People v. Cudjo CA2/2

CourtListener 10850499CalctappApr 29, 2026

Full text

Filed 4/29/26 P. v. Cudjo CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B337977

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XNOMA082999)
v.

GREGORY PAUL CUDJO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
In 1986, defendant Gregory Paul Cudjo and his brother
Armenia Cudjo burglarized the Prokuda residence while Amelia
Prokuda and her five-year-old son Kevin Prokuda were home.1
After Armenia raped Amelia, Gregory tied her up and bludgeoned
her to death with a fireplace poker and a hammer. Gregory now
appeals his conviction for first degree murder. Because we
perceive no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In March 1986, Gregory and Armenia lived together in a
cab-over camper in a desert lot in the Antelope Valley.2 They
were cocaine users but did not have money to afford it.
On the morning of March 21, 1986, the brothers planned a
burglary to obtain valuables that they could then sell. They chose
the nearby Prokuda house, which appeared to be unoccupied.
They entered through the open garage at the back of the house.
After they encountered a locked door in the garage, Gregory used
a survival knife to “jimmy the lock” and open the door.
Behind the door was Amelia. As Gregory grabbed Amelia,
Armenia ducked down out of sight. Gregory continued into the
house with Amelia while holding the survival knife to her neck
and demanding money. As he did so, he found Kevin standing
next to Amelia. Gregory then led Amelia and Kevin down a
hallway, directed Kevin into a bedroom, and closed the door.
Gregory next led Amelia to the living room, where Armenia
joined them. Gregory handed Amelia off to Armenia and searched

1 We refer to individuals who share the same last names by
their first names for clarity. We intend no disrespect.
2 In reciting this summary, “we ‘view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Navarro
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.)

2
the house for valuables. In the living room, Armenia raped
Amelia. After this, Gregory returned with various items and two
long rifle cases.
As the brothers were about to leave, Gregory took Amelia to
a bedroom to tie her up. Armenia, who remained in the living
room, heard scuffling noises coming from the bedroom. Thinking
Gregory might need help, Armenia grabbed a fireplace poker and
went into the bedroom. There, Gregory stood over Amelia, who
was face down, had her mouth gagged, had something tied
around her head, and had her hands tied behind her back.
Annoyed that Amelia was resisting, Gregory grabbed the poker
from Armenia, hit Amelia twice in the head with it, and
repeatedly said, “Bitch, be still.” The second strike was so forceful
the tip of the poker broke.
After the second strike, Armenia left the room and heard
Gregory strike Amelia a third time with the poker. Armenia also
heard four loud thud sounds and several quieter thud sounds.3 A
few minutes later, Gregory exited the bedroom and said Amelia
had been “acting up” and he “knocked her out and tied her up.”
The brothers then left the Prokuda house using separate
routes. Gregory took the northwestern path through the desert,
which left footprints in the sand. Armenia took the eastern path
on a paved road, which did not leave footprints. They both
returned to their camper. That afternoon, deputies from the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) arrested the
brothers at the camper.

3 No one witnessed what caused these sounds. However, a
claw hammer with blood on it was found next to Amelia’s body.
The People theorized the thuds were the sound of Gregory hitting
Amelia with the hammer.

3
A medical examiner performed an autopsy and found that
Amelia died of blunt force trauma. The examiner identified 16
scalp lacerations as the minimum number of blows dealt to
Amelia’s head. He opined the actual number was probably
substantially higher.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Armenia’s 1988 Conviction
In 1986, the LASD believed only one person broke into the
Prokuda home. Kevin testified he saw only one intruder, and
although the deputies found two set of footprints heading toward
the general direction of the Prokuda house and numerous
footprints around the house, they only found one set of footprints
heading away from the house.
LASD arrested the brothers, who looked similar and wore
similar clothing on March 21, 1986. They shared the same weight
and height. They wore the same model and size of MacGregor
shoes. They wore similarly colored blue shorts. The difference
was Armenia’s semen was found at the crime scene.
In 1986, Armenia was charged with Amelia’s murder. In
1988, Armenia was convicted of special circumstances first degree
murder and sentenced to death, which our Supreme Court
affirmed on direct appeal. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585,
637.)
In 2012, the Ninth Circuit overturned Armenia’s conviction
and death sentence on the ground that evidence that Gregory had
confessed to the crime had been improperly excluded. (Cudjo v.
Ayers (9th Cir. 2012) 698 F.3d 752, 770.)
II. Gregory’s Confessions
Between 1986 and 2012, Gregory confessed to multiple
people that he murdered Amelia.

4
First, in 1986, Gregory confessed to family friend John
Culver. After Gregory was arrested at the camper, he was
coincidentally placed in the same cell as Culver. Seeing Gregory
was pacing back and forth, Culver asked what was wrong.
Gregory replied he was arrested for murder and admitted he was
the culprit. Gregory said, “I went over to rob, burglarize this
lady’s house, and she seen me, and that’s when all the stuff went
down, and that’s what happened.” Gregory also said he knocked
Amelia out after she started screaming and continued to beat her
with a hammer after she was unconscious.
An officer overheard that conversation and prepared a
report stating “Suspect Cudjo” said “I’m in here for murder and I
did it.” To aid Armenia’s Ninth Circuit appeal, Gregory prepared
declarations in 2008 identifying himself as the person who said,
“I’m in here for murder and I did it.”
Second, in 1988 or 1989, Gregory confessed to his best
friend’s nephew Shontae Franklin. Gregory and Franklin were
waiting outside a convenience store when they saw a man who
had attempted to kill Franklin’s mother. Gregory said the man
was a bad person and “has bodies out here like me.” Gregory
added, “My brother’s in jail for a white girl that I killed.”
Third, in 1991 or 1992, Gregory confessed to his best friend
Steven Davison. The two men were hanging out in Davison’s van
when Gregory said, “I feel bad. I never did tell nobody about this,
but my brother Armenia is the one that’s in prison, and I’m the
one that did the crime that Armenia is in prison for.”
Finally, in 2000, Gregory confessed to LASD Sergeant
Brian Jones. While Jones was on duty, Gregory came into the
station and asked a community service officer why two detectives
were looking for Gregory. Gregory told the officer he thought it
might be related to a homicide. Jones then spoke to Gregory, who
said someone else was in jail for a homicide the person did not

5
commit. When Jones asked Gregory how he knew this, Gregory
answered he was involved in the homicide.
C. Gregory’s 2024 Trial and Conviction
After the Ninth Circuit overturned his conviction, Armenia
confessed to raping Amelia but accused Gregory of killing her.
Because Armenia’s confession corroborated Gregory’s confessions,
which had been obtained by the LASD over the years, Gregory
was charged by an amended information with Amelia’s murder.
(See Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).4) The information further alleged
Gregory used a deadly and dangerous weapon within the
meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
Armenia was separately charged, for a second time, with
first degree murder. He pled no contest and was sentenced to
25 years to life.
Gregory was tried by a jury in March 2024. Gregory’s sole
defense was the LASD got it right the first time. He argued
Armenia, and only Armenia, burglarized the Prokuda house and
killed Amelia.
The jury found Gregory guilty of first degree murder and
found true the allegation he personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon. The trial court denied his motion for new
trial. On May 10, 2024, he was sentenced to 26 years to life.
Gregory timely appealed. (See § 1237, subd. (a); Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.308(a).)
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Gregory makes two arguments that he never
made before the trial court. First, he argues CALJIC Nos. 3.10
and 3.16, which defined accomplice and informed the jury that an
accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated, should have been

4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

6
modified to also say that an accomplice can also be the direct
perpetrator of a crime. Second, he argues CALJIC No. 8.31, the
implied malice second degree murder instruction, should have
also been given to the jury.
The People argue Gregory forfeited these claims of
instructional error by not requesting these instructions below. We
assume he did not. (See People v. Owen (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d
996, 1004 [“In criminal cases, the trial court must instruct sua
sponte on the general principles of law relevant to issues raised
by the evidence . . . . At a minimum, the court must ensure that
the jury is adequately instructed on the law governing all
elements of the case submitted to it to the extent necessary for a
proper determination in conformity with applicable law.”].) We
reject both contentions on the merits.
I. Standard of Review
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581, 584.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Instructing the Jury
With CALJIC Nos. 3.10 and 3.16 Without Modification
A. The Principal and Accomplice Jury
Instructions
Gregory’s jury received a number of instructions to guide
their deliberations and decision making. Pertinent portions
relating to liability were as follows:
CALJIC No. 2.90: “A defendant in a criminal action is
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case
of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he
is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places
upon the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.”

7
CALJIC No. 3.00: “Persons who are involved in committing
a crime are referred to as principals in that crime . . . . Principals
include: [¶] 1. Those who directly and actively commit the act
constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet the
commission of the crime.”
CALJIC No. 3.03: “The People have the burden of proving
that the defendant was a principal in, and had not effectively
withdrawn from participation in, that crime. If you have
reasonable doubt that he was a principal in and participated as
an aider and abettor in a crime charged, you must find him not
guilty of that crime.”
CALJIC No. 3.10: “An accomplice is a person who is subject
to prosecution for the identical offense charged in Count 1
against the defendant on trial by reason of aiding and abetting.”
CALJIC No. 3.11: “You cannot find a defendant guilty
based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony
is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect the
defendant with commission of the offense.”
CALJIC No. 3.12: “To corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice, there must be evidence of some act or fact related to
the crime which, if believed, by itself and without any aid,
interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice,
tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime
charged. [¶] . . . [¶] In determining whether an accomplice has
been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the
accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then
determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends
to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. [¶] If
there is no independent evidence which tends to connect
defendant with the commission of the crime, the testimony of the

8
accomplice is not corroborated. [¶] If there is independent
evidence which you believe, then the testimony of the accomplice
is corroborated.”
CALJIC No. 3.16: “If the crime of Murder was committed
by anyone, the witness Armenia Cudjo was an accomplice as a
matter of law and his testimony is subject to the rule requiring
corroboration.”
CALJIC 3.18: “To the extent that an accomplice gives
testimony that tends to incriminate the defendant, it should be
viewed with caution.”
B. The Accomplice Instructions Were Not
Tantamount to a Directed Verdict for the
People
As mentioned, Gregory’s sole defense at trial was that
Armenia alone broke into the Prokuda house on March 21, 1986.
Gregory thus argued the only person who could have murdered
Amelia, and did in fact murder her, was Armenia.
According to Gregory, CALJIC Nos. 3.10 and 3.16, given
without modification, precluded the jury from accepting his
theory. Gregory takes issue with CALJIC No. 3.10’s language
stating “[a]n accomplice is a person who is subject to prosecution
for the identical offense charged in Count 1 against the defendant
on trial by reason of aiding and abetting” and CALJIC No. 3.16’s
language stating “[i]f the crime of Murder was committed by
anyone, the witness Armenia Cudjo was an accomplice as a
matter of law.” (Italics added.) Gregory contends that without any
language that an accomplice can also be a director perpetrator,
these instructions implicitly rejected his theory that Armenia
acted alone because they effectively instructed the jury Armenia
did in fact aid and abet Gregory in committing Amelia’s murder.

9
Gregory thus claims these instructions were tantamount to a
directed verdict that Gregory was the murderer. He argues an
instruction like CALCRIM No. 334, which defines accomplice to
be either a direct perpetrator or aider and abettor, would have
been more appropriate.
However, as Gregory acknowledges, the California
Supreme Court rejected similar claims of instructional error in
People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147 (Heishman), abrogated
on other grounds by People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190,
and People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, and we
are bound by these precedents. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
In Heishman, the defendant was charged with murdering a
woman to prevent her from testifying that he had raped her.
(Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 156–157.) Nancy Gentry, a
woman with whom the defendant was romantically involved,
testified she drove the defendant to the victim’s home, lured the
victim outside, and drove the defendant from the scene after the
murder. (Id. at pp. 158–159.) The defendant argued at trial
Gentry acted on her own and was the one who killed the victim.
(Id. at p. 162.) The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC
Nos. 3.10 and 3.16, the language of which were similar to those
given in Gregory’s trial. (Heishman, at p. 162.)
In Heishman, on appeal following his conviction, the
defendant argued that, because of CALJIC Nos. 3.10 and 3.16,
the jury was “directed to find that Gentry was an accomplice in
the sense of one who assists another and was precluded from
finding that she acted alone.” (Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at
p. 162.)

10
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and explained
the instructions still allowed the jury to conclude Gentry was
both an accomplice and the actual killer: “The instructions did
not literally tell the jury it could not find Gentry was the killer.
And Gentry was legally an accomplice ‘if the crime of murder was
committed by anyone’ including Gentry herself. CALJIC No. 3.16
was given to make clear that Gentry was being labeled an
accomplice for purposes of the rule requiring corroboration if her
testimony were believed. The instruction could not reasonably be
understood as precluding rejection of her testimony—including
rejection based on a conclusion that in fact she was the killer.
[Citation.] Defendant’s interpretation of the instruction would
make it practically a direction of conviction. Yet the jury was
fully instructed on the presumption of innocence and the
prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 162–163.)
In Coffman and Marlow, defendants Coffman and Marlow
were convicted of kidnapping, robbing, raping, and killing the
victim. (34 Cal.4th at p. 16.) On appeal, Coffman argued that
because CALJIC No. 3.10 defined accomplice only as aider and
abettor and because the evidence clearly established Marlow was
the direct perpetrator, the instructions precluded the jury from
finding Marlow to be an accomplice. (34 Cal.4th at p. 103.)
According to Coffman, this prejudiced her case by depriving her
of the benefit of instructions stating an accomplice’s testimony
must also be corroborated by independent evidence. (Id. at
p. 104.) Citing Heishman, the court held CALJIC No. 3.10 could
not have misled the jury in the manner that Coffman claimed.
(34 Cal.4th at p. 104.) Marlow also was entitled to the
presumption of innocence, and CALJIC No. 3.10 did not direct

11
the jury to find Marlow was the direct perpetrator. (34 Cal.4th at
p. 104.)
Here, the instructions similarly did not tell the jury
Gregory was necessarily guilty. Instead, they left that fact-
finding function to the jury. CALJIC No. 2.90 instructed the jury
Gregory was presumed innocent and the People bore the burden
of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. CALJIC
No. 3.00 defined principal, and CALJIC No. 3.03 reminded the
jury that the People bore the burden of proving Gregory was a
principal in the charged crime. CALJIC No. 3.10 defined
accomplice, and CALJIC Nos. 3.11, 3.12, 3.16, and 3.18 benefited
Gregory by informing the jury it must view Armenia’s testimony
with caution, assume Armenia’s testimony was removed from the
case, and consider whether independent evidence connected
Gregory with the commission of the murder. We presume the jury
only considered Armenia’s status as an accomplice for these
purposes and concluded Gregory was guilty because the evidence
supported that finding. (People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897,
1028 [“We presume jurors follow their instructions.”].)
Gregory first attempts to distinguish Coffman and Marlow.
According to Gregory, the case is inapposite because there (1) it
was obvious the two defendants were accomplices no matter who
committed the killing, (2) the issue was whether the jury was
precluded from applying the rule requiring corroboration of an
accomplice’s testimony, and (3) the jury was not instructed that
Marlow was an accomplice as a matter of law. Although there are
some differences between Coffman and Marlow and this case,
Coffman and Marlow still compels us to reject Gregory’s
argument as it stands for the proposition that CALJIC No. 3.10

12
does not create a conclusive presumption that a defendant is a
direct perpetrator.
As for Heishman, Gregory argues that to the extent it bars
his “directed verdict” argument, Heishman does not preclude him
from arguing that giving CALJIC Nos. 3.10 and 3.16 was still
erroneous because these instructions, in the context of this case,
were ambiguous, incomplete, and could have been interpreted by
a juror as a judicial declaration that Armenia was an aider and
abettor rather than direct perpetrator. This argument fails for
several reasons.
First, although we are considering Gregory’s claim of
instructional error despite his failure to object below (see p. 7,
ante), to the extent he is arguing the instructions were
misleading rather than legally incorrect, he has forfeited the
argument. “A trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or
improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request
from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an
otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for
purposes of appeal.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638.)
Second, assuming Gregory did not forfeit the argument, he
provides no evidence or citation to the record to support his
insinuation that the instructions misled the jury. He merely
speculates the instructions could have done so. This is
insufficient to demonstrate error. (See Hernandez v. First
Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 [“ ‘When an
appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.” ’ ”].)
Finally, in People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152,
disapproved on other grounds by People v. Stansbury (1995)

13
9 Cal.4th 824, 830, footnote 1, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Heishman and rejected a similar contention that CALJIC
Nos. 3.10 and 3.16 should be supplemented with an additional
instruction that an accomplice can be a direct perpetrator. There,
the trial court instructed the jury that two witnesses were
accomplices as a matter of law and defined an accomplice as
essentially an aider and abettor. (Morris, at p. 210.) The
defendant argued the court’s refusal to instruct the jury that “an
accomplice could also be a person who ‘directly’ committed the
crime” resulted in a conclusive presumption against his defense
that two testifying accomplices “were the actual killers.” (Id. at
p. 211.) The Supreme Court followed its precedent in Heishman
and rejected the claim that the proposed language was necessary.
(Ibid.)
Because we find Heishman, Carlow and Marlow, and
Morris dispose of Gregory’s argument, we conclude the trial court
did not err by instructing the jury with CALJIC Nos. 3.10 and
3.16 as they were given.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Not Instructing the
Jury with CALJIC No. 8.31 Sua Sponte
A. Relevant Legal Principles and Jury
Instructions
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) “Second degree murder is
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought
but without the additional elements, such as willfulness,
premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction
of first degree murder.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139,
151.) Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “The
primary difference between express malice and implied malice is

14
that the former requires an intent to kill but the latter does not.”
(People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 976.) Implied malice murder
instead requires the killing be proximately caused by an act,
“ ‘ “ ‘the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows
that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 988.)
Second degree murder, including express and implied
malice murder, is a lesser included offense of first degree murder.
(See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 623–624.) The trial
court must instruct on lesser included offenses “if there is
evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the
defendant of guilt of the greater offense but not of the lesser.”
(People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744–745, overruled on
other grounds by People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919.) “To
justify a lesser included offense instruction, the evidence
supporting the instruction must be substantial—that is, it must
be evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons
could conclude that the facts underlying the particular
instruction exist.” (Blair, at p. 745.)
Here, in addition to instructing the jury on first degree
murder, the trial court also instructed the jury on express malice
second degree murder with CALJIC No. 8.30: “Murder of the
second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought when the perpetrator intended to unlawfully

15
to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove
deliberation and meditation.”
B. There Was Insufficient Evidence to Require the
Trial Court to Instruct on Implied Malice
Second Degree Murder
According to Gregory, the trial court should have also given
the jury CALJIC No. 8.31, the implied malice second degree
murder instruction. Not so. No reasonable jury could have
concluded that whoever killed Amelia acted with conscious
disregard for life instead of the intent to kill.
Although the parties disputed how many people broke into
the Prokuda house on March 21, 1986, and who killed Amelia,
there was no dispute as to why the burglary occurred and how
Amelia was killed. It was undisputed an armed culprit broke into
the Prokuda house as part of a plan to steal valuables that could
be sold for cocaine. There was no dispute that during the
commission of the burglary Amelia was taken captive, raped, and
bound. It was undisputed after Amelia was rendered helpless and
unable to resist, someone bludgeoned her to death with a
fireplace poker and hammer. There was no dispute that one of
the poker strikes was so forceful that the tip broke. It was
undisputed at least 16 poker and hammer blows were dealt to
Amelia’s head. Under these circumstances, regardless of who the
jury concluded killed Amelia, the jury could reasonably conclude
that killer acted with the intent to kill.
Even Gregory concedes there was “strong evidence of intent
to kill,” including the evidence showing Amelia was repeatedly
struck in the head and suffered multiple skull fractures and
brain injuries. Nevertheless, he conclusorily asserts this did not
negate the possibility that the person who inflicted these wounds

16
acted only with a conscious disregard for life, rather than the
specific intent to kill. That does not demonstrate error. (Cf. Jones
v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not
have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by
argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues
waived.”].)
Gregory further argues the jury was not required to accept
Armenia’s testimony that Gregory was the person who inflicted
all the wounds while Armenia inflicted none of them. According
to Gregory, if the jury concluded both brothers inflicted some of
the blows and found Armenia inflicted the majority of them, the
jury could have reasonably concluded Gregory did not act with
the specific intent to kill. We are not persuaded.
Assuming the brothers bludgeoned Amelia to death
together, this does not help Gregory. With her hands bound and
mouth gagged, Amelia could not fight back or summon help. She
was helpless and at the brothers’ mercy. Regardless of how the
number of blows was allocated, striking her head with a fireplace
poker or hammer under these circumstances evinces an intent to
kill.
Because instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 8.31 was not
supported by substantial evidence, the trial court had no duty to
do so.
Since we have found no error, we need not and do not
consider the parties’ harmless error or cumulative error
arguments.

17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

18

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.