CourtListener 10851204•People v. Avram CA2/7
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Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Avram CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B332182
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA495360)
v.
JOSHUA PETER AVRAM, a.k.a.
Aphrodite Avram,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Judgment
affirmed in part, and reversed and vacated in part; remanded
with directions.
Nate Crowley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Aphrodite Avram1 appeals her conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon after a jury trial. As an aggravating factor, the
jury found that the assault “involved great violence, great bodily
harm, threat of great bodily harm, and other acts disclosing a
high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness” within the
meaning of rule 4.421(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court.2 The
jury also found that Avram personally inflicted great bodily
injury on the victim within the meaning of Penal Code
section 12022.7, subdivision (a).3 Avram argues the trial court
prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on the elements
of the aggravating factor, and by relying on other factors not
found by the jury when imposing an upper term sentence. She
further argues the court should have dismissed the
section 12022.7 sentencing enhancement in the interests of
justice due to her mitigating circumstances. Avram also requests
we review the denial of her request for law enforcement records
pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531
(Pitchess).
1 Aphrodite Avram is a transgender woman whose name at
birth was Joshua Peter Avram.
2 Further rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
We affirm the judgment of conviction, but vacate Avram’s
sentence and remand for a new trial on the aggravating factors
because it was prejudicial error for the court to impose an upper
term sentence based on uninstructed and unproven aggravating
factors.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Information and Pretrial Proceedings
In May 2021, Avram was charged with one count of assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
After Avram’s appointed counsel declared a doubt as to her
mental competence, Avram was psychologically evaluated and
diagnosed with unspecified schizophrenia spectrum disorder,
chronic psychotic disorder, and delusional disorder. (See §§ 1368,
subd. (b), 1369.) In October 2021, the trial court found Avram
incompetent to stand trial, suspended the criminal proceedings,
and ordered her committed for treatment with the Department of
State Hospitals. (See § 1370.) In February 2023, the trial court
found Avram had attained competence and reinstated criminal
proceedings, based on a new psychological report and a
certification of Avram’s mental competency from the Department
of State Hospitals. (See § 1372.)
In April 2023, Avram filed a Pitchess motion for discovery
of law enforcement personnel files of the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) officers who responded to and investigated
the assault. The court granted the motion and agreed to review
the files for “complaints regarding credibility, dishonesty and
false reports” by the responding officers. After review, the court
found “no discoverable items” and denied Avram’s motion.
3
The People filed an amended information in May 2023,
newly alleging that Avram “personally inflict[ed] great bodily
injury” upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and that the offense
“involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily
harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, and callousness” (rule 4.421(a)(1)).
B. The Jury Trial
At trial, the People’s evidence showed that around
3:00 p.m. on May 6, 2021, Avram stabbed John Doe in the
abdomen with a knife in the vicinity of Hillhurst and Vermont
Avenues in Los Angeles. Eyewitnesses saw Avram approach Doe
while “yelling” and “walking at an accelerated pace,” stand over
Doe on the ground, and stab Doe “more than once” with what
appeared to be a “butcher knife” or “kitchen knife.” Avram left
the scene immediately and was apprehended by LAPD officers
shortly afterward. Officers found a “large kitchen knife” with
“fresh blood” in Avram’s shoulder bag.
Witnesses reported Doe was “bleeding a lot” from “[t]he
lower abdomen,” “his stomach [was] cut wide open,” his
“intestines spilled out” and “he was holding his intestines with
one hand.” Doe also had “multiple other . . . stab wounds,”
including “one on the back of the right arm, two on the front of
the right arm, and . . . two on [his] back.” Doe was unidentified
at trial, and he appeared to be homeless. He was transported to
the hospital for surgery to address his wounds. Doe did not
testify at trial.
Avram admitted stabbing Doe but testified that she acted
in self-defense. Avram explained that she was a transgender
woman, and at the time of the offense, she was homeless. Earlier
4
in the day, “around 10:30 a.m.,” Avram was exiting a women’s
restroom in Griffith Park when she encountered Doe. Doe
approached Avram as she washed her hands at a sink outside of
the bathroom building and “threatened [her] very aggressively.”
According to Avram, Doe stated, “It’s a tranny pedophile.” Avram
testified she “was immediately very wary” and “frightened.” Doe
continued, “How can I stop you from molesting more kids? Oh, I
know, I’m going to shoot you.” Doe told Avram “that he had a
loaded gun in his backpack, and he said, ‘I’m going to put a bullet
in your skull.’ ” Avram described that “his tone, his demeanor
was very angry, very aggressive, very threatening. I was very
scared. I did not want to provoke him, but I was also very
conscious of the fact that he could suddenly pull a gun out and
shoot me.” Avram testified she “did [her] best to keep an eye on
him, and see if he reached into the backpack . . . I didn’t speak to
him. I didn’t want to provoke him. He continued to accuse me of
being a child molester.” Doe then walked away from Avram
toward Vermont Avenue.
Later that afternoon, Avram left Griffith Park and saw Doe
again. Avram described that Doe began walking “slightly
behind” her and in the same direction, and he “continu[ed] to
threaten” Avram. According to Avram, Doe stated, “You want to
hunt for little girls in bathrooms. Well, I’m going to hunt you
back,” and “[j]ust one bullet and your pedophile career is over.”
Avram crossed the street, retrieved a knife from her bag, and
reapproached Doe, asking him to “please just leave me alone.”
According to Avram, Doe said, “ ‘Bullet in your skull, pedo,’ and
he began removing his backpack.” Avram described that she
unsheathed the knife, Doe “stumbled and fell back,” and she
“reached over with the knife,” and “moved the knife horizontally”
5
across his “upper left chest.” Doe “made a very angry noise” and
“he reached for his backpack,” so Avram “stabbed him once only
in the stomach” and fled the scene.
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of
assault with a deadly weapon, the doctrine of lawful self-defense,
and the definition of “great bodily injury” within the meaning of
the section 12022.7, subdivision (a), sentencing allegation.4 The
court did not instruct on the aggravating factor allegation under
rule 4.421(a)(1). Instead, the jury received the special verdict
form directing it to determine “the aggravated factor that the
above offense involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, and callousness within[] the meaning [of]
California [] Rules Of Court 4.421(a)(1).” Avram did not object to
the omission of the aggravating factor instruction.
The jury found Avram guilty as charged and found the
sentencing enhancement and aggravating factor allegations true.
4 As relevant here, the self-defense instruction (CALCRIM
No. 3470) provided: “The defendant acted in lawful self-defense
if: 1. The defendant reasonably believed that she was in
imminent danger of suffering bodily injury or was in imminent
danger of being touched unlawfully; 2. The defendant reasonably
believed that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend
against that danger; AND 3. The defendant used no more force
than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.”
The instruction on the section 12022.7, subdivision (a),
enhancement provided, “Great bodily injury means significant or
substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than
minor or moderate harm.”
6
C. Sentencing
In her sentencing memorandum, Avram argued that under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), she was entitled to a
presumption of the low term of two years based on her “long-
standing history of mental illness.” Avram also identified other
mitigating factors, including her lack of criminal history, her
uncontradicted testimony that Doe harassed and provoked her,
and her belief that she acted in self-defense. Avram further
requested the court dismiss her sentencing enhancement under
section 12022.7, subdivision (a), based on the mitigating factor
that her offense was “connected to mental illness.”
The People’s memorandum asked the court to impose the
upper term, arguing that mental illness did not warrant a
presumptive low term and that the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors. The People opposed Avram’s
request to dismiss the section 12022.7 sentencing enhancement
because dismissal would endanger public safety.
At the sentencing hearing, Avram additionally argued the
trial court should not impose “both the [great bodily injury]
enhancement and the aggravating factor,” because “the only
thing the People alleged to the jury was the injury itself for both
of those [allegations], and therefore it would be inappropriate for
the court to enforce a punishment for both of those things, when
it’s the same act.” The People contended it was appropriate to
enforce both the enhancement and the aggravating factor because
the rule 4.421 aggravating factor “also talks about the degree of
cruelty and viciousness and callousness. So there are multiple
things that the jury could have considered, in terms of how the
crime occurred[,] in reaching that decision.”
7
The trial court sentenced Avram to a total of seven years,
comprised of the upper term of four years, plus three years on the
section 12022.7, subdivision (a), enhancement. The court
reasoned that the aggravating facts of the offense “outweigh[ed]
the mental health concerns” and thus it would not impose the low
term. The court further identified “severe public safety issues”
outweighing Avram’s lack of criminal history, including that the
assault happened “in broad daylight, on a busy street” in “a
residential area, a commercial area [with] lots of individuals
around, and defendant is running around with a butcher knife,
and attacks someone for simply yelling at [her] hours earlier.”
The court stated this was “clearly, an issue for all residents, and
the public safety here, if it was a zero to 10 [scale], it would have
to be a 10, because there’s just nothing, in this court’s opinion,
that could assist the citizens of this county to be in a secure and
safe environment if this person isn’t in custody for the full
amount of the period.”
Avram timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Sixth Amendment Error Regarding Jury Determination of
Aggravating Circumstances
Avram argues the court prejudicially erred by omitting
CALCRIM No. 3224 regarding the rule 4.421(a)(1) aggravating
factor. As relevant here, CALCRIM No. 3224 reads:
If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s]
charged . . . you must then decide whether the People
have proved the additional allegation that the
8
crime . . . involved great violence, or great bodily
harm, or threats of great bodily harm, or other acts
revealing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness. . . .
To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:
1. During the commission of the crime, the defendant
used great violence or inflicted great bodily harm, or
threatened to inflict great bodily harm, or committed
other acts showing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness;
AND
2. The type/level of violence, or bodily harm, or
threat of bodily harm, or cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness was distinctively worse than what was
necessary to commit the crime.
For the crime to have been committed with great
violence, or cruelty, or viciousness, or callousness, no
one needs to actually have been injured by the
defendant’s act. But if someone was injured, you may
consider that fact, along with all the other evidence,
in deciding whether the defendant committed the
crime with great violence, or cruelty, or viciousness,
or callousness.
Great bodily harm means significant or substantial
9
physical injury, as opposed to minor or moderate
harm. . . .
Viciousness means dangerously aggressive or marked
by violence or ferocity. Viciousness is not the same as
violence. For example, some acts which may be
described as vicious do not involve violence at all, but
rather involve acts such as deceit and slander. On
the other hand, many violent acts do not indicate
viciousness, but instead show frustration, justifiable
rage, or self-defense.
An act discloses cruelty when it demonstrates the
deliberate infliction of physical or mental suffering.
An act discloses callousness when it demonstrates a
lack of sympathy for the suffering of, or harm to, the
victim.
You may not find the allegation true unless all of you
agree that the People have proved at least one of the
following: that the defendant used great violence, or
inflicted great bodily harm, or threatened to inflict
great bodily harm, or committed other acts showing a
high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.
However, you need not all agree on the acts or
conduct that constitutes the use of great violence, or
infliction of great bodily harm, or threat to inflict
great bodily harm, or show a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness.
10
You may not find the allegation true unless all of you
agree that the People have proved that the
defendant’s conduct was distinctively worse than an
ordinary commission of the underlying crime. . . .
The People have the burden of proving this allegation
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find that the allegation
has not been proved.[5]
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process “entitle a
criminal defendant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466,
476-477 (Apprendi).) Where “enumerated aggravating factors
operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense,’ [citation], the Sixth Amendment requires that they be
found by a jury.” (Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 609; see
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 288-289
(Cunningham) [under Apprendi, aggravating circumstances
5 After the Legislature amended section 1170 to require a
jury finding on aggravating circumstances, the Judicial Council
implemented CALCRIM No. 3224 in March 2023, along with
CALCRIM Nos. 3225 to 2351, “to provide guidance on the
definitions and required findings for the listed aggravating
circumstances.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 748,
fn. 6.) Avram’s trial took place in June 2023.
11
supporting upper term sentence must be found by a jury].)
“The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury
on the essential elements of the charged offense. [Citation.] It is,
indeed, very serious constitutional error because it threatens the
right to a jury trial that both the United States and California
Constitutions guarantee.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819,
824 (Merritt), citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 477.)
Accordingly, “it is well settled that no objection is required to
preserve a claim for appellate review that the jury instructions
omitted an essential element of the charge.” (People v. Mil (2012)
53 Cal.4th 400, 409 (Mil) [trial court erred by omitting “essential
elements of a special circumstance allegation”].)
We review constitutional claims and claims of instructional
error de novo. (See People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326
[instructional error]; In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035
[constitutional claims].) We must consider the claim of
instructional error “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole
and the trial record.’ ” (Rivera, at p. 326; accord, People v.
Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 248 [“ ‘ “[t]he correctness of jury
instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the
court” ’ ”].)
“[A]n instructional error that improperly describes or omits
an element of an offense . . . generally is not a structural defect in
the trial mechanism that defies harmless error review and
automatically requires reversal under the federal Constitution”
(People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503 (Flood)), unless
the “instructional error or omission . . . amounts to the total
deprivation of a jury trial” (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 830).
Rather, where the trial court fails to instruct on necessary
elements, generally this error “is subject to harmless-error
12
analysis” under the test of Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18 (Chapman), that is, “whether it appears ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained.’ ” (Neder v. U.S. (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15
(Neder); accord, Merritt, at pp. 825-826, 831; Mil, supra,
53 Cal.4th at p. 409.) “ ‘[O]verwhelming’ ” evidence, “other
properly given jury instructions,” or a defendant’s concession of
elements for which an instruction was omitted may render an
error harmless. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009)
45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; accord, Merritt, at p. 827 [if omitted
“elements were uncontested and supported by overwhelming
evidence, it would not necessarily follow that the trial was
fundamentally unfair”]; Flood, at p. 504 [harmless error to omit
instruction on element of crime “where the defendant concedes or
admits that element”].)
2. The Trial Court Erred by Not Instructing the Jury on
the Rule 4.421(a)(1) Aggravating Factor
Avram contends the trial court failed to instruct on all the
elements of the rule 4.421(a)(1) aggravating factor, and this error
was prejudicial, if not structural.
The People first contend that Avram forfeited her claim by
failing to object to the omission or to request an instruction. The
People also argue that this is “a discretionary sentencing matter
that [Avram] had an incentive and a full opportunity to argue
below.” As stated, however, forfeiture does not bar Avram’s claim
because the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on all
essential elements of the charge. (See Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 409; see also People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46 [“a
13
‘[d]efendant’s failure to object . . . [does] not preclude his
asserting on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to
a jury trial’ ”]; accord, People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580,
589, fn. 5.) Further, the failure to instruct the jury on all
essential elements is not a matter of discretion but raises a legal
claim under the federal constitution subject to de novo review.
(See People v. Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 908-909; People
v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1013.)
The People further argue that, as a whole, the jury was
adequately instructed on the definition of great bodily injury
within the meaning of rule 4.421(a)(1). The record reflects that
the jury received CALCRIM No. 3160 on the great bodily injury
sentencing enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), defining great
bodily injury. In closing arguments, the prosecution stated the
definition of great bodily injury, but did not otherwise refer to or
explain the aggravating factor allegation.
While CALCRIM No. 3160 and the prosecution’s argument
adequately covered the element of great bodily injury, Avram is
correct that the jury was not instructed on other essential
elements of the aggravating factor under rule 4.421(a)(1). First,
the jury was not instructed on the requirement that, to find the
aggravating factor true, it must determine that Avram’s conduct
was “distinctively worse than what was necessary to commit the
crime.” (CALCRIM No. 3224.) This element was necessary to a
true finding under rule 4.421(a)(1). (See CALCRIM No. 3224
[“You may not find the allegation true unless all of you agree that
the People have proved that the defendant’s conduct was
distinctively worse than an ordinary commission of the
underlying crime.”]; see also People v. Sengpadychith (2001)
26 Cal.4th 316, 320 (Sengpadychith) [constitutional error occurs
14
when trial court fails to instruct jury on a “necessary” element of
a sentencing enhancement, meaning “a finding [that] is necessary
to prove the . . . enhancement”]; People v. Harvey (1984)
163 Cal.App.3d 90, 116-117 [“In imposing the upper
term . . . [under] rule 421(a)(1) [now rule 4.421(a)(1)] . . . the
[factfinder] must convince itself that, when compared to other
ways in which such a crime could be committed, the manner of
this crime’s commission indicated viciousness and callousness.”];
accord, People v. Webber (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1146, 1169;
People v. Nevill (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 198, 206.)
Second, the jury instructions omitted any definition of
“cruelty, viciousness, or callousness” within the meaning of
rule 4.421(a)(1). This element of the aggravating factor may not
be necessary in every case because “great bodily injury” alone
may satisfy the requirements of rule 4.421(a)(1). (See People v.
Gutierrez (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1735 (Gutierrez)
[aggravating factor satisfied by finding of “great bodily injury”];
accord, People v. Castaneda (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 611, 614-615;
People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1575; People v.
La Fargue (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 898.)
But here, Avram was also subject to a sentencing
enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury (see § 12022.7,
subd. (a)), and the trial court could not aggravate Avram’s
sentence on the same factual basis. (See People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 350 [a court “generally cannot use a single fact
both to aggravate the base term and to impose an enhancement”];
see also § 1170, subd. (b)(5) [“The court may not impose an upper
term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence
is imposed.”].) Thus, as the People acknowledged at sentencing,
in Avram’s case a jury finding of cruelty, viciousness, or
15
callousness was necessary to avoid dual punishment for inflicting
“great bodily injury.” (See Gutierrez, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1735 [trial court “erred by using the fact the crime involved
great bodily injury in imposing the upper term” where it also
“imposed an enhancement for great bodily injury,” but the error
was harmless where the court further found “defendant’s conduct
also demonstrate[d] a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and
callousness”].) The court’s failure to instruct the jury on the
necessary element of “cruelty, viciousness, or callousness” was
error.
“[I]t is th[e] court’s duty to see to it that the jury are
adequately informed on the law governing all elements of the
case submitted to them to an extent necessary to enable them to
perform their function in conformity with the applicable law.”
(People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 528; cf. Chavez Zepeda v.
Superior Court (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 65, 91 [“jurors can be (and
we expect that they will be) given additional guidance and
explanation, both in the meaning of qualitative terms [relevant to
aggravating factors] . . . and in the meaning of the requirement
that the aggravating circumstance makes the commission of the
offense distinctively worse”].) Accordingly, the trial court erred
by omitting jury instructions on necessary elements of the
aggravating factor allegation. (See, e.g., Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 409 [constitutional error to omit “essential elements of a
special circumstance allegation”]; Sengpadychith, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 320 [same, as to sentencing enhancement].)
16
3. The Trial Court Further Erred By Imposing an Upper
Term Sentence Based on Untried Aggravating Facts6
At sentencing, the trial court discussed public safety factors
to justify Avram’s upper-term sentence. The court stated the
crime happened in “a residential area, a commercial area, [with]
lots of individuals around, and defendant is running around with
a butcher knife, and attacks someone for simply yelling at them
hours earlier. . . . [W]hen you’ve got this kind of conduct
happening in broad daylight, on a busy street, where one person
was walking with a friend, the other person was taking her dogs
out, there’s people walking, and the city is living and thriving,
and somebody is running towards another person in broad
daylight stabbing him, close to death, . . . [it] is clearly, clearly,
an issue for all residents, and the public safety here, if it was a
zero to 10 [scale], it would have to be a 10.”
As discussed, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, “[a]n
upper term sentence may be imposed ‘only’ when circumstances
in aggravation ‘justify’ that term, and ‘only’ when the facts
underlying ‘those’ justifying circumstances have been stipulated
to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a
jury or court trial.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 759
(Lynch).) Here, the court erred by imposing an upper term
sentence based on facts not found by the jury or stipulated to by
Avram, including that Avram used a knife, that the assault
occurred in a busy public area, and that Avram’s conduct
endangered public safety. The court’s reliance on these facts at
sentencing suggests the court considered additional uncharged
6 Although Avram did not raise this argument in her opening
brief, this court requested supplemental briefing on the issue.
(See Gov. Code, § 68081.)
17
and unproven aggravating circumstances to impose an upper
term sentence. (See, e.g., rules 4.421(a)(2) [“defendant was
armed with or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the
crime”], 4.421(b)(1) [“defendant has engaged in violent conduct
that indicates a serious danger to society”].) This was error. (See
Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at pp. 274-275 [Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial does not permit a judge to impose an upper-
term sentence “based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not
found by a jury or admitted by the defendant”]; accord, People v.
Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 728.)
The People concede that in imposing the upper term, the
trial court “considered the facts that the offense occurred in a
public area and created a threat to public safety.” But they
contend “the court was permitted to consider additional
aggravating factors not subject to reasonable dispute or
challenged by defense counsel.” As the United States and
California Supreme Courts have repeatedly held, however,
imposition of a higher sentence based on any facts not found by a
jury or specifically admitted by the defendant violates the Sixth
Amendment. (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at pp. 274-275;
Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 760.)
4. These Errors Were Prejudicial
We conclude that the court’s sentencing errors, taken
together, were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman.7
7 Avram argues the omission of the aggravating factor
instruction was structural error requiring automatic reversal.
(But see People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 256-257 [rejecting
18
If an element of the charge is removed from the jury’s
consideration, the error is harmless under Chapman if “it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (Merritt, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 831; see Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 504.) The
reviewing court must “ ‘conduct a thorough examination of the
record. If, at the end of that examination, the court cannot
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would
have been the same absent the error—for example, where the
defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence
sufficient to support a contrary finding—it should not find the
error harmless.’ [Citation.] On the other hand, instructional
error is harmless ‘where a reviewing court concludes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th
at p. 417, quoting Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 17, 19.)
Instructional error may also be harmless if the jury’s other
findings “support[] the conclusion the error did not contribute to
the verdict.” (Merritt, at p. 832.)
Here, the jury expressly found that Avram caused great
bodily injury, but it was not instructed on the meaning of and it
did not find that (1) Avram’s offense was “distinctively worse
than an ordinary commission of the underlying crime” or
(2) Avram displayed “a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
defendant’s argument that omission of special circumstance
elements was “reversible per se” and applying Chapman test for
harmless error].) Alternatively, Avram contends the error was
prejudicial under Chapman. We need not decide whether the
error was structural because we conclude that cumulatively, the
errors at sentencing were not “harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt” under Chapman. (Prieto, at p. 257.)
19
callousness.” (CALCRIM No. 3224.) The People argue that
Avram “did not seriously contest the great bodily injury element
at trial, hence there was no prejudice.” They further argue that
no reasonable jury would have found the rule 4.421(a)(1)
aggravating factor untrue, given Avram’s “horrific conduct.”
In Mil, the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the
mental state required for the felony-murder special-circumstance
allegation (i.e., the defendant’s intent to kill or reckless
indifference to human life). (Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 409.)
The California Supreme Court determined this error was
prejudicial because the defendant contested his mental state at
trial, and the record “ ‘contain[ed] evidence that could rationally
lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element,’ ”
specifically the defendant’s statements to police that “he did not
plan a robbery, he did not expect to use any force, he was
unaware that [his accomplice] had a knife with her . . . , and he
did not know that [the victim] had been stabbed.” (Id. at pp. 417-
419.) By contrast, in Merritt, the high court concluded the failure
to instruct the jury on the elements of robbery was harmless
under the circumstances. (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 831.) In
that case, the “attorneys for both parties accurately described the
elements of robbery in front of the jury,” and the defendant
argued he was not the perpetrator but “expressly conceded that
the perpetrator, whoever he was, committed robbery.” (Ibid.)
The evidence at trial, including surveillance footage of the
perpetrator holding a gun and a demanding money, “did not
allow [the defendant] to argue credibly that no robbery occurred.”
(Id. at p. 832.)
Applying these cases here, and in light of the trial court’s
reliance on other unproven aggravating facts, we conclude the
20
trial court’s failure to instruct on the elements of the
rule 4.421(a)(1) aggravating factor was not harmless. As in Mil,
Avram contested the omitted elements at trial (i.e., that Avram’s
offense was distinctively worse than an ordinary commission of
the underlying crime and that she displayed a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness), and the record contains
evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding as to
these elements (as explained below). (Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 417.) Further, unlike Merritt, here neither party described the
elements of the aggravating factor to the jury in closing
arguments, and although Avram conceded that she stabbed Doe,
she did not concede any other elements of the charge.
Avram testified at trial that she acted in self-defense in
response to Doe’s transphobic and gender-based harassment and
that Doe’s repeated threats caused her to fear for her life. This
evidence was relevant to whether Avram showed viciousness or
cruelty by attacking Doe in the context of their interaction, and
whether she showed callousness by quickly leaving the scene of
the stabbing, such that the record could have supported a finding
in Avram’s favor. (See CALCRIM No. 3224 [“Viciousness is not
the same as violence” and “many violent acts do not indicate
viciousness, but instead show frustration, justifiable rage, or self-
defense”]; accord, People v. Reed (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 489, 492;
cf. People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840-841 (Sandoval)
[concluding a reasonable jury could have found defendant did not
“demonstrate[] callous behavior” where a codefendant testified
the deadly confrontation was “a matter of self-defense” and
“defendant’s state of mind was hotly contested at trial”],
superseded by statute as stated in Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 756.) By the same token, the record permits a finding that
21
Avram’s offense was not “distinctively worse” than other assaults
based on Avram’s testimony that she believed she was acting in
self-defense, even if her conduct did not otherwise satisfy the
requirements of the self-defense doctrine. (See People v. Minifie
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064-1065 [self-defense for charge of
assault requires “honest and reasonable belief” in imminent
threat of bodily injury and permits only “ ‘the use of such force as
is reasonable under the circumstances’ ”].)
Our conclusion is also supported by Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th 730. There, the California Supreme Court held that “a
Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on
unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence,
even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly
established. The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court
can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial
court to justify an upper term sentence . . . . If the reviewing
court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of
review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.”
(Id. at p. 768.) Lynch further stated that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a
potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case
rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be
difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence” ’ ” how
“ ‘ “the jury would have assessed the facts,” ’ ” because “ “ ‘[m]any
of the aggravating circumstances described in the rules require
an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the
facts.’ ” ” (Id. at pp. 775-776; accord, Sandoval, supra, (2007)
41 Cal.4th at p. 840.) The high court has noted that whether “the
crimes involved a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and
callousness” is one such subjective standard. (Lynch, at p. 776;
22
see also People v. Whitten (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1767
[“examination of aggravating . . . factors necessarily involves
subjective determinations based upon objectively demonstrated
facts”].)
The People raise several arguments why the errors were
not prejudicial. First, they contend that, had the jury been fully
instructed, it would have found that Avram’s offense was
“distinctively worse than what was necessary to commit the
crime,” given the severity of Doe’s injuries. (CALCRIM
No. 3224.) Even if there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
find Avram’s conduct distinctively worse than necessary to
commit the crime, Avram did not concede this issue nor was the
evidence so overwhelming that we could find the omission of
CALCRIM No. 3224 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See
Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 418 [if elements of charge are
omitted, even if the “evidence would be sufficient to sustain a
finding [against the defendant] on appellate review, . . . our task
in analyzing the prejudice from the instructional error is whether
any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite
conclusion”].)
The People also contend that any instructional error was
harmless because the jury “would have found at least one
additional aggravating factor to be true,” specifically the factor
mentioned in the probation report that Avram “has engaged in
violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.” (See
rule 4.421(b).) The People further submit that at sentencing the
trial court relied on “numerous” other aggravating facts,
“including [Avram]’s great violence in rushing across the street to
attack the unarmed victim with a butcher knife, the mere threat
of great bodily harm which caused the victim to stumble and
23
fall . . . , and [Avram]’s cruelty and callousness in departing the
scene without rendering or summoning aid.” The People also
assert the court was “entitled to rely on the additional
aggravating factor outlined in the probation report, i.e., the
defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society,” citing the court’s finding at sentencing that
Avram’s conduct endangered “public safety.” Finally, the People
argue that the trial court “made an extensive record at
sentencing, which reveals that it was not inclined to reduce
[Avram’s] sentence.”
But as discussed above, the trial court’s imposition of an
upper term sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because it
engaged in this additional factfinding, including that Avram used
a knife, that the assault took place in a public area, and that her
conduct endangered public safety. In essence, the People argue
that the trial court’s instructional error as to the rule 4.421(a)(1)
aggravating circumstance was harmless because of the court’s
additional error in finding aggravating facts at sentencing. We
cannot accept such an argument. We further note that, like the
degree of cruelty and callousness of a given crime, whether a
defendant’s conduct “poses a serious danger to society” is a
subjective determination difficult for a reviewing court to assess
for harmlessness. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 775-776.)
We cannot conclude that the instructional error
compounded with the factfinding errors were harmless. Under
the circumstances and evidence present here, we cannot conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would
have found true both the rule 4.421(a)(1) aggravating
circumstance and the additional aggravating facts found by the
court at sentencing. (See Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 417
24
[instructional error on elements of offense is prejudicial unless
there is no “reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have
been the same absent the error”]; see also Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 775 [omission of a jury trial on aggravating facts
is harmless, as to “every aggravating fact the trial court used to
justify an upper term sentence,” if “ ‘ “ ‘[n]o reasonable jury’ ”
would have found in favor of the defendant . . . , given the jury’s
actual verdict and the state of the evidence’ ”].)
For these reasons, the court’s failure to instruct on the
elements of the rule 4.421(a)(1) aggravating factor and its
reliance on untried aggravating facts constituted prejudicial
error. (See Lynch, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776 [“Because we cannot find
the omission of a jury trial harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
as to every aggravating fact relied upon by the trial court to
impose an upper term, [defendant’s] sentence must be
reversed.”].) We remand to “ ‘ “give the People an opportunity to
retry” ’ the aggravating facts.” (Ibid.) On remand, “[t]he court
may rely on any properly proven aggravating facts, including . . .
facts necessarily found by the jury to support a verdict on
underlying counts and enhancements” and it “retains its
discretion to impose an upper term sentence if it concludes that
one or more properly proved circumstances justify such a
sentence.” (Id. at pp. 777-778.) Because we otherwise find
prejudicial error, we need not address Avram’s argument that the
trial court also failed to instruct the jury that the prosecution
must prove the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
25
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining
To Strike the Great Bodily Injury Enhancement Under
Section 1385
Avram next argues the court erred by declining to strike
the section 12022.7, subdivision (a), great bodily injury
enhancement under section 1385.
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), provides that “the court
shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so.” “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances
[enumerated] are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) As relevant here,
mitigating circumstances include that “[t]he current offense is
connected to mental illness.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D).)
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision
that dismissing a sentencing enhancement would endanger
public safety. (See People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
215, 225; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298
(Mendoza).) The court’s exercise of discretion “ ‘ “ ‘must not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ”
26
(Mendoza, at p. 298.) “ ‘[A]n abuse of discretion arises if the trial
court based its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on an
incorrect legal standard.’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 225; see People v.
Randolph (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 602, 614.) “ ‘The trial court is
not required to state reasons for declining to exercise its
discretion under section 1385’ [citations], and ‘is presumed to
have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an
affirmative record to the contrary.’ ” (People v. Brugman (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637; see People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th
866, 881 [“on appeal a judgment is presumed correct, and a party
attacking the judgment, or any part of it, must affirmatively
demonstrate prejudicial error”].)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Avram argues the trial court abused its discretion by
applying the wrong legal standard to its finding that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety. Avram asserts
the court erroneously found that dismissal would not “assist the
citizens to be in a secure and safe environment,” instead of
finding a “likelihood . . . [of] physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Avram contends that
this “ ‘secure and safe’ standard would capture almost every
crime, including many low level offenses and even
misdemeanors.”
“ ‘The general rule is that a trial court is presumed to have
been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ [Citations.] The
presumption is overcome by an affirmative showing of error in
the record.” (People v. Shiga (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 22, 40; see
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390; People v. Stowell
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.)
27
In the context of the trial court’s full ruling, Avram has not
affirmatively shown that the court misapplied or misunderstood
the standard that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety by causing a likelihood of physical injury or other
serious danger to others. (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2).) At Avram’s
sentencing, the court recounted the circumstances of Avram’s
offense, noting it happened in “a residential area, a commercial
area, [with] lots of individuals around, and defendant is running
around with a butcher knife, and attacks someone for simply
yelling at them hours earlier.” The court stated it was “concerned
about . . . public safety,” “when you’ve got this kind of conduct
happening in broad daylight, on a busy street” and “somebody is
running towards another person in broad daylight stabbing him,
close to death.” For these reasons, the court found that the risk
to public safety “would have to be a 10” on a zero to 10 scale.
Although the court also stated that “there’s just nothing, in
this court’s opinion, that could assist the citizens of this county to
be in a secure and safe environment if this person isn’t in custody
for the full amount of the period,” the record otherwise reflects
the court’s awareness of the correct legal standard. Given the
nature and location of Avram’s offense, the court found serious
public safety concerns “if [Avram] isn’t in custody for the full
amount of the period.” (See Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 299 [affirming court’s decision not to dismiss enhancement
under section 1385 “[g]iven the court’s consideration of the
circumstances of the crime and the court’s determination that a
long sentence was necessary for [defendant] to become
rehabilitated”].) Contrary to Avram’s assertion, the record does
not demonstrate that the court applied an “improper lower
standard” in finding a danger to public safety. The court instead
28
found that dismissal was not appropriate because Avram’s
conduct warranted public safety concerns at a level “10” out of
ten. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by finding dismissal of Avram’s enhancement would endanger
public safety.
Avram further argues that the court gave only “minimal
consideration” to her “mental health issues,” even though
section 1385 requires “great weight” to mitigating circumstances,
including where “[t]he current offense is connected to mental
illness.” (§ 1385, subds. (c)(2), (c)(2)(D).) Avram asserts that the
court “did not discuss the link between [her] psychotic,
schizophrenic, delusional symptoms and the offense conduct at
all,” even though these symptoms were “serious” and “direct[ly]
connect[ed] to the offense conduct.” In Avram’s view, the court
thus failed to consider dismissal of the enhancement in light of
the Legislature’s intent to “alleviate prison overcrowding”
through section 1385. Avram also contends the court failed to
consider her “lack of criminal history, and prospects for
rehabilitation with psychiatric treatment,” although these
circumstances are not enumerated by section 1385.
The record reflects the court reviewed Avram’s sentencing
memorandum, where “the mental health issues . . . [were]
detailed clearly,” as well as the “doctor’s report” which detailed
Avram’s delusions of “reincarnation” and “past life issues.” The
court recognized Avram’s mental illness as a mitigating factor
and stated that this mitigating factor warranted a “mental health
presumption of [the] low term, or even midterm.” After
“consider[ing] that thoroughly,” the court determined the facts of
the offense were “overwhelmingly egregious” and “outweigh[ed]
the mental health concerns,” and it further found that any
29
sentence less than the full term would endanger public safety.
Accordingly, the court imposed the upper term and declined to
dismiss Avram’s section 12022.7, subdivision (a), enhancement.
The court’s decision not to dismiss the enhancement despite
the mitigating factor of mental illness was not an abuse of
discretion. (See People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th
1144, 1157 [no abuse of discretion in declining to dismiss
sentencing enhancement where “[n]othing in the record
demonstrates the trial court failed to assign significant value” to
the section 1385 mitigating factors]; People v. Ponder (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1053 [same, where “the trial court
considered all the mitigating circumstances related to defendant”
and “gave great thought to whether to dismiss”]; People v. Ortiz
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099 [same, where court
acknowledged mitigating factor “but determined that other
factors were collectively weightier”]; see also People v. Walker
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033 [“in most cases, ‘if the trial court
finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public
safety, then it is hard to see how dismissal would further the
interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the applicability of any
mitigating factors identified in [section 1385,]
subdivision (c)(2)”].)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying
Avram’s Pitchess Motion
At Avram’s request, we reviewed the trial court’s decision
to deny her Pitchess motion. When a defendant demonstrates
good cause for discovery of law enforcement personnel
information, the custodian of records must produce all potentially
relevant documents, and the trial court shall examine the
30
information in camera and disclose relevant documents not
otherwise protected by statute. (See People v. Mooc (2001)
26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226-1227 (Mooc); see also Evid. Code, §§ 1043-
1047.) “ ‘ “[T]rial courts are granted wide discretion when ruling
on motions to discover police officer personnel records.” ’
[Citation.] ‘On appeal, this court is required to review the “record
of the documents examined by the trial court” and determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
disclose the contents of the officer’s personnel records.’ ”
(People v. Nuno (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1055-1056; accord,
People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 180.) To “permit
future appellate review,” the trial court must “make a record of
what documents it examined before ruling on the Pitchess
motion.” (Mooc, at p. 1229.) The court can “photocopy” the
documents “and place them in a confidential file,” “prepare a list
of the documents it considered, or simply state for the record
what documents it examined.” (Ibid.)
Because the sealed record in this appeal did not contain a
record of the documents the trial court reviewed at the Pitchess
hearing, on our own motion, we directed the trial court to
augment the record with these documents. (See Mooc, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 1231.) Having received and reviewed these
documents, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by determining there were no personnel documents
relevant to Avram’s request. (See People v. Prince (2007)
40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285-1286.)
31
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. We reverse and
vacate Avram’s sentence to allow the People an opportunity to
retry the aggravating factors and for resentencing in accordance
with amended section 1170, subdivision (b), and any other
applicable ameliorative legislation.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
STONE, J.
32
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