CourtListener 10847823•People v. Letchaw CA4/1
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Filed 4/24/26 P. v. Letchaw CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085028
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE414484)
CURTIS ANTONIO LETCHAW,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lilys McCoy, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
instructions.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, Matthew Mulford and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Curtis Antonio Letchaw of felony failing to register as
a convicted sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290.018, subd. (b); count 1) and
misdemeanor providing false registry information (§ 290.018(k); count 2).
Letchaw was sentenced to four years in prison. He raises three issues on
appeal.
First, Letchaw—who exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify
at trial—argues the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on
CALCRIM No. 361, which concerns a testifying defendant’s failure to explain
adverse evidence. We agree the court erred in giving an unwarranted
instruction but conclude on this record the error was harmless under People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.
Second, Letchaw claims the trial court erred in sentencing him under
the Three Strikes law because he did not admit the alleged strike prior. We
agree that, given Letchaw never admitted the strike prior on the record,
reversal of the true finding on the strike prior allegation is required.
Lastly, Letchaw contends the Felony Minutes—Pronouncement of
Judgment dated August 14, 2024 must be corrected to reflect a sentence as to
count 2 of 364 days in custody, rather than 365. We accept the People’s
concession.
We therefore reverse the true finding as to the prior strike allegation
and remand to the trial court to (1) hold a hearing on whether Letchaw elects
to admit the strike prior allegation or proceed to trial on it and hold further
proceedings accordingly and (2) amend the Felony Minutes—Pronouncement
of Judgment dated August 14, 2024 to reflect a sentence as to count 2 of
364 days in custody. In all other respects, we affirm.
I.
In 2012, Letchaw was convicted of a sex crime that imposed a lifetime
requirement that he register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.
Section 290 requires individuals convicted of specified sex crimes to register
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the address at which they are residing with law enforcement. (§ 290(b).)
A person who is transient—defined as “a person who has no residence”—must
register every 30 days and “list the places where” that person “sleeps, eats,
works, frequents, and engages in leisure activities.” (§ 290.011(a), (d), (g).) If
a transient person moves to a residence, the person must register that
address within five working days. (§ 290.011(b).)
A.
In late January 2020, Letchaw registered as transient. Letchaw
initialed each requirement on the registration form and affirmed he had read
and understood them all.
On February 1, 2020, Letchaw called 911 from a residence in
San Diego. When law enforcement arrived, Letchaw indicated he had lived
at the address for “probably a couple months” and helped pay the rent. He
told the detective “he goes between [another] house and this home in San
Diego.” The detective searched the residence and found men’s clothing and
medications bearing Letchaw’s name in the bedroom in which Letchaw had
been staying.
The detective arrested Letchaw for violating his sex offender
registration requirements. He reminded Letchaw that he was required to
register an address where he was residing within days of moving in.
B.
On September 21, 2022, Letchaw again registered as transient. He
indicated on the registration form that he could be located near an address in
downtown San Diego. Letchaw confirmed that he had read all the
registration requirements, understood them, and had no questions. He also
initialed each requirement and signed and fingerprinted each page of his
registration form.
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The requirements he initialed included requirement 9, which informs
the registrant to re-register within five working days of any move;
requirement 12, providing that a person registered as transient has
five working days in which to register after moving to a residence; and
requirement 17, which indicates that a person who resides at more than one
address regularly must register each address within five working days of
moving in. On the last page of his registration form, Letchaw affirmed he
understood the requirements and had notified the Sex Offender Registration
Unit of any changes that needed to be made to his information.
In reality, however, Letchaw had lived fulltime at his girlfriend’s
residence in an unincorporated part of El Cajon since 2016. Letchaw paid
rent and kept his personal belongings—like clothes and composition books—
in the residence. He received mail at the address. If Letchaw and his
girlfriend were fighting, he would sleep at his son’s mother’s house in San
Diego—the location of the 2020 incident.
On October 5, 2022, Letchaw’s girlfriend called 911 and indicated she
wanted Letchaw to move out. A sheriff’s deputy responded to the residence
but left after talking with the girlfriend. He came back several hours later,
after Letchaw had returned home, and detained him.
Letchaw’s girlfriend also called the probation department. A probation
supervisor responded to the residence. Based on Letchaw’s many belongings
in the bedroom, the probation supervisor concluded Letchaw was residing at
the El Cajon address.
The investigating police officer reviewed a law enforcement database
showing Letchaw’s current registration information and his prior registration
violation. He also reviewed photographs of Letchaw’s belongings at the
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El Cajon address. Based on his investigation, the officer concluded Letchaw
was residing at that address and was required to register the address.
Letchaw was charged with one felony count of failing to register as a
convicted sex offender and one misdemeanor count of providing false registry
information. The information further alleged Letchaw had suffered a 1988
prior strike conviction.
C.
At trial, the jury was shown body-worn camera footage of the 2020
incident where Letchaw was arrested for registering as transient despite
helping pay rent at an address at which he had been residing for several
months. Letchaw elected not to testify. The jury convicted him of both
charged counts.
After the jury was excused, the prosecutor raised “the issue of the
strike prior allegation.” Letchaw’s counsel indicated Letchaw “would like to
admit the strike.” The court informed Letchaw that he was “entitled to a
trial on the question of whether [he] suffered the strike” and asked Letchaw if
his counsel was “accurate” in saying he was “willing to waive that.” Letchaw
responded, “Yes, ma’am.” At that point, the conversation turned to a
potential motion for new trial.
The court then returned to the strike prior, stating: “[J]ust to be clear,
with respect to the strike prior, when I said you have a right to a trial, Mr.
Letchaw, did you understand what I meant by that in terms of right to call
witnesses, cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses, have appointed counsel
for free? Did you understand all of that?” Again, Letchaw responded, “Yes,
ma’am.” The court then stated, “with that, I am going to set sentencing.”
The court never elicited Letchaw’s admission to the strike prior.
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D.
Probation recommended the court sentence Letchaw, as to count 1, to
the midterm of two years in prison, doubled to four years for the strike prior.
Letchaw sought to strike his strike prior and asked the court to sentence him
to either probation or the low term of 16 months in prison.
The court denied the motion to strike Letchaw’s strike prior. As to
count 1, the court selected the midterm of two years in prison, doubled for the
strike prior, for a base term of four years. As to count 2, the court imposed
but stayed “one year of custody to run concurrently with the term for
count 1.” The Felony Minutes—Pronouncement of Judgment dated
August 14, 2024 indicate Letchaw was sentenced to a term of 365 days in
custody for count 2.
II.
A.
Letchaw argues the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the
jury, despite the fact he did not testify at trial, as follows: “If the defendant
failed in his testimony to explain or deny evidence against him, and he could
reasonably be expected to have done so based on what he knew, you may
consider his failure to explain or deny in evaluating that evidence. Any such
failure is not enough by itself to prove guilt. The People must still prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defendant failed to
explain or deny, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that
failure.” (See CALCRIM No. 361.)
“It is error for a court to give an ‘abstract’ instruction, i.e., ‘one which is
correct in law but irrelevant.’” (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 282.)
“‘[I]n most cases the giving of an abstract instruction is only a technical error
which does not constitute ground for reversal.’” (Ibid.) Generally, “[s]uch
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error does not implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights and is subject to
harmless error review under” Watson. (People v. Falaniko (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1247.)
The instruction here was abstract because Letchaw did not testify at
all, so he could not fail to explain or deny incriminating evidence during his
nonexistent testimony. Thus, the instruction was given in error.
The People contend errors in giving CALCRIM No. 361 may be
evaluated under Watson. Letchaw, however, claims the instruction
amounted to federal constitutional error under Griffin v. California (1965)
380 U.S. 609 such that it is subject to the prejudice standard set forth in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (See, e.g., People v. Vargas
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 478.)
Griffin error occurs when the judge or prosecutor comments on the
defendant’s right not to testify. In Griffin, the court gave the following
instruction regarding a non-testifying defendant: “‘As to any evidence or facts
against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or
explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if,
though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may
take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such
evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably
drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.’”
(Griffin, 380 U.S. at pp. 609-610.) “The prosecutor made much of” the
defendant’s failure to testify, and the defendant was convicted. (Ibid.) The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari “to consider whether comment on the
failure to testify violated the . . . Fifth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 611.) The
court concluded it did, holding “the Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either
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comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the
court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” (Id. at p. 615.)
Letchaw claims that “[g]iving the instruction in a case such as this,
where the defendant did not testify, implicitly comments on the defendant’s
exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination” and therefore constitutes
Griffin error. Letchaw thus contends “the trial court permitted the jury to
draw adverse in[ference]s based on [Letchaw]’s exercise of his
Fifth Amendment right and ensuing failure to explain or deny not only the
evidence of the charged offenses, but also the very powerful [Evidence Code]
section 1101, subdivision (b) evidence, used by the People to prove
knowledge.” We disagree.
The instruction in Griffin, which expressly directed the jury to use the
defendant’s refusal to testify as evidence against him, is distinguishable from
the instruction here, which by its terms applies only when the defendant
testifies—not, as here, when the defendant elects to exercise the defendant’s
constitutional right to not testify. “We presume that jurors are intelligent
and capable of correctly understanding, correlating, applying, and following
the court’s instructions.” (People v. Acosta (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 108, 119.)
Letchaw fails to overcome the presumption the jury understood CALCRIM
No. 361, appreciated it did not apply to the case, and therefore disregarded it.
As we discern no Griffin error, we apply Watson and determine the erroneous
instruction was harmless.
Under Watson, an erroneous jury instruction is prejudicial only if “it is
reasonably probable [the] defendant would have obtained a more favorable
result had the instruction not been given.” (People v. Rogers (2013)
57 Cal.4th 296, 336.) In making that assessment, we consider the
instructions as a whole, the closing arguments, and the jury’s findings.
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(People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 831.) We also may consider
“whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively
strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively
weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant
complains affected the result.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142,
177.) It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate prejudice. (People v.
Triplett (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 655, 663.)
We agree with the People that giving CALCRIM No. 361 was harmless
on this record. The jury was instructed that it was to “consider
the[ instructions] together” and that “[s]ome . . . may not apply.” (See
CALCRIM No. 200.) The jury was instructed on the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard, and, as given, CALCRIM No. 361 reminded the jury that
“[t]he People must still prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Importantly, the jury was instructed under CALCRIM No. 355 that
Letchaw “has an absolute constitutional right not to testify” and “not [to]
consider, for any reason at all, the fact that the defendant did not testify” or
to “let it influence [its] decision in any way.” Neither counsel raised
CALCRIM No. 361 during closing arguments or commented on Letchaw’s
failure to explain adverse evidence. And the evidence against Letchaw was
strong. Several years before the charged offenses, Letchaw was arrested for
registering as transient when he was helping pay rent at an address at which
he was staying with some regularity. He then registered as transient days
before being arrested again for registering as transient despite paying rent at
an address at which he was residing. The jury deliberated for less than two
hours before finding Letchaw guilty of both charges. On this record, it is not
reasonably probable Letchaw would have obtained a more favorable outcome
had the jury not been instructed on CALCRIM No. 361.
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To the extent Letchaw claims the jury may have applied CALCRIM
No. 361 to his statements in the body-worn camera footage from the 2020
incident, we are unconvinced. By its terms, CALCRIM No. 361 is limited to a
defendant’s testimony. The jury was separately instructed under CALCRIM
No. 358 on how to handle “evidence the defendant made oral . . . statements
before the trial.” Again, we presume the jury was able to correlate CALCRIM
Nos. 358 and 361 and understand which applied to the body-worn camera
footage. (Acosta, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.)
In sum, the court’s error in giving CALCRIM No. 361 was harmless.
B.
Letchaw argues we must reverse the true finding as to the strike prior
allegation because he did not admit the allegation. We agree.
“Whenever the fact of a previous conviction of another offense is
charged in an accusatory pleading, and the defendant is found guilty of the
offense with which he is charged, the jury, or the judge if a jury trial is
waived, must unless the answer of the defendant admits such previous
conviction, find whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction.”
(Pen. Code, § 1158.) The prosecution bears the burden of proving a strike
prior allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Frierson (2017)
4 Cal.5th 225, 233.)
This procedure was not followed here. While Letchaw expressed his
intention to admit the strike prior, the record shows Letchaw never actually
did so. Nor did a jury or the trial court find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Letchaw suffered the alleged strike prior. Accordingly, we must reverse the
true finding as to the strike prior allegation and remand for the trial court to
hold a hearing on whether Letchaw elects to admit the strike prior allegation
or proceed to trial on it and hold further proceedings accordingly. (See People
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v. Strike (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 143, 154 [when true finding on strike prior
allegation is reversed, “the appropriate remedy is to remand the case to the
trial court for a new hearing on the prior strike allegation”].) Given the
foregoing, we need not address whether the court’s advisements preceding
admission of the strike prior were adequate.
C.
Finally, Letchaw contends—and the People concede—that his sentence
as to count 2 must be adjusted to 364 rather than 365 days in custody. We
accept the People’s concession.
“Every offense which is prescribed by any law of the state to be
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail up to or not exceeding one year
shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to
exceed 364 days.” (Pen. Code, § 18.5.) Count 2, providing false registry
information, is subject to this 364-day limit on imprisonment.
(See § 290.018(k).) Yet here, the Felony Minutes—Pronouncement of
Judgment dated August 14, 2024 specify Letchaw’s term of imprisonment for
count 2 to be 365 days. Under section 18.5, this length of imprisonment is
improper. Accordingly, on remand we direct the trial court to amend the
Felony Minutes—Pronouncement of Judgment dated August 14, 2024 to
instead reflect a term of imprisonment of 364 days on count 2.
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III.
We reverse the true finding on the prior strike allegation and remand
to the trial court to (1) hold a hearing on whether Letchaw elects to admit the
strike prior allegation or proceed to trial on it and hold any further attendant
proceedings and (2) amend the Felony Minutes—Pronouncement of
Judgment dated August 14, 2024 to specify Letchaw’s term of imprisonment
to be 364 days for count 2. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
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