People v. Deramus CA2/8

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Filed 4/14/26 P. v. Deramus CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B344634

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XCNBA464841-01)
v.

HENRY J. DERAMUS III,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.

Neil Rosenbaum, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, we
review an order denying Henry Deramus’s motion for
resentencing brought under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. Because
Deramus’s conclusory allegations of entitlement to resentencing
relief were refuted by the record of conviction, we affirm the
order. We also remand with directions to the trial court to permit
Deramus to file an amended petition within 30 days of the
remittitur if he chooses to do so.
BACKGROUND
As relevant here, in 2018, an information charged Deramus
with attempted murder along with prior strike and firearm use
enhancements. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022.5, subd. (a), 667,
subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12, subd. (b).) On July 9, 2019, Deramus pled
no contest to attempted murder, admitted a prior strike
conviction, and admitted possession of a firearm during the
commission of the offense. The trial court imposed an aggregate
sentence of 22 years in prison, consisting of the upper term of
nine years for the attempted murder conviction, doubled due to
the prior strike, and the midterm of four years for the firearm
enhancement.
On October 10, 2024, Deramus filed a form petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95 (renumbered on
June 30, 2022 as section 1172.6). The form petition alleged no
evidentiary facts. The trial court appointed counsel for Deramus.
On December 3, 2024, the People filed a response to the
resentencing petition. The People contended that testimony at
the preliminary hearing established that as the victim sat in the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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driver’s seat of his car, Deramus approached him on foot and
fired numerous rounds at him. The victim later identified
Deramus as the person who shot him, as did police officers who
reviewed surveillance video of the shooting. The People
contended they prosecuted Deramus as the lone and actual
shooter of the victim. At the hearing on January 15, 2025,
Deramus submitted on his petition and the People’s response.
Finding that Deramus had failed to make a prima facie case for
relief, the trial court denied the petition for resentencing.
Deramus timely appealed.
We appointed counsel to represent Deramus on appeal. On
October 24, 2025, counsel filed a no issue brief pursuant to People
v. Delgadillo. Counsel advised us they told Deramus he could file
his own supplemental brief.
On October 24, 2025, we sent Deramus notice that counsel
had filed a no issue brief on his behalf. We advised him he could,
within 30 days, submit a supplemental brief or letter stating any
contentions or arguments that he wanted us to consider. We also
advised Deramus that if no supplemental brief or letter were
timely filed, the appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
On January 5, 2026, Deramus filed a supplemental letter
brief. Citing People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, he
contended the trial court erroneously denied his resentencing
petition because he did not admit malice and did not admit he
harbored an intent to kill when he pled no contest.
DISCUSSION
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) amended “the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the

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actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §1,
subd. (f).) It accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) amended the statute to include attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and
manslaughter. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see former § 1170.95, subd.
(a).)
The Legislature provided a procedure, now codified in
section 1172.6, whereby defendants may petition the court to
vacate their convictions and seek resentencing on any remaining
counts if they show they could not now be convicted of murder,
attempted murder or manslaughter because of the changes to
sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Alternatively,
persons are eligible who accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder.
attempted murder or manslaughter under the law as it was
before Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(2).)
In People v. Patton, the California Supreme Court held that
a petitioner who offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement
to relief under section 1172.6 in response to a record of conviction
demonstrating petitioner’s conviction under a still-valid theory
has not made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief.
(People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 557 (Patton).) Patton
held that a trial court may properly, at the prima facie stage,
reference the record of conviction to refute conclusory allegations

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in furtherance of its statutory screening function. This includes
relying on unchallenged facts within a preliminary hearing
transcript to ascertain the People’s theory of liability and frame
the issues that may require an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at
pp. 568–569.)
Here, the People refuted Deramus’s conclusory allegations
of entitlement to resentencing relief with a contrary showing:
testimony at the preliminary hearing that one man, later
identified as Deramus, approached the victim as he was seated in
his car and shot multiple rounds into the front passenger side of
the victim’s car. When confronted with a record of conviction that
demonstrated relief was unavailable, Deramus did not meet his
“burden of coming forward with nonconclusory [factual]
allegations to alert the prosecution and the court to what issues
an evidentiary hearing would entail.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 567.) The trial court therefore did not err in concluding
Deramus failed to meet his prima facie burden. (See ibid.; People
v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1196 (Rodriguez).)
Patton was issued after the trial court’s finding of
ineligibility for relief. We asked the parties to submit
supplemental briefing on the effect of Patton on this appeal.
Deramus acknowledged the Patton decision permits the trial
court to look to the preliminary hearing transcript when
conducting a prima facie review of a resentencing petition made
after a conviction based on a no contest plea. He also noted that
in Patton, although the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
order denying resentencing relief where Patton had offered only
conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief under section
1172.6, at Patton’s request the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the superior court with directions to consider an amended

5
petition if Patton chose to file one. Deramus argued he was
identically situated to the Patton petitioner: his resentencing
petition was also a checkbox declaration with legal conclusions,
his trial counsel did not file a brief in response to the People’s
showing, and his counsel made no argument at the prima facie
hearing. Deramus requested we grant him the same relief the
Supreme Court afforded Patton: a remand to permit him to file
an amended petition pleading additional facts.
It is clear that in Patton the Supreme Court entertained
some level of doubt whether Patton would be able to plead
additional facts that would establish a prima facie showing, as
the court explained it was remanding the matter “out of an
abundance of caution.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.)
Here, too, it is unknown whether Deramus will be able to allege
additional facts sufficient to make a prima facie showing, but we
follow the California Supreme Court’s lead and remand the
matter in an abundance of caution to permit him to file an
amended petition if he is able to do so. (Ibid.; see also Rodriguez,
supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1196; People v. Glass (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 922, 925, 930.)

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. We remand the matter to the
superior court with directions to consider an amended petition
should Deramus, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

I concur:

WILEY, J.

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SCHERB, J., Concurring
I concur in the court’s affirmance and limited remand. But
as to the limited remand, I express hesitation that People v.
Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton) alone justifies this relief. I
decline to address the matter further now, however, because of
the posture of this appeal and my concern with applying a
contrary rule in Deramus’s case, given the appellate courts have
established a practice, in the nearly 14 months since Patton, of
granting remands in cases like Deramus’s — a practice Deramus
has relied upon before us. (See People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117
Cal.App.5th 1179, 1196, petn. for review filed Feb. 24, 2026,
S295404 [remanding when petitioner “did not have the benefit of
Patton when he filed his resentencing petition”]; People v. Glass
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 930 [remanding when petitioner
“did not have the benefit of Patton’s guidance during the prima
facie stage before the trial court”].)

SCHERB, J.

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