People v. Womack CA2/6

CourtListener 10842649CalctappApr 14, 2026

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Filed 4/14/26 P. v. Womack CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335361
(Super. Ct. No. BA490998)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

DESHON MAURICE
WOMACK,

Defendant and Appellant.

Deshon Maurice Womack appeals from the judgment
entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder and
shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. (Pen. Code, §§ 187; 189,
subd. (a), 246.)1 The trial court found true allegations that
appellant had previously been convicted of three serious felonies
within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and three
serious or violent felonies within the meaning of California’s

Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the
1

Penal Code.
“Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-
(d).) The trial court struck the three prior serious felony
convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
It sentenced appellant to prison for 75 years to life: 25 years to
life for the first degree murder conviction, tripled pursuant to the
“Three Strikes” law.
Appellant contends the trial court erroneously (1) admitted
evidence of appellant’s and his accomplices’ membership in a
criminal street gang, as well as evidence of gang culture and
customs; (2) denied appellant’s motion for new trial based on the
alleged misconduct of a juror; and (3) denied appellant’s request
for an evidentiary hearing at which the juror would be required
to testify concerning the misconduct. We affirm and direct the
trial court to correct errors in the abstract of judgment.
Facts
The murder was committed during a drive-by shooting.
The shooting and surrounding events were recorded by video
surveillance cameras.
The videos showed that at 3:52 p.m. a silver BMW left
Jesse Owens Park in the City of Los Angeles. At 3:57 p.m. the
victim’s vehicle, a black Mercedes, was heading “northbound on
Western Avenue followed moments later” by the silver BMW.
The Mercedes made a U-turn into the southbound lanes on
Western Avenue and parked along the curb.
Witnesses described the subsequent events as depicted in
the videos: “Moments later the silver BMW . . . also comes
southbound” on Western. Someone in the BMW is lowering the
front passenger window. “[T]he front passenger is wearing a red
hoodie.” The BMW “pulled up next to the [parked Mercedes]. A
hand appears from the front passenger window. It appears to be

2
holding a small object . . . -- almost instantaneously to that . . .
the right-rear passenger window of the [Mercedes] . . . appears to
shatter, and then the silver BMW continues southbound on
Western.”
“[A] couple of minutes after the shooting,” the BMW pulled
into a driveway and stopped. Appellant got out of the driver’s
seat. Appellant’s codefendant, Alon Hunt, got out of the rear
passenger seat.2 J.T., a juvenile, got out of the front passenger
seat. J.T. was wearing “[a] red hoodie.” He appeared to take a
“shooting stance.” He “put his left foot forward, right foot back,
[and] extended his right hand out towards the direction or at the
driver’s window” of the BMW.3
When the police arrived at the scene of the shooting, they
“noticed bullet impacts on the driver’s side” of the Mercedes.
Three .9 millimeter bullet casings were “on the ground next to
the driver’s side.” The only occupant of the vehicle was a man in
the driver’s seat, later identified as Derald Loadholt. He had a
gunshot wound to the left side of his face. An officer tried to
speak to Loadholt, but he was nonresponsive. The wound was
fatal. It caused “injuries to multiple parts of his brain.” There is
no evidence that Loadholt was a gang member.
Appellant, Hunt, and J.T. were members of the Rollin’ 90’s
Neighborhood Crips (Rollin’ 90’s), a criminal street gang. The
Rollin’ 90’s claim territory in Los Angeles. Jesse Owens Park

2 The jury acquitted Hunt.

3 In an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed the

judgment entered after the juvenile court found true an
allegation that J.T. had committed first degree murder. (In re
J.T. (Oct. 18, 2022, B314411) [nonpub. opn.].)

3
“[is] known as a stronghold of [the] Rollin’ 90’s.” Prior to the
shooting, the silver BMW departed from the park.
Another criminal street gang – the Eight Trey Gangster
Crips (Eight Trey) – is one of the main rivals of the Rollin’ 90’s.
In gang culture, rival gangs are viewed as “enemies.” Gang
rivalries can result in “violence[,] shooting[s,] and something as
bad as a homicide.”
A gang member’s reputation is very important. Gang
members enhance their reputation by committing acts of violence
and “having [] other members from the gang see them do it.” By
committing acts of violence, a gang member demonstrates that he
is “loyal” to the gang, “committed,” and “trustworthy.” A gang
member also enhances his reputation “by helping fellow gang
members commit crimes.”
It is “common for gang members to commit shootings in
groups.” “[I]n a group [they are] stronger together.” Civilians
who witness a group shooting are “more afraid” and therefore
“less likely to report the incident to the police.”
The shooting of Loadholt occurred in territory claimed by
Eight Trey. Committing a murder in a rival gang’s territory
enhances a gang member’s reputation more than any other act of
violence. It shows “that he’s not only willing to be violent in his
territory but he’s willing to be violent . . . in enemy territory.” It
also enhances the entire gang’s reputation because news of the
“killing [in] enemy territory . . . spreads [and] . . . makes them
stronger as a whole . . . [and] more feared” in the community.
After the People had rested, the defense rested without
presenting any evidence.

4
Trial Court’s Admission of Gang Evidence
The information alleged that appellant had committed the
murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the
meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). The trial court
granted appellant’s motion to bifurcate the trial of the gang
allegation.4
As to the trial by jury on the other charges, the People
moved to admit gang evidence relating to appellant, Hunt, and
J.T. Appellant moved to exclude all gang-related evidence.
At the hearing on the motions, the prosecutor argued: “If
the gang evidence is removed from this case, then it doesn’t make
any sense why three people would go into . . . a random
neighborhood and kill a random person they have no connection
with for no apparent reason at all.” “So in terms of aspects of the
case like motive, intent, premeditation, knowledge, the gang
evidence speaks highly to all of that. And to exclude it
essentially sanitizes the trial and leaves the jury with a confusing
impression.”
The trial court granted the People’s motion to admit gang
evidence. The court reasoned that the “probative value [of the

4 At the bifurcated trial, the court found the gang allegation

“not true.” The court reasoned: “[I]n summary, I think the
prosecution’s theory [of the shooting] is a reasonable
interpretation. It very well could have been a gang-related
incident, or a brazen gang shooting, but there’s also an
interpretation that there was some other motivation behind the
crime; that it could have been a personal vendetta, a personal
beef. It could have been simply random. [¶] And so if there are
two reasonable interpretations, the court is required to adopt the
one that points to innocence. So based upon all of that, the court
will find that the gang enhancement hasn’t been proven . . . .”

5
gang evidence] exceeds [its] prejudicial [impact].” In support of
its ruling, the court read into the record the following excerpt
from People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261: “ ‘The People
are entitled to “introduce evidence of gang affiliation and activity
where such evidence is relevant to an issue of motive or intent.”
[Citation.] “[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily the incentive for
criminal behavior, its probative value generally exceeds its
prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is permitted in admitting
evidence of its existence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 275.)
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion in Admitting the Gang Evidence
Evidence Code section 352 provides, “The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” “We apply the deferential abuse of
discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's ruling under
Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th
1100, 1121.)
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the gang evidence because other admissible evidence
“failed to establish a nexus between the victim and any gang-
related motive that was not essentially speculative. There was
no evidence the victim belonged to or associated with a gang, or
even that his outward appearance suggested he might be holding
himself out as such. Nor was there evidence of any gang-related
altercation or incident preceding the homicide that would
typically give rise to a gang-motivated killing, such as a gang
challenge, exchange of signs or competition over territory.

6
Instead, the People offered only the weak and speculative
possibility that the fatal shooting might have been a case of
‘mistaken identity’ and involved gang activity because alleged
gang members committed it in the territory of one of their rivals.
For these reasons, the gang evidence either was completely
irrelevant or any minimal probative value it arguably might have
had was substantially outweighed by its well-recognized
prejudicial effect.”
“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 318-319.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Our Supreme
Court has “ ‘described the “prejudice” referred to in Evidence
Code section 352 as characterizing evidence that uniquely tends
to evoke an emotional bias against a party as an individual, while
having only slight probative value with regard to the issues. . . .’ ”
(People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 19.) The gang evidence had
substantial probative value as to appellant’s motive and intent.
Appellant was not the actual shooter. The actual shooter was
J.T. Appellant could be convicted of murder only if he had aided
and abetted J.T.’s shooting of Loadholt. The jury was instructed,
“Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the
perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends
to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” Appellant
observes, “The central issue here was appellant’s intent to kill;

7
specifically, whether he shared and aided the shooter’s specific
intent to kill.”
In his reply brief appellant acknowledges that “evidence of
his mens rea at the time of the shooting was weak without the
gang evidence.” Appellant argues that, without this evidence,
instead of “the driver and shooter . . . acting together, . . . the
driver could just as likely have been driving as he did only
because the passenger wanted to catch up to the vehicle for a
reason unbeknownst to the driver . . . .” Appellant’s positioning
of the BMW next to the parked Mercedes “is equally consistent
with how a driver would position a vehicle to accommodate a
passenger who had said he wanted to interact with the driver of
the parked car for any number of peaceable or non-violent
purposes. . . . For all the BMW’s driver might know, the
passenger who asked him to catch up to and approach the other
car might have wanted to greet a friend, verbally confront
someone he had previously argued with, collect a debt, or invite
to a party. Mere positioning of the two cars does not support an
inference beyond a reasonable doubt [that] the driver of the
BMW, appellant, knew what his passenger, [J.T.], intended to do
once the windows were aligned.”
The gang evidence refutes the theory that appellant was
ignorant of J.T.’s unlawful purpose. It is reasonable to infer that
appellant and J.T. misidentified the driver of the Mercedes as an
Eight Trey gang member. A gang expert testified that
“mistake[s] [i]n identity shootings” by gang members are “pretty
common.”
It is also reasonable to infer that appellant and J.T.
planned to shoot the driver of the Mercedes regardless of whether
he was a gang member. The gang expert opined that, if the

8
driver was not a member of Eight Trey, shooting him in Eight
Trey’s territory would still “be significant in the world of gangs.”
The expert explained that “[f]or the Rollin’ 90’s it’s just [as] big
[a] disrespect you can do for Eight Trey Gangsters” because a
gang does not allow rival gangs to commit crimes inside its
territory. “[E]ven though [the victim] may not be a gang member
they [Eight Trey] still feel disrespected because it happened in
their territory.” “[I]t’s a sign of disrespect” for Rollin’ 90’s gang
members to even enter Eight Trey’s territory. Committing a
murder in Eight Trey’s territory would enhance appellant’s and
J.T.’s reputation within the Rollin’ 90’s.
The trial court instructed the jury: “Having a motive may
be a factor tending to show the defendant is guilty. Not having a
motive may be a factor tending to show not guilty.” “Gang
evidence was critical to explaining, not appellant[’s] general
disposition to kill, but the specific motives for killing [Loadholt].”
(People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1169.)
“[B]ecause gang evidence was central to this case involving gang
members committing [a] gang murder[] for gang motives, broad
admissibility of gang evidence was appropriate.” (Ibid.; see also
People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1551 [the gang
“evidence, coupled with the evidence that appellant was a gang
member, may have led the jury to the ineluctable conclusion that
appellant intended to kill [Loadholt], but that does not render it
inadmissible. [Citation.] To the contrary, the [gang] expert[’s]
testimony was crucial to the prosecution's theory of the case. [¶]
The law does not disfavor the admission of expert testimony that
makes comprehensible and logical that which is otherwise
inexplicable and incredible”].)

9
Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the gang evidence, we reject appellant’s claim the
admission “infringed on [his] federal constitutional right[] by
rendering the trial fundamentally unfair.” (Capitalization and
bold omitted.) (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.)
The Alleged Juror Misconduct
Appellant contends, “The trial court erred by denying [his]
motion for new trial on grounds that juror misconduct denied him
his ‘right to have the charges against him determined by a fair
and impartial jury . . . .’ ” The alleged misconduct was based on
two posts on social media by juror no. 21. On September 12,
2022, when jury selection began, she posted a photograph of
herself wearing a juror badge. In response, a person posted, “You
always get picked lock ‘em up.” Juror no. 21 did not respond to
the post. On September 29, 2022, when jury deliberations began,
she posted a photograph of herself accompanied by the statement,
“I’m so tired of jury duty!!!!”
The prosecutor argued that “the juror committed no
misconduct, and even if she did, no prejudice resulted.” The court
concluded the juror had committed misconduct because she
“post[ed] [on social media] after the court told her not to [post].”
The court denied the motion for new trial because the
misconduct was “very minimal” and not prejudicial. The court
explained: “There’s no indication that any other juror . . . was
aware of the post . . . . There’s no mention in the post of the
evidence in the case, any opinions about the evidence, any of the
parties, attorneys or witnesses. There’s no mention in the post
about deliberations or anything along those lines. Plus most
importantly there was clearly more than sufficient evidence to
support the verdict. The jury . . . acquitted the co-defendant

10
[Alon Hunt] which suggests that there was no predisposition on
the part of this particular juror to convict whoever was on trial
just because they were on trial.”
“Jury misconduct ‘ “creates a presumption of prejudice that
may be rebutted by a showing that no prejudice actually
occurred.” ’ [Citations.] The presumption can be rebutted ‘by an
affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist or
by a reviewing court’s examination of the entire record to
determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual
harm resulting from the misconduct.’ [Citation.] This analysis
has also been phrased as: ‘The presumption is rebutted “if the
entire record . . . indicates there is no reasonable probability of
prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors
were actually biased against the defendant.” ’ ” (People v. Flores
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 100, 112 (Flores).)
“ ‘ “On appeal, . . . whether jury misconduct was prejudicial
presents a mixed question of law and fact ‘ “subject to an
appellate court’s independent determination.” ’ [Citation.] We
accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations if supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (Flores,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.)
We need not determine whether the juror’s social media
posts constituted misconduct. Assuming that they did, “the
presumption of prejudice was thoroughly rebutted for the reasons
discussed [by the trial court]. There is no substantial likelihood
that any juror was impermissibly influenced to [appellant’s]
detriment.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 838.) The
posts on social media “had no bearing on the matter pending
before the jury, that is, [appellant’s] guilt or innocence.” (People
v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 605 (Avila).)

11
Appellant contends the trial court’s “misplaced focus on the
strength of the evidence caused it to erroneously find the
misconduct harmless.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.)
Appellant is referring to the court’s statement, “[M]ost
importantly there was clearly more than sufficient evidence to
support the verdict.” ~ (RT 6623, lines 22-24)~ (See People v.
Vigil (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1488, fn. 5 [“Where the jury
has been exposed to improper outside influences, the test for
prejudice is not the strength of the prosecution’s case, but
whether the impartiality of the jury has been compromised”].)
The “test” applied here by the trial court was “not the strength of
the prosecution’s case.” This was one factor among several
considered by the court. The other factors alone establish that
the alleged misconduct was not prejudicial.
Appellant claims the trial court “erred by placing the
burden of demonstrating prejudice on the defense” instead of
requiring the People to rebut the presumption of prejudice. (See
People v. Weatherton (2014) 59 Cal.4th 589, 600 [“It is for the
prosecutor to rebut the presumption” of prejudice arising from
juror misconduct].) In support of his claim, appellant cites page
6617 of volume 23 of the reporter’s transcript. At this page the
trial court asked defense counsel, “Let me hear from you as to
why you believe this [misconduct] is prejudicial.” We do not
interpret the court’s remark as imposing upon appellant the
burden of demonstrating that the misconduct was prejudicial.
The court was asking counsel to explain why the People had not
carried their burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice.
“[W]e apply the general rule ‘that a trial court is presumed to
have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’” (People v.
Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) Moreover, the trial court’s

12
purportedly misplaced burden of proof has not affected our de
novo decision that the prosecutor carried his burden of rebutting
the presumption of prejudice. Therefore, any error as to the trial
court’s allocation of the burden of proof was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Appellant’s Request
to Order Juror No. 21 to Appear in Court for Questioning
Appellant asserts that the trial court “erred and violated
[his] federal constitutional right to due process” by denying his
request to order juror no. 21 into court so she could be questioned
about her alleged misconduct. (Bold and capitalization omitted.)
“The trial court has the discretion to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine the truth or falsity of allegations of jury
misconduct, and to permit the parties to call jurors to testify at
such a hearing. [Citation.] Defendant is not, however, entitled to
an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right. Such a hearing
should be held only when the court concludes an evidentiary
hearing is ‘necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of fact.’
[Citation.] ‘The hearing should not be used as a “fishing
expedition” to search for possible misconduct, but should be held
only when the defense has come forward with evidence
demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct
has occurred. . . .’ [¶] ‘We review for abuse of discretion the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s postverdict request for an
evidentiary hearing into allegations of jury misconduct.’” (Avila,
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 604.)
As we have previously explained, juror no. 21’s posts on
social media “did not create a strong possibility of prejudicial
misconduct . . . .” (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th p. 605.) But appellant
contends that, irrespective of the posts on social media, the trial

13
court abused its discretion because defense counsel argued that
juror no. 21 had “published a picture of herself . . . flashing what
appeared to be a gang sign.” Defense “counsel believed the gang
expert had described this type of gesture as a sign used by Rollin’
90’s gang members.”5
Appellant claims juror no. 21’s “failure to disclose any
familiarity with gang culture during voir dire even though she
arguably appears to be flashing a gang sign in a group
photograph suggests her impartiality may have . . . been
compromised . . . .” But appellant observes that defense counsel
“acknowledged the sign [juror no. 21] was flashing is ‘subject to
many different interpretations’ and maybe was a ‘peace
sign’ . . . .” Appellant asserts, “The very uncertainty about
whether or not she was making a gang sign was ‘why it needs to
be investigated’ by the court questioning the juror, either in court
or even in camera.”
We have inspected the photo at issue. It is dated “Feb 12”
without indicating the year. The trial occurred in September
2022. The photo shows juror no. 21 in the company of three other
women at “Taste of Inglewood.” All the women are smiling. With
her left hand, juror no. 21 is making a “V” sign by parting her
index and middle fingers. Based on this flimsy evidence, we

5 Appellant acknowledges that “[e]rrors in the reporter’s

transcript make the expert’s description of the hand sign
somewhat difficult to decipher.” (Italics added.) “Somewhat” is
an understatement. Appellant notes, “The pertinent part of the
transcript [of the expert’s testimony] reads: ‘. . . you would put
you’re not ping evan you’re not ring finger down curled in bring
other fingers upsidedown and thumb extended incident finger
extended middle finger extended.’ (14 RT 3987.)”

14
cannot speculate that juror no. 21 may have been “flashing a
gang sign.” The prosecutor objected that “most people” would
interpret the sign as a “peace sign.” (See <https://stock.
adobe.com/search?k=peace+sign+hand> [as of Mar. 6, 2026],
archived at <https://perma.cc/3C4A-8F4B>.
Thus, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s
request for an evidentiary hearing at which juror no. 21 would be
compelled to testify. (See Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20
Cal.4th 1084, 1092 [“The uncontrolled invasion of juror privacy
following completion of service on a jury is . . . a substantial
threat to the administration of justice”].)
Correction of Abstract of Judgment
The first page of the abstract of judgment shows that
appellant was “convicted by” a “plea.” Since appellant was
convicted by a jury, the parties agree that the abstract of
judgment should be corrected.
There is another error in the abstract of judgment that
neither party mentions. Section 6.c. shows that on count 1 (first
degree murder) appellant was sentenced to prison for 25 years to
life. It should show that he was sentenced to 75 years to life
because the 25 year-to-life sentence was tripled pursuant to the
Three Strikes law.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
correct the first page of the abstract of judgment to show that
appellant was convicted by a jury, not by plea, and was sentenced
to prison for 75 years to life on count 1 (first degree murder), not
25 years to life. The trial court is further directed to transmit a
certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

15
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

16
David Herriford, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Law Offices of Steven Schorr and Steven Schorr, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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