CourtListener 10849143•JIPC Ventures v. Newkoa CA4/3
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Filed 4/28/26 JIPC Ventures v. Newkoa CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JIPC VENTURES, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065385
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01394156)
NEWKOA, LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Theodore R. Howard, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Gerald S. Ohn, Gerald S. Ohn and Rodney Gi for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rutan & Tucker, Steven J. Goon, Kathryn D.Z. Domin and Golsa
Honarfar for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Newkoa, LLC appeals after the trial court denied its
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute) special motion to
strike each cause of action brought against it by plaintiff JIPC Ventures, Inc.
(JIPC).1 The court concluded none of the causes of action fall within the scope
of the anti-SLAPP statute. Newkoa contends that conclusion was error
because all the claims are based on its alleged acts or failure to act regarding
the City of Buena Park’s (city) consideration of a proposed development
project on land adjacent to land owned by Newkoa, and those acts and
omissions are protected activity. It further argues JIPC failed to establish the
minimal merit of its claims and the court erred in overruling certain
objections to JIPC evidence. We conclude, as the trial court did, that none of
the claims arise from activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, which
obviates the need to consider Newkoa’s remaining arguments. Accordingly,
we affirm the challenged order.
FACTS
JIPC operates a pizza restaurant with family entertainment on
the lower level of a shopping mall owned by Newkoa. After disputes arose
between the parties about maintenance of the mall’s common areas and
access to JIPC’s premises, JIPC sued Newkoa on various contract related
theories. It thereafter amended its complaint to more than double the
number of causes of action.
The operative complaint lists 10 causes of action: breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach
of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, intentional concealment,
intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic relations,
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise stated.
2
negligence, violations of the California Fire Code (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, pt.
9; Fire Code) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §
12101 et seq.; ADA), and declaratory and injunctive relief.
According to the complaint, the only means of accessing JIPC’s
premises is by descending from the upper level of the mall. To do so, patrons
must use either an escalator, an elevator, or the stairs. Although there are
two sets of escalators, Newkoa has allegedly decommissioned both sets and
indicated its intent to remove at least one set. In addition, the main elevator
“is frequently inoperable and in disrepair.” As a result, patrons wanting to
access JIPC’s premises must use the stairs. This allegedly precludes those
with certain disabilities from accessing the premises without a manager
resorting to using a freight elevator, typically used for delivery of food,
supplies, and equipment, to help them descend. However, “the only freight
elevator available to JIPC is and has been continuously inoperable and/or
malfunctioning,” and JIPC was later informed use of the freight elevator for
patrons is not allowed.
Separate from the access issues, the complaint alleges Newkoa
has failed to adequately maintain the mall’s fire alarm and sprinkler system,
including the portion of the system located within the premises leased by
JIPC. The alarms and sprinklers have allegedly improperly activated on
occasion and not activated on others. When the former occurred, JIPC’s game
room had to be shut down and JIPC was forced to defuse patrons’ complaints
and issue many refunds.
The one other general area of dispute covered by the complaint
concerns parking. JIPC alleges the city approved a development project in
2023 which will reduce the number of mall parking spaces by almost 50
percent. The project, to be developed on third party owned land adjacent to
3
the mall, will consist of apartments and townhomes (the adjacent
development project). Newkoa purportedly knew about the proposed project
and the public meeting at which the city council considered it, but it did not
notify JIPC. The complaint alleges Newkoa intentionally concealed the
information so JIPC would not attend the meeting and object to the project.
As a result, JIPC allegedly will be left with inadequate parking for its
patrons.
Pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Newkoa moved to strike the
complaint “as to each cause of action alleged therein.” It argued “each of
[JIPC’s] causes of action against [it] is based on allegations of [Newkoa’s]
exercise of the right to petition,” namely “communications with the
[city] and/or . . . activity with respect to public town hall meetings held by the
[city].” Identifying the claims as “also stem[ming] from public internet or
social media postings made by consumers, Newkoa asserted all the alleged
activity fell “squarely . . . within the ambit of” one or more of the protected
activity categories specified in the anti-SLAPP statute. It further contended
JIPC could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on any of its claims.
JIPC opposed the motion, asserting Newkoa failed to meet its
initial burden of establishing the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute.
Alternatively, it argued its claims had the requisite minimal merit to survive
the motion. JIPC supported the latter argument with a declaration from
JIPC’s director of finance and exhibits attached thereto. In response, Newkoa
lodged various objections to the declaration and exhibits.
Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying
Newkoa’s motion, as well as overruling some of its evidentiary objections. The
court noted multiple of the causes of action do not mention the parking or
consumer comment related matters on which Newkoa focused its motion.
4
And, as for the causes of action that involve parking, the court found they
arise from Newkoa’s alleged failure to notify JIPC of the meeting at which
the city planned to consider the adjacent development project, not any alleged
failure by Newkoa to oppose the project. Because the court determined the
anti-SLAPP statute did not apply, it did not reach the question of whether
JIPC demonstrated the minimal merit of its claims.
Newkoa timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Newkoa challenges the trial court’s denial of its anti-SLAPP
motion, contending the court erroneously determined the anti-SLAPP statute
does not apply to any of the claims against it. It further argues the trial court
erred in denying certain evidentiary objections it made to evidence filed by
JIPC in conjunction with its opposition to the motion, and asserts JIPC is
unable to demonstrate the minimal merit of its claims. We do not reach the
latter arguments because Newkoa fails to show that any of the claims fall
within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute.
I.
ANTI-SLAPP LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Legislature enacted section 425.16 in response to ‘a
disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of
the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances.’” (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610,
619 (Rand Resources).) The special motion to strike provided for in the
statute is “‘intended to resolve quickly and relatively inexpensively meritless
lawsuits that threaten free speech on matters of public interest.’” (Ibid.) By
legislative direction, the statute is to “be construed broadly.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(a).)
5
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process.
First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged.’” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11
Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) The statute sets forth four categories of protected
activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).) The focus at this step is identifying the alleged
protected acts and determining whether they supply the basis for any claim.
(Bonni, at p. 1010.) “It does not matter that other unprotected acts may also
have been alleged within what has been labeled a single cause of action;
these are ‘disregarded at this stage.’” (Ibid.)
“Second, for each claim that does arise from protected activity,
the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.”’” (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) This “step of the anti-SLAPP analysis has been
described as a summary-judgment-like procedure. [Citation.] The court
determines whether ‘“the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and
made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment.”’ [Citation.] The plaintiff ‘“may not rely solely on its complaint,
even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible
evidence.”’ [Citation.] The defendant may submit evidence in support of its
motion. [Citation.] However, ‘“[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims.”’ [Citation.] Rather, the court ‘“accepts the
plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.]
‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’””’ (Billauer v.
Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 962 (Billauer).) Conversely, “[i]f the
plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni, at
p. 1009.)
6
“On appeal, we review [an anti-SLAPP] motion de novo and
independently determine whether the parties have met their respective
burdens.” (Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 371.) We employ the
same two-step process used by the trial court. (Billauer, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 962.) “‘Only a [claim] that satisfies both prongs of the anti-
SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and
lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the
statute.’” (Ibid.)
II.
STEP ONE: ARISING FROM PROTECTED ACTIVITY
Newkoa contends all JIPC’s claims stem from three types of
alleged “acts”: (1) Newkoa’s communications with the city about the adjacent
development project; (2) Newkoa’s activity related to the city’s public
meetings concerning that project; and (3) “public internet or social media
postings made by consumers.” With the exception of the intentional
concealment cause of action, Newkoa does not separately analyze the various
claims, types of acts, or categories of protected activity. Instead, it makes a
broad, conclusory argument that all the acts fall within the scope of one or
more of the four protected activity categories. We conclude Newkoa fails to
demonstrate the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute to any of the claims.
Beginning with the causes of action for violations of the Fire Code
and the ADA, the complaint’s allegations definitively base the former on
Newkoa’s failure to maintain a compliant fire alarm and sprinkler system
and the latter on its failure to provide a means of access to JIPC’s premises
for disabled persons. Tellingly, Newkoa does not explain how those acts fall
within a category of protected activity. Instead, it seems to wrongly assume
that because each cause of action “re-alleges and incorporates by reference”
7
all prior allegations of the complaint, the Fire Code and ADA related claims
arise from the parking related matters. Irrespective of any incorporation by
reference, the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires closely
scrutinizing each claim to determine the activity on which it is based. (See
Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) Here, the specific failures alleged in the
Fire Code and ADA claims have nothing to do with parking. Because those
causes of action do not arise from protected activity, the trial court properly
denied Newkoa’s motion as to them without moving to step two of the anti-
SLAPP analysis.
JIPC contends we need not look at the complaint’s other causes of
action because Newkoa’s combined notice of motion and motion “sought to
strike the [complaint] in its entirety.” We disagree. First, nothing in Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th 995, or Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral),
the cases cited by JIPC, supports such a position. To the contrary, they make
clear a court’s obligation is to evaluate which act or set of acts supplies a
basis for each claim pled in the complaint and to consider whether the
moving party has met its burden of demonstrating applicability of the anti-
SLAPP statute to each claim. (Bonni, at pp. 1010–1012; Baral, at p. 396.)
Second, although Newkoa’s combined notice of motion and motion referenced
the entire complaint, the document indicated it was seeking to have the trial
court strike each cause of action within it. Accordingly, we must make a
determination regarding step one as to each claim.
Also misdirected is JIPC’s reliance on a “gravamen” based
approach to the analysis. Although at one time courts were applying a
gravamen test in the first step of an anti-SLAPP analysis, the Supreme Court
has made clear it is not the proper inquiry. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
1009–1011.) Instead, we must first identify each claim for relief pled in the
8
complaint, without being constrained by the way the complaint structures
each cause of action. (Id. at p. 1010.) Once we identify “each act or set of acts
supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded
cause of action,” we must determine whether each act or set of acts is
protected. (Ibid.) If through this analysis it becomes clear a cause of action is
a mixed cause of action, meaning “one that rests on allegations of multiple
acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of which do not,”
we disregard the unprotected acts and reach the second step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis with respect to the claims arising from protected activity.
(Ibid.; see also Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
Identifying the act or set of acts which supply a basis for relief,
meaning the acts from which a claim arises, involves looking to the legally
required elements of a cause of action. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1015;
Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1057, 1063.) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity
took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes
of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at p. 1063.) Allegations which are merely
incidental, collateral, or provide context, as opposed to supplying an element
of a claim, may not be used as a basis for triggering anti-SLAPP protection.
(Bonni, at p. 1012; Rand Resources, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 621; Baral, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 394.)
In addition to forming the basis for the Fire Code and ADA
claims, the allegations concerning failure to maintain a compliant fire alarm
and sprinkler system and a means of access to JIPC’s premises for disabled
persons expressly supply a basis for most of the other causes of action in the
complaint, including: breach of contract, breach of the implied covenants of
quiet enjoyment and good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and
9
negligent interference with prospective economic relations. Because those
alleged failures to act are not protected activity under section 425.16, all the
claims arising therefrom necessarily survive Newkoa’s motion.
For the same reason, the same contract related and interference
related claims grounded in allegations about lack of maintenance of the
mall’s escalators, elevators, roof, and sump pump must remain. Newkoa
makes no argument as to how those alleged acts are protected activity, and
there is no basis for so concluding.
As for the negligence cause of action, the complaint is not clear
which alleged acts form the basis of it. Found on page 27 of the complaint, the
cause of action re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations
preceding it. It then states “NEWKOA’s conduct was negligent as outlined
hereinabove.” Although in some situations the ambiguity, alone, may be fatal
to a moving party’s ability to demonstrate the claim arises from protected
activity (see Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018) 19
Cal.App.5th 203, 218–219; Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 611, 627–628), the ambiguity in this case is resolved by
JIPC’s briefing. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1017 & fn. 5 [using
briefing of party opposing anti-SLAPP motion to provide details about claim
not included in complaint].) Both JIPC’s opposition to the motion filed in the
trial court and its brief on appeal indicate the negligence claim arises from
Newkoa’s failure to maintain the elevators and escalators in a safe condition,
as well as its failure to maintain the mall in compliance with fire safety
standards. For the same reason Newkoa did not meet its step one burden
regarding the claims previously discussed, it does not meet its step one
burden concerning the negligence claim.
10
Without specifying which claims, Newkoa contends the claims
against it “also stem from public internet or social media postings made by
consumers.” This argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of
the anti-SLAPP statute. The statute targets “lawsuits brought primarily to
chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
petition for the redress of grievances.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) In that vein, it
provides for a motion to strike one or more causes of action “against a person
arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech.” (Id., subd. (b)(1), italics added.) Even assuming,
arguendo, the consumer activity will be used by JIPC to prove some aspect of
a claim, it is not a basis for Newkoa to strike the claim. Suffice to say, act of
consumers are not acts by Newkoa.
What remains for us to consider is the only alleged activity on
which Newkoa’s argument elaborates: the parking related matters. Newkoa
contends the claims against it, particularly the intentional concealment
claim, arise from its communications with the city concerning the adjacent
development project and/or its alleged failure to object to the project at public
meetings. In contrast, JIPC contends those allegations simply provide context
for the claims. It asserts that to the extent the claims are based on parking-
related matters, they “‘arise from’ Newkoa’s . . . intentional concealment of an
issue it knew would have a significant impact on [JIPC].” A review of the
complaint leads us to agree with JIPC.
The parking-related breach of contract claim alleges “NEWKOA
wrongfully and intentionally concealed facts from JIPC in efforts to take
away JIPC’s customer parking at the [m]all.” Similarly, the intentional
concealment claim alleges, in relevant part, that “NEWKOA intentionally
failed to disclose certain facts to JIPC, including facts related to the potential
11
loss of parking at the [m]all due to [the adjacent development project] as
detailed hereinabove,” and it did so with an “inten[t] to deceive JIPC.” And
the claims for intentional and negligent interference with prospective
economic relations allege, in relevant part, “NEWKOA engaged in wrongful
conduct through the breaches outlined hereinabove,
including . . . intentionally concealing material facts in order to prohibit JIPC
from exercising its rights under the [l]ease and from appearing at the [c]ity
[council] meeting and objecting to the [adjacent development project].”
These allegations demonstrate the claims arise from a purported
failure to act, as opposed to an affirmative action. Further, they show the
claims are not limited to the mere fact of the inaction. Instead, they arise
from inaction with a purpose—an intent to deceive so that JIPC would not
contest the adjacent development project. This is underscored by the punitive
damage allegations included with some of the claims.
“The right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and under Article I, section 2 of the California
Constitution, encompasses what a speaker chooses to say, and what a
speaker chooses not to say; it is a right to speak freely and also a right to
refrain from doing so at all.” (Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 118, 124.) However, “[a] failure to speak cannot fall in any of the
first three categories” of anti-SLAPP protected activity because they “protect
only ‘statement[s] or writing[s],’ and not the failure to make them.” (Ratcliff
v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 982,
1011.) Thus, “[i]f a failure to speak is protected at all, it must fall within the
fourth category, as ‘other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.’” (Ibid.)
12
As the moving party, and as the appellant, Newkoa bears the
burden of demonstrating the anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability. (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009 [anti-SLAPP burdens]; San Diegans for Open
Government v. San Diego State University Research Foundation (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 76, 106, fn. 17 [burden on appeal].) But, consistent with
deficiencies in its overall briefing, Newkoa does not explain what “public
issue” or “issue of public interest” is involved. (Ibid.) Nor does it articulate
how the alleged omissive conduct was “in connection with” such an issue.
(Ibid). Those deficiencies are fatal to its parking-related arguments.
Even assuming, arguendo, the adjacent development project
would qualify as a public issue or issue of public interest by virtue of the fact
the city council considered whether to approve or deny the project at a public
meeting, the necessary connection between the issue and Newkoa’s alleged
conduct is absent. A critical component of the “catchall” provision analysis is
“what functional relationship exists between the speech and the public
conversation about some matter of public interest.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149–150.) Overall, “‘some degree of
closeness’ between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest
[is required]. [Citation.] . . . [T]he statement must in some manner itself
contribute to the public debate.’” (Id. at p. 150.) That closeness is missing
here. The alleged conduct involves omissions vis-à-vis JIPC, not a failure to
communicate with the city about the adjacent development project. Newkoa’s
alleged silence toward its own tenant, even if surreptitiously intended to
allow the adjacent development project to be approved by the city, does not
have the requisite functional relationship with the public conversation under
the circumstances.
13
III.
CONCLUSION
Because we conclude Newkoa failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating the anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability to any of JIPC’s claims,
we do not reach the parties’ disputes concerning the minimal merit of the
claims, including Newkoa’s assertion that the trial court erred in overruling
certain of its objections to JIPC’s evidence. The court properly denied
Newkoa’s anti-SLAPP motion. We decline JIPC’s invitation to decide the
issue of attorney fees entitlement related to the appeal. That issue is properly
left for the trial court in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. JIPC is entitled to costs on appeal.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
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