CourtListener 10842615•People v. Macias CA4/1
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Filed 4/14/26 P. v. Macias CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085448
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB23002985)
JOSE MACIAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, David S. Cohn, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Susan
Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After he learned that his wife, S.M., was having an affair, Jose Macias
shot her twice in the back, killing her, when no one else was home. At trial
the prosecution proceeded on two theories of first degree murder: murder that
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and murder committed by lying in
wait. The jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1
§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true several firearm enhancements. The trial
court sentenced Macias to 25 years to life.
On appeal Macias contends the trial court failed to instruct the jury
that lying in wait murder required the jury to find that Macias acted with a
state of mind more culpable than that required to prove second degree
murder. We conclude that the jury instructions did not omit this element of
lying in wait murder and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Macias and S.M. had been married for over 40 years. Macias was a
welder and S.M. did housekeeping. Macias had been the primary
breadwinner of the family but he stopped working in 2014 after a series of
heart attacks.
Macias and S.M. lived in San Bernardino County with their three adult
sons, including J.M. and E.M. In the beginning of 2023, J.M. and his siblings
learned that their mother was having an affair. In June, J.M. and his sister
told Macias about the affair. J.M. told his father the affair had been going on
for months and that S.M. did not want to stop seeing the other man. Macias
subsequently confronted his wife about the affair and they argued over it
frequently.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Macias asked J.M. about getting a gun for self-defense. Macias worried
the other man would hurt or kill Macias in order to be with S.M. J.M. and
his siblings refused to help Macias get a gun.
On August 10, 2023, around 6:00 p.m., J.M. and E.M. went out for
drinks at a bar about a block and a half away from their home. Their other
brother was at work. When J.M. and E.M. left, their mother was at the
kitchen table eating dinner and Macias was on the couch eating dinner and
watching TV.
About thirty minutes after J.M. and E.M. got to the bar, Macias called
J.M. and told him, “I already killed your mother.” J.M. asked Macias what
he meant, and Macias said, “I already did it.” J.M. and E.M. rushed home.
J.M. walked inside the house and saw his mother lying on the floor
near the kitchen, face down and surrounded by blood. Macias was lying
down on his side and had a gunshot wound to his chest. J.M. asked Macias
why he did this, and Macias, answered, “There, it’s all over.”
J.M. saw a gun on the ground about a foot away from Macias’s head.
J.M. moved the gun to the couch. Macias later told J.M. that he shot himself
because he did not want his grandchildren to know he shot S.M.
Police arrived at the house around 7:47 p.m. S.M. was found lying face
down on the ground with several gunshot wounds to her upper back. She
was not breathing or moving and had no pulse. She was on the patio steps,
with her feet in the kitchen and her legs lying through the doorway from the
kitchen. Macias was lying on his side with a gunshot wound to the chest.
His breathing was labored. There was no sign of a struggle between them,
such as bruising or scrapes on the victim, or items knocked over in the home.
Police recovered a semi-automatic nine-millimeter caliber Luger pistol
and three fired nine-millimeter cartridges from the scene.
3
S.M.’s autopsy revealed two gunshot entrance wounds: one in the upper
right side of her back and one in the left side of the middle of her back. The
bullets exited through her chest and abdomen. The gunshot wounds were the
cause of death, and the manner of death was homicide.
Macias was charged with first degree murder. The court instructed the
jury on express and implied malice with CALCRIM No. 520. As to implied
malice, the instruction informed the jury: “The defendant had implied malice
if: [¶] 1. He intentionally committed the act; [¶] 2. The natural and
probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the
time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; [¶] AND [¶] 4.
He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.”
The court instructed the jury on first degree murder with CALCRIM
No. 521 as follows: “The [d]efendant has been prosecuted for first-degree
murder under two theories: [¶] 1) willful, deliberate, and premeditated and
2) the murder was committed by lying in wait. Each theory of first degree
murder has different requirements and I will instruct you on both.”
As to lying in wait murder, over objection2 the court instructed the
jury: “The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved
that the defendant committed murder while lying in wait or immediately
thereafter. The defendant committed murder by lying in wait if: [¶] 1. He
concealed his purpose from the person killed; [¶] 2. He waited and watched
for an opportunity to act; [¶] AND [¶] 3. Then, from a position of
advantage, he intended to and did make a surprise attack on the person
killed.” [¶] “The lying in wait does not need to continue for any particular
2 Defense counsel objected that there was insufficient evidence to give
the lying in wait instruction and objected to giving CALCRIM No. 521 as
written. The court overruled the objections.
4
period of time, but its duration must be substantial enough to show a state of
mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation. Deliberation means
carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice, and, knowing
the consequences, deciding to act. An act is done with premeditation if the
decision to commit the act is made before the act is done.” [¶] “A person can
conceal his or her purpose even if the person killed is aware of the person’s
physical presence.” 3
After the instruction set forth the instructions for the two types of first
degree murder, it closed with the following two paragraphs:
“The requirements for second degree murder based on express or
implied malice are explained in [CALCRIM No.] 520. [¶] The People have
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first
degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and the
murder is second degree murder.”
The jury convicted Macias of first degree murder and found true that,
in the commission of the murder, he personally used a handgun within the
meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (b), personally and intentionally
discharged a handgun within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision
3 The transcript’s punctuation introduces confusion as to how the court
read this instruction. The transcript shows: “A person can conceal his
purpose. If the person killed is aware of the person’s physical presence, the
requirements for second-degree murder based on implied malice are
explained in [CALCRIM No.] 520.” Because there was every indication the
court was reading from the written instructions, a comparison with this part
of the written instruction recommends the following punctuation and
formatting: “A person can conceal his purpose [even] if the person killed is
aware of the person’s physical presence. [¶] The requirements for second-
degree murder based on implied malice are explained in [CALCRIM No.]
520.” The court thus apparently omitted the word “even” after “purpose” in
its reading of the instruction.
5
(c), and personally and intentionally discharged a handgun which caused
death under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The trial court struck the
firearm allegations and sentenced Macias to 25 years to life.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
We review de novo whether a jury instruction correctly states the law.
(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) “ ‘ “[T]he correctness of jury
instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from
a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.” ’ ”
(People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 822.)
“A trial court must instruct on each element of a charged offense, even
when the defendant does not propose a complete instruction or object to the
court’s failure to provide one.” (People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 453, 461
(Brown).) We consider whether “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the
jury understood the charge as the defendant asserts.” (People v. Kelly (1992)
1 Cal.4th 495, 525–526.) “ ‘It is fundamental that jurors are presumed to be
intelligent and capable of understanding and applying the court’s
instructions.’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335,
433.)
The omission of an element of an offense from a jury instruction
violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial and requires reversal
unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained. (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
473; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
B. Elements of First Degree Lying in Wait Murder
6
“ ‘To prove first degree murder of any kind, the prosecution must first
establish a murder within section 187—that is, an unlawful killing with
malice aforethought.’ ” (People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257,
1262 (Maldonado).) Malice is express when there is an intent to unlawfully
kill. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) “Malice is implied when the killing is proximately
caused by ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his
conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard
for life.” ’ ” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143.) Courts have
described this as acting with a “wanton disregard for human life” or
“conscious disregard for human life,” phrases that articulate the same
standard as implied malice. (Knoller, at pp. 143, 152.)
“ ‘Ordinarily, . . . [an implied malice] killing would be murder of the
second degree. However, if this murder is perpetrated by means of lying in
wait, it is, by statutory definition, murder of the first degree.’ ” (Maldonado,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1262-1263; § 189, subd. (a).) “All that is
required of lying in wait is that the perpetrator exhibit a state of mind
equivalent to, but not identical to, premeditation and deliberation. [Citation.]
This state of mind simply is the intent to watch and wait for the purpose of
gaining advantage and taking the victim unawares in order to facilitate the
act which constitutes murder.” (People v. Laws (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 786,
795.)
C. Analysis
Macias contends his first degree murder conviction must be reversed
because CALCRIM No. 521 omitted an element of lying in wait murder.
Relying on the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown, supra,
14 Cal.5th 453, he insists that the instruction should have informed the jury
7
that Macias must have acted with state of mind more culpable than the
malice required for a second degree murder conviction. We conclude that
CALCRIM No. 521 did not omit this element of the mental state required for
first degree lying in wait murder.
CALCRIM No. 520 informed the jury that express or implied malice is
a necessary element of murder. It stated that the defendant had express
malice if he unlawfully intended to kill, and he had implied malice if he
intentionally committed an act, the natural and probable consequences of
which were dangerous to human life, with knowledge at the time he acted
that this act was dangerous to human life, and he acted deliberately with
conscious disregard for human life.
CALCRIM No. 521 required proof of additional elements to elevate the
murder to first degree. It instructed Macias’s jury that to convict him of first
degree murder on a theory of lying in wait, it had to find that Macias
concealed his purpose from the person killed, waited and watched for an
opportunity to act, and, from a position of advantage, intended to and did
make a surprise attack on the person killed. He also had to do so in a
manner sufficient to “show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or
premeditation.”
In Brown, after the defendant’s baby died with traces of
methamphetamine in her system, the defendant was charged with first
degree murder under section 189 by means of poison for breastfeeding her
baby while taking methamphetamine. (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 455-
56.) The case required the court to address “what mental state in the
administration of poison is required to elevate a poison murder to the first
degree.” (Brown, at p. 464)
8
Starting with the language of section 189, the court noted, “We
previously have interpreted this language to require proof of a mental state
more culpable than the malice required for second degree murder, in keeping
with the Legislature’s determination that murders perpetrated by these
means warrant the greater punishment reserved for first degree murder.”
(Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 456.) The Brown court recognized it had
already addressed the “more culpable” mental state required for two of
section 189’s other means to perpetrate first degree murder: lying in wait and
torture. As to lying in wait murder, existing case law established “ ‘it is not
sufficient to merely show the elements of waiting, watching and concealment.
It must also be shown that the defendant did those physical acts with the
intent to take [the] victim unawares and for the purpose of facilitating [the]
attack.’ ” (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 456.) The Brown court continued,
“[w]e have also established that the defendant must act with a ‘ “wanton and
reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death,” ’ [citation] and the
period of lying in wait must be sufficient to show that the defendant had
‘ “ ‘a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.’ ” ’ ” (Brown,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 465.) These “specific showings of the defendant’s
mental state in lying in wait” serve as the “ ‘functional equivalent of’ a
premeditated, deliberate intent to kill” and thus satisfy the heightened
mental state necessary for a finding of first degree murder. (Ibid.)
After reviewing the mental states required for torture and lying in wait
murder, the Brown court reasoned that first degree murder by poison
required a “similar state of mind requirement—one equivalent in turpitude to
willful, deliberate, premeditated intent to kill” as those crimes already
required. To convict of poison murder, the court concluded the trial court
should have informed the jury “it had to find that [the defendant] deliberately
9
gave her newborn daughter poison with the intent to kill her or inflict injury
likely to cause her death.” (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 467, 472.)
Brown thus did not, as Macias contends, add a mental state element to
lying in wait murder. Instead, Brown expressly relied on existing case law
establishing that the elements of lying in wait murder serve as the functional
equivalent of a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill. CALCRIM No. 521
required the jury to find that Macias carried out the crime through waiting,
watching, and concealment. As Brown noted, these acts by themselves would
be insufficient. (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 456.) But having concealed
his purpose from his victim, and waited and watched for his opportunity to
act, Macias had to gain a “position of advantage” over his victim and act
“from that position of advantage,” thus exploiting the favorable position he
had gained. He had to, from the position of advantage, have the intent to
make a “surprise attack” on S.M.—in other words, to act “with the intent to
take [the] victim unawares.” (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 465.) All of this
had to be carried out in a manner that showed “ ‘ “a state of mind equivalent
to deliberation or premeditation.” ’ ” (See ibid.) The state of mind terms
were further defined for the jury: “Deliberation means carefully weighing the
considerations for and against a choice, and, knowing the consequences,
deciding to act. An act is done with premeditation if the decision to commit
the act is made before the act is done.”
Macias contends the trial court “instructed the jury that the mental
state requirement for first degree murder by means of lying in wait was the
same ‘express or implied malice’ required for second degree murder” and
argues it was reasonably probable the jurors interpreted the court’s written
or oral instruction to mean that a first degree murder conviction by means of
lying in wait could be based on the mental state required for second degree
10
murder. We do not find support for such a reading. Looking at the entirety
of CALCRIM No. 521 as written or delivered, the jury would have understood
that to find first degree murder by lying in wait, it had to find Macias met the
three predicate elements listed in that instruction for lying in wait, including
the intent to make a surprise attack on the person killed, and that he did so
in a manner sufficient to show a mental state “equivalent to deliberation or
premeditation.” This required a higher degree of culpability than just the
malice required for second degree murder.
If the People failed to prove that Macias met all the elements of lying in
wait—even if the jury believed Macias acted with express or implied malice—
the last two paragraphs of the instruction made clear that the jury could not
convict him of first degree murder and had to turn to the instruction for
second degree murder in CALCRIM No. 520.
Even if the court misread the jury instruction and combined the last
phrase about concealment with the following sentence about second degree
murder—which we doubt, attributing this instead to a scrivener’s choice in
the transcript’s punctuation (see ante, fn. 3)—we do not see a reasonable
likelihood that such an elision would lead a jury to believe that the mental
state for second degree murder was sufficient for first degree lying in wait
murder. The transcript took down the court’s statement as follows: “If the
person killed is aware of the person’s physical presence, the requirements for
second-degree murder based on implied malice are explained in [CALCRIM
NO.] 520.” On its face, a fair reading of this statement would be that if the
People had not proven concealment—that is, the victim was aware of
Macias’s presence—then the crime was only second degree murder.
In any case, the jury received in writing the properly punctuated and
formatted CALCRIM No. 520. To the extent a discrepancy exists between the
11
written and oral versions of jury instructions, the written instructions
provided to the jury will control. (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 201.)
We conclude the instructions did not improperly inform the jury that a
conviction for lying in wait could be based on the mental state required for
second degree murder.4
Since we find no instructional error we need not address prejudice.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
4 Macias does not argue that CALCRIM No. 521 failed to inform the jury
that the acts of watching, waiting, and concealment must be done “with the
intent to take the victim by surprise to facilitate the infliction of injury likely
to cause death.” (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 456–457.) We express no
view on this question because the issue has not been raised on appeal.
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