CourtListener 10850508•Akala v. L.A. Unified School Dist. CA2/2
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Filed 4/29/26 Akala v. L.A. Unified School Dist. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
AMOSUN AKALA et al., B340852
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV34738)
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Kowal Law Group, Timothy M. Kowal, Teddy T. Davis and
Ryan Merker for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Littler Mendelson, Connie L. Michaels, Donna Leung, Joy
Rosenquist and Amelia A. McDermott for Defendant and
Respondent.
____________________
Plaintiffs Amosun Akala, Stacy Hayes, and Dan Stelzer
appeal the trial court’s summary judgment in their California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code,1 § 12900
et seq.) action against their former employer, defendant Los
Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). Because we perceive no
error, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs worked in the facilities department of LAUSD.2
Hayes was a project engineer from June 1999 until his early
retirement on December 14, 2021. The last position he held was
assistant project manager for projects including painting, football
field turf, safety, and technology. His role involved pre-
construction planning, contract negotiations, managing
construction schedules, tending to daily onsite construction
activities, managing project close-outs, and providing written and
oral reports. Hayes worked onsite both before and throughout the
pandemic. At his last project, he and his team were housed in
their own offices inside a construction trailer at a school. During
the pandemic, Hayes’s team followed safety protocols like weekly
testing, masking, and physical distancing.
Stelzer worked as a locksmith from 2007 until January 31,
2022. He repaired and replaced locks and door hardware at
approximately 30 to 40 facilities within his territory. Seventy-five
percent of his job was onsite. His regular shift was weekdays
6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., with overtime between 3:00 p.m. and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government
Code.
2 We construe the facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs. (Nicoletti v. Kest (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 140, 144.)
2
7:00 p.m. and on Saturdays. Stelzer’s group was “not ever shut
down at all” and was “on campus every day through the whole
pandemic” because “[b]uildings are there always needing
maintenance.” When working, Stelzer “[a]lways” interacted with
LAUSD’s staff onsite, because his job required “a lot of
communication and understanding of” the problem he was there
to address. Nevertheless, Stelzer’s “job was solitary in nature and
brought [him] into very limited physical contact with other[s],” he
“normally fix[ed] locks when no one was around” (e.g., before
school, during lunchbreaks, or when classrooms were empty), and
“[i]t was always possible to coordinate [his] work so that no one
was present or physically close.”
Akala was also employed as a locksmith, from
February 2020 until his termination on December 8, 2021. He
repaired and replaced door locks and hardware. He was
responsible for approximately 30 to 40 schools in his territory.
His regular shift was weekdays 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., with
regular Saturday overtime and occasional weekday overtime from
3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. His job was entirely in person. While
students were not present if he were repairing a lock in a private
administrative office, students were generally present about
60 percent of the time he was working. Nevertheless, Akala’s “job
was solitary in nature and brought [him] into very limited
physical contact with other[s],” and he “normally fix[ed] locks
when no one was around.”
In March 2020, the prevalence of COVID-19 in Los Angeles
County caused LAUSD to limit in-person instruction and close its
facilities to students, faculty and staff. Soon thereafter, the
Governor required all schools to close. LAUSD suspended in-
person instruction for the remainder of the school year, and
3
students instead engaged in distance learning. That continued
into the following academic year (early 2021).
In spring 2021, LAUSD transitioned to a hybrid education
model in which some in-person instruction was supplemented
with distance learning. To provide in-person instruction safely,
LAUSD partnered with public health officials to develop a multi-
pronged strategy to mitigate the risks of COVID-19 to its
students and staff, including periodic asymptomatic testing,
required masking, and physical distancing. Students and staff
were required to take PCR tests each week. LAUSD required
those who tested positive (and those individuals in close contact
with them) to quarantine for 10 days.
Meanwhile, LAUSD developed a plan to fully reopen its
schools for in-person learning for the 2021–2022 school year.
That plan included encouraging all eligible individuals to be
vaccinated against COVID-19. To further its goal, in August 2021
LAUSD required all employees be fully vaccinated against
COVID-19 by October 15, 2021, as a condition of employment.
LAUSD formed the Sincerely Held Religious Belief Reasonable
Accommodation Committee to review employee exemption
requests based on sincerely held religious beliefs.
Plaintiffs each informed LAUSD the COVID-19 vaccination
violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. They believed the
vaccines were developed using material originating from an
aborted fetus, and that receiving a vaccine would make them
participants in voluntary abortions, which is offensive to their
religious teachings. LAUSD did not question the sincerity of
Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.
Plaintiffs requested accommodations to be exempt from the
vaccination requirement. All Plaintiffs were willing to undergo
4
daily PCR testing at their own expense. They were also willing to
“comply with other safety protocol[s] including quarantine,
masking, and social distancing.”3 In addition, both Akala and
Stelzer offered to work night shifts to avoid contact with others.
“Hayes proposed working entirely remotely or limiting any
necessary on-site presence to hours when no staff or students
were [present].” LAUSD “rejected [Plaintiffs’] proposed
alternatives.”
Plaintiffs did not submit evidence of vaccination. In
October 2021, LAUSD suspended all employees who had failed to
submit proof of vaccination, and those employees were later
processed for termination. LAUSD terminated Akala’s
employment on December 8, 2021, and Stelzer’s on January 31,
2022. Hayes was not terminated, but was allowed to retire eight
months early, as of December 14, 2021.
In September 2023, LAUSD rescinded the employee
vaccination mandate. It informed Akala and Stelzer they could
reapply for employment, but both refused to do so.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 2022, Plaintiffs filed this action against LAUSD
alleging various FEHA violations:
(1) Failure to accommodate religious belief or observance
(§ 12940, subd. (l));
(2) Discrimination based on religion (§ 12940, subd. (a));
(3) Harassment based on religion (§ 12940, subd. (j));
(4) Discrimination based on national origin (§ 12940,
subd. (a));
3 Nevertheless, Stelzer admitted while he was employed, he
had refused to comply with some required COVID-19 safety
protocols.
5
(5) Harassment based on national origin (§ 12940,
subd. (j));
(6) Retaliation for opposing FEHA violations and
requesting religious accommodations (§ 12940, subds. (h), (l)(4));
and
(7) Failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent
discrimination, retaliation, and harassment (§ 12940, subd. (k)).
LAUSD moved for summary judgment, or alternatively,
summary adjudication of a number of issues. Plaintiffs opposed.
The trial court ultimately granted LAUSD’s motion for
summary adjudication of each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action.4 The
failure to accommodate religious belief cause of action failed
because LAUSD demonstrated no reasonable accommodation was
possible without imposing an undue hardship. The religious
discrimination and retaliation causes of action failed because
LAUSD showed Plaintiffs were terminated for a legitimate
reason—their failure to be vaccinated. Moreover, Plaintiffs failed
to show a triable issue of material fact that reason was
pretextual. The harassment cause of action failed because
Plaintiffs did not show they experienced harassment within the
meaning of FEHA—that is, they did not show the purported
harassment was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile
work environment. And finally, the cause of action for failure to
prevent retaliation, harassment, and discrimination necessarily
failed because Plaintiffs had shown no underlying FEHA
violation.
4 Plaintiffs do not challenge the summary adjudication of
their causes of action for discrimination and harassment based on
national origin.
6
Because the trial court granted summary adjudication of all
causes of action, it granted LAUSD’s motion for summary
judgment. Judgment was entered on July 1, 2024. Plaintiffs
timely appealed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1).)
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the trial court’s order granting a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Guz v. Bechtel Nat.,
Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and decide whether there
is a triable issue of any material fact. (Serri v. Santa Clara
University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 859 (Serri); see also Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
On this record, the trial court correctly granted summary
adjudication of all causes of action; therefore, summary judgment
was appropriate.
I. Failure to Accommodate
FEHA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against
a person . . . because of a conflict between the person’s religious
belief or observance and any employment requirement, unless the
employer . . . demonstrates that it has explored any available
reasonable alternative means of accommodating the religious
belief or observance . . . but is unable to reasonably accommodate
the religious belief or observance without undue hardship.”
(§ 12940, subd. (l)(1).)
To make out a prima facie case for relief, the plaintiff must
first show he “sincerely held a religious belief; the employer was
aware of that belief; and the belief conflicted with an employment
requirement.” (California Fair Employment & Housing Com. v.
Gemini Aluminum Corp. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011; see
also Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th
7
345, 370 (Soldinger).) If the plaintiff makes that showing, “the
burden shifts to the employer to establish that ‘it initiated good
faith efforts to accommodate or no accommodation was possible
without producing undue hardship.’ ” (Gemini, at p. 1011.)
When “[an] employer fails to initiate an accommodation for
the religious practices, the burden is . . . on the employer to prove
it [would have] incur[red] an undue hardship if it
accommodate[d] that belief.” (Soldinger, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at
p. 371.) LAUSD does not dispute it did not offer or initiate an
accommodation for Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.5 Therefore, like
the trial court, we consider whether LAUSD demonstrated it was
“unable to reasonably accommodate [Plaintiffs’] religious belief[s]
. . . without undue hardship.” (§ 12940, subd. (l)(1).)
A. LAUSD Demonstrated No Reasonable
Accommodation Was Possible
“ ‘[T]he extent of undue hardship on the employer’s
business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is
unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such
hardship.’ ” (Soldinger, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 371, italics
added.) When an employer fails to “explore any available
alternatives, it violate[s] its statutory obligation to accommodate
unless [it] establishe[s] that any reasonable accommodation
would have caused it an undue hardship.” (Id. at p. 373, italics
added.)
“ ‘Undue hardship’ ” is defined as “an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the
following factors: [¶] (1) The nature and cost of the
5 In their reply brief, Plaintiffs concede they have no cause of
action for failure to engage in the interactive process under
section 12940, subdivision (n).
8
accommodation needed. [¶] (2) The overall financial resources of
the facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable
accommodations, the number of persons employed at the facility,
and the effect on expenses and resources or the impact otherwise
of these accommodations upon the operation of the facility. [¶]
(3) The overall financial resources of the covered entity, the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of employees, and the number, type, and location of its
facilities. [¶] (4) The type of operations, including the
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the
entity. [¶] (5) The geographic separateness or administrative or
fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities.” (§ 12926, subd. (u);
see also Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue (9th Cir.
2025) 150 F.4th 1211, 1217 (Petersen) [analyzing undue hardship
under federal law]; Soldinger, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 370,
fn. 11 [“California courts look to . . . federal cases . . . in
evaluating failure to accommodate allegations”].) This includes
analyzing the effect of the accommodation on coworkers, to the
extent that effect bears upon the conduct of the employer’s
business. (Groff v. DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447, 472.)
As an initial matter, we evaluate LAUSD’s decision at the
time it refused to accommodate Plaintiffs—that is, in the broader
context of the COVID-19 pandemic during fall 2021. (See
Petersen, supra, 150 F.4th at p. 1222 [“Nor can we judge [an
employer] with the clarity of hindsight or the benefit of post-
pandemic debates over what measured responses frontline
employers should have taken.”].)
COVID-19 is caused by infection with a novel coronavirus,
SARS-CoV-2, that spreads rapidly among people; cases were first
reported in China in late 2019. Because of its novelty, few (if any)
9
people worldwide were immune to it, so “the entire population . . .
was susceptible to infection.” While the original SARS-CoV-2 was
itself highly infectious, subsequent mutations produced
additional variants which were “found to be even more infectious
. . . , almost on a par with measles virus.” By July 2021, it was
estimated the United States had experienced 35 million cases of
COVID-19 and 612,000 deaths therefrom.
While some people infected with COVID-19 remain
asymptomatic or experience mild disease, “severe illnesses and
deaths . . . can occur in individuals of all ages, including
previously healthy adults and children.” “[T]hose at increased
risk of severe illness, hospitalization, and death . . . are teachers
over the age of 50 and those with diverse underlying conditions,”
such as obesity or diabetes. COVID-19 can also cause the severe
illnesses Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome in Children and
Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome in Adults. Finally, even
people with mild COVID-19 cases can “go on to have persistent
sequelae, [or] long COVID . . . , the frequency, duration, and
severity of which remain to be characterized.”
By summer 2021, COVID-19 rates in Los Angeles County
had begun to rise again. That fall, LAUSD had just reopened for
full-time in-person instruction for the first time since
March 2020. COVID-19 rates continued to rise throughout that
period, ultimately “producing a very large peak in . . . infections[,]
hospitalizations[,] and deaths at the end of 2021 and the
beginning of 2022.” It was accordingly “difficult to predict future
trends” in COVID-19 rates, including how long the pandemic
would last or mitigation measures would be needed.
10
1. Plaintiffs’ Masking, Testing, and
Quarantining Accommodation Posed an
Undue Hardship
The trial court correctly determined LAUSD demonstrated
it would have been an undue hardship for LAUSD to
accommodate Plaintiffs in fall 2021 by allowing them to continue
working in their positions, onsite, unvaccinated, while abiding by
masking, testing, and quarantining protocols (i.e.,
nonpharmaceutical interventions). Specifically, the trial court
determined: (1) “the non-pharmaceutical interventions . . . were
not sufficient to protect against COVID-19; (2) [LAUSD] saved
‘millions of dollars as a result’ of implementing its vaccination
policy” in lieu of weekly testing; and “(3) [Plaintiffs’ suggested
accommodation] could have resulted in the further spread[] of
COVID-19, could have endangered the health and safety of its
employees, students, and surrounding community, and could
have resulted in disruptions to its workforce.”
We agree LAUSD showed it would suffer undue hardship
in accommodating Plaintiffs in light of the significant health and
safety, operational, and financial burdens it would impose in the
context of the extraordinary challenge presented by the COVID-
19 pandemic. (See Petersen, supra, 150 F.4th at p. 1218
[discussing those categories for undue hardship in a Title VII
case].)
Health and Safety Burdens. (See § 12926, subd. (u)(2),
(4).) The health and safety of LAUSD’s students, teachers, and
staff (including Plaintiffs) would be jeopardized by allowing
Plaintiffs in fall 2021 to work onsite, unvaccinated, with a
masking, testing, and quarantining protocol. COVID-19 posed
serious health risks. Requiring vaccinations “support[ed] the
11
safety of . . . students, teachers, staff, and the community at
large, and . . . minimize[d] the risk of transmission throughout
. . . schools and community.” Vaccinating employees “was a
critical component of the multi-dimensional plan to maximize the
safety of teachers, other staff, students and visitors and to
minimize disruptions to in person education of students in 2021.”
LAUSD’s experts explained “the more people [who] were
vaccinated, the less chance they’re going to get the virus or
transmit it.” Not requiring those vaccinations “would have
presented significant and unnecessary risks to a sizable number
of individuals.”
Specifically, the evidence showed unvaccinated individuals
were at substantially and materially higher risks of being both
infected with COVID-19 and hospitalized as a result. A July 2021
study of Los Angeles public health records found “the [COVID-19]
infection rate among unvaccinated persons was 4.9 times greater
than those [who] were vaccinated and the hospitalization rate
was 29.2 times greater.” Other studies found a more pronounced
difference: a fall 2021 study estimated infection rates and
hospitalization rates among unvaccinated people were 13.9 times
and 53.2 times, respectively, that of vaccinated people. In
addition, other “studies have shown that COVID-19 vaccination
can reduce infection with and transmission of [the virus].” While
vaccinated individuals could still become infected, their illness
was often mild, and they often have substantially less virus
present in their noses than unvaccinated infected individuals.
Thus, requiring staff to be vaccinated substantially reduced
health and safety risks from COVID-19 to those vaccinated
individuals as well as to other LAUSD employees and students.
Given the potentially serious consequences of infection with
12
COVID-19, allowing an unvaccinated employee to work onsite
with a masking, testing, and quarantining accommodation posed
substantial health and safety risks to staff, students, and visitors
to campus.
Operational Burdens. (See § 12926, subd. (u)(2), (4).)
Allowing Plaintiffs to work onsite, unvaccinated, with a masking,
testing, and quarantining protocol would also impose substantial
operational burdens on LAUSD. It risked exposing LAUSD to
significant employee and student absenteeism as a result of
COVID-19 illness and quarantine. From April 2021 until
approximately May 2023, LAUSD required staff and students
who were infected with COVID-19 or in close contact with an
infected person to quarantine for 10 days. The presence of
unvaccinated individuals, with their associated higher risk of
COVID-19 infection, thus “made work disruptions more likely.”
Vaccinated people were “less likely to get sick and have to miss
work,” and were “less likely to test positive and have to be kept
out of work as a result of testing positive.” Moreover, “vaccination
protects . . . 24/7 . . . and therefore reduces the likelihood [an
employee] will get infected and have to be out of the workforce.”
CDC guidance did not require vaccinated individuals to
quarantine if they were exposed to COVID-19, which meant they
“could more quickly resume their normal activities”—e.g.,
returning to work. Thus, staff vaccinations allowed LAUSD “to
maintain its business operations without significant disruption
arising from student, teacher, and worker COVID-19 infections.”
Vaccinated workers, with their lower chance of infection,
also reduced the risk of COVID-19 outbreaks in schools. When
outbreaks occurred, “need for isolation, quarantine, and other
measures produced substantial disruptions in affected schools.”
13
That had a significant detrimental effect on LAUSD’s education
process and learning environment. While LAUSD could use
online or hybrid distance learning models when in-person
instruction was impossible, that approach was undesirable
because it led to “negative effects on children[,] includ[ing] both
impairments to education and adverse mental health outcomes.”
Thus, requiring staff vaccinations reduced the likelihood
LAUSD’s educational operations would be disrupted by staff
illness, absenteeism, and COVID-19 outbreaks.
Financial Burdens. (§ 12926, subd. (u)(2).) Requiring
workers to be vaccinated “would decrease overall rates of COVID-
19 infection,” which ultimately allowed LAUSD to “significantly
reduce the costs associated” with its weekly PCR COVID-19
testing program. That testing program was “a heavy financial
burden” to LAUSD and involved testing “every student and staff
member” weekly, amounting to approximately half a million tests
per week. Thus, requiring staff vaccinations enabled LAUSD to
discontinue its expensive, districtwide testing program and its
associated administrative costs.
All of these substantial burdens combined to demonstrate
allowing Plaintiffs to remain onsite in their positions,
unvaccinated, with a masking, testing, and quarantine
accommodation imposed an undue hardship upon LAUSD.
2. Plaintiffs Failed to Show a Triable Issue
of Fact Regarding Undue Hardship
We also conclude the trial court did not err in finding
Plaintiffs failed to meet “their burden to show that a triable issue
of material fact exists as to the existence of undue hardship on
[LAUSD].” (See Soldinger, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 373 [at
14
summary judgment, we “determine if there are triable issues of
fact”].)
Plaintiffs first argue there was a triable issue of material
fact because LAUSD had previously “protected health and safety
through daily symptom checks, masking, distancing, and
mandatory PCR testing before the vaccine mandate took effect.”
But this record showed nonpharmaceutical interventions were
inadequate to protect the health and safety of students and
employees and to ensure the successful delivery of in-person
instruction to students. Plaintiffs also ignore the significant
operational and financial burdens those interventions imposed on
LAUSD, both in direct expenses for testing programs and
indirectly in work disruption via absenteeism. Thus, that
nonpharmaceutical interventions were used in the past with
some success does not show a triable issue of material fact that
accommodating Plaintiffs in fall 2021 by allowing them to work
onsite, unvaccinated, with those interventions was not an undue
hardship.
Second, Plaintiffs argue the trial court wrongly discounted
their expert’s evidence “that frequent PCR testing would have
been at least as effective as . . . vaccination alone in preventing
workplace spread” of COVID-19. But Plaintiffs’ narrow focus on
viral transmission in the workplace ignores that is only one
aspect of the substantial burdens COVID-19 imposed on LAUSD.
While the vaccine did directly reduce workplace transmission by
infected individuals, it also produced myriad other benefits—such
as reducing the chance a vaccinated individual became infected
at all (protection that operated continuously, not just while the
employee was at work). The vaccine thus also reduced workplace
transmission indirectly by reducing the chance an infected person
15
would be onsite in the first place. In addition, vaccinated workers
were less likely to miss work due to either infection or
quarantine. Requiring vaccines thus eased LAUSD’s operational
burden of worker absenteeism. Even crediting Plaintiffs’ evidence
that if they were infected with COVID-19, a masking, testing,
and quarantining protocol would have reduced their transmission
of that virus to others in the workplace by an amount comparable
to the vaccine,6 that does not demonstrate a triable issue of
material fact that accommodating Plaintiffs in this manner did
not impose an undue hardship on LAUSD.
Finally, in their reply brief, Plaintiffs argue LAUSD’s
evidence of undue hardship is not sufficiently tailored to the
specific accommodations they proposed for themselves. (See
Atkins v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 696, 733.) For
example, they point out the cost savings LAUSD generated by
discontinuing its universal testing program do not show regularly
testing the three of them, rather than tens of thousands, would
have been an undue hardship.
But Plaintiffs ignore the specific evidence in the record that
vaccinated employees were substantially less likely to become
infected with COVID-19 (and to suffer serious illness from it)
than unvaccinated individuals. They also ignore the substantial
burdens accommodating Plaintiffs’ unvaccinated status would
impose, with regard to the health and safety of these individual
Plaintiffs, their coworkers, other staff and students at their
facilities, the operational burden of worker absenteeism, and the
6 The record, however, indicates masking was less effective
in reducing transmission in the real world than in laboratory
studies like the one relied upon by Plaintiffs.
16
material effect on LAUSD’s delivery of educational services to its
students.
3. Plaintiffs’ Other Proposed
Accommodations Do Not Create a Triable
Issue of Material Fact
Plaintiffs further argue they proposed alternative
accommodations, such as Akala and Stelzer “work[ing] after
hours to avoid contact with staff or students” or Hayes working
“remotely or isolate[d] in his office trailer” where he could
participate in meetings via videoconferencing.
But Plaintiffs have pointed to no evidence in this record
indicating those proposed accommodations alter the undue
hardship analysis we already described above. For example, there
is no evidence quantifying any incremental reduction in
workplace viral transmission rates produced by after-hours or
isolated work. There is no evidence after-hours or isolated work
would reduce the likelihood of Plaintiffs’ being infected with or
exposed to COVID-19 and having to miss work. And, there is no
evidence those proposed accommodations would not increase
other burdens upon LAUSD—for example, because it could be
more challenging to monitor Plaintiffs’ compliance with masking
and cleaning protocols if they were working alone.
Moreover, while LAUSD was required to “establish[] that
any reasonable accommodation would have caused it an undue
hardship” (Soldinger, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 373), it had no
burden to do so for all possible accommodations. (Raine v. City of
Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227 [the question is
“whether the accommodation requested is reasonable and thus
required in the first place”].) It is well established “FEHA does
not require [an] employer to create a new position to
17
accommodate an employee” (Raine, at p. 1226), nor require the
employer to “substantially alter” existing positions (id. at
p. 1228).
On this record, Plaintiffs’ proposed after-hours shifts and
remote work were not reasonable accommodations as a matter of
law. We agree with the trial court this record does not show any
other employees in Plaintiffs’ positions (locksmiths or project
managers) “worked primarily after hours, or . . . were able to
work remotely.” Akala and Stelzer uniformly testified locksmiths
worked onsite during the day; they prioritized the order of their
in-person response to service calls (including emergency lockouts
and high priority restroom doors) from the 30 to 40 facilities in
their assigned territory. Stelzer testified he “[a]lways” interacted
with LAUSD’s staff onsite, because his job required “a lot of
communication and understanding of” the problem he was there
to address. While Akala’s and Stelzer’s work sometimes required
overtime after school hours, there was no evidence any
locksmiths worked a regular after-hours or night shift. That
Akala and Stelzer subjectively believed their positions could be
reconfigured to work after hours or outside the presence of others
is not evidence creating a genuine issue of fact that it was
reasonable to require LAUSD to do so. (Taylor v. Financial
Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 966, 994 (Taylor)
[“ ‘ “[t]he employee’s ‘subjective beliefs . . . do not create a genuine
issue of fact’ ” ’ ”].) LAUSD was not required to create new
locksmith positions to accommodate Akala and Stelzer.
Likewise, nothing in the record suggests Hayes’s proposed
accommodation to work remotely (offsite) or in isolation (onsite)
was reasonable. There was no evidence any other project
engineers or project managers worked remotely or in isolation.
18
On the contrary, the evidence showed Hayes’s position required
onsite presence to evaluate and inspect project sites and to hold
regular in-person meetings with the plant manager or principal
of the school. As with Akala and Stelzer, Hayes’s subjective belief
his job could be reconfigured to perform aspects remotely or in
isolation is not evidence creating a genuine issue of fact that it
was reasonable to require LAUSD to do so.
II. Religious Harassment
FEHA makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . , because of
. . . religious creed . . . , to harass an employee . . . .” (§ 12940,
subd. (j)(1).) “To establish a prima facie case of harassment, [a
plaintiff] must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the
harassment was based on her protected status; (4) the
harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance
by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment.”
(Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 549,
563 (Galvan).)
The trial court correctly determined LAUSD showed
Plaintiffs could not make out a prima facie case of religious
harassment, and Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a triable issue of
material fact to the contrary.
A. FEHA Harassment Differs from FEHA
Discrimination
As a threshold matter, “[h]arassment is distinguishable
from discrimination under the FEHA.” (Serri, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 869.) “ ‘[D]iscrimination refers to bias in
the exercise of official actions on behalf of the employer, and
harassment refers to bias that is expressed or communicated
19
through interpersonal relations in the workplace.’ ” (Ibid.) On the
other hand, “ ‘[h]arassment claims are based on a type of conduct
that is avoidable and unnecessary to job performance,’ ” such as
the use of slurs or derogatory drawings. (Ibid.) “ ‘[T]he
Legislature intended that commonly necessary personnel
management actions such as . . . firing, job or project
assignments, office or work station assignments, promotion[s]’ ”
and the like “ ‘do not come within the meaning of harassment.’ ”
(Id. at p. 870.) They “may retrospectively be found discriminatory
if based on improper motives, but in that event, the remedies
provided by the FEHA are those for discrimination, not
harassment. Harassment, by contrast, consists of actions outside
the scope of job duties which are not of a type necessary to
business and personnel management.’ ” (Ibid.)
Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs rely upon the same evidence
of “how [LAUSD] responded to their religious objections, how
those objections were dismissed, and the workplace consequences
that followed from [LAUSD’s] categorical refusal to consider
alternatives” upon which their section 12940, subdivision (a)
discrimination cause of action was based, that evidence does not
amount to actionable harassment for purposes of subdivision (j).
B. There Is No Triable Issue of Material Fact
Plaintiffs Suffered Actionable Harassment
The trial court determined there was no triable issue of
material fact the purportedly harassing conduct Plaintiffs
experienced was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to interfere
with their work environment. We agree. “ ‘[A]n employee
claiming harassment based upon a hostile work environment
must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was severe
enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of
20
employment and create a work environment that qualifies as
hostile or abusive to employees because of their [protected
status].’ [Citation.] ‘The harassment cannot be occasional,
isolated, sporadic, or trivial; the plaintiff must show a “ ‘concerted
pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized
nature.’ ” ’ ” (Galvan, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 564.)
“Moreover, ‘[t]he harassment must satisfy an objective and
a subjective standard. “ ‘[T]he objective severity of harassment
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position, considering “all the circumstances.” . . .’ ”
[Citation.] And, subjectively, an employee must perceive the work
environment to be hostile.’ ” (Galvan, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 564–565.) That is, “ ‘ “[t]he plaintiff must prove that the
defendant’s conduct would have interfered with a reasonable
employee’s work performance and would have seriously affected
the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee and that
[he] was actually offended.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 565.)
None of the Plaintiffs demonstrated a triable issue of
material fact he was harassed within the meaning of FEHA.
1. Hayes
Plaintiffs’ opening brief argues they presented “direct
evidence of ridicule and hostility,” but discusses testimony only
from Akala and Stelzer. Because the opening brief does not
sufficiently argue Hayes was harassed, we do not consider that
issue further. (See Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1282 [“An appellate court ‘will not
develop the appellants’ arguments for them . . . .’ ”].)
2. Akala
Plaintiffs argue Akala’s declaration stated “LAUSD allowed
hostile comments and attitudes about unvaccinated persons to
21
permeate in my work environment even though LAUSD knew
that unvaccinated persons like myself were unvaccinated due to
our religious beliefs.” First, that conclusory statement is not
evidence creating triable issue of material fact that the purported
harassment was objectively severe as to create a hostile work
environment. (See Taylor, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 994
[disregarding “legal conclusions [and] ultimate facts” in an
employee’s affidavit].)
Second, this record does not show a triable issue of material
fact Akala was harassed within the meaning of FEHA. Akala said
he received “more than a half dozen hostile comments . . . when
[he] checked in to facilities” that “accus[ed] [him] of endangering
other people” because he was unvaccinated. When asked what
had transpired, he said it was “just the treatment that you
receive,” and he could “sense that someone has . . . some type of
animosity towards [him].” Akala denied anyone said anything
“particularly offensive to [him] that upset [him],” to his face or to
anyone else. He also said he did not “put too much effort into it”
and “tr[ied] to ignore it.”
None of these comments mentioned anything about
religious beliefs, focusing instead on the consequences of not
vaccinating. Even assuming those comments could be construed
as motivated by religious animus, they are precisely the type of
“ ‘occasional [or] sporadic’ ” comments that do not amount to a
“ ‘ “concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a
generalized nature” ’ ” so as to show a hostile work environment.
(Galvan, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 564.) Nor do those limited
comments amount to “ ‘ “conduct [that] would have interfered
with a reasonable employee’s work performance” ’ ” or
22
“ ‘ “seriously affected the psychological well-being of a reasonable
employee.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 565.)
3. Stelzer
Stelzer stated “LAUSD allowed hostile comments and
attitudes about unvaccinated persons to permeate in my work
environment even though LAUSD knew that unvaccinated
persons like myself were unvaccinated due to our religious
beliefs. Hostile comments included several hostile comments by
LAUSD executives or board members, made publicly, accusing
unvaccinated persons of being a problem or a threat. For
example, before my termination, I saw a video on the LAUSD
website of a board meeting where a board member expressed
intense fear of and hostility towards unvaccinated persons. In
another example, during a phone conversation with an interim
superintendent of LAUSD, the interim superintendent laughed
at me for seeking religious accommodation.”
First, as with Akala, the conclusory statement Stelzer’s
work environment was “permeate[d]” with hostile comments is
not evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact. (See
Taylor, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.)
Second, the rest of Stelzer’s declaration does not
demonstrate a triable issue of material fact regarding a hostile
work environment. Stelzer does not connect the public comments
by “several” LAUSD officials to his own work environment or
explain how the comments were hostile or “ ‘show[ed] a
“ ‘concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a
generalized nature.’ ” ’ ” (Galvan, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at
p. 564.) Likewise, Stelzer points to no evidence those unspecified
remarks would interfere with a reasonable employee’s work
performance and psychological well-being. (Id. at p. 565.) Finally,
23
that an interim superintendent once laughed at Stelzer for
seeking a religious accommodation is the sort of isolated remark
that does not amount to a generalized hostile work environment.
(Id. at p. 564; cf. Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 945, 955–959 [multiple incidents of rudeness,
taunting, and intimidation by several colleagues could show a
hostile work environment].)
III. Religious Discrimination
FEHA employment discrimination cases are analyzed
under the “three-step process . . . based on the burden-shifting
test . . . in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S.
792.” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 860; see also § 12940,
subd. (a).) “ ‘[T]he employer . . . has the initial burden to present
admissible evidence showing . . . that the adverse employment
action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.’ ”
(Serri, at p. 861.) “If the employer meets its initial burden, the
burden shifts to the employee to ‘demonstrate a triable issue by
producing substantial evidence that the employer’s stated
reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted
with a discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional
discrimination or other unlawful action.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
The trial court concluded LAUSD showed “[its] termination
of Plaintiffs was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason”—their failure to comply with the vaccination mandate—
and Plaintiffs failed to show there was a triable issue of material
fact that was pretext for discrimination. We agree.
24
A. LAUSD Showed Plaintiffs Were Terminated for
a Legitimate and Nondiscriminatory Reason
An employer’s “[r]easons [for its action] are ‘legitimate’ if
they are ‘facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which, if true,
would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.’ ” (Hodges v.
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 894, 910.)
The trial court correctly concluded LAUSD showed it “terminated
Plaintiffs . . . because they did not comply with its vaccination
policy and their request for an exemption from that policy could
not be reasonably accommodated.”
This record showed LAUSD adopted the vaccination policy
to protect the health and safety of its students, its workforce, and
its ability to deliver education services. Plaintiffs do not dispute
this. The policy relied upon recommendations from scientists,
doctors, and public health officials that requiring employee
vaccinations was the best way to achieve those goals in fall 2021.
Therefore, “all employees who had not submitted verifications of
their having been vaccinated, regardless of the reason, were
suspended” in October 2021, and those who did not ultimately
submit verification of vaccination status “were processed for
termination.”
Plaintiffs do not dispute they did not submit vaccination
verifications. Instead, they argue the vaccination policy was not
neutral because it applied only to employees, not to “other adult
users of district facilities.” But the cases they cite for that
proposition involve First Amendment challenges to laws and
government regulations that “burden[] religious exercise.” (Bacon
v. Woodward (2024) 104 F.4th 744, 750; see also Tandon v.
Newsom (2021) 593 U.S. 61, 62 (per curiam).) Plaintiffs have not
pled a First Amendment cause of action, and these authorities
25
are not relevant to their FEHA religious discrimination cause of
action. Plaintiffs tacitly recognize as much in their reply brief
when they argue “constitutional decisions” are irrelevant to their
FEHA reasonable accommodation cause of action.
Thus, we conclude LAUSD showed it terminated Plaintiffs
for the legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason they failed to
comply with the vaccination policy.
B. Plaintiffs Did Not Show a Triable Issue of
Material Fact That Reason Was Pretextual
The trial court noted “Plaintiffs did not specifically address
[the] cause of action for discrimination in their opposition papers,
and therefore have not met their burden to show that a triable
issue of material fact as to whether [LAUSD] discriminated
against [them] on the basis of their religions.” Plaintiffs have not
argued the trial court erred in that regard. Instead, they make a
newly minted argument: that they demonstrated a triable issue
of material fact regarding pretext because “after they requested
religious exemptions, [LAUSD] treated them with hostility,
refused to discuss alternative accommodations, and quickly
moved to terminate them.”
Because Plaintiffs raised this argument for the first time on
appeal, we refuse to consider it. (DiCola v. White Brothers
Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676
[“[W]e are not obliged to consider arguments or theories,
including assertions as to deficiencies in defendants’ evidence,
that were not advanced by plaintiffs in the trial court.”].)
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ reply brief acknowledges this cause of action
turns upon the success of Plaintiffs’ failure to accommodate cause
of action which fails for the reasons discussed in part I, ante.
26
IV. Retaliation
“ ‘[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a
“protected activity,” (2) the employer subjected the employee to
an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed
between the protected activity and the employer’s action.’ ” (Light
v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 91
(Light); see also § 12940, subds. (h), (l)(4).) That “requisite ‘causal
link’ may be shown by the temporal relationship between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.’ ” (Light,
at p. 91.) “ ‘Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the
employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason
for the adverse employment action.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court determined LAUSD had “met its
burden of showing [its] termination of Plaintiffs was taken for a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the same reasons as set
forth in connection with the court’s ruling on Plaintiffs’ . . . causes
of action for discrimination.” We agree with that conclusion for
the same reasons we discussed in part III.A., ante.
Because LAUSD “ ‘produce[d] a legitimate reason for the
adverse employment action’ ” (Light, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at
p. 91), Plaintiffs “ha[d] the burden of offering evidence sufficient
to raise a triable issue of fact regarding intentional retaliation”
(id. at p. 94). That is, they “must offer evidence sufficient to allow
a trier of fact to find either the [LAUSD’s] stated reasons were
pretextual or the circumstances ‘ “as a whole support[] a reasoned
inference that the challenged action was the product of
discriminatory or retaliatory animus.” ’ ” (Ibid., first brackets
added.)
27
The trial court determined Plaintiffs failed to show
LAUSD’s asserted reason for their termination was pretextual or
retaliatory because they “did not specifically address [this] cause
of action . . . in their opposition papers.” Plaintiffs do not dispute
that characterization, but instead argue Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c, subdivision (c) required the trial court to evaluate
the merits of this cause of action based upon the record as a
whole.
The burden-shifting framework applicable to retaliation
causes of action requires the plaintiff opposing summary
judgment—not the trial court sua sponte—to point to evidence
sufficient to raising a triable issue of fact regarding intentional
retaliation. (Light, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 94.) Plaintiffs
failed to do so because their opposition to LAUSD’s motion for
summary adjudication did not address their retaliation cause of
action. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ reply brief acknowledges this cause
of action turns upon the success of Plaintiffs’ failure to
accommodate cause of action–which fails for the reasons
discussed in part I, ante. Summary adjudication was appropriate.
V. Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment
FEHA makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to
take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring.” (§ 12940, subd. (k).) The parties
agree this cause of action is derivative of Plaintiffs’ other FEHA
causes of action. Thus, because Plaintiffs did not show any
discrimination or harassment occurred, their failure-to-prevent
cause of action necessarily fails. (Cf. Dickson v. Burke Williams,
Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1314 [there must be “ ‘a finding
of actual discrimination or harassment under FEHA before a
plaintiff may prevail under section 12940, subdivision (k)’ ”].)
28
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. LAUSD is entitled to costs on
appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.*
* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
29
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