CourtListener 10843479•People v. Ruelas CA2/6
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Filed 4/15/26 P. v. Ruelas CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B339030
(Super. Ct. No. 2020007916)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
EDGAR RODRIGUEZ
RUELAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Edgar Rodriguez Ruelas appeals his conviction, by
jury, of assault with the intent to commit rape, sodomy, or oral
copulation against a person under 18 years of age (Pen. Code,
§ 220, subd. (a)(2), (count 1))1; two counts of assault with the
intent to commit rape, sodomy, or oral copulation (§ 220, subd.
(a)(2)), (counts 2 and 4)); genital penetration with a foreign object
(§§ 289, subd. (a)(1)), 667.61, subd. (d)(4), (count 3)); and assault
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise stated.
with the intent to commit rape, sodomy, or oral copulation during
the course of a burglary. (§ 220, subd. (b), (count 5).) With
respect to counts 1, 2 and 4, the jury found true aggravating
circumstances that the victims were vulnerable, the crimes
involved planning, sophistication, or professionalism, and that
appellant engaged in conduct indicating he was a serious danger
to society. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(8).) It
found untrue the allegation that these offenses involved a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness or callousness. (Id., rule
4.421(b)(1).) The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term
in prison of 21 years plus 32 years to life.
Appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of uncharged acts he committed and pornography he
accessed. He contends the admission of this evidence violated
Evidence Code sections 352, 1101 and 1108 as well as his right to
due process of law. We affirm.
Facts
Appellant assaulted five different women, all of
whom were strangers to him. Three of these assaults occurred on
Ventura County hiking trails, two in early morning hours and
one in the late afternoon, while each victim was hiking alone.
The other two assaults occurred inside apartments at night. One
victim was sleeping in her own bed, the other in her boyfriend’s.
At trial, appellant admitted that he was the person who
committed these assaults, but denied any intent to rape the
victims. Instead, his counsel argued that appellant “has an
underwear fetish, which became an underwear obsession, which
got out of his control and it led to him grabbing people and going
into homes, but not to commit rape.”
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The Charged Offenses. Appellant was married to
A.S. from 2006 to 2018. During their marriage, appellant often
went hiking alone, usually late at night or very early in the
morning. He would wear a sweatsuit, e.g., matching black
sweatpants and a sweatshirt, and a ski mask that covered his
face. Appellant sometimes wore a beanie and neck warmer or
gaiter that could be pulled up to cover his face.
Count 1. In March 2020, then 16-year-old Y.C. went
for a hike in Oak Park at about 3:30 p.m. She took her ukulele, a
book, a notebook and her cell phone. Y.C. walked to a clearing
where there was a tree with a swing. Along the way, she heard
some rustling in the bushes. After reaching her destination, Y.C.
heard the rustling again. About 5 minutes later, she decided to
walk back home. As she was walking, appellant jumped out of
the bushes and ran out toward her.
Appellant put his hand over Y.C.’s mouth. She bit it.
He pushed Y.C. to the ground as she screamed for help. Once she
was on the ground, Y.C. hit appellant in the shin with her
ukulele. Appellant backed up, giving Y.C. the chance to get up on
her feet. The two stood facing each other. Y.C. pleaded with
appellant to not hurt her. He told her to run away and she did.
Count 2. In April 2019, Jane Doe went hiking alone
in Oak Park at about 5:40 p.m. She was carrying a backpack, a
jacket and an umbrella for shade. After hiking for about 40
minutes, she turned around to walk back to her car.
After turning around, Jane Doe saw appellant, who
was dressed in a black sweatsuit and ski mask, running toward
her. Doe stepped backwards. Appellant put a hand over her
mouth and grabbed her umbrella with his other hand. Doe tried
to run backwards but stumbled and fell to the ground. Appellant
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got on top of her, holding her arms down. He asked Doe where
her cell phone was. Doe was twisting around, trying to get
appellant’s hand off her mouth. He told her several times to be
quiet. She yelled at him to go away.
The two struggled as appellant pulled at Doe’s
clothes and Doe tried to remove his ski mask. At one point, Doe
was able to get back on her feet and was almost standing when
appellant used the umbrella to push her into the hillside. Doe
told appellant that people knew where she was and would be
coming. He grabbed Doe’s backpack and ran down the trail. Doe
lost sight of appellant at a switchback. She testified that she did
not believe appellant was trying to sexually assault her. She
believed he was trying to steal her cell phone.
Count 3. In October 2017, B.T. visited her then
boyfriend, Ian, at his ground floor apartment in Thousand Oaks.
The two went to bed at about midnight. They locked the
apartment’s front door, but left the sliding glass door open about
two feet. B.T. wore her ripped jeans and a cropped t-shirt to bed.
B.T. woke up at about 3 a.m. to find a man she did
not know standing in front of her. Appellant approached B.T.,
putting one hand over her mouth and the other on her stomach.
He quickly unzipped her jeans and put his hand down her pants,
touching her clitoris. B.T. was scared and tried to move, pushing
her body against Ian’s, and yelling his name. Ian woke up to see
appellant moving toward the sliding glass door. Both men went
outside, onto the patio. They briefly struggled. When Ian saw
appellant reach for his pocket, he thought appellant might stab
him so he backed off. Appellant fled.
Count 4. H.H., a woman, went hiking alone in
Wildwood Canyon Regional Park at about 5:45 a.m. one day in
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July 2017. After she had been walking for about 10 minutes, she
saw appellant walking toward her. H.H. began to feel unsafe, so
she turned onto another path which would lead her back to the
parking lot. As she was walking, H.H. again noticed appellant
behind her on the trail. She told appellant that he was scaring
her. He shook his head and then pushed her to the ground.
Appellant got on top of H.H., pushed up her shirt and touched her
breasts. He tried to pull H.H.’s pants down. As they struggled,
H.H. told appellant that she had called her husband and the
police, and both were on their way to help her. Appellant picked
up H.H.’s cell phone and ran away.
Count 5. In June 2017, B.P. lived with her roommate
in a first-floor apartment in Thousand Oaks. The apartment had
a sliding glass door which they left unlocked one night.
B.P. was awakened at about 4:20 a.m. because she
heard her bedroom door creaking. It was very dark and B.P. was
disoriented. Then she saw the shadow of a large man enter her
room. B.P. asked, “Who are you?” Appellant put his hand over
B.P.’s mouth and said, “shh.” B.P. moved to the left side of her
bed. She was able to stand up and walk toward the bedroom
door. Appellant grabbed B.P.’s arms and pushed her back toward
the bed. B.P. screamed for her roommate who woke up and went
into the apartment’s hallway. Appellant tried to leave B.P.’s
room and escape through the apartment’s front door. The
roommate grabbed his sweatshirt, thinking she would be able to
hold him until police arrived. He broke free, unlocked the door
and left the apartment. No property was missing and nothing in
the apartment seemed out of place.
Uncharged Offenses. In addition to evidence of the
offenses themselves, the prosecution introduced evidence that
5
appellant assaulted L.R., his then mother-in-law, three times.
On another occasion, while working at a hotel, appellant entered
a guest room and rummaged through a drawer in which pre-teen
girls were storing their underwear. These events occurred
between four and nine years before the charged offenses.
The first two assaults on L.R. occurred in 2006, while
appellant and his then wife, A.S., were staying with L.R. in her
two-story condominium in Mammoth Lakes. The condominium’s
bedrooms were located on the lower floor, which was much colder
than the upper floor. As a result, all three adults slept on
mattresses on the living room floor, where it was warmer. On the
first occasion, L.R. woke in the middle of the night, because she
felt appellant touching her labia. When L.R. woke up and moved,
appellant returned to where he had been sleeping without saying
anything. The next night, L.R. again awoke to appellant
touching her labia. She kicked him and he retreated.
The third occasion occurred about three years later,
when L.R. was living in Crowley and A.S. and appellant were
living in Mammoth Lakes. Early one morning, A.S. and
appellant arrived at L.R.’s home with breakfast. They ate, A.S.
left for work and appellant stayed behind.
L.R. felt uncomfortable being alone with appellant.
Eventually she told him that she was going back to bed. She
closed her bedroom door and fell back asleep. L.R. believed
appellant had left. At around 12:15 p.m., L.R. woke up because
she heard a knock on her front door. When she sat up, she saw
appellant was inside her bedroom. He was on the floor at the foot
of the bed, on his hands and knees, facing in the direction of
L.R.’s bed. She asked appellant what he was doing. He said he
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was looking for his shoes. Appellant was already wearing shoes.
He got up and left quickly, through the back door.
About four years after this incident, appellant was
working at a hotel in Mammoth Lakes. One family staying at the
hotel consisted of twin 12-year-old girls and their parents. The
whole family went to the hotel’s hot tub. After a few minutes, the
mother returned to their room. She opened the door to find
appellant inside, looking into the drawer where her daughters
stored their underwear and pajamas. Appellant’s pants were
unbuckled and unzipped but his penis was not exposed and he
was not masturbating. When confronted by the mother,
appellant ran out of the room without saying anything. In a
tape-recorded interview with police, appellant explained that he
was fantasizing about underwear and went into the room for that
reason.
Searches for and Access to Pornography. A forensic
examiner testified that appellant used two mobile phones to
search for and access pornography. The examination of his
mobile phones did not disclose any searches for or access to child
sexual abuse materials. Some of the search terms appellant used
included “incestuous-type of relationships,” “spying on women or
voyeurism on women engaged in sexual acts,” “hidden camera,”
“spying in the dressing room,” “young teen forced,” and sleeping,
drugged or helpless women. Appellant also searched for
pornography relating to hiking and to “sexual acts committed
during home invasions.” The forensic examiner did not find
evidence of a focus on pornography relating to underwear
fetishes.
Appellant also used his phones to search for other
types of pornography and for numerous “innocuous items,”
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including social media sites, real estate listings, and retail stores.
The forensic examiner prepared an exhibit listing searches for
pornography made, and websites visited on appellant’s phones.
This exhibit reflected less than 4 percent of the phones’ search
history.
Standard of Review
Appellant’s sole contention is that the trial court
erred when it admitted evidence of the uncharged incidents and
pornography. We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings
under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v.
Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 128.) The trial court’s decision
may not be disturbed unless it was arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (People
v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 699-700; In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Discussion
Invited Error. Respondent contends any error in
admitting evidence relating to pornography was invited because
appellant’s trial counsel withdrew the objection to its admission.
Initially, counsel argued that appellant’s searches for and use of
pornography were not relevant because the types of pornography
were too diverse to support an inference that he intended to
commit sexual assault. At the pre-trial hearing, however,
counsel withdrew that objection. Counsel stated, “[A]t this point
if the Court is going to let in the pornography, I am going to ask
to admit all of the pornography. Because I think that it shows
that he doesn’t have the specific intent . . . .” Counsel later made
a similar argument to the jury, noting that it could not infer
appellant’s intent from the pornography because the prosecution
showed them only the small percentage of material used by
8
appellant that fit the prosecution’s narrative. She further argued
there was no evidence that watching pornography leads to sexual
assault.
Invited error precludes a party from asserting on
appeal an error that was induced by the party’s own deliberate,
tactical decisions and conduct. (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d
216, 228; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 333,
disapproved on other grounds, People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th
186, 200.) Here, appellant stipulated to the pornography on the
theory that the types of pornography appellant searched for and
accessed were too broad to show an intent to commit sexual
assault. The choice was a tactical one and any error was
therefore invited.
Uncharged Acts. Appellant contends evidence of his
prior, uncharged assaults against L.R., his conduct in the
Mammoth Lakes hotel room and his pornography use was
inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 352, 1101, subdivision
(b), and 1108. He further contends admission of the evidence
violated his right to due process. There was no error.
Evidence Code section 352 grants the trial court
broad discretion to exclude otherwise relevant evidence where its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
“that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
(Ibid.) The prejudice referred to here is not the prejudice or
damage that results from probative evidence. Instead, “evidence
is considered unduly prejudicial if it tends to evoke an emotional
bias against the defendant as an individual and has a negligible
bearing on the issues.” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th
1056, 1091.) Section 352 permits the exclusion of evidence that
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encourages “‘“‘“‘prejudging’ a person or cause on the basis of
extraneous factors. . . .”’”’” (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70,
105.)
Evidence that the defendant in a criminal case
committed an uncharged crime, tort or other act may be
admissible to “prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake
or accident, . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such
an act.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) The degree and nature of
similarity between the uncharged misconduct and the charged
offense determines whether the uncharged misconduct is relevant
to demonstrate one of the enumerated facts. (People v. Ewoldt
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) “The least degree of similarity . . . is
required in order to prove intent. . . . In order to be admissible to
prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently
similar to support the inference that the defendant ‘“probably
harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.” [Citations.]’”
(Ibid.)
Where the defendant is accused of a sexual offense,
evidence that he or she committed another sexual offense “is not
made inadmissible by [Evidence Code] [s]ection 1101, if the
evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code]
[s]ection 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1108.) This statute “authorizes the
admission of evidence of a prior sexual offense to establish the
defendant’s propensity to commit a sexual offense, subject to
exclusion under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Lewis
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1286 (Lewis).) Evidence of prior bad acts
that is properly admitted under Evidence Code sections 1101,
subdivision (b) and 1108, does not violate the defendant’s right to
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due process. (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 75; People v.
Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 900.)
Here, appellant’s defense at trial was that he lacked
the intent to sexually assault his victims. Evidence of his prior
sexual assaults and pornography use was admissible to show that
he attacked his victims with the intent to rape or digitally
penetrate them. For example, evidence that appellant sexually
assaulted his mother-in-law by touching her labia as she slept
supports the inference that he intended to forcibly digitally
penetrate each of his sleeping victims rather than simply to
physically assault them. The same holds true for appellant’s
hiking victims. Appellant’s sexual assaults on L.R. demonstrate
his propensity to commit that offense, supporting the conclusion
that his assaults on the hikers were sexual in nature. (Lewis,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1286.)
We reach the same conclusion with respect to
evidence of appellant’s pornography searches and use. His
searches for and use of materials depicting the sexual assault of
sleeping women and hikers support the logical inference that he
was interested in those topics. That interest, in turn, supports
the inference that he intended to commit a sexual assault, rather
than a simple physical assault when he attacked women in
similar circumstances.
The trial court also properly exercised its discretion
when it concluded this evidence was not inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 352. Appellant’s assaults on L.R. were
substantially similar to his assaults on B.T. (count 3) and B.P.
(count 5). The conduct was not significantly more violent,
invasive or inflammatory than the charged offenses. Similarly,
the pornography searches indicated an interest in the subjects of
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sleeping and hiking women, but not in child abuse or other
subjects that were more inflammatory or violent. Because the
uncharged acts were similar in critical respects to the charged
offenses, that evidence was not likely to evoke an emotional bias
against appellant or to encourage the jury to base its verdict on
extraneous factors. There was no error.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
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Anthony J. Sabo, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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