CourtListener 10849110•In re C.K. CA2/2
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Filed 4/28/26 In re C.K. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re C.K., a Person Coming B345012
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. 22CCJP01089B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CH.K.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan M. Valles, Judge. Affirmed.
Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Ch.K. (mother) appeals from an order granting maternal
grandmother (MGM) legal guardianship of C.K. (born April 2014)
at a hearing conducted pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 366.26.1 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is the
juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to conduct an
adequate inquiry pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 and related California statutes (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.;
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) (ICWA). For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm the order of the juvenile court.
COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND RELEVANT TO ICWA
The family
Mother has two children, J.K. (born September 2009) and
C.K.2 At the time the proceedings were initiated, J.K. and C.K.
were living in California with mother. Jonathan K. (father) was
living in Michigan with his girlfriend and her four children.3
The family had a history with child protective services in
Michigan, including six referrals between January 2016 and June
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 J.K. is not a subject of this appeal.
3 Father is not a party to this appeal.
2
2017. The family also had six prior referrals in Los Angeles
County, including allegations of general neglect, excessive
drinking by mother, physical and emotional abuse of the children,
mother leaving the children unsupervised for long periods of
time, domestic violence between mother’s boyfriend and mother
in the children’s presence, and a violent altercation among
mother, a maternal aunt who was seven months pregnant, and
MGM.
Detention, petitions and jurisdiction
On February 28, 2022, DCFS received a referral alleging
mother drank alcohol daily, smoked marijuana in front of C.K.
and left the child alone or with homeless people. The caller
further alleged mother drinks and drives and does not provide for
C.K.’s basic needs.
Following investigation into the allegations, on March 17,
2022, the juvenile court authorized removal of the children from
mother pursuant to a protective custody warrant. The children
were detained with MGM.
On March 23, 2022, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging mother physically abused C.K. and abused alcohol and
marijuana, subjecting the children to risk of harm.
On March 29, 2022, the juvenile court detained both
children from their parents.
On April 13, 2022, DCFS filed a first amended section 300
petition adding allegations involving father.
The adjudication on the amended petition took place on
April 25, 2022. After hearing testimony and arguments, the
juvenile court sustained the amended petition, striking the
allegations pertaining to father.
Prior to the disposition hearing, DCFS filed a petition
pursuant to section 342 containing additional allegations
3
concerning father. On August 26, 2022, the juvenile court
sustained the section 342 petition. The children were detained
from the parents and suitably placed with MGM, with
reunification services for both parents.
ICWA investigation
DCFS inquired of mother and father on March 1 and 2,
2022, respectively, about any possible Indian ancestry. Mother
and father each denied having any Indian ancestry.
MGM said she had five daughters, including one named
Patience. MGM denied any American Indian heritage.
DCFS spoke with maternal aunt Dorothy G. and maternal
uncle Navarre G. about case issues but did not question them
about ICWA.
During Michigan investigations in 2017, mother and father
each denied the children were eligible for membership in any
Indian tribe.
On March 25 and 28, 2022, respectively, father and mother
filed ICWA-020 forms indicating none of the possible grounds for
ICWA applied.
At the detention hearing on March 29, 2022, the juvenile
court orally confirmed the parents’ responses on the ICWA forms
with each parent. The court instructed the parents, “although
you have indicated that you have no knowledge of any Indian
ancestry, please, inquire of all your relatives. And if you learn
that there’s a possibility of Indian ancestry, if you can provide
that information to the social worker and to your lawyer so that
[DCFS] can make contact and do further investigation with
respect to possible Indian ancestry.” Both parents responded
affirmatively to the court’s instruction. The court found ICWA
did not apply.
4
DCFS again inquired of mother and father on April 11 and
12, 2022, respectively, and each denied having any American
Indian heritage.
Father reported he was an only child, and his father was
addicted to heroin and had been in and out of jail. Mother said
her father moved out of state before her birth, and she had only
sporadic contact with him. She had five siblings.
J.K. testified at a hearing on April 27, 2022, and reported
that “two aunties” of his also lived with the children in MGM’s
home.
On September 26, 2022, DCFS spoke to maternal aunt
Promise and asked if there was any American Indian heritage in
the family. Promise denied knowledge of American Indian
ancestry.
On March 6, 2024, DCFS inquired of the paternal
grandmother as to whether there was any American Indian
ancestry in the family. Paternal grandmother denied any
American Indian ancestry.
The juvenile court inquired of mother again on May 29,
2024, and she denied any American Indian heritage.
The minute orders for the review hearings on March 19,
April 24, June 20, August 20, and September 25, 2024, indicate
the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply. The court indicated
it had reviewed the file for ICWA and found it inapplicable. The
court continued to find ICWA did not apply on October 3,
October 16, and November 20, 2024.
At the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing on
March 5, 2025, the juvenile court found ICWA not applicable.
On March 19, 2025, mother appealed from the juvenile
court’s order at the section 366.26 hearing appointing MGM as
C.K.’s legal guardian.
5
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
“ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal
standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family.” (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881, disapproved on other
grounds in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18
(Dezi C.).)
ICWA and corresponding statutes that our Legislature
enacted to implement ICWA assign the juvenile court and DCFS
“three distinct duties” aimed at assessing whether a child in a
dependency action is an “Indian child,” and hence a child who
should not be separated from his or her tribal family through
adoption or foster care placement. (In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052.) First, the statute imposes a duty of
inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may be an
Indian child. If that initial inquiry creates a reason to believe the
child is an Indian child, the agency must make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child. Finally, if that
further inquiry results in a reason to know the child is an Indian
child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3 apply.
(D.S., at p. 1052.)
Under California state law, DCFS and the juvenile court
“have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” into
whether a dependent child “is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This includes DCFS making an initial
inquiry, which includes asking the child, parents, extended
family members, and anyone else that has an interest in the child
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whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd.
(b).) “[E]xtended family member[s]” are defined as the child’s
“grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c).)
Federal regulations require the juvenile court to “ask each
participant … whether the participant knows or has reason to
know that the child is an Indian child. The inquiry is made at
the commencement of the proceeding and all responses should be
on the record.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a); see Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224.2, subd. (c) [similar state law requirement].)
A juvenile court’s findings relating to ICWA notice and
inquiry issues are reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re E.W.
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 404.) When a child welfare agency
conducts an inadequate ICWA inquiry, and the record is thus
underdeveloped as to what information might exist about a
child’s Indian ancestry, a harmless error analysis is not feasible.
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1126.) However, “the juvenile
court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate,
proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary
function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.”
(Id. at p. 1141.) “‘“On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific
facts of the case.”’” (Ibid.)
The Dezi C. court made it clear that reversal is not required
“in all cases in which every possible extended family member has
not been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry.” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) Instead, ICWA requires reasonable
inquiries of individuals who are reasonably available. (Dezi C., at
p. 1140.) The court emphasized that “‘the obligation is only one
7
of inquiry and not an absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native
American ancestry.’” (Id. at p. 1143.)
II. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
ICWA finding
Mother argues DCFS’s initial inquiry was insufficient in
this case. Specifically, mother argues no social worker
questioned the child’s extended family members maternal aunt
Dorothy G. and maternal uncle Navarre G. about possible Indian
ancestry, despite these relatives being readily available. Mother
contends this is a violation of section 224.2, subdivision (b). A
social worker spoke to both Dorothy G. and Navarre G. about the
petition’s allegations but failed to ask these two individuals
whether they knew about C.K.’s possible Indian ancestry or knew
maternal grandfather’s whereabouts to determine whether he
had any pertinent information. Mother contends based on these
failures, the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS’s initial inquiry
was adequate lacked sufficient evidence, and remand is necessary
for DCFS and the juvenile court to conduct a proper inquiry.
(Citing Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1134, 1147—1148.)
We conclude the record supports the juvenile court’s ICWA
finding in this matter. DCFS inquired of mother, father, MGM,
paternal grandmother, and maternal aunt Promise, all of whom
denied any Indian ancestry. The testimony of these individuals
constitutes credible, substantial evidence supporting the juvenile
court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to C.K.
Mother and father repeatedly denied Indian ancestry, both
in Michigan proceedings and during this proceeding. Mother and
father provided their responses under penalty of perjury on
ICWA-2020 forms and orally in court when asked by the juvenile
court.
8
DCFS also inquired of MGM and maternal aunt Promise,
both of whom denied any Indian ancestry. Maternal grandfather
was not readily available, as mother indicated she had only
sporadic contact with him during her life. DCFS had no
obligation to “‘“find” [him], merely to make reasonable inquiries’”
into the child’s potential Indian ancestry. (Dezi C., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1140.)
Mother is correct that, early in the investigation, DCFS had
contact with maternal aunt Dorothy G. and maternal uncle
Navarre G., and there is no record that DCFS inquired of these
two individuals whether C.K. potentially had any Indian
heritage. However, this oversight does not undermine the
substantial evidence in this case supporting the juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA does not apply. The repeated denials of
mother, and the denials of MGM and maternal aunt Promise are
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination that no
relevant Indian heritage existed on the maternal side.4 There is
no reason to suspect that mother’s siblings had information as to
Indian heritage that was not available to mother, Promise or
MGM.
Mother cites In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70 in support
of her argument that DCFS’s failure to interview the two
maternal relatives rendered the ICWA inquiry insufficient. In
J.C., “The Department did not fulfill its duty to conduct an
adequate inquiry into whether J.C. may be an Indian child
because it did not ask any extended family members—some of
whom were readily available—whether J.C. had any possible
Indian ancestry.” (Id. at p. 78.) The department’s failure in J.C.
4 Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the ICWA
inquiry on the child’s paternal side.
9
to ask the children’s “extended relatives about their possible
Indian ancestry violated the express mandate of section 224.2,
subdivision (b).” (Id. at p. 79.) Here, in contrast to J.C., DCFS
did ask extended family members about possible Indian ancestry.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination
that the inquiry was sufficient.
Mother also cites In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
421. In Antonio R., the department failed to inquire of any
maternal extended family members regarding Antonio’s possible
Indian ancestry, despite these relatives’ availability. (Id. at
p. 431.) Although mother, father, and paternal great-
grandmother denied Indian ancestry, the inquiry was insufficient
because “the Department never interviewed any extended family
members on the maternal side regarding Antonio’s possible
Indian ancestry.” (Id. at p. 432.) Here, DCFS interviewed
extended family on both sides of the family.
In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542 is similarly
distinguishable. There, the department did not make meaningful
efforts to locate the mother’s biological parents, who were
extended family members as defined by ICWA. Although the
department initially had no way to contact the mother’s biological
parents, “once the social worker learned of a potentially viable
lead to locate them, she made no effort to pursue it.” (Y.W., at
p. 553.) In the matter before us, reasonably available
grandparents on both sides of the family were interviewed.
In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53 is applicable. In C.L.,
mother argued the juvenile court erred in finding DCFS’s ICWA
inquiry adequate because the record did not reflect the agency
asked a maternal uncle about the children’s possible Indian
ancestry. (Id. at p. 67.) The C.L. court disagreed, in part because
“DCFS … made inquiries of all available extended family
10
members in the older generations,” a strategy that addressed “the
realities of generational loss of information that may have
prevented the parents from having accurate information about
their potential Native American ancestry.” (Id. at p. 70.) The
C.L. court noted there was no indication the maternal uncle
would have more information than his own mother, the maternal
grandmother, as to whether the children may be Indian children.
(Ibid.; see also In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 802 [“The
court also reasonably could find mother’s sister (maternal aunt)
would not have had any more information about the family’s
potential Indian ancestry than their own mother (maternal
grandmother) had.”].) Similarly, here, there is no reason to
believe a maternal aunt and uncle would have more information
than their own mother, MGM.
Mother expresses concern about the credibility of DCFS’s
report that maternal aunt Promise denied Indian ancestry.
Mother argues the social worker did not provide Promise’s last
name or contact information, and the declaration that C.K. had
no Indian ancestry was the only statement DCFS took from
Promise during the proceedings. Mother argues these
“irregularities” undermine the declaration from Promise.
Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports the juvenile court’s findings. (In re I.J. (2013) 56
Cal.4th 766, 773.) “‘“In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.”’” (Ibid.) Under this standard, we are not permitted to
reject the testimony of Promise due to the alleged irregularities
11
mother describes. Instead, it is within the province of the
juvenile court to address such issues in the first instance. We
therefore decline to disturb the juvenile court’s ruling on this
ground.
The juvenile court did not err in finding DCFS’s inquiry
was reasonable and adequate under the circumstances of this
case.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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