CourtListener 10843476•People v. Urrutia CA4/1
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Filed 4/15/26 P. v. Urrutia CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085707
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV21004726)
NICHOLAS JAMES URRUTIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Michael A. Camber, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Nicholas James Urrutia of first degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true that he personally used a deadly
or dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense (§ 12022(b)(1)).
Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 indicating he
found no arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks us to review
the record for error as Wende requires. We offered Urrutia the opportunity to
file his own brief, but he has not done so.
Based on our independent review of the record, we find no reasonably
arguable appellate issues. We remand for the trial court to correct
discrepancies between the court’s oral pronouncement and the abstract of
judgment. So modified, we otherwise affirm.
I.
A.
In late December 2021, Gabriel Fuentes entered his local bar at
roughly 9:00 or 10:00 p.m.
About an hour later, Urrutia arrived wearing a plaid flannel shirt.
Kristy J. and her aunt arrived at about 10:00 p.m., after Urrutia.
The bartender gave Urrutia water while he sat at the bar and talked
with Fuentes a couple seats away. At first, Urrutia and Fuentes’
conversation was friendly. About twenty minutes in, Urrutia mentioned
someone in his family had died, and Fuentes was supportive. Fuentes asked
whether Urrutia’s parents could have done something about it, and Urrutia
became “[v]ery angry and loud and completely changed.”
Urrutia stood up, slammed his hands on the bar, and said, “‘Are you
calling my parents chickens?’” Fuentes looked shocked but stayed calm.
Urrutia walked angrily out the front door. Fuentes went over to the jukebox
next to the door.
According to Kristy J., Fuentes was behind her and her aunt, who were
in the process of leaving, when the door swung back and “startled” her. She
saw Urrutia standing in the doorway holding the door open with his foot, and
she and her aunt went around him. As they did so, Kristy saw Urrutia was
holding a knife flat against his chest. He seemed to be looking past her and
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her aunt. The door slammed behind them and they walked away. Kristy’s
aunt gave a similar account.
According to the bartender, when Urrutia first left the bar, she thought
he might be going to retrieve a weapon. She grabbed the keys to the door and
went to lock it, but before she got around the bar, Urrutia stormed back in.
After pushing the door inwards, Urrutia stood face to face with Fuentes and
screamed something akin to “You can’t call my parents chickens” before “very
forcefully” putting his hands on Fuentes’ chest. Fuentes stumbled backward
into a pool table, and Urrutia left.
Fuentes looked bewildered for 30 seconds or so, at which point the
bartender noticed he was having difficulty breathing. She came around the
bar to check on him. The bartender asked if Fuentes was okay, but Fuentes
collapsed.
The bartender asked some patrons to help so she could call 911, and a
female patron said she knew CPR. As soon as the patron began CPR, blood
covered her hands. She lifted Fuentes’ shirt and the bartender could see
“stab wounds and blood everywhere.”
Fuentes was transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced
dead. Fuentes was stabbed in his sternum and below his right nipple. The
stab wound to the sternum penetrated the aorta and caused his death.
B.
Later the same day of the stabbing, police officers were tasked with
locating the murder suspect. The description of the suspect was a “Hispanic
male wearing a red hat and a flannel shirt.” The officers also knew the
suspect’s license plate number and that he drove a black sedan. An officer in
an unmarked vehicle spotted the sedan and followed it to a motel parking lot,
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where Urrutia was arrested. While processing the car later, the police
located a blue hat with a red bill.
Urrutia was charged with first degree murder, and it was alleged he
personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing the offense.
In the days immediately following the stabbing, the police obtained
surveillance video from several stores in the same strip mall as the bar. The
videos, which were played for the jury, showed a man wearing a long-sleeved,
blue flannel shirt with a backwards dark hat with a red bill engage in a
“commotion at the bar door” and then leave by car. The videos also showed
the man was wearing the same shoes as those Urrutia was wearing when he
was arrested. The videos showed Urrutia leaving the bar several times to go
to his car and then reentering the bar. At 11:49 p.m., he exited the bar to
relocate his car. He reentered the bar at 12:05 a.m. and then exited and
drove away at 12:23 a.m.
About a week after Fuentes died, “a large group of people”—at least
five—came into the bar on an evening when the same bartender was on duty.
They threatened the bartender about testifying in the case. Jail calls, which
the jury heard, led the police to believe Urrutia was involved in the
bartender’s intimidation despite being in custody.
C.
At the end of the People’s case, defense counsel moved to dismiss under
section 1118.1, which motion the court denied.
Over the defense’s objection, the court instructed the jury on CALCRIM
Nos. 371 (consciousness of guilt—suppression of evidence) and 372
(defendant’s flight). Over the People’s objection, the court also instructed the
jury on CALCRIM Nos. 522 (provocation), 570 (voluntary manslaughter—
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heat of passion), and 640 (deliberations and completion of verdict forms)
rather than its alternative version 641.
During closing arguments, the People argued Urrutia was guilty of first
degree murder, he demonstrated consciousness of guilt by fleeing the scene
and arranging the intimidation of the bartender, and he was not adequately
provoked to make his crime manslaughter. The defense focused on
discrediting the bartender’s testimony, demonstrating Urrutia’s lack of
premeditation and deliberation, and establishing Fuentes’ provocation of
Urrutia. In rebuttal, the People disputed Urrutia was provoked.
The jury found Urrutia guilty of first degree murder and found true the
allegation that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon.
Urrutia waived his right to a jury in the bifurcated trial on any prior
convictions and circumstances in aggravation and agreed to defer that
portion of the trial until sentencing. After hearing the People’s evidence, the
court found true beyond a reasonable doubt that Urrutia suffered a prior
conviction under both sections 1170.12(a) through (d) and 667(a)(1).
D.
During sentencing, the court indicated it had received and reviewed the
probation report, the defense’s sentencing position paper and motion under
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and the People’s
response. Defense counsel argued the court should grant his Romero motion
because the strike prior—an attempted robbery—was nearly 10 years old.
The People argued denial of the motion was warranted given Urrutia had
numerous convictions since the late 1990s, including after the strike prior,
and the present offense was “serious[]” and “violent.” The court denied the
motion, noting the many factors it was to consider and expressly relying on
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“the horrific facts of this case,” Urrutia’s criminal history, and his past parole
violations.
The court denied probation and sentenced Urrutia to a prison term of
25 years to life for his murder conviction, doubled by the strike prior to
50 years to life. The court also imposed a consecutive one-year prison
sentence for the weapon enhancement and a consecutive five-year prison
sentence for his serious violent felony prior, for an aggregate prison sentence
of 56 years to life. The court orally imposed a $40 court operations
assessment, a $30 court facilities assessment, a restitution fund fine of
$5,000, and victim restitution in the amount of $12,655.97 plus $489.96, or
$13,145.93. The court noted Urrutia was entitled to no conduct credit under
section 2933.2 and 1,019 days of actual credit.
The abstract of judgment specifies victim restitution in the amount of
$12,655.97 and omits any reference to the restitution fund fine. The abstract
of judgment also imposes a $300 restitution fine under section 1202.4(b) and
a $300 parole revocation fine under section 1202.45 that were not orally
imposed.
II.
Urrutia’s counsel filed a Wende brief setting forth a statement of the
case and facts, urging no grounds for reversal, and asking us to
independently review the record for error. To assist our review under
Anders, 386 U.S. at pp. 744-745, counsel identified the following issues he
considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal:
(1) “Whether the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing the jury
to hear the recordings of [Urrutia]’s telephone calls from jail.”
(2) “Whether the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing the
prosecution to elicit testimony from [the bartender] that a few
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days after the stabbing incident, unknown people came into the
pub and warned her not to testify.”
(3) “Whether the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the
jury under CALCRIM No. 371 that it could consider [Urrutia]’s
purported complicity in the alleged threat to [the bartender] not
to testify as showing consciousness of guilt.”
(4) “Whether the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the
jury under CALCRIM No. 372 that it could consider [Urrutia]’s
flight as showing consciousness of guilt.”
(5) “Whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict that
[Urrutia] committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder.”
(6) “Whether the trial court erred by refusing to strike [Urrutia]’s
‘strike’ in the interests of justice.”
We reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders and
discovered no arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has
represented Urrutia on this appeal.
We, however, identified several discrepancies between the court’s oral
pronouncement and the abstract of judgment.
First, during the sentencing hearing, the court awarded victim
restitution totaling $13,145.93 and imposed a restitution fund fine of $5,000.
Yet the abstract of judgment only imposes part of the victim restitution and
omits any reference to the restitution fund fine. In general, the oral
pronouncement controls, so we amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185, 188.)
Second, the abstract of judgment reflects a $300 restitution fine under
section 1202.4(b) and a $300 parole revocation fine under section 1202.45
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that were not orally imposed during the sentencing hearing. Under
section 1202.4(b), “the court shall impose a separate and additional
restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not
doing so and states those reasons on the record.” Under section 1202.45, if a
defendant’s sentence includes a period of parole or the defendant is subject to
post-release community supervision or mandatory supervision, the court
shall impose an additional fine in the same amount as the section 1202.4 fine.
The People did not object to the court’s failure to orally impose these fines.
Because such fines are discretionary given the court’s ability to not impose
them if it makes certain findings on the record, the People forfeited the
imposition of the fines by not objecting. (People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th
300, 303.) Accordingly, we direct those fines to be stricken.
III.
We remand to the trial court with directions to amend the abstract of
judgment to reflect, as orally imposed, (1) victim restitution in the amount of
$12,655.97 plus $489.96, for a total victim restitution award of $13,145.93;
and (2) a restitution fund fine in the amount of $5,000. We also (3) strike the
$300 restitution fine under section 1202.4(b) and $300 parole revocation fine
under section 1202.45, which were not orally imposed. We direct the trial
court to prepare and forward a copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. We otherwise affirm.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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