People v. Alcazar CA3

CourtListener 10846342CalctappApr 21, 2026

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Filed 4/21/26 P. v. Alcazar CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)

THE PEOPLE, C103840
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No.
v. MANCRFE20120002712)

BALTAZAR ALCAZAR,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Baltazar Alcazar appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order
denying his motion to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7.1 His
counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the factual and procedural background of the
case and asking this court to review the record and determine whether there are arguable
issues on appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Alcazar was advised
by counsel of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days from the date the
opening brief was filed. More than 30 days have elapsed, and he has not filed a
supplemental brief.
Although this is not Alcazar’s first appeal as of right, in the interest of judicial
economy, we exercise our discretion to independently review the record. (People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233, fn. 6 (Delgadillo).) Having done so, we find no

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to Alcazar. The trial
court’s postjudgment order denying Alcazar’s motion to vacate is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
In May 2012, Alcazar was charged with possession of a controlled substance for
sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378—count 1), criminal street gang activity (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)—count 2), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)—count 3), two counts of
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)—counts 4 & 5), possession of
ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)—count 6), carrying a concealed firearm in
a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1)—count 7), possession of a controlled substance (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)—count 8), and transportation and/or sale of a controlled
substance (id., § 11379—count 9). As to counts 1 and 9, the complaint alleged Alcazar
was armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (c).) The complaint further alleged that
Alcazar suffered a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and
served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
In July 2012, Alcazar pled guilty to counts 1 and 2. The parties stipulated to an
aggregate state prison term of seven years four months, consisting of the upper term of
three years on count 1, doubled to six years pursuant to the strike, plus the middle term of
eight months on count 2, doubled to 16 months pursuant to the strike. The prosecutor
recited the factual basis for the plea as follows: “On May 8th·of 2012 in Manteca, San
Joaquin County, the defendant was in possession of a substance, which was later
analyzed by [the] Department of Justice and was determined to contain 3.48 grams net of
methamphetamine. [¶] In his possession, he also had a firearm, as well as other·indicia
of narcotic sales. He also had text messages·indicating narcotic sales. [¶] Based on all
these circumstances, a detective from the Manteca Police Department would testify -- a
qualified narcotics expert would testify that he possessed these items for purposes of
sale. [¶] Also, based on his tattoos and his prior admissions and his prior contacts, as
well as his classifications in prison, as well as jail and his past history, he has admitted to

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being [a] Sureno gang member. [¶] Manteca Police Department gang expert would
testify based on the fact that he was in possession of a firearm, he’s a gangster, that he
possessed the narcotics for purposes of sale in furtherance of the Sureno gang activity.
All this happened in Manteca.”
The trial court sentenced Alcazar in accordance with the plea agreement and also
imposed mandatory fines and fees totaling $380. Alcazar received 67 days of custody
credit. All other counts and enhancements were dismissed.
In January 2025, Alcazar filed a motion to vacate his conviction on count 2
(§ 186.22, subd. (a)) under section 1473.7, claiming newly discovered evidence showed
he was factually innocent. Alcazar explained that the “evidence” consisted of a
California Supreme Court opinion “that clarified the statute and disapproved previous
Court of Appeal cases that otherwise permitted his conviction on the same facts,” citing
People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125 as constituting the “new evidence.” Alcazar
acknowledged that this argument appeared barred by People v. Perez (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 994, which held: “The publication of a new appellate opinion is not
newly discovered evidence as that term is used in section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(2).”
(Perez, at p. 999.)
The People opposed the motion to vacate citing Perez. The People also submitted
a supplemental opposition arguing Alcazar was still guilty of a violation under
section 186.22, subdivision (a) despite changes in the law made by Rodriguez.
In April 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on Alcazar’s motion to vacate
and denied the motion. Alcazar timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
In Wende, our Supreme Court held that “Courts of Appeal must conduct a review
of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal which
raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as frivolous.” (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 221.) The Wende procedure applies “to the first appeal as of right and is

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compelled by the constitutional right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.” (Ibid.)
In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court held that Wende independent review is not
required in an appeal from a postjudgment order denying a section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing because the denial does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional right to
counsel in a first appeal as of right. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 222, 224-226.)
The court further found that general due process principles regarding fundamental
fairness did not compel a Wende independent review of the order. (Id. at pp. 229-232.)
Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, the court exercised its discretion to
conduct its own independent review of the record given that the lower court’s
“suboptimal” notice did not inform the defendant that his appeal might be dismissed as
abandoned if he did not file a supplemental brief. (Id. at pp. 222, 233 & fn. 6.)
While Delgadillo addressed the application of Wende’s review procedures in the
specific context of a postjudgment relief order under section 1172.6 (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 231, fn. 5 [“[i]n this case, we are not deciding Wende’s application to
other postconviction contexts, which may present different considerations”]), the same
principles may nonetheless apply in the present matter given that this is not Alcazar’s
first appeal as of right. However, we need not decide whether Delgadillo in fact governs
review of this order denying Alcazar’s motion to vacate his conviction under section
1473.7 because, like our Supreme Court, we exercise our discretion to conduct an
independent review of the record. Having done so, we find no arguable error that would
result in a disposition more favorable to Alcazar.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s postjudgment order denying Alcazar’s motion to vacate is
affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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