CourtListener 10848612•People v. Miller CA4/1
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Filed 4/27/26 P. v. Miller CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085911
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BAF2100510)
v.
GANNON KELLY MILLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Mark E. Singerton, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Donald W.
Ostertag and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Gannon Kelly Miller on two counts of lewd act upon
Jane Doe (Jane), a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a);
counts 1 and 2).1 The trial court found Miller had a prior strike conviction
(Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1) and 667, subd. (c) & (e)(1)) and sentenced
him to an aggregate prison term of 16 years.2 On appeal, Miller asserts the
trial court erred by excluding evidence of Jane’s prior “sexual conduct.”
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jane was 17 and in the 12th grade at the time of Miller’s trial. During
the relevant period, she lived with her mother in Banning and often went to
her father and stepmother’s home in Beaumont (and later Cabazon) to visit
her half-siblings, including her younger half-sister Jane Doe 2.
Jane’s stepmother met Miller sometime in 2015 or 2016. She worked at
a Dollar Tree store and Miller—who went by “Juan”3—would frequently
come in as a customer, or sometimes just to “say hello.” Eventually, in 2019,
the stepmother brought Miller to the family home to help “run the house,”
including yard work, cleaning, and “play[ing] with the kids” while she cooked
dinner or did the laundry. She didn’t pay Miller for his help but rather
offered him work to “get him off the street.”
1 The jury acquitted Miller on two counts of lewd act upon Jane Doe 2, a
child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 3 and 4), which
consequently eliminated the allegation of multiple victims under the One
Strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (e)(4)). We limit our discussion to the
conviction offenses in counts 1 and 2.
2 The sentence consisted of 12 years in count 1 (the middle term of six
years, doubled for the strike prior) and a consecutive four years on count 2
(one-third of the middle term of two years, doubled for the strike prior).
3 During his testimony, Miller explained his given name at birth is
Gannon Juan Guzman and he sometimes went by Juan.
2
Miller was “often” at the family’s home. And because Jane’s
stepmother and father came to trust and consider him a friend, they would
leave their children alone with Miller. Jane first met Miller at her father’s
Beaumont home when she was in sixth grade. Like the other children, Jane
called him “Uncle Juan.”
On two occasions, Miller touched Jane inappropriately. The first time
Jane was at her father’s house in Beaumont. She was alone in the living
room, lying down on a couch, and watching YouTube on her phone. Her half-
siblings and father were home but in other rooms. Miller came up behind
Jane and lay down on the couch with her. He placed his body directly against
Jane’s, and “cuddled” and “held” her “really closely.” With his arms and
hands over her clothing, Miller held Jane around her lower stomach. He was
“hugging [her] very tightly.” After about a minute, Miller got up and Jane
went to play with the other children. This was not something Miller would
“normally” do with Jane, and it made her feel “[u]ncomfortable.” Although
she could not remember her age, she was at least in the sixth grade at middle
school when this incident happened.
The second time Miller touched her was at her father’s house in
Cabazon; the family had moved. Jane was sitting on the couch watching a
movie. Miller sat down next to Jane. He then laid down on the couch, placed
his head on Jane’s lap, with his head facing her body. As before, Miller made
Jane “[u]ncomfortable.” She asked him to get up so she could put a pillow
and blanket on her, “kind of like as a barrier.” Miller wouldn’t get up at first.
After she “kept telling” him to get up, he finally got up and Jane reached for
the pillow and blanket on the couch and put them over her lap to cover
herself. Jane was wearing black skinny jeans with two “big holes” over her
thighs.
3
Miller laid back down, placing his head on the pillow that was now on
Jane’s lap. At some point, Miller removed the pillow and blanket from Jane’s
lap and laid back down, with his head again on her lap and facing her body.
He then put his hand in the hole in her pants over her right leg and “went
up” to her upper thigh toward her groin area and touched her “underwear
line.” His fingers were “brushing” her underwear line, moving “back and
forth.” As he did this, Miller asked Jane, “Do you have a tattoo here?” This
happened when Jane was in the seventh or eighth grade of middle school,
when she was possibly 12 or 13.
Jane “panick[ed]” and tried to get up to go the bathroom. She felt
“uncomfortable.” To get Miller off her, she told him to get up because she was
going “to throw up.” Miller responded by asking her why she had to “lie to
him.” Jane got up and locked herself in the bathroom. After five or 10
minutes in the bathroom, Jane came out and intended to go to her sister’s
room. But she had to “get past” Miller who was in the hallway. Miller
grabbed Jane from behind and held her closely around her stomach “for a
minute.” She was pulling away, telling him to let her go, and hitting his arm
so he would release her. When she broke free, Jane went to Jane Doe 2’s
room and told her what had happened. Jane was crying when Miller came in.
He said he was sorry and did not mean to make Jane cry.
When she was in the fifth or sixth grade, Miller told Jane and Jane’s
younger brother that their “private parts” could be “ticklish.” Jane was in the
living room playing with her brother, they were tickling each other. Miller
came in and the three began talking “about parts that were ticklish.” It was
then that Miller told the kids, “Your private parts can be ticklish.”
After the second incident, Jane told her father and mother that Miller
had touched her inappropriately. Although neither Jane’s father nor
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stepmother ever saw Miller touch Jane inappropriately, both observed he was
“[v]ery playful” with Jane, “tickling” and “roughhousing” with her. The
People admitted evidence of a text message between Jane’s stepmother and
Miller, in which Miller denied inappropriately touching Jane but said he
sometimes “get[s] happy” and “hug[s] and kiss[es Jane and Jane Doe 2] to
death.”
Miller testified. He estimated he had been at the family’s home “30 to
40 times to do work,” and the stepmother was “always home” except for three
to four times when he was alone with the children. On one occasion, Jane’s
stepmother asked Miller to do yard work and paint her bedroom walls. When
he arrived, the stepmother asked Miller to watch the children and left. While
doing yardwork, Miller heard “a commotion” inside. He went into the house
and saw Jane and her younger half-brother “tickling each other.” Because
Jane was tickling her brother “around the area,” Miller tried to “educate
them” by telling them, “Private parts can be ticklish, but you’re not supposed
to go near those private parts at all, so be careful where and how you touch
and tickle each other.” Miller then went back outside to his yard work.
According to Miller, this was the first time he had met Jane. He
“interacted” with Jane only “a few times” or maybe “four or five times” over
the course of his visits to the family’s home. He described Jane as “the quiet
one” who “really never came up to [him]” and “hardly” talked to him. Miller
denied he inappropriately touched Jane. He gave her “side hugs a few times”
but “never did a full-on hug.” He played with her and tickled her “a little
bit.” When asked if Jane ever “indicate[d]” to him “that how [he] touched her
might have been a sensitive area,” Miller explained once he gave her a “side
hug” and “when she leaned in, maybe [his] hand brushed her a little bit.”
5
The People also presented the testimony of Dr. Jody Ward, a clinical
and forensic psychologist, who testified about child abuse accommodation
syndrome, “which is a pattern of behaviors that many children who have
been sexually abused within an ongoing relationship.”
DISCUSSION
Miller sought to introduce evidence of three instances of Jane’s “prior
sexual conduct” he asserted were relevant to impeach her credibility: (1)
when she was four years old, Jane’s maternal grandfather rubbed his penis
on Jane’s face; (2) when she was in the seventh grade, Jane was hugged from
behind by a classmate causing her to feel uncomfortable; and (3) during the
incident that prompted Miller to educate Jane and her half-brother to not
tickle each other’s private parts, Miller saw Jane touching her half-brother
outside his clothing in his genital area. The trial court excluded the evidence
under Evidence Code4 sections 782 and 352, determining it was not relevant
and any minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the
potential for undue consumption of time. Miller contends the court
prejudicially erred in its rulings.
A defendant generally may not introduce evidence of a sexual assault
victim’s prior “sexual conduct.” (§ 1103, subd. (c)(1); see People v. Mestas
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1514 (Mestas).) There is a limited exception to
this rule if the victim’s prior sexual conduct is relevant to her credibility.
(§ 1103, subd. (c)(5); Mestas, at p. 1513.) Such evidence is admissible in
certain sex offense prosecutions “only under very strict conditions” (People v.
Fontana (2010) 49 Cal.4th 351, 362 (Fontana)), including in lewd act
4 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
6
prosecutions under Penal Code section 288 (§ 782, subd. (c)(1); accord People
v. Bautista (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 762, 781–782 (Bautista).)
Section 782 sets forth “a strict procedure” that is “designed to protect
victims of molestation from ‘embarrassing personal disclosures’ unless the
defense is able to show in advance that the victim’s sexual conduct is relevant
to the victim’s credibility.” (Bautista, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.) It
requires the defendant to file a written motion, “which includes an offer of
proof of the relevancy of the evidence of sexual conduct and its relevancy in
attacking the credibility of the complaining witness. If the court finds the
offer of proof sufficient it shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury
at which the complaining witness may be questioned.” (People v. Daggett
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 751, 757 (Daggett); see § 782, subd. (a)(1–(4).) A trial
court is not required to hold a hearing “ ‘unless it first determines that the
defendant’s sworn offer of proof is sufficient.’ ” (Mestas, supra, 217
Cal.App.4th at p. 1514; see § 782, subd. (a)(2).) For example, where the
alleged conduct is not sufficiently like the charged conduct, the trial court
may properly determine it is not sufficiently probative of the victim’s
credibility to require an evidentiary hearing. (Mestas, at p. 1517.) “If at the
conclusion of the hearing the court finds the evidence relevant and not
inadmissible pursuant to . . . section 352, it may make an order stating what
evidence may be introduced and the nature of the questions permitted.”
(Daggett, at p. 757.)
Because the limitations of section 782 reflect our Legislature’s
“determination that victims of sex-related offenses deserve heightened
protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of
privacy,” our high court has emphasized “ ‘[g]reat care must be taken to
insure that this exception to the general rule barring evidence of a
7
complaining witness’ prior sexual conduct . . . does not impermissibly
encroach upon the rule itself and become a ‘back door’ for admitting
otherwise inadmissible evidence.’ ” (Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 362–
363.) Thus “our [trial] courts have properly exercised the discretion afforded
by . . . section 782 ‘narrowly.’ ” (Id. at p. 362.) They are “vested with broad
discretion to weigh a defendant’s proffered evidence, prior to its submission to
the jury, ‘and to resolve the conflicting interests of the complaining witness
and the defendant.’ ” (Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1515.)
We reverse a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of prior sexual
conduct only if the appellant can show an abuse of discretion. (Bautista,
supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 781–782; People v. Chandler (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 703, 710.) We find no abuse in the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings here.
Miller filed two motions in compliance with section 782 to admit
evidence of the three instances of Jane’s prior “sexual conduct.”5 After
permitting counsel to argue both motions, the trial court excluded evidence of
the first and third instances without an evidentiary hearing. It determined
the second instance merited an evidentiary hearing, allowed the parties to
5 We assume, without deciding, the three instances identified by Miller
constitute sexual conduct for purposes of sections 782 and 1103. Section 782
does not define “sexual conduct” except to state that such evidence includes
“those portions of a social media account about the complaining witness . . .
which depict sexual content, sexual history, nudity or partial nudity, intimate
sexual activity, communications about sex, sexual fantasies, and other
information that appeals to a prurient interest.” (§ 782, subd. (b)(2).) Courts,
however, have construed “sexual conduct” as used in sections 782 and 1103 to
“encompass[ ] any behavior that reflects the actor’s or speaker’s willingness
to engage in sexual activity” and cautioned “[t]he term should not be
narrowly construed.” (People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 334.)
8
question Jane about them outside the presence of the jury, and ruled it also
was not admissible under sections 782 and 352. Miller does not assign any
error to the trial court’s procedural rulings under section 782. He challenges
only the court’s rulings to exclude the proffered evidence, asserting each
instance was relevant and admissible to impeach Jane’s credibility because,
among other things, “they reflected upon her sexual knowledge and
sophistication.” We disagree.
In Daggett, the court explained the potential relevance of a molestation
victim’s prior sexual knowledge and sophistication. “A child’s testimony in a
molestation case involving oral copulation and sodomy can be given an aura
of veracity by his accurate description of the acts. This is because knowledge
of such acts may be unexpected in a child who had not been subjected to
them. [¶] In such a case it is relevant for the defendant to show the
complaining witness had been subjected to similar acts by others in order to
cast doubt upon the conclusion that the child must have learned of these acts
through the defendant. Thus, if the acts involved in the prior molestation are
similar to the acts of which the defendant stands accused, evidence of the
prior molestation is relevant to the credibility of the complaining witness and
should be admitted.” (Daggett, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 757.)
Here, the trial court determined the first instance was too dissimilar to
the conduct charged in this case and thus was not sufficiently probative of
Jane’s credibility to require an evidentiary hearing. We find no abuse of
discretion here. We agree with the court that the maternal grandfather’s act
of rubbing his penis on four-year old Jane is, as the People put it, “radically
different” from Miller’s reported conduct of “simple touching[ ]” over the
clothing. Additionally, because Jane was four and her mother was an
9
eyewitness to the maternal grandfather’s crime,6 Jane did not report the
molestation. There was no evidence, as the People argued, that Jane even
remembered the molestation that happened 10 years before the events in this
case. For these reasons, it was not error for the court to reject Miller’s theory
that Jane learned something from the prior molestation that would inform
the jury that her testimony in this case may be false. (E.g., Mestas, supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1512, 1517 [allegation that seven-year-old victim had
shirt and underwear removed by foster care boys when she was three years
old too dissimilar to be probative of defendant’s act of masturbating in front
of victim and forcing her to orally copulate him].)
The second instance involved Jane being “hug[ged] from behind” by a
male classmate in the seventh grade, which Miller asserted was “reported as
potential inappropriate conduct or sexual assault” to Child Protective
Services and ultimately determined “unfounded.” He argued the incident
was “extremely similar” to Jane’s report that Miller hugged her from behind
and thus, as in Daggett, provided “a potential explanation” of her knowledge
to later “experience and/or describe” Miller’s conduct. Additionally, Miller
argued the incident would provide the jury with “potential insight “that Jane
was “potentially unreasonable and/or hyper-sensitive” about people touching
her. The People responded that Jane did not report or allege “any sexual
misconduct” from this incident, either to social workers or law enforcement.
Rather, Jane was describing the incident in a mental health interview (three
months after she reported Miller’s conduct) and stated the classmate’s hug
made her feel uncomfortable.
6 The maternal grandfather was prosecuted and sentenced to a prison
term.
10
The trial court found “some similarity” and a “potential false accusation
of inappropriate sexual behavior” to warrant “at least explor[ing]” it in an
evidentiary hearing. In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Jane
testified she was getting “treatment” and told her therapist that a classmate
hugged her from behind and it made her feel “uncomfortable.” She was not
reporting “sexual abuse or anything like that.” Though she felt
uncomfortable “in a sexual way,” she did not feel her classmate touched her
in a sexual way “on purpose.” At some point Child Protective Services spoke
to her and she told the social worker, the classmate “gave me a hug from
behind, and that it was a regular hug,” and she felt uncomfortable because
she was “not very assertive.”
After hearing her testimony, the trial court noted that Jane testified
she told the truth about the hug, she was not “even sure whether or not it
was sexual in nature” (observing that she stated the words, “sexual way,”
“with a question mark, like she was guessing”), but that she did not feel it
was done on purpose. The court found she was describing an act, “not
asserting that it was a sexual act.” For these reasons, the court concluded
the incident was not probative of the charged conduct and its admission
would cause an undue consumption of time under section 352.
We, again, find no abuse of discretion here. We disagree with Miller’s
appellate contention that this hugging incident was relevant to Jane’s
credibility because it demonstrated “sexual knowledge and sophistication.” It
was a hug from a seventh grader. Whereas she reported that Miller, an
adult, twice got on the couch to lie down with her, and the second time,
inserted his hand inside the hole of her pants and touched her underwear
line. Not only is there dissimilarity between the two acts, but there is also no
unique or special sexual knowledge that would be learned from a hug. And
11
contrary to his assertion that the incident also demonstrated she was “overly
sensitive to physical contact” and thus “supported an inference that she
mischaracterized or misinterpreted [Miller’s] actions,” as the trial court
found, she did not assert or report the hug as a sexual act or sexual abuse.7
As to both the grandfather’s molestation and the classmate’s hug,
Miller contends “the fact that [she] experienced and/or reported prior sexual
abuse tended to belie the fundamental theory behind CSAAS, i.e. that victims
of child molestation commonly fail to or delay reporting such abuse.” But as
we have just discussed, Jane did not report her grandfather’s molestation nor
did she report the classmate’s hug to social workers or law enforcement, let
alone report it as a sexual act or sexual abuse.
As to the third instance of Jane’s prior “sexual conduct,” Miller
proffered that he would testify he saw Jane “touching” her younger half-
brother outside the clothing on his “genital area,” he told Jane to stop, and
explained to her “that boys’ and girls’ private parts are ticklish or can be
ticklish, but those areas are personal tickle spots and should not be touched
by anyone else.” Miller argued in his written motion that the testimony was
relevant to provide “an alternative explanation” as to why, according to
Jane’s testimony, Miller would tell her, “Your private parts can be ticklish.”
The trial court and parties held a long discussion about Miller’s request, after
which Miller’s trial counsel agreed with the court’s tentative that a section
782 hearing was not necessary and that it would be appropriate to allow
7 Miller’s trial counsel conceded two days after the section 782
evidentiary hearing that “after putting [Jane] on the stand” regarding the
hug, “we were able to ascertain that there was insufficient evidence to
support that it was potentially a sexual assault report by” Jane.
12
Miller to provide context for that statement without the specifics of Jane
allegedly touching her half-brother inappropriately.
The trial court explained it did not find there to be any real
inconsistency between Jane’s testimony and Miller’s proffered testimony and
that Miller had a right to explain what he meant by the statement, “Your
private parts can be ticklish.” But it found the additional context to be
insufficiently probative and would involve “so many pitfalls under [section]
352,” such as requiring an undue consumption of time because the People
may call both Jane and her half-brother to rebut Miller’s testimony of any
inappropriate touching between the siblings and “a mini trial about whether
or not this other incident happened.”
After fully explaining its tentative, the trial court asked defense
counsel if he had “[a]nything to add.” Defense counsel responded, “No, Your
Honor. I agree with the Court. I guess the defense’s primary concern was
being able to have the opportunity to explain the statements not in a vacuum.
I think it can be sanitized in a way that we don’t have to address directly the
specific act that prompted the statement, but simply the conduct that preceded
it. Again, [Jane] testified to the fact that she was tickling [her half-brother],
and then . . . Miller can certainly address he had concerns and expressed
them to [Jane], not that he specifically saw something that caused that, but
just the statement came in after that. I think that gives the defense primarily
what we would want.” (Italics added.)
Consistent with this discussion, the trial court ruled Miller could testify
to the statement and the context in which he made it, but not to any alleged
inappropriate touching between the siblings on the basis of section 352.
Miller then testified that because Jane was tickling her brother “around the
area,” Miller redirected them by telling them, “Private parts can be ticklish,
13
but you’re not supposed to go near those private parts at all, so be careful
where and how you touch and tickle each other.”
Because Miller acquiesced in the trial court’s ruling here, he has
forfeited any claim of error on appeal. (Chyten v. Lawrence & Howell
Investments (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 607, 617–618 [acquiescence in court ruling
forfeits issue on appeal]; Allin v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees & Moving Picture Machine Operators (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 135,
138 [“One who by his conduct accepts a ruling of the court under
circumstances amounting to acquiescence therein, may not complain of it on
appeal.”].) Even if not forfeited, Miller fails to demonstrate any abuse of
discretion in the court’s ruling. He devotes a mere three sentences to the
argument that exclusion of the “ ‘tickling’ incident” deprived him of “placing
into context or fully justifying his statement to [Jane]” and “prevented him
from defending his determination that it was not ‘appropriate’ to tell the
parents about the incident.” To the extent he means exclusion of Jane’s
alleged touching of her half-brother in the genital area, he does not explain
why this additional fact sheds any further light on his testimony he was
educating the children that “[p]rivate parts can be ticklish” so “you’re not
supposed to go near those private parts at all.” The jury, if it credited
Miller’s testimony, had sufficient context to conclude there was an innocent
explanation for his statement to Jane about “private parts.”
Fatal to Miller’s contentions on appeal, as to all three instances, is his
complete failure to address the trial court’s section 352 analysis in his
opening brief on appeal. His belated three-sentence argument in reply that
the proffered evidence would have required minimal additional consumption
of time or not confused the jury is inadequate to demonstrate the court
abused its discretion under section 352. Under section 352, the trial court
14
enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of particular
evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or
consumption of time. (People v. Woodward (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 832.)
“ ‘Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial
court, its exercise of that discretion “must not be disturbed on appeal except
on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 833.) The court and parties discussed the prosecution’s
need to call Jane and her half-brother in rebuttal should Miller be allowed to
testify about the alleged inappropriate touching between the siblings, and
potentially a Child Protective Services employee to explain why the agency
closed out the hugging incident as unfounded. It was not arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd for the court to determine that the minimal
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission would necessitate undue consumption of time.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
RUBIN, J.
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