CourtListener 10848685•People v. Nguyen CA2/3
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Filed 4/27/26 P. v. Nguyen CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B351038
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XNEA564897)
v.
NINH KIM NGUYEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Peabody and Larry Pizarro, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Ninh K. Nguyen appeals from an order denying his Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.1 His appellate
counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo). Nguyen filed a supplemental brief arguing the
trial court erred in denying his petition. We consider Nguyen’s
contentions and affirm the trial court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2010, the People charged Nguyen by amended
information with the murder and grand theft of Bui Khuyen in
1983. At trial, the jury was instructed on the general principles
of homicide, self-defense, murder with malice aforethought, the
degrees of murder, provocation, heat of passion voluntary
manslaughter, and imperfect self-defense voluntary
manslaughter. The instruction on the degrees of murder
informed the jury: “The defendant is guilty of first degree murder
if the People have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he
intended to kill. The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully
weighed the considerations for and against his choice and,
knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted
with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the acts
that caused death.”
The jury was not instructed on aiding and abetting
liability, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
felony murder.
In November 2010, the jury found Nguyen guilty of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) for the killing of Khuyen with
malice aforethought. The jury found true that Nguyen personally
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
used a knife in the commission of the crime. (§ 12022, subd. (b).)
The jury also found Nguyen guilty of grand theft (§ 487), and
found true that he personally used a knife in the commission of
the offense. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) The trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 33 years to life.
In April 2025, Nguyen filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus which, among other things, asserted he was entitled to
relief pursuant to Senate Bill Nos. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill No. 1437) and 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 775). The trial court appointed counsel to represent
Nguyen in the section 1172.6 proceedings. The People opposed
the petition, arguing Nguyen was not entitled to relief “because
he was prosecuted and convicted as the actual stabber and
perpetrator of the first-degree murder of [Khuyen] and personally
acted with express malice.” The People attached to their
opposition this court’s opinion from the direct appeal, the jury
verdicts, and the jury instructions.
Nguyen’s counsel filed a prima facie brief and reply to the
People’s response. The reply discussed the relevant law and,
without making any arguments based on the specific facts of the
case, asserted the trial court should issue an order to show cause
and set an evidentiary hearing.
In December 2025, counsel appeared before the court for
the prima facie hearing. Nguyen was not present. The trial
court indicated it had reviewed the parties’ briefs and the court
file and was prepared to rule. Both counsel submitted without
argument. The court noted it had reviewed the opinion from the
direct appeal and the preliminary hearing transcript “just to get
an idea as to what was involved and not necessarily for the truth
of any of the information contained in there.” The court
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concluded the record established that Nguyen was the sole
perpetrator in the underlying matter. The instructions given
were on first and second degree murder. There were neither
aiding and abetting instructions nor an “alternative theory of
liability.” The court concluded Nguyen had not made a prima
facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. It accordingly
denied his petition.
Nguyen timely appealed. Nguyen’s court-appointed
appellate counsel filed an opening brief that raised no issues
pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. We directed
appellate counsel to send Nguyen the record and a copy of the
opening brief. We additionally advised that within 30 days of the
date of the notice, Nguyen could submit a supplemental brief or
letter stating any grounds for an appeal, contentions, or
arguments he wished this court to consider. Nguyen timely
submitted a supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and limited the scope of the felony murder rule. (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong); People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The bill amended section 188, requiring that to be convicted
of murder, “a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
The bill also amended section 189, subdivision (e). Under the
amended law, a person may be convicted of felony murder only if
he or she (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer
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but, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the actual killer in
committing first degree murder; or (3) “was a major participant
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Ibid.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 created “a procedural mechanism for
those previously convicted of murder under a theory amended in
[Senate Bill No. 1437] to petition for resentencing.” (People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959.) “The process begins with the filing of a petition that
declares, among other things, that ‘[t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective
date of Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see id.,
subd. (b)(1)(A).)” (Emanuel, at p. 880.) Senate Bill No. 775
subsequently extended resentencing relief to any person
convicted of murder based on any “other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
These amendments to the Penal Code did not invalidate
murder convictions based on the theory that the defendant
intended to kill. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 707; People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1158, 1166.)
Under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), once a petition is filed
that complies with the statute’s basic requirements, the
prosecutor must respond and the petitioner may reply to that
response. “After the parties have had an opportunity to submit
briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to
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relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. If the court
declines to make an order to show cause, it shall provide a
statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” (Ibid.)
II. The Record of Conviction Establishes Nguyen is
Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
The record of conviction in this case conclusively
establishes that Nguyen was not convicted of murder on a theory
that is now invalid. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.)
The jury was not instructed on aiding and abetting liability, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, felony murder, or
any other theory under which the jury could have imputed malice
to Nguyen based solely on his participation in a crime. The
charging document, jury instructions, and jury verdicts
demonstrate that Nguyen was convicted as the direct perpetrator
who acted with malice aforethought and intent to kill. (People v.
Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 [petitioner ineligible for
relief where he alone attempted to commit murder].)
On appeal, Nguyen contends the trial court violated his
constitutional right to be personally present at the prima facie
hearing. We disagree.
“ ‘A defendant has the constitutional right to be personally
present in court “where necessary to protect the defendant’s
opportunity for effective cross-examination, or to allow him to
participate at a critical stage and enhance the fairness of the
proceeding.” ’ [Citations.] The right is guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as well
as article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution. [Citation.]
The state constitutional right to be present is generally
coextensive with the federal due process right. [Citations.] [¶]
Critical stages of a defendant’s criminal prosecution include the
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imposition of sentence, a sentence modification hearing, and
resentencing.” (People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 57
(Basler).)
In Basler, the court concluded the right to be personally
present attached in section 1172.6 proceedings when the
defendant’s eligibility for relief required an evidentiary hearing.
(Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 58.) Here, in contrast, the
petition was at a noncritical stage. The prima facie
determination is a question of law based on the record of
conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) Nguyen’s
presence was not necessary to protect his opportunity to present
evidence, conduct effective cross-examination, or enhance the
fairness of the proceeding. (People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302,
312; People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1128 [at prima
facie stage the court may consider only the petition and the
record of conviction].) He had no constitutional right to be
present.
Moreover, even if the prima facie determination is
considered a critical stage of the proceedings, any alleged
violation of Nguyen’s right to be present was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.) The
record of conviction was conclusive, and clearly established that
Nguyen was not entitled to relief as a matter of law. Nguyen’s
personal presence at or participation in the proceeding could not
have changed the result.
Nguyen next contends that his appellate counsel did not
give him 30 days to file a supplemental brief in this appeal. We
must reject this argument. Counsel informed Nguyen of his right
to submit a supplemental brief and this court informed Nguyen
that he had 30 days to file such a brief. Nguyen filed a
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supplemental brief well before 30 days had passed. We have
considered that brief.
Nguyen refers to People v. Nino (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
844, seemingly for the proposition that a defendant who was the
actual killer may be eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if that
defendant could have been convicted of second degree felony
murder based on a now invalid theory of imputed malice. (Nino,
at p. 854.) Here, however, the record conclusively establishes
that Nguyen was not convicted on a felony murder theory.
Further, he was convicted by jury of first degree murder, not
second degree murder. The jury expressly found that he
personally acted with malice aforethought.2 The Nino court’s
reasoning could not apply in this case.
The trial court properly denied Nguyen’s section 1172.6
petition.
2 Nguyen also cites a case he identifies as “People v. Nguyen
109 Cal.App.5th 844.” The noted reporter citation is not
affiliated with the case title People v. Nguyen. We are unable to
identify the case to which Nguyen refers.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
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