CourtListener 10847824•Ornelas v. De Jong's Dover Dairy CA5
Full text
Filed 4/24/26 Ornelas v. De Jong’s Dover Dairy CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUIS FELIPE DIAZ ORNELAS,
F089076
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 22C-0214)
v.
DE JONG’S DOVER DAIRY, LLC, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Valerie R.
Chrissakis, Judge.
Mendez & Sanchez, Alex D. Guerrero for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, Stephen E. Norris, Mark A. Kressel; Procter, Shyer & Winter,
Lisa N. Shyer for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Luis Felipe Diaz Ornelas poured and installed concrete walls for his employer
Supreme Construction, Inc. De Jong’s Dover Dairy, LLC hired Supreme as a contractor
to pour and install concrete walls to an excavated pit, which had been excavated by the
owner, De Jong.
While Ornelas worked in the pit, a wall collapsed on him causing serious injury.
He sued De Jong, and De Jong moved for summary judgment, contending essentially that
this was an ordinary worker’s compensation matter.
The trial court agreed with De Jong, stating “a hirer or landowner … is ordinarily
not liable for injuries to contract workers,” and Ornelas failed to raise “a triable issue of
fact as to the applicability of an exception” to the rule. As explained below, we disagree
and reverse the judgment.
BACKGROUND
De Jong concluded the dairy needed a “sand separator” to separate “water from …
sand,” keeping pipes on the dairy flowing free. Building a sand separator requires
“[d]igging a hole and putting cement walls and a cement floor in it.”1 Supreme—a
general contractor—was hired only to install the cement; De Jong would dig the pit.
The parties did not discuss permits, engineering, or any analysis relative to the
project. De Jong, as agreed, excavated the pit, and Supreme poured the concrete.
Supreme is not an excavator but felt confident in De Jong because De Jong previously
dug a pit for a similar project. Prior to this incident, Supreme would simply visually
inspect the dirt before beginning the job.
Gregory Axten, a “licensed professional civil engineer and geotechnical engineer,”
offered expert opinion for Ornelas. The expert assumed De Jong did the excavation and
Supreme “pour[ed] concrete only[.]” He stated De Jong “breach[ed] … the standard of
care for excavation” by neither “perform[ing] a soils engineering study or subsurface
testing,” nor “obtain[ing] an appropriate excavation permit[.]” A proper analysis would
have “revealed” “the soil instability that caused” injury to Ornelas.
The expert explained Supreme, “simply pouring concrete,” would perform “a
visual only inspection,” but such an inspection “would not have revealed … the soil
1 The parties interchangeably use the terms concrete and cement.
2.
instability in the walls of the [excavated] pit[.]” He concluded “soil density” or “pit wall
instability[] was not an open and obvious danger.”
On these facts, De Jong moved for summary judgment. Ornelas, of course,
opposed the motion.
The trial court ruled in De Jong’s favor. It recognized at issue in the case was an “
‘unsafe concealed condition’ ” theory of liability.2 The court stated “a hirer as landowner
may be independently liable to the contractor’s employee … if (1) the hirer knows or
reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on the
premises, (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the
condition, and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor,” citing Kinsman, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 675.)
The trial court next found “a jury could reasonably infer” De Jong “should have
known of” the soil instability had it conducted any study prior to excavating the pit. The
court also found, however, Supreme “could have … reasonably detected” the latent
hazard had it “engage[d] in inspections … delegated to it as the independent contractor.”
It explained “Supreme was charged with a responsibility to conduct more than a visual
inspection of the worksite, including an inspection of the integrity of the pit wall[.]” In
so explaining, the court explicitly did not accept the Supreme expert’s opinion “as to
what constitutes a reasonable inspection in this case,” i.e., the opinion Supreme’s duty
was to conduct a visual inspection which would not have revealed the hazard.
Finally, the trial court explicitly found “a reasonable inspection” here “would have
required a thorough assessment of the pit wall stability” contrary to, again, the expert
2 The theory, discussed in detail below, is known as the Kinsman exception to the
Privette doctrine. (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675 (Kinsman);
Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 21 (Privette).)
3.
opining a simple visual inspection would have been reasonable under the circumstances.3
It accordingly entered judgment in De Jong’s favor.
DISCUSSION
Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment? Ornelas claims he raised a
triable issue of material fact by presenting specific expert opinion regarding duties and
reasonable inspections by the parties in this case. De Jong contends there is no triable
issue of material fact for two reasons. One, Supreme reasonably could have discovered
the soil’s instability. Two, the expert opinion was inadmissible.
In our view, Ornelas raised a triable issue of material fact with respect to the scope
of Supreme’s work, which in turn informs its duty to inspect the premises, and whether a
reasonable inspection under that duty would have discovered the latent hazard. We will
reverse the judgment.
I. Standard of Review
“We review a trial court’s granting summary judgment de novo, ‘considering all
the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which
objections have been made and sustained.’ [Citation.] We ‘liberally constru[e] the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolv[e] doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc.
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1034 (Peralta).)
A trial court properly grants summary judgment when “ ‘all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact’ such that ‘the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) ‘The
moving party bears the burden of showing the court that the plaintiff “has not established,
and cannot reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie case.” ’ [Citation.] The burden
3 The trial court concluded, notwithstanding the expert opinion, “a reasonable
inspection [by Supreme] would have required a thorough assessment of the pit wall
stability and that … such an inspection would have revealed the hazardous condition.”
4.
then ‘ “shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden,
the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings ... but,
instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists
as to that cause of action.’ ” ’ ” (Peralta, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1034-1035.)
II. Premises Liability
“There is a strong presumption under California law that a hirer of an independent
contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for workplace safety. (See
generally Privette[, supra,] 5 Cal.4th [at p.] 721; [citation].) This means that a hirer is
typically not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers
while on the job. Commonly referred to as the Privette doctrine, the presumption
originally stemmed from the following rationales: First, hirers usually have no right to
control an independent contractor’s work. [Citation.] Second, contractors can factor in
‘the cost of safety precautions and insurance coverage in the contract price.’ [Citation.]
Third, contractors are able to obtain workers’ compensation to cover any on-the-job
injuries. [Citation.] Finally, contractors are typically hired for their expertise, which
enables them to perform the contracted-for work safely and successfully.” (Gonzalez v.
Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 37-38 (Gonzalez).)
“[A] hirer may,” however, “be liable when it retains control over any part of the
independent contractor’s work and negligently exercises that retained control in a manner
that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injury.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 38.) “[A] landowner who hires an independent contractor may [also] be liable if the
landowner knew, or should have known, of a concealed hazard on the property that the
contractor did not know of and could not have reasonably discovered, and the landowner
failed to warn the contractor of the hazard.” (Ibid.)
“A landowner’s duty generally includes a duty to inspect for concealed hazards.
[Citation.] But the responsibility for job safety delegated to independent contractors may
5.
and generally does include explicitly or implicitly a limited duty to inspect the premises
as well.” (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 677.)
In opposition to the De Jong motion for summary judgment, Ornelas elicited the
expert opinion of Axten that Supreme’s duty to inspect the land, based on the scope of
the work it contracted to perform, was to perform a visual-only inspection which would
not have exposed the latent defect in the dirt. The trial court, however, explicitly
disagreed with the opinion, holding “Supreme was charged with a responsibility to
conduct more than a visual inspection of the worksite, including an inspection of the
integrity of the pit wall[.]” The court did not explain the basis for its conclusion
elevating Supreme’s inspection duty above that which the expert opined. The conclusion
is flawed because it entails improper factual resolution at the summary judgment stage.
The trial court stated, in relevant part, at paragraphs 14 and 15 of its order, as
follows:
“14. … Counsel also referred to the Axten Declaration for
its assertion that ‘a reasonable inspection for a non-
excavating contractor simply pouring concrete, such as
[Supreme], would be a visual only inspection[.]’
“15. The court disagrees. First, Plaintiff does not present
authority that the court is required to accept the conclusion in
the Axten Declaration as to what constitutes a reasonable
inspection in this case. Further, taking into account the
circumstances of the particular hazard at issue in this case and
the particular work for which Supreme was hired to complete,
the court finds that Supreme was charged with a
responsibility to conduct more than a visual inspection of the
worksite, including an inspection of the integrity of the pit
wall, and that by failing to do so, Supreme failed to conduct a
reasonable inspection of the premises.” (Italics added.)
This explanation by the trial court would be appropriate in a statement of decision
following a bench trial; however, it constitutes determination of disputed issues of fact
and law which is not appropriate at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. (See
6.
Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840 [the trial court may not
weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more
likely true.].) The trial court’s finding Supreme’s duty to fully inspect the land resolved
at least three separate factual disputes. First, it resolved whether Supreme was hired to
pour concrete, or whether it was hired to pour concrete and excavate. Supreme contends
it was hired to pour concrete only, leading to the second dispute: What is the duty to
inspect when retained to complete the final step in the project rather than undertaking the
entire project?
Ornelas’s expert contended Supreme need, in the situation where it pours concrete
but does not excavate, conduct “a visual only inspection,” and such an inspection “would
not have revealed … the soil instability in the walls of the [excavated] pit[.]” He added
the latent hazard was not inherently obvious.
Third, the trial court implicitly found a visual inspection was unreasonable. Put
simply, there is no basis to reject the expert’s opinions and factually decide, at the
summary judgment stage, the scope of Supreme’s work, the scope of Supreme’s duty to
inspect, and the reasonableness of an inspection.
De Jong, below and here, directly attacks the expert’s opinion via objection. The
trial court did not rule on the objections but we must address them on appeal. (Reid v.
Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534 [“[I]f the trial court fails to rule expressly on
specific evidentiary objections, it is presumed that the objections have been overruled, the
trial court considered the evidence in ruling on the merits of the summary judgment
motion, and the objections are preserved on appeal.”].) De Jong argues the expert’s
opinions are “irrelevant,” inappropriate “legal conclusion[s],” and unfounded. We
disagree on each point.
The expert opinion is not irrelevant. De Jong asserts the proper viewpoint is
“what inspection would have been reasonable for” it because it delegated control and all
duties to Supreme. De Jong’s assertion simply restates a presumption. (See Sandoval v.
7.
Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 271.) The question at issue in this case
is whether “the concealed hazards exception” to the presumption is applicable. (Ibid.)
The answer depends, in part, on factual resolution involving Supreme’s slated work, i.e.,
concrete alone or concrete and excavation, Supreme’s attendant duty to inspect based
upon its slate, and the reasonableness of said inspection. These questions are not
amenable to resolution on summary judgment. More to the point, evidence regarding
those questions is not irrelevant. (See id. at pp. 271-272 [“a landowner-hirer cannot
effectively delegate its duties respecting a concealed hazard without disclosing
that hazard to the contractor.”].)
The expert’s opinion does not constitute an impermissible legal conclusion.
De Jong argues reasonableness is a question reserved for the trial court. But it truly
presents a mixed question of law and fact, and the underlying facts here—scope of
Supreme’s work and an appropriate duty to inspect based on that scope—are disputed
and not amenable to resolution at the summary judgment stage. In other words, neither
the expert nor the court could decide reasonableness on the record in this case, leaving
the facts in place to constitute substantial evidence Supreme’s actions were reasonable.
Finally, De Jong contends the expert’s opinion is “inadmissibly conclusory.” The
expert’s opinions were, as they often are, based on the expert’s “training, education[,] and
experience,” including a review of the discovery in the case. There is no reason to
conclude the opinions were unfounded or otherwise conclusory. (Cf. Garrett v.
Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 189 [“In light of the rule of
liberal construction, a reasoned explanation required in an expert declaration filed in
opposition to a summary judgment motion need not be as detailed or extensive as that
required in expert testimony presented in support of a summary judgment motion or at
trial.”]; Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 470.)
To defend the trial court’s decision, De Jong relies heavily on SeaBright Ins. Co.
v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590 (SeaBright). There, the California Supreme
8.
Court held the hirer “presumptively delegated to [the independent contractor] any tort law
duty of care … to ensure workplace safety for the benefit of [the contractor’s]
employees.” (Id. at p. 601.) While true, this case raises the applicability of an
exception—namely, the latent hazard exception—to the ordinary presumption. SeaBright
simply did not deal with the exception at issue here.4
Similarly, an appellate court recently concluded a “hazardous condition was
reasonably discoverable as a matter of law.” (Acosta v. Mas Realty LLC (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 635, 661.) There, however, the court explicitly relied on “undisputed
evidence” relative to inspections. (Ibid.) The reasonableness of an inspection is at the
factual core of this case. Indeed, the Acosta court recognized “an independent contractor
does not have a duty to inspect all of the landowner’s property or to identify hazards
wholly outside his [or her] area of expertise”—another disputed fact in this case.5 (Id. at
pp. 661-662, emphasis added.)
In sum, De Jong effectively argues Supreme was negligent in accepting and
performing the work it undertook because Supreme failed to investigate the land, ask any
questions, and ultimately ensure workplace safety. Supreme counters its duty to ensure
workplace safety is necessarily informed by the limited scope of its work, i.e., pouring
concrete, and its duty in this case would not have discovered the latent hazard which
injured Ornelas. These viewpoints are grounded in factual disputes not amenable to
resolution on summary judgment. (See Carson v. Facilities Development Co. (1984)
36 Cal.3d 830, 843 [“The questions of whether a dangerous condition could have been
4 The decision in SeaBright discussed the “nondelegable duties doctrine,”
addressing whether a hirer is barred under law from delegating specific workplace safety
duties to an independent contractor. (See, generally, SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at
pp. 600-601.)
5 Again, Supreme claims it is not an excavator and it was not retained to excavate.
9.
discovered by reasonable inspection and whether there was adequate time for preventive
measures are properly left to the jury.”].)
10.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment is reversed. Costs are awarded to Ornelas.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P. J.
FRANSON, J.
11.
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.