Kamal v. Burns CA4/3

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Filed 4/28/26 Kamal v. Burns CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

EYAD KAMAL,

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and G065059
Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-
v. 01027280)

DON C. BURNS et al., OPINION

Defendants, Cross-complainants
and Appellants;

JASMINA KAMAL et al.,

Cross-defendants and
Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
David J. Hesseltine, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Law Office of Don C. Burns and Don C. Burns for Defendants,
Cross-complainants and Appellants Don C. Burns and Arpi Evans-Burns.
Business Law Center and Jonathan Barry Sexton for Defendant,
Cross-complainant and Appellant ZXRV, LLC.
The Law Office of Lewis & Lewis and John Lewis for Plaintiff,
Cross-defendant, and Respondent Eyad Kamal and Cross-defendants and
Respondents Jasmina Kamal and Zaid Kamal.
Maha Ishak, in pro. per., for Cross-defendant and Respondent.
* * *
The underlying action arises from a lease and option to purchase
a house owned by plaintiff Eyad Kamal and his wife, cross-defendant
Jasmina Kamal (the Kamals).1 Defendants and cross-complainants Don C.
Burns and Arpi Evans-Burns (the Burnses) leased the house and entered into
an option and purchase agreement whereby they intended to purchase the
house. During the term of the written lease, the Burnses began significant
renovations on the house. They also borrowed funds from defendant and
cross-complainant ZXRV, LLC (ZXRV) to extend escrow. ZXRV was later
listed as the buyer under the purchase agreement. The Burnses and ZXRV
ultimately did not complete the renovations, pay the remaining lease
payments, or purchase the house.
Eyad then filed suit against the Burnses and ZXRV for breach of
the lease and breach of the purchase agreement, among other things. The
Burnses and ZXRV filed a cross-complaint against the Kamals, cross-
defendant Zaid Kamal, who was the Kamals’ son and served as their real
estate agent, and cross-defendant Maha Ishak, who was Zaid’s broker. The

1 Where necessary, we refer to the parties by first name to avoid

confusion. No disrespect is intended.

2
Burnses and ZXRV claimed, inter alia, that the Kamals, Zaid, and Maha
made material misrepresentations or failed to disclose known defects about
the house.
The jury found in favor of Eyad and awarded $225,000 in
damages. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s special verdict.
The Burnses raise three arguments on appeal. First, they
contend the jury’s answers to the special verdict questions are internally
inconsistent or contrary to the evidence. Second, they claim the court should
have rescinded the lease and the purchase agreement. Finally, they argue the
court improperly excluded testimony of their expert witness.
ZXRV raises one issue on appeal. It argues the court erred by
finding it was jointly and severally liable for $225,000 in damages.
For the reasons post, we agree the jury’s findings on the cross-
complaint’s concealment cause of action are inconsistent. We accordingly
remand for a new trial on that claim. We also modify the judgment to provide
that ZXRV is jointly and severally liable for $135,000 (not $225,000) in
construction repair damages. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
THE RESIDENTIAL LEASE AND OPTION AGREEMENT
In February 2015, the Kamals leased their Laguna Niguel home
(the Property) to the Burnses. In addition to executing a lease agreement, the

2 On the day before oral argument, Maha filed a motion to

dismiss her as a respondent in the instant appeal. We deny the motion. As a
prevailing party in the judgment under review, Maha remains a proper party
to the appeal. Because she did not file a respondent’s brief, we decide the
appeal on the record, available briefs, and oral argument. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)

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parties entered into a purchase agreement and an option agreement whereby
the Burnses could purchase the Property by September 2016, the date when
the lease would terminate. The option agreement noted the consideration
would be “$200,000 in upgrades to the [P]roperty.” The purchase price for the
Property was $3 million minus both the $200,000 consideration and an
$11,100 security deposit.
The parties subsequently extended the lease and option to
purchase several times. In October 2017, ZXRV loaned $150,000 to the
Burnses so that they could extend escrow. Around the same time, the
Kamals, Don, and ZXRV executed an addendum noting ZXRV would be the
buyer under the purchase agreement, which was intended to serve as
security for the $150,000 loan. The parties ultimately extended the lease and
option to purchase until February 2019.
The Burnses eventually stopped paying rent, and ZXRV refused
to consummate its purchase of the Property.
II.
THE COMPLAINT
In October 2018, Eyad initiated an unlawful detainer action to
recover possession of the Property. In 2024, he filed the operative second
amended complaint (SAC) against the Burnses, ZXRV, and another
individual who is not a party to the instant appeal. According to the SAC, the
Burnses stopped paying rent in October 2018 and did not vacate the Property
until January 2019.
When Eyad inspected the Property after the Burnses vacated, he
discovered the Burnses had caused substantial damage to the Property. They
allegedly “damaged, destroyed or removed most of the drywall or wall
coverings on the bottom floor, all downstairs floor coverings, and all fixtures

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from the bottom floor . . . , including the kitchen appliances.” They also
“removed a weight bearing wall causing instability of the structure,” “cut into
the post-tension slab foundation,” and generally “damaged the post-tension
slab, tension cables, structure and support foundation of the [Property].”
Several other items were missing or damaged, including furniture and
appliances. The Burnses purportedly did not get permits necessary for the
construction work and failed to notify the Property’s association about the
work.

The SAC further alleged it cost at least $200,000 to repair the
damage. Eyad also lost rental income between January 2019, when the
Burnses vacated, and August 2019, when the Property was finally repaired.
Eyad sold the Property in March 2021 for $2,600,000. As to ZXRV, the SAC
alleged ZXRV made “false subsidence claims” in order to refuse purchasing
the Property.
Based on these allegations, the SAC alleged two causes of action
against the Burnses and ZXRV: (1) breach of the purchase agreement and
(2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The SAC
also alleged five additional causes of action against only the Burnses: (1)
breach of the lease agreement, (2) intentional misrepresentation,
(3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) negligence, and (5) conversion.
III.
THE CROSS-COMPLAINT
The Burnses and ZXRV filed a cross-complaint against the
Kamals, Zaid, Maha, and others who are not parties to the instant appeal.
According to the fourth amended cross-complaint (the cross-complaint), the
Kamals were represented by their son, Zaid, in negotiating the purchase
agreement. Zaid, in turn, was supervised by his broker, Maha.

5
The cross-complaint alleges the Kamals, Zaid, and Maha did not
disclose known defects or material facts regarding the Property. Among other
things, they did not disclose water damage, soil subsidence, broken water
lines, structural damage to the foundation, repairs undertaken by the
Kamals, and insurance claims made by the Kamals related to water and
structural damage. Based on these allegations, the cross-complaint alleged
causes of action for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment,
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, negligence per se, agreement
induced by fraud or mutual mistake, and breach of contract.3
IV.
THE JURY VERDICT
A. Eyad’s Claims
After the case proceeded to a jury trial in 2024, the jury returned
a special verdict in favor of Eyad on his claim for breach of the lease. The jury
awarded $225,000 in damages to Eyad, which covered the cost of construction
to repair damages, failure to pay rent for four months, and loss of rent due to
the Property being unlivable for seven months. The jury awarded no damages
for “loss of value of the [Property] for having to resell at a lower price.”
As to Eyad’s claim for breach of the purchase agreement, the jury
found Don and ZXRV breached the agreement and that Eyad was harmed.
But the verdict form listed zeros for the same damages awarded for breach of
the lease—i.e., cost of construction to repair damages, failure to pay rent for
four months, loss of rent due to the Property being unlivable for seven
months, and loss of value of the Property for having to resell at a lower price.

3 The cross-complaint alleged additional causes of action against

parties who are not involved in this appeal.

6
Likewise, as to Eyad’s negligence claim, the jury found the
Burnses were negligent and that their negligence was a substantial factor in
causing harm to Eyad. But the verdict form again listed zeros for two
categories of damages: cost of construction to repair damages and loss of
value of the Property for having to resell at a lower price.
B. The Burnses’ and ZXRV’s Claims
As to the cross-complaint, the jury returned a special verdict in
favor of Eyad, Zaid, and Maha on all the claims asserted against them by the
Burnses and ZXRV, except on the concealment cause of action, as discussed
below.
V.
JUDGMENT
In October 2024, the court entered judgment on the jury’s special
verdict. In November 2024, the Burnses and ZXRV filed a motion for new
trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court denied the motion,
and the Burnses and ZXRV timely appealed.4
DISCUSSION
I.
THE SPECIAL VERDICT FINDINGS ARE PARTLY INCONSISTENT
The Burnses argue the jury’s answers to the special verdict
questions are either internally inconsistent or contrary to the evidence. We
agree the jury’s findings on the cross-complaint’s concealment cause of action
are inconsistent. The other findings are not inconsistent or contrary to the
evidence.

4 The record on appeal does not include the reporter’s transcript

of the hearing on the motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.

7
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“A special verdict is inconsistent if there is no possibility of
reconciling its findings with each other. [Citation.] If a verdict appears
inconsistent, a party adversely affected should request clarification, and the
court should send the jury out again to resolve the inconsistency. [Citations.]
If no party requests clarification or an inconsistency remains after the jury
returns, the trial court must interpret the verdict in light of the jury
instructions and the evidence and attempt to resolve any inconsistency.”
(Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338, 357–358,
fn. omitted (Singh).)
We review de novo whether special verdict findings are
inconsistent, and we do not infer findings to support the verdict. (Singh,
supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) “‘“‘Where the findings are contradictory on
material issues, and the correct determination of such issues is necessary to
sustain the judgment, the inconsistency is reversible error.’” [Citations.]’
[Citation.] ‘The appellate court is not permitted to choose between
inconsistent answers. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The proper remedy for an
inconsistent special verdict is a new trial.” (Ibid.)
B. Internal Inconsistencies
At the outset, we address the Kamals’ contention that the
Burnses forfeited their arguments because they did not identify the
purported inconsistencies before the jury was discharged.
A party who believes a special verdict is ambiguous or internally
inconsistent should object before the jury is discharged so the trial court may
direct further deliberations. (Singh, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 357–358.)
“If the verdict is ‘merely ambiguous,’ a party’s failure to seek clarification of
the verdict before the jury is discharged may work a forfeiture of the

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purported defect on appeal, ‘particularly if the party’s failure to object was to
reap a “‘technical advantage’” or to engage in a “‘litigious strategy.’”’” (Little v.
Amber Hotel Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 280, 299.) However, “if the special
verdicts are ‘“hopelessly ambiguous”’ or inconsistent, failure to seek
clarification from the jury does not create a forfeiture, and the proper remedy
is ordinarily a retrial on the issues underlying the defective verdict.” (Id. at
p. 300.)
Here, the Burnses did not forfeit their arguments because they
identify at least one inconsistency, not mere ambiguity, in the special verdict
findings. They also objected to the proposed judgment and properly raised
their arguments in a motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.5
1. No Damages for Concealment
The Burnses argue the verdict is irreconcilable because the jury
found in their favor on all elements of concealment but awarded no damages.
We agree.
The jury found: (1) Zaid, who was the real estate agent for his
parents (the Kamals), intentionally failed to disclose a fact the Burnses could
not have reasonably discovered; (2) Zaid intended to deceive by concealing the
fact; and (3) the Burnses would have behaved differently if the omitted
information had been disclosed. The jury further found Zaid’s concealment
was “a substantial factor in causing harm” to the Burnses. (Italics added.)
These findings satisfy the elements of fraudulent concealment (CACI

5 The record on appeal does not include the Burnses’ objections to

the proposed judgment.

9
No. 1901).6 But the jury awarded no damages for economic losses (remodeling
and relocation costs) or noneconomic losses, including mental suffering. The
complete absence of damages cannot be reconciled with the finding of harm—
i.e., Zaid’s concealment was a substantial factor causing harm to the Burnses.
Indeed, the jury was instructed that harm was an essential element of the
concealment claim. (CACI Nos. 1901, 1910.) It was further instructed:
“[Y]ou . . . must decide how much money will reasonably compensate [the
Burnses] for the harm. This compensation is called ‘damages.’” (CACI
Nos. 1920, 1923.) Under these instructions, the jury was expected to award
compensation for the harm it found to exist.

Given the internally inconsistent findings, the jury’s intent
regarding Zaid’s liability is also unclear. We therefore remand for a new trial
on the concealment cause of action against Zaid. (Singh, supra, 186
Cal.App.4th at p. 358 [“The proper remedy for an inconsistent special verdict
is a new trial”]; Missakian v. Amusement Industry, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
630, 661–662 [remanding for a new trial due to inconsistent jury findings].)
2. Contractual Damages and Eyad’s Contractual Performance
The Burnses next contend the damages award for their breach of
the lease “is inconsistent with the finding of intentional and negligent
misrepresentation and concealment by [Eyad] and his agent.” They likewise
claim the jury’s finding that Eyad fulfilled his disclosure obligations under
the relevant contracts is inconsistent with findings that the Kamals engaged
in misrepresentations and concealment. But the Burnses do not identify any

6 On the court’s own motion, we augment the record to include

the September 12, 2024, jury instructions filed in the Orange County
Superior Court, case No. 30-2018-01027280. We refer to the CACI jury
instructions as given at trial.

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jury finding regarding Eyad’s “disclosure obligations.” Instead, the jury
generally found Eyad did all or substantially all the significant things
required under the lease agreement. It further found Eyad was excused from
having to do all or substantially all the significant things required under the
purchase agreement.
These findings regarding Eyad’s contractual performance are not
inconsistent with tort findings on the cross-complaint. As to intentional
misrepresentation, the jury found Zaid (not Eyad) knowingly or recklessly
made a false representation of fact, which was not a substantial factor in
causing harm to the Burnses. Although the jury found both Eyad and Zaid
made a negligent misrepresentation of fact, they found the Burnses did not
reasonably rely on the misrepresentation. In other words, the findings do not
establish the Burnses were induced to enter into or continue the contractual
relationship based on any negligent misrepresentation.
The concealment findings likewise do not create an irreconcilable
conflict. The jury found Eyad and Zaid intentionally failed to disclose a fact,
but only Zaid had the intent to deceive. Eyad’s concealment also was not a
substantial factor in causing harm to the Burnses. The jury therefore did not
impose any liability on Eyad. As such, the verdict contains no findings
suggesting the lease or purchase agreements were void or unenforceable.
The Burnses’ argument assumes any misrepresentation or
nondisclosure necessarily renders a contract invalid or unperformed. The
special verdict does not compel that conclusion. At most, the jury found a
false statement, which did not cause harm or was not reasonably relied upon,
or concealment for which Eyad lacked intent to deceive. Those findings can
coexist with the determination that Eyad performed his contractual

11
obligations and was excused from further performance under the purchase
agreement.
3. Negligent Misrepresentation and Concealment
The Burnses further insist the jury made inconsistent findings on
the negligent misrepresentation and concealment causes of action. They
argue: “Finding that the buyers did not reasonably rely on negligent
misrepresentations by Eyad . . . and Zaid . . . is inconsistent with the finding
that [Zaid’s] concealment was a substantial factor in causing harm to the
buyers . . . .” We disagree. Negligent misrepresentation and concealment are
distinct causes of action with separate elements. (Compare CACI No. 1901
with CACI No. 1903.) A finding of no reasonable reliance on one cause of
action does not preclude a finding of causation under another cause of action.

4. Intentional Misrepresentation and Concealment
The Burnses further contend “[f]inding that [they] reasonably
relied on the intentional misrepresentation by Zaid . . . but that his
misrepresentation was not a substantial factor in causing harm” to them is
“inconsistent with the findings on concealment.” We presume the Burnses
argue the jury’s finding that Zaid’s concealment was a substantial factor in
causing harm necessarily requires a similar causation finding as to the
intentional misrepresentation cause of action. Not so.
The elements of intentional misrepresentation include reasonable
reliance and causation. (CACI No. 1900.) The verdict reflects the jury found
reliance but not causation. The jury could conclude the Burnses reasonably
relied on Zaid’s misrepresentation but did not prove the misrepresentation
was a substantial factor in causing compensable harm. The concealment
findings do not alter that conclusion. The jury could determine an affirmative

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misstatement did not cause harm but an omission of a different material fact
did. When read as a whole, the findings are not inconsistent.
C. Inconsistencies with the Evidence
The Burnses next contend the jury’s findings are inconsistent
with the evidence. First, they point to the finding that Eyad “did all the
significant things the contracts . . . required him to do.” They suggest an
inconsistency exists because their expert witness testified water damage was
a material fact that should have been disclosed. To the contrary, this
evidence concerns a separate duty to disclose material facts. It does not
contradict the jury’s findings about the duties imposed by the relevant
contracts. The Burnses also do not identify the specific portions of the
contracts at issue.
Second, the Burnses complain about other findings but do not
identify any evidence supporting the supposed inconsistencies. For example,
they disapprove of the jury’s findings that: (1) Zaid’s negligence, “which
would be attributable to his broker, Maha Ishak, did not cause harm”;
(2) Zaid’s intentional misrepresentation was not a substantial factor causing
harm; and (3) Maha did not conceal the same facts concealed by Eyad and
Zaid. A bare assertion of conflict without any citation to the record does not
demonstrate an inconsistency with the evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [a party must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the
record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the
matter appears”].)
Finally, the Burnses argue the jury’s “[f]inding that Eyad . . . and
Maha . . . were not liable for the intentional misrepresentation, concealment
and negligent misrepresentation by Zaid . . . as they worked together, hand in
glove,” is inconsistent with evidence of their relationship and principles of

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agency law. As noted ante, Zaid was the Kamals’ son and served as their real
estate agent under the supervision of his broker, Maha. The jury was
generally instructed on vicarious liability and that Maha would be
responsible if the jury found “that Zaid . . . was acting within the scope of his
agency when the incident occurred . . . .” (CACI No. 3703; see CACI
No. 3700.) But contrary to the Burnses’ assertion, the special verdict form did
not ask the jury to determine whether Zaid was acting as Eyad’s or Maha’s
agent for purposes of imputing liability. It also did not ask the jury to
determine whether Eyad or Maha were vicariously liable for Zaid’s conduct.
Instead, the jury found Zaid’s concealment was a substantial factor causing
harm to the Burnses but rejected the other theories of misrepresentation.
Because the verdict contains no separate findings that Zaid was acting within
the scope of his agency, we cannot impose liability on Eyad and Maha
through agency principles. (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222
Cal.App.4th 1228, 1242 [“‘When a special verdict is involved as here, a
reviewing court does not imply findings in favor of the prevailing party’”].)
We also need not resolve the issue because the jury’s findings on the
concealment cause of action are inconsistent and we remand for a new trial.
II.
THE BURNSES DID NOT ELECT RESCISSION
The Burnses further argue the court should have rescinded the
lease and purchase agreements. The record shows, however, the Burnses did
not pursue that remedy. The case was tried on a theory of fraud damages,
and the special verdict form asked the jury to determine specific damages.
(See CACI No. 3934.) The Burnses also did not request an equitable decree to
rescind the agreements. Having proceeded on a theory affirming the
agreements and seeking damages, they cannot now argue the court erred by

14
failing to rescind them. (Wong v. Stoler (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1385
[“[r]escission and damages are alternative remedies,” and election of one bars
the other].) Our reversal of the concealment cause of action against Zaid does
not alter that conclusion.
III.
THE COURT ERRED BY FINDING ZXRV JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES

ZXRV contends the court erred by entering judgment against it
and finding it was jointly and severally liable for $225,000 in damages.
According to ZXRV, the jury awarded damages for breach of the lease and
ZXRV was not a party to that cause of action. Instead, it argues it was a
party to the cause of action for breach of the purchase agreement for which
the jury awarded no damages. For these reasons, ZXRV insists the court
violated its right to a jury trial and entered a judgment that was inconsistent
with the jury’s findings.
The record supports ZXRV’s arguments in part. ZXRV was not
jointly and severally liable for the entirety of the $225,000 in damages, but it
was jointly and severally liable for a portion of those damages.
A. Relevant Background
As noted ante, the jury found in favor of Eyad on his claim for
breach of the lease against the Burnses. The jury awarded $225,000 in
damages as follows: (1) $135,000 for cost of construction to repair damages,
(2) $40,000 for failure to pay rent for four months, (3) $50,000 for loss of rent
due to the Property being unlivable for seven months, and (4) $0 for loss of
value of the Property for having to resell at a lower price.
The jury also found in favor of Eyad on his claim for breach of the
purchase agreement against the Burnses and ZXRV. It specifically found Don

15
and ZXRV breached the purchase agreement and Eyad was harmed by their
breach. But the verdict form listed zeros for the same category of damages
awarded for breach of the lease.
The day after receiving the jury verdict, the court discussed with
the parties whether they believed the jury’s damages findings were
ambiguous or inconsistent. The court noted the jury listed zeros when asked
about damages for breach of the purchase agreement and negligence claims.
But the jury awarded damages for breach of the lease, which included the
same category of damages. The court believed the jury awarded zero damages
for breach of the purchase agreement and negligence claims because “they
were instructed to only award damages once.” CACI No. 3934 instructed:
“‘[E]ach item of damages may be awarded only once regardless of the number
of legal theories alleged.’” Given these instructions, the court explained:
“[T]he presumption [is] they followed the instructions they were given, those
zeros were because they already awarded it on an earlier legal theory and,
therefore, didn’t award it a second time.”
The court then asked the parties if they agreed with the court’s
interpretation. If they did not, the court proposed it could ask the jury the
following supplemental question: “Please answer the following question by
checking the line that explains the basis for your response to questions
number 16 and 19. You answered zero dollars for each of the identified items
of damages in question number 16 and 19 because, A, jury instruction 3934
entitled damages on multiple legal theories instructed the identified items of
damage may be awarded only once; or, B, you found plaintiff Eyad Kamal
failed to prove any of the items of damages identified in question number 16
and 19.” Assuming the jury answered with the latter response B, the court
noted “that would be an inconsistency and they’d have to go into further

16
deliberations.” Counsel for all parties agreed they did not need to further
question the jury about the damages findings.
B. Analysis
Here, the court erred by finding ZXRV jointly and severally liable
for the entirety of the $225,000 damages award. Instead, the court should
have found ZXRV jointly and severally liable for the $135,000 awarded for
cost of construction to repair damages.
CACI No. 3934 instructed the jury that “each item of damages
may be awarded only once regardless of the number of legal theories alleged.”
The instructions then identified Eyad’s legal theories, which included breach
of the lease agreement and breach of the purchase agreement. (CACI
No. 3934.) The instructions next explained the following damages were
recoverable only once under the latter legal theories: (1) “Past lost profit”; (2)
“Cost of construction repair”; (3) “Loss of rent for four months during
tenancy”; (4) “Loss of rent due to house being unlivable for 7 months”; and (5)
“Loss of value for having to resell for a lower price.” (CACI No. 3934, italics
added.) As to breach of the purchase agreement, the jury was again
instructed that “[c]ost of construction repair” and “[l]oss of value for having to
resell for a lower price” “are recoverable only once under the above legal
theory.” (CACI No. 3934.) In other words, “cost of construction repair” and
“loss of value for having to resell for a lower price” were recoverable under
both the breach of lease and breach of purchase agreement theories. Given
the anti-duplication instructions, the jury’s decision to award $135,000 for
cost of construction repair under the lease cause of action while noting “0” on
the breach of purchase agreement claim is consistent with CACI No. 3934.
However, the remaining $90,000 ($40,000 in unpaid rent and
$50,000 in lost rental income) arises solely from obligations imposed by the

17
lease. ZXRV also was not a party to the lease, and the verdict does not reflect
an award of rental damages against ZXRV under the purchase agreement.
Imposing joint and several liability on ZXRV for the $90,000 rental
component therefore exceeded the verdict.
Finally, the Kamals argue ZXRV’s substitution into the option
agreement rendered it jointly and severally liable for all damages. They point
to provisions in the option agreement allowing the Kamals to retain the
option consideration, rent, services rendered, and improvements to the
Property if the option to purchase was not exercised. These latter provisions
identify sums the Kamals would keep if the transaction failed. They did not
impose lease obligations on ZXRV, require payment of unpaid rent, or effect
an assumption of lease duties. In short, the option agreement does not
provide a contractual basis for imposing $90,000 in rent-related damages on
ZXRV.
The judgment is therefore modified to provide that ZXRV is
jointly and severally liable for $135,000 in construction repair damages.
IV.
THE COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
The Burnses argue the court improperly excluded testimony of
their expert, Gerald Minich, about soil movement. The court did not abuse its
discretion.
A. Relevant Background
Before trial, the Burnses and ZXRV designated Minich as an
expert who would testify about “[e]vidence of [the] condition of the [Property]
before and after water damage reported on 8/8/2014; history of repairs and
undisclosed defects and material conditions at [the Property]; cost of repair or
remediation, as expected by [the Burnses] on or about 3/1/15; work performed

18
by [the Burnses] before discovery of material defects; scope of problems
caused by soil movement and irrigation failure; observed pattern of distress
features and retaining wall movement in the southwest portion of the lot;
future rear yard movement and pool failure; potential cost of caissons and
other steps to remedy soil movement and related damage.”
At trial, Minich testified he was an architect. He acknowledged
he was not a geotechnical expert and had no license in soils engineering.
When asked if he had formal training “in soils,” he testified he did not but
had “40 years of experience.” As part of his job as an architect, he “inspect[ed]
the building process and . . . design[ed] . . . building[s].” When designing a
building, he considered the soil conditions of the property and reviewed a
soils report. He also was familiar with building on hillsides, but he did not
have “experience building on hillsides with soil creep” unless it had been
identified in a soils report. When asked if he had experience building on
properties where the soils report identified soil creep, he responded:
“Normally, [the soils reports] do not.” He had designed a caisson system for
hillside properties about three times.
Minich defined soil creep as “[s]lippage between the two different
layers of soil” and noted that introducing water into soil impacts soil creep.
He later defined soil creep as “natural movement towards a lower elevation,”
which was “[c]aused by rain, earthquakes or excessive watering.” He noted
soil creep was not something that would stop until “it falls down the hill.”
When questioned a second time as to whether creep would not stop “until it
falls down the hill,” the court sustained a lacking foundation objection.
Minich further testified he inspected the Property in September
2018 to see if there was “[s]tuff that could be a potential hazard, stuff that
could be a potential cost to fix and errors in construction.” After the Burnses’

19
counsel questioned whether Minich had made any observations about soil
movement, the court sustained an objection, finding the question was vague.
Minich then testified the inside of the Property and walls were
bent while a back wall by the pool was “bowed out.” He further noted a
“window was cracking, supports were missing,” “[t]he pool was tipped,” and
the retaining wall “was also tipped.” When asked if he told the Burnses why
some of these conditions existed, he testified: “It was either as a result of
earthquakes, slippage.” The Kamals’ attorney asserted a lacking foundation
objection and noted Minich was not a soils expert. The court sustained the
objection.
Minich also testified about what he had reported the cost of a
caisson system might be for the Property. The court sustained an objection
that the testimony assumed facts not in evidence.
When questioned if he knew about “any breaks in irrigation
lines” at the Property, Minich testified: “No, but obviously there were”
“[b]ecause [of] the amount of creep.” The Kamals’ attorney objected on the
grounds of speculation and lacking foundation. The court sustained the
objections.
Finally, Minich described the “deadman tieback . . . technique
used with caissons.” The court sustained a lacking foundation objection to a
question as to whether Minich recommended the deadman tieback technique
on the Property.7
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
An expert witness may testify as an expert if the witness “has
special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to

7 We only summarize the portions of Minich’s testimony relevant

to the instant appeal.

20
qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.” (Evid.
Code, § 720, subd. (a).) His or her testimony also must be “[b]ased on matter
(including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education)
perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or
before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the
subject to which his testimony relates . . . .” (Id., § 801, subd. (b).)
“For purposes of evaluating an expert’s qualifications, expertise
‘“‘is relative to the subject,’ and is not subject to rigid classification according
to formal education or certification.” [Citation.] Rather, an expert’s
qualifications can be established in any number of different ways, including
“a showing that the expert has the requisite knowledge of, or was familiar
with, or was involved in, a sufficient number of transactions involving the
subject matter of the opinion.”’” (Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 1263, 1277.)
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert
testimony for an abuse of discretion. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) An abuse of discretion
occurs only if “‘the trial court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason and
results in a miscarriage of justice.’” (Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283, 292.)
C. No Abuse of Discretion
Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the
above disputed objections. Although Minich was a licensed architect and
considered soil conditions in his designs, nothing in the record suggested he
had experience in geotechnical engineering or soil mechanics. He also never
claimed to have experience building on hillsides where soil creep had been

21
identified. Regardless, the court allowed Minich to testify about his general
understanding of soil creep. On this record, the court’s rulings did not exceed
the bounds of reason. The court could reasonably require additional
foundation before permitting Minich to opine about: (1) the predicted
progression of soil movement on the hillside; (2) whether the Property
conditions were caused by slippage or earthquakes; (3) whether there must
have been breaks in irrigation lines due to soil creep; and (4) whether he
recommended the deadman tieback technique for the Property, which was an
engineering solution.
Even assuming any error, the Burnses do not offer an adequate
claim of prejudice. “The erroneous exclusion of evidence is grounds for
reversal only if ‘in light of the entire record, it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error.’” (Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 1280.) The Burnses do not address how a different outcome
was reasonably probable if the court had not sustained the above objections.
Indeed, the Burnses claim similar testimony was provided by plaintiff’s
expert, Gregory Axten, who was a geotechnical engineer. Any potential error
was accordingly harmless, or the Burnses have forfeited any claimed
prejudice.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to the cross-complaint’s concealment
cause of action against Zaid, and the matter is remanded with direction to
the trial court to conduct a new trial on the concealment cause of action
against Zaid. The judgment also is modified to provide that ZXRV is jointly
and severally liable solely for $135,000 in construction repair damages, and
not for the remainder of the damages award. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, all parties shall bear their
own costs incurred on appeal.

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, J.

SCOTT, J.

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