consider the issue. (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 10–11.) The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the lower court to consider ability
to pay a Penal Code section 1202.4 discretionary restitution fine and a Health
and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a), fee. (Kopp, at pp. 23, 30.)
While due process does not require the trial court to hold a hearing prior to
imposing fines and fees, the court determined, a defendant may challenge
fines and fees based on the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
(Id. at pp. 22–23.) Although the defendant in Kopp had not specifically raised
ability to pay due to the excessiveness of the fines, the Supreme Court noted
he would be permitted to pursue that claim below. (Id. at p. 23.) Here,
Pineda did not raise ability to pay on any basis in the trial court, and, as
such, has forfeited this argument altogether.

3 Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a), requires the
court to “determine whether or not the person who is convicted of a violation
of this chapter has the ability to pay a drug program fee” (id., subd. (b)),
while section 11372.5, subdivision (a), establishing the criminal laboratory
analysis fee, does not include an ability to pay requirement. While statutory
challenges are obviously dependent on the statute’s language, defendants
may raise constitutional challenges whether or not the statute includes an
ability to pay requirement. (People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30 (Kopp).)

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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Pineda asserts, to the extent his claims are forfeited, he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because there was no explanation for his trial
counsel’s failure to object to the fines and fees. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, Pineda bears the burden to establish: (1) counsel
performed deficiently such that the “representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness . . . [¶] under prevailing professional norms,” and
(2) the deficient performance caused prejudice, meaning that there exists “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688, 694.)
“Our Supreme Court addressed the issue of establishing ineffective
assistance of counsel on a silent record in People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15
Cal.4th 264, 266–268 . . . The court found it difficult to establish error or
prejudice without a full record. The court suggested the defendant’s remedy,
if any, must be by way of a petition for habeas corpus.” (People v. Keene
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 861, 865.) In this case, the record is silent as to why
counsel did not raise the ability to pay issue, providing us no basis to
determine counsel was ineffective. Pineda’s remedy, if any, is a petition for
writ of habeas corpus supported by an appropriate record.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.*

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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