CourtListener 10850500•People v. Brownlee CA2/1
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Filed 4/29/26 P. v. Brownlee CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B343179
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24VWCF01014)
v.
MARY BROWNLEE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Reversed.
Sharon Fleming, by appointment of the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The prosecution charged appellant Mary Brownlee
with possession for sale of a large quantity of fentanyl and
methamphetamine. She requested the trial court permit
her to participate in pretrial diversion under Penal Code
section 1001.361—that is, “ ‘the postponement of prosecution . . .
to allow [her] to undergo mental health treatment’ ” for a
“qualifying mental disorder.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th
618, 626, quoting § 1001.36, subd. (c).) The court found her
unsuitable for diversion, citing an “unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) On appeal, Brownlee
contends the court abused its discretion in declining her request.
We agree.
Section 1001.36 narrowly defines an “ ‘unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety’ ” as requiring an “unreasonable risk” that
the defendant will commit one of several statutorily enumerated
violent felonies colloquially known as “ ‘ “super strikes.” ’ ”
(People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449 (Moine); § 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) In concluding Brownlee posed such a danger, the court
found she was likely to continue selling fentanyl, that the fentanyl
she sold was likely to kill someone, and that Brownlee could be
prosecuted for such a death on a theory of implied malice murder.
According to the court, this established an unreasonable risk that
Brownlee would commit a super strike—murder—and the court
denied diversion.
The court’s reasoning rests on purely speculative factual
findings unsupported by any evidence. Accordingly, the court
abused its discretion in denying diversion on this basis. The court
did not cite any other basis for denying diversion, nor do the People
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
cite an alternative basis for affirming the court’s order.
Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charged Offenses and Criminal History
During a May 1, 2024 warrant-based search of Brownlee’s
residence, police found approximately 2.9 pounds of what appeared
to be fentanyl, approximately .9 pounds of what appeared to be
methamphetamine, and $6,629 in cash. Brownlee told the police
she had been selling fentanyl, and that she started selling drugs
over 40 years ago.
On November 22, 2024, the district attorney charged
Brownlee with possession of fentanyl for sale and possession of
methamphetamine for sale, in violation of Health and Safety Code
sections 11351 and 11378, respectively. The criminal information
also included allegations based on Brownlee’s lengthy criminal
history. Brownlee has 20 prior felony convictions spanning
36 years, primarily for drug-related offenses (possession, possession
with the intent to sell, and transportation for sale of controlled
substances). None involved violence.2 Nor does Brownlee’s
misdemeanor record reflect any violence.
B. Brownlee’s Voluntary Substance Abuse
Treatment Efforts
Brownlee was released from custody after her arrest. On
July 23, 2024—almost four months before the district attorney
filed a criminal information charging her—she voluntarily began
2 The remaining felonies were nonviolent property offenses,
such as theft, possession of stolen property, and a section 470,
subdivision (d) conviction for possessing false identification.
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a chemical dependency rehabilitation program at an organization
called CRI-Help. Upon completing the detoxification portion of
the program, she transferred to CRI-Help’s community-based
residential rehabilitation program. Care providers prescribed
Brownlee various medications, including Tegretol for mood
instability and Suboxone, a medication to assist in maintaining
sobriety from opioids. In October 2024, Brownlee completed
CRI-Help’s residential program and enrolled in I-ADARP, an
outpatient drug and alcohol treatment program affiliated with
CRI-Help.
C. Brownlee’s Section 1001.36 Diversion Request
1. Section 1001.36
The primary goal of section 1001.36 is to “[i]ncrease
diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate
the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice
system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).)
“[A]dvances in psychology and neuroscience” inform this goal.
(Sarmiento v. Superior Ct. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 898
(Sarmiento).) “[T]he Legislature has made it abundantly
clear that for defendants whose criminal behavior is a function
of their diagnosed mental health disorders, treatment is the
much preferred option . . . . [Citation.] . . . The Legislature has
determined that in most cases, the community will be safer if
defendants . . . [whose mental illness contributes to their criminal
activity] receive mental health treatment so that they will pose
fewer risks to the community both now and in the future.” (Ibid.)
A defendant must be both “eligible” and “suitable”
to be granted diversion. (§ 1001.36, subds. (a) & (b).) Under
section 1001.36, a defendant is “eligible” if (1) the defendant
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suffers from a qualifying mental disorder, and (2) the disorder
played a significant role in the commission of the charged offense.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) Even if eligible, a defendant
is “suitable” for diversion only if the defendant also establishes
all the following: (1) The defendant’s “symptoms of the mental
disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal
behavior would respond to mental health treatment” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(1)); (2) The defendant consents to diversion and
waives his or her right to a speedy trial (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2));
(3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(3)); and (4) The defendant “ ‘will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
[section] 1170.18’ ”—meaning a risk that the defendant will
commit one of several statutorily enumerated violent felonies
(“ “ ‘super strikes” ’ ”) (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449)—
“if treated in the community” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)).
A hearing on eligibility and suitability for diversion “shall
be informal and may proceed on offers of proof, reliable hearsay,
and argument of counsel.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (e).) “The court may
consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a
qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history,
the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
2. Request and Supporting Materials
On November 18, 2024, Brownlee filed a request for
section 1001.36 diversion, attaching an evaluation of psychiatrist
Dr. Sanjay M. Sahgal (the Sahgal report) and letters of support
from individuals involved in her substance abuse treatment
efforts.
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a. The Sahgal report
Sahgal reviewed Brownlee’s criminal record and documents
related to the current charges. He also conducted a formal
interview of Brownlee, during which she shared her decades-long
history of drug use and abusive relationships. Brownlee began
using various drugs at the age of 14 after her mother abandoned
her and placed her in the care of a physically abusive uncle. At
age 18, she married a man who used illegal drugs and physically
abused her. They divorced eight years later. While in prison in
her early 20’s, Brownlee suffered additional abuse and continued
her drug use. She reported that she received drugs from a
correctional officer who sexually abused her. Brownlee openly
admitted that she had been selling drugs her entire adult life
because it is “ ‘all [she] knew or know[s] how to do’ ” to support
herself and her addiction, aside from prostitution and petty theft.
“Brownlee was quick to spontaneously state that she accepts
responsibility for her behaviors.”
Sahgal opined that Brownlee met the diagnostic criteria
for opioid use disorder and methamphetamine use disorder.
He described “[t]he entire arc of her life from the age of 14
to her current age of 61 [as] a long series of convictions for
the consequences and demands of her opioid addiction and
methamphetamine addiction.” Sahgal further opined that
Brownlee’s substance abuse disorders were “significant
contributing factors to her behaviors associated with the charged
offenses,” “if not the sole contributing factor.” He described her
entire criminal history as deriving from her chemical dependence
disorders and efforts to financially support them.
According to the Sahgal report, “clinical data suggest
that participation in a formal residential chemical dependency
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rehabilitation program would provide . . . Brownlee with a
high probability of achieving longstanding voluntary sustained
sobriety.” Such programs “very often lead[ ] to sustained
voluntary sobriety,” and “older patients [like Brownlee] . . .
have a higher chance of achieving lasting sobriety. The progress
Brownlee had made in her substance abuse treatment efforts
since August 2024 provided additional support for Sahgal’s
opinion that her disorders will respond to treatment. At the
time of Sahgal’s interview (September 2024), Brownlee was still
in the I-ADARP program and “participat[ing] in consistent daily
12-Step meetings for relapse prevention support. Her compliance
and adherence to the strict treatment requirements at CRI-Help
have been met without deviation. She states that she [feels] a
sense of peace for the first time in her life” while participating in
these programs. Brownlee told Sahgal, “ ‘I’m 61 and I just want
to be sober and have some sort of life or quality of life.’ ”
Finally, Sahgal opined that, if Brownlee “were to be placed
in a community residential treatment rehabilitation program
such as CRI-Help or another similar program, the data suggest
that she would be a very low risk to public safety. She has no
history of known violence and has indeed been participating
in such a program through CRI-Help for four months without
any erratic or violent behaviors. Instead, she has been a
model patient who has experienced significant benefits from
the treatment offered at CRI-Help and through the Baird Street
Clinic [of I-ADARP].”
b. Letters regarding substance abuse
treatment efforts
November 2024 letters from CRI-Help, I-ADARP, and
Brownlee’s sponsor all attest to Brownlee’s strict compliance
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with the requirements of her substance abuse treatment
programs and the progress she was making. According to
these letters, Brownlee began regular drug testing around
August 22, 2024 and consistently tested negative for all
substances. Brownlee was participating in mental health
treatment as part of her efforts to remain sober. All three
letters spoke in glowing terms of Brownlee’s efforts in treatment.
At the hearing on the request, Brownlee supplemented
her request with letters from additional service providers.
A November 15, 2024 letter from the Center for Living and
Learning (CLL), an organization that assists previously
incarcerated individuals find employment, housing and other
services, reports that Brownlee was “actively looking for
employment and working closely with [CLL] case managers.”
A November 15, 2024 letter from Care First Community
Investment describes a “[r]eentry program” in which Brownlee
was enrolled that “assist[s] participants to effectively engage
with community-based health, behavioral health, and social
service providers as they return to the community.”
3. Hearing and Ruling
On December 2, 2024, the court held a hearing on
Brownlee’s diversion request. A criminal justice liaison from
CRI-Help appeared to “support” Brownlee and informed the
court that Brownlee was still participating and doing “very
well” in the independent outpatient program. Brownlee had also
found employment. The court acknowledged Brownlee’s progress,
including that she had been sober for over 100 days.
The court expressed concern, however, that the charged
offenses “involve[d] the sale of a really, really deadly substance,
fentanyl,” “something that kills people . . . has killed people
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[the court] know[s],” and that Brownlee was in possession
of “a lot of it.” The district attorney opposed diversion based
on similar concerns. He cited the “particular dangerousness
with fentanyl” and noted Brownlee had been in possession of
a quantity that “could wipe out a city.”
The court denied the diversion request on the basis that
Brownlee “pose[d] an unreasonable risk [to] public safety.” The
court explained: “[E]specially given [her] history, if she were
to sell fentanyl and someone were to wind up getting killed
she would be charged with murder,” which “would constitute
a super[ ]strike.”
The court noted that “if [Brownlee] were to plead no
contest . . . as to everything, I would place her on probation.”
After a brief recess, Brownlee pleaded no contest to both charges,
and the court placed her on formal probation for two years. The
probation had numerous conditions, including that Brownlee do
“outpatient treatment at the direction of [I-ADARP] and CLL.”
The court noted Brownlee was already involved in these
programs and had completed the residential rehabilitation
component, hence the court was not also requiring that. The
court ordered Brownlee to return to court in two months so the
court could “see how [she is] doing.”
Brownlee timely appealed the order denying her diversion
request.
DISCUSSION
We review a trial court’s decision on whether to grant
section 1001.36 diversion for abuse of discretion. (Moine,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.) In this context, a court
abuses its discretion when it “appl[ies] the wrong legal standard
[citation] . . . or bases its decision on express or implied factual
9
findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.
at p. 449.)
Here, the court did not question that Brownlee was eligible
for diversion. Rather, the court denied diversion based entirely
on its assessment that she poses a risk to public safety sufficient
to render her unsuitable under section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4).
Unsuitability on this basis requires—without exception—“[a]
likelihood the defendant will commit [one of] a limited subset
of violent felonies.” (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450;
see Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.) The court
concluded such a likelihood existed based on the following factual
findings: (1) Brownlee was likely to sell fentanyl again, (2) if
Brownlee sells fentanyl, it is likely use thereof will result in
the death of a third party, and (3) a factfinder could conclude
that, in selling that fentanyl, Brownlee acted with implied
malice sufficient to support a murder conviction. (See People v.
Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300 [“malice may be implied when
defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result
in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a
wanton disregard for human life”].) All three of these findings
are necessary to the court’s public safety analysis. As we explain
below, however, substantial evidence does not support two of
them. Therefore, we reverse.3
Brownlee’s criminal record provides substantial evidence
supporting the first finding—that it is likely she will sell
fentanyl again. But evidentiary support for the court’s public
3 We thus need not consider whether, if the evidence did
support these factual findings, they would establish the type
and/or level of risk section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4) requires
to deny diversion.
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safety analysis ends there. As to the second finding, the record
contains no evidence on the likelihood that a given dose of
fentanyl will prove fatal. The evidence thus does not support
an “unreasonable risk” that one of the doses Brownlee might
sell will prove fatal. As to the third finding, the record contains
no evidence bearing on the likelihood a jury would find Brownlee
guilty of murder in the court’s hypothetical scenario. And it is
unclear what type of evidence could support a finding that this is
so likely as to pose the requisite “unreasonable risk.” In theory,
if permitted to participate in diversion, Brownlee could possibly
sell fentanyl causing someone’s death, which could possibly result
in a murder conviction. But this is wholly speculative, and
“ ‘speculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence.’ ”
(Wise v. DLA Piper LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188;
People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851.) Indeed, the
court’s findings boil down to “ ‘what if ’ surmises” that “are
doubly speculative, because [they] . . . speculate both” that the
fentanyl Brownlee sells could prove fatal, and, building on that
hypothetical, “how others would have reacted to” it—namely,
that a jury would convict her of murder. (Wise v. DLA Piper LLP,
supra, at p. 1188, italics omitted.)
Nothing else in the record suggests an unreasonable risk
that Brownlee will commit a super strike. Indeed, nothing in the
record supports a risk that she will engage in any violent conduct
whatsoever. To the contrary, Brownlee has no history of violence,
there is no violence involved in the offense currently charged, and
the Sahgal report opines she does not present a threat of violence.
The record does not support that Brownlee is unsuitable due to
public safety concerns under section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4).
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After receiving a diversion request, “[t]he trial court’s
role is to determine whether a narrow range of factors warrant”
denial of diversion, bearing in mind the “Legislature[’s] . . .
determin[ation] that in most cases, the community will be safer
if defendants” “whose criminal behavior is a function of their
diagnosed mental health disorders” “receive mental health
treatment so that they will pose fewer risks to the community
both now and in the future.” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th
at p. 898.) The public safety factor is the only factor the court
identified in denying Brownlee’s diversion request, and the
only basis for affirmance the People argue on appeal. Because
substantial evidence does not support that this factor rendered
Brownlee unsuitable, the court abused its discretion in denying
her diversion request.
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DISPOSITION
We reverse the court’s order denying Brownlee’s request for
section 1001.36 pretrial diversion. We direct the court, following
remand, to enter a new order vacating Brownlee’s plea and
sentencing and granting her request.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
M. KIM, J.
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