People v. Smith CA2/1

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Filed 4/13/26 P. v. Smith CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B339651

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA022581)
v.

RICKEY SMITH, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with
directions.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Scott A. Taryle, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
In 1996, then-19-year-old Rickey Smith exploited his
friendship with Jonathan Landau, then 15 years old, to gain entry
to the Landau family home for the purpose of committing a home
invasion robbery. Once inside the Landaus’ residence, Smith
opened the front door to allow his younger cousin, Antwan Allison,
to enter. Allison—wearing a black ski mask, carrying duct tape,
and wielding a loaded gun—ordered Jonathan1 and his parents,
Richard and Donna Landau, to turn over their jewelry. Smith
then applied duct tape to the Landaus’ hands and eyes. And either
Smith or Allison affixed a plastic bag around Donna’s head with
duct tape. When Donna said she was having difficulty breathing,
someone popped a hole in the bag. Moments later, however, one of
the perpetrators shot Richard, Donna, and Jonathan. Richard died
of a gunshot wound to the neck and chest. Donna likewise died of
a gunshot wound to the chest. Jonathan, who suffered a gunshot
wound to his leg, survived the incident.
A jury convicted Smith of the murders of Richard and Donna,
among other offenses, and the trial court sentenced Smith to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.
In 2021, Smith filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code2
section 1172.6 challenging his murder convictions. That section
permits defendants convicted under certain theories of homicide
invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015)—including certain felony murder theories—to file a
petition seeking resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the petition
sets forth a prima facie case for relief, the court must hold an

1 We refer to the victims by their first names because they
share a last name. We likewise refer to Smith’s wife by her first
name.
2 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of
“prov[ing], beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty”
under a still-valid theory of murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
The trial court here conducted an evidentiary hearing on
Smith’s petition. At the hearing, the prosecution relied exclusively
on the existing record of Smith’s jury trial. The defense introduced
new evidence in the form of testimony from a clinical psychologist
who opined that Smith’s age at the time of the offense, coupled with
his childhood trauma, might have impaired his ability to appreciate
the consequences of his actions. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court found Smith guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a major
participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to
human life—a theory of homicide that remains valid post-Senate
Bill No. 1437. (See People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867,
879-881 (Emanuel).) The court therefore denied Smith’s petition.
Smith now asks us to reverse, arguing the evidence
is insufficient to support the court’s finding. We disagree.
Substantial evidence—including fingerprint analysis and
testimony from Jonathan and from Smith’s wife, Thricia—
supports that Smith orchestrated the incident and consciously
disregarded “ ‘ “the significant risk of death his . . . actions
create[d].” ’ [Citation.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
Accordingly, we reject Smith’s challenge to the court’s finding
and affirm. We, however, grant Smith’s unopposed request that
we direct the trial court to correct certain clerical errors in the
amended abstract of judgment.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.

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A. Overview of Smith’s Convictions and Sentence
In 1996, the district attorney charged Smith and Allison
with the murders of Richard and Donna (§ 187, subd. (a))
(counts 1 and 2). The charging document further alleged the
special circumstance that Smith and Allison committed the
murders while “engaged in . . . the commission of the crime[s]
of burglary . . . [¶] . . . [and] robbery” (capitalization omitted; see
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). In addition, the district attorney charged
both defendants with the attempted murder of Jonathan (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664) (count 3), first degree residential burglary (§ 459)
(count 4), home invasion robbery (§ 211) (counts 5 through 7), and
conspiracy to commit home invasion robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1))
(count 8).
The case proceeded to trial in April 1997. The prosecution
tried Smith and Allison jointly, but before separate juries. Smith’s
jury convicted him on all counts and found true that he committed
the murders while engaged in the crimes of burglary and robbery.
Allison’s jury hung, and the prosecution retried him in September
1997. The jury in that second trial convicted Allison of two counts
of first degree murder, but hung on the robbery and burglary
special circumstance allegations. Allison later admitted those
allegations as part of a plea deal.
The trial court sentenced Smith to two terms of life in
prison without the possibility of parole on the murder counts,
plus a consecutive 25-years-to-life sentence on the attempted
murder count. On direct appeal, we affirmed the judgment with
modifications to the sentence that did not affect the aggregate term.
(People v. Smith (Nov. 24, 1998, B120300) [nonpub. opn.] (Smith I).)

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B. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
More than 20 years later, effective January 2019, the
Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437. (People v Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) As relevant here, the bill
“significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule” such
that “[a] person who did not kill or act with the intent to kill can be
liable for murder under the felony-murder doctrine only if he or she
‘was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of [s]ection 190.2.’ [Citations.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 880.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1172.6 (former
section 1170.95) to the Penal Code, creating a procedural
mechanism whereby “convicted murderers who could not be
convicted under the law as amended” may petition to have their
convictions vacated and be resentenced on any remaining counts.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) If a section 1172.6 petition
sets forth a prima facie case for relief, the court must issue an order
to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which “the trial
judge is charged with determining, beyond a reasonable doubt,
if the petitioner is guilty of murder under a theory that remains
valid after [Senate Bill No. 1437].” (People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 952; see § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “ ‘If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction,
and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction,
shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the
remaining charges.’ [Citation.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 880.)
In 2021, Smith filed a petition for resentencing relief
pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel to
represent Smith in the resentencing proceedings. Smith’s counsel

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filed two briefs arguing that Smith was entitled to resentencing
because (1) he did not actually kill the victims, (2) he did not act
with the intent to kill, and (3) although he was a major participant
in the robbery that resulted in the murders, he did not act with
reckless indifference to human life as defined in the Supreme
Court’s then-recent decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
The trial court found Smith had demonstrated a prima facie
case for section 1172.6 relief and set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing.

1. Prosecution Case
At the July 2024 evidentiary hearing, the prosecution
relied exclusively on the transcript of Smith’s 1997 trial3 to meet
its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith acted
with reckless indifference to human life.4 As relevant here, the
transcript includes testimony from (1) Jonathan, (2) Detective
Jesse Castillo, one of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
homicide detectives assigned to the case, (3) Thricia, and
(4) Emmette Jean Braggs, a forensic print specialist with the

3 Smith requested that we take judicial notice of the opinion
and record in Smith I, which included a copy of the trial transcript.
That record, however, was destroyed. We therefore take judicial
notice of the superior court’s copy of the trial transcript on our own
motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)
4 Jonathan appeared at the evidentiary hearing, represented
by independent counsel. Although the court granted his counsel’s
request to read Jonathan’s victim impact statement during the
hearing, the court expressly did not consider the statement in
ruling on Smith’s resentencing petition.

6
LAPD, who testified concerning fingerprints found at the crime
scene.

a. Jonathan’s testimony
Jonathan testified that, at the time of the incident, he
lived with his parents and older brother, Jason, at their home in
Chatsworth. Jonathan knew Smith because Smith had attended
school with Jason. Jonathan thought that Smith was a good friend.
Smith had visited the Landau home, had met Richard and Donna,
and may have spent the night at the Landaus’ house on at least one
occasion.
On the day of the crimes, Smith called Jonathan somewhere
between noon and 1:00 p.m. Smith “said he wanted to come
down and visit for a little bit, see some of his old friends, see how
everything was going.” Jonathan testified that Smith planned to
visit at 6:00 p.m., but failed to arrive on time. Jonathan waited
until 9:30 p.m. before finally calling another friend to make plans
“because [Smith] wasn’t showing up.”
While waiting in his front yard for his other friend, Jonathan
“thought [he] saw [Smith] drive by in a car with one other person
in the car.” “It looked like a convertible Dodge Chrysler,” “sort of
a brownish color.” “[A]fter a couple of minutes,” Jonathan “saw the
same car go by again. [Smith] looked at [him],” but the car pulled
into the parking lot of a nearby bar, and Jonathan “didn’t see [the
car] again.”
Jonathan’s friend then picked him up, and they went to
another friend’s house. While there, Jonathan received a page from
Donna saying that “[Smith] had just called from Hughes Market
down the street from [the Landaus’] house, and [Smith] was down
there.” Jonathan went to Hughes Market with two of his friends,
but did not find Smith. Jonathan then returned to his own house.

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Almost immediately upon returning home, Jonathan heard
the doorbell ring. He went out front and “saw [Smith] standing
out there talking to [the friends who had accompanied Jonathan
to Hughes Market].” Jonathan asked Smith “what took so long,”
and Smith said “he had to drop his heat off to some of his people[ ]
because his girlfriend gets mad if he keeps it in the house.”
Jonathan testified that when Smith said “heat,” he knew that
Smith was referencing a gun. Jonathan further testified that he
had seen Smith with “a small palm size .22” caliber gun on one
prior occasion.
Jonathan and Smith then went inside the Landaus’ home.
They “were inside for a little bit,” and Jonathan “asked [Smith]
when his people were coming back. [Smith] said he didn’t know.”
Jonathan briefly exited the house to tell his other friends that he
and Smith “were just going to stay in.” Shortly thereafter, Smith
went back outside “to check and see if his people [had come] back
by yet.” Smith walked “[o]ut to the street,” “looked up and down
the street, said they weren’t there, turned around and came back.”
Jonathan and Smith went back inside the house. The front
door locked behind them. Smith sat down on the couch. Jonathan
“told [Smith] [he] was going to be right back. [Jonathan] had to go
shut the [telephone] ringers off in [his] room and in [Jason’s] room”
“[i]n case [his] girlfriend called back” because he did not want to
wake his sleeping parents.
As Jonathan walked down the hallway to return to Smith,
“the front door open[ed]. Someone walk[ed] through [the] front
door, . . . look[ed] in the living room, turn[ed] around to [Jonathan],
[and] put[ ] [a] gun in [his] face. [The man] had a mask on[.] [He]
told [Jonathan] to go in the living room [and lie] down on the floor.”
Jonathan noticed that Smith was no longer sitting on the couch, but
instead “on the chair” “close to the front door.”

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The masked man told Smith “to [lie] down, too,” and he
complied. At some point, the masked man said to Smith: “ ‘You’re
some sort of punk, I can’t believe the kind of people you hang
around with.’ ” The man asked Jonathan how many other people
were in the house and where they were located. Jonathan replied
that his parents were asleep in their bedroom. The man went into
Richard and Donna’s bedroom, woke them, and “told them to get
in the hallway.” Jonathan testified that Richard “thought . . .
someone was playing around or something, and the guy with the
mask hit him in the head with the gun.” They all went into the
hallway. The masked man again told everyone to lie down, but
“[Smith] was still standing.” Smith did not lie down until the man
had repeated the command several times.
The masked man proceeded to take the gold necklace off
Richard’s neck. He then told Smith to “get back up” and “tape
[Richard, Donna, and Jonathan] up.” Smith placed duct tape over
Richard’s eyes and taped Richard’s hands behind his back. The
masked man also told Donna to take off her tennis bracelet. “He
told her to hurry up, and then she said it’s not real. It’s not worth
that much. He said he didn’t care; hurry up and take[ ] it off or he’ll
pop a cap in her ass.” After Donna removed the bracelet, Smith
“taped her up,” wrapping duct tape across her eyes and around her
head and hands. Finally, “they taped [Jonathan]. . . . [¶] . . . First
[his] eyes and then [his] hands.”
Once his eyes were taped, Jonathan could no longer see
anything. But he “heard people asking where the money and
jewelry [were], and [he] heard people going—someone going
through things, like through the jewelry, like through the drawers
in [his] parents’ room, like ransacking.” It was “always one voice”
making the requests, but Jonathan could not tell whether it was
Smith’s voice or the masked man’s voice.

9
Either Smith or the masked man then attempted to
remove Jonathan’s necklace from his body, and Jonathan fainted.
Jonathan “came to . . . when [he] felt somebody grab [him] by [the]
belt loop and drag [him] . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [i]nto a different room.”
“It felt like the bathroom because [he] felt the toilet.” “[He] hear[d]
someone walking around . . . going through things. [He] start[ed]
hearing a plastic bag; getting plastic bags.” Next, Jonathan heard
“[t]he crinkling of [a] bag like it opening . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [and] the
sound of tape as if someone was putting it on.” He heard Donna say
that “it was hard for her to breathe,” and someone replied, “here,
this will help you out.” Jonathan “heard the bag pop like a little
hole was popped in the bag, and [he] could heard [Donna] breathing
for air . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [h]eavily.”
Jonathan then “heard [Richard] start[ ] yelling.” “He was
saying, . . . ‘Don’t do it man, don’t do it; I won’t be able to breathe;
don’t do it.’ ” “[H]e was struggling, and then [Jonathan] heard a
pop. Then [Richard] started screaming, ‘I’ve been shot; I’ve been
shot. He shot me.’ ” “Then he was wheezing, stopped breathing,
then [Jonathan] heard another shot, and . . . felt [Donna’s] head hit
[his] head. [Jonathan] heard [Donna] breathing; there was another
pop, [Jonathan’s] leg started hurting, and then—[¶] . . . [¶] . . . he
[lay] there, stayed quiet.” Jonathan testified there were two or
three seconds between the first and second gunshots and one or
two seconds between the second and third shots.
Jonathan “sat there for a while,” “listening to see if [he] heard
anybody else in [his] house.” Eventually, he was able to slip one
of his hands out of the duct tape and push some of the tape off his
left eye. He “got up and . . . went out to the hallway, looked down
towards where the living room was[,] and the kitchen lights were
on, the front door was left open, the back door was left open.” Then,

10
Jonathan “thought [he] heard somebody, so [he] went and [lay]
back down . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . by the toilet.”
He got up again a few minutes later and found Richard in
the hallway with “blood all over his body.” He did not see Donna’s
body because he still “couldn’t see that well.” Jonathan went to
his room, climbed out the window, and “[lay] down on the roof on
[his] stomach to see if [he] could see anything going on in the yard.”
A few minutes later, Jason—who had left the house earlier in the
evening—arrived. Jonathan “waited until [Jason] pulled around
to the back just to make sure it was him,” and then “yelled out his
name.” “[Jonathan] told him that [Smith] was there and some other
guy with a mask, that the house was robbed. [And that he] thought
[Richard and Donna were] dead.”
Jason drove Jonathan to a friend’s house, where Jason called
911. At the friend’s house, Jonathan examined his injured leg and
saw that he had a bullet wound to his right thigh.

b. Detective Castillo’s testimony
Detective Castillo testified concerning his examination of
the physical crime scene. He observed “[n]o pry marks” on the
front door or any other doors in the house. The front door “was in
a locked position as if somebody had opened it from the inside or
somebody had a key.”
Inside the house, Detective Castillo observed “some evidence
of ransacking” and the bodies of Richard and Donna. Richard was
“taped to his eyes, nose, he had tape on his right hand . . . and he
was bloodied all through his upper chest and through his arms.”
Donna’s “hands had been wrapped with gray duct tape, and her
head was covered with plastic, and at her neckline [there was]
gray duct tape.”

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Detective Castillo further testified that officers recovered
one bullet from the residence, from underneath Donna’s body. The
parties stipulated that this bullet and the bullets later recovered
from Richard’s and Donna’s bodies all were .22 caliber bullets fired
from the same .22 caliber firearm.

c. Thricia’s testimony
Thricia testified that she and Smith dated for two and half
years before marrying in October 1995. They share one child.
Thricia and Smith separated a month and a half after getting
married, and Smith moved in with a woman named Keesha. At
the time of the incident, Thricia was interested in reconciling with
Smith.
On the night of the robbery, Smith asked Thricia to pick
him up so they could discuss their relationship. Thricia drove her
mother’s car—a brown, nonconvertible Dodge—to Keesha’s house
to pick up Smith. Smith was not allowed to use the car outside of
Thricia’s presence. Smith got in the driver’s seat of the car. Thricia
did not see him holding a gun, duct tape, or a ski mask. Smith
drove himself and Thricia to another location in Compton to pick
up Allison. Allison was “dressed in full black,” and Thricia did not
see anything in his hands. Allison sat in the back seat of the car.
After picking up Allison, Smith drove to the Landaus’ house in
Chatsworth.
Thricia testified that, on the way to Chatsworth, Smith asked
Allison, “ ‘Are we going to do this?’ ” Allison replied, “ ‘Yeah. It’s
all to the good.’ ” When Thricia asked what they were talking
about, Smith said, “ ‘Don’t worry about it.’ ” On cross-examination,
Thricia testified that Smith and Allison were smoking marijuana
and rapping in the car. Thricia further testified that Smith often

12
rapped, and that she had heard him ask, “Are we going to do this?”
before rapping in the past.
At some point during the drive, Smith braked, and a gun slid
beneath Thricia’s feet in the front passenger seat. At first, Thricia
testified that she did not ask any questions about the gun. Later,
however, she testified that she recalled asking Allison whether the
gun was his, and Allison replied, “[Y]es, [and] that he needed it for
protection.”
When they arrived at the Landaus’ house, Smith left the car
for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. When he returned, he “said
that Johnny or Jason wasn’t there.” Thricia, Smith, and Allison
then drove to a Taco Bell “just a few blocks away.” They ate, and
at some point, Smith and Allison got out of the car and spoke to one
another “for about a minute or two.” Smith then went to a phone
near the Taco Bell and made two calls. When he returned, he said
that “the boys would be there in a minute.”
Thricia, Smith, and Allison drove back to the Landaus’
residence and parked the car “two or three cars” back from the
driveway of the house. Thricia saw a red car pull up and “[t]wo
boys and a girl” exit the car. Smith went and talked to the boys.
“They were hugging and shaking hands,” and “[Smith] went into
the house with one of the guys.” Thricia and Allison waited in the
car. Thricia testified that, while they were alone, Allison told her
“that he had a gun and that he had killed somebody before.”
After about 15 minutes, the other boy and the girl who had
arrived in the red car left. Allison then exited the brown Dodge,
carrying “gray tape and a gun.” Allison walked in the direction
of the Landaus’ house and disappeared behind trees that shielded
the house from view. Thricia waited in the car “[f]or about 15 or
20 minutes.” Then she heard three gunshots. Thricia saw Allison
come “running out” with “something in his hands,” although she
could not see what it was. Allison got into the car and said Smith

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would “be right here.” Moments later, Smith entered the car,
and one or both of Smith and Allison told Thricia to drive. Smith
appeared to be angry.
After Thricia drove a short distance, Smith “told [her] to
switch places,” and Smith drove the car back to Compton. Thricia
observed a necklace and a checkbook bearing the name “Donna”
in the car. During the drive, Smith “asked [Allison] why he hit
him with a gun so hard.” Allison responded that “[h]e had to do
it.” Allison also said “that he had to use the credit cards within
24 hours.” Thricia further testified that Allison told her, in Smith’s
presence, that “if anyone [said] anything . . . about what happened,
[Allison] was going to have [Smith] and his family killed.” On
cross-examination, however, Thricia testified that she neglected to
tell the lead homicide detective about Allison’s purported threat.
In addition—although Thricia initially testified that she
did not recall whether Smith made further statements—Thricia
confirmed that she told police during a recorded interview that
Smith remarked on the drive back to Compton, “ ‘I got a chain,’ ”
and said to Allison, “ ‘Did you see the look on Johnny’s face?’ ”
After dropping Allison off, Smith and Thricia drove to
Keesha’s house. Thricia picked her daughter up from Keesha,
and left. Smith stayed at Keesha’s house.
Finally, on cross-examination, Thricia admitted that she
had not initially been truthful with police about the incident. She
further testified that she had been granted immunity in the case
prior to testifying, but understood her immunity could be revoked
if she committed perjury.

d. Bragg’s testimony concerning
fingerprint evidence
Braggs testified that fingerprints lifted from (1) a Delta card
retrieved from the crime scene, and (2) the duct tape removed from

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Donna’s neck, with the plastic bag attached, matched Smith’s
fingerprints.

2. Defense Case
In response, the defense offered testimony from one new
witness at the evidentiary hearing: Dr. Katy Drorit Gaines, an
expert in clinical psychology and neuropsychology, who performed
in-person neuropsychological assessments of Smith in 2023 and
2024. Dr. Gaines also interviewed some of Smith’s family members.
Dr. Gaines provided background testimony concerning the
science of brain development and executive functioning. She
testified that the brain is not fully developed until the mid to late
20s and that “the last area to develop in the brain to full maturation
is the frontal lobe and prefrontal cortex,” an area responsible for
executive functioning.
Dr. Gaines further testified that, based on Smith’s own
reporting and other sources, Smith scored a 10 out of a possible
10 on the Adverse Childhood Experiences test. These experiences
included persistent poverty, parental neglect and absence, and
exposure to neighborhood violence. In addition, Smith reported
that, when he was 12, a family friend raped him. Dr. Gaines opined
that this sort of “[t]rauma . . . impact[s] the brain and the frontal
lobe.” And she opined that “the data [she] reviewed and collected”
concerning Smith’s life prior to the crimes “supports that . . .
age-related and family social circumstances really did impact,
could have contributed to Mr. Smith’s decisions around—or [at]
the time of [the] offense.” She therefore concluded “[i]t’s possible”
that “the facts of the crime and the facts that [she] ascertained . . .
support an inference that . . . Smith might not have subjectively
appreciated the risk of the conduct that he was engaging in.”

15
Dr. Gaines, however, conceded that she faced certain
limitations in conducting her evaluation: “It’s important to note
that I am testing the individual almost 30 years after the event,
the incident. And so[,] at best[,] we are able to administer tests
that are looking into [a person’s] current functioning, [and] some
tests that [give] us some insight possibly [into] what the person
may have suffered from or experienced closer to the time of the
crime.” And on cross-examination, Dr. Gaines agreed “[i]t is
a possibility” that “Smith did foresee the consequences [of his
actions], but he committed the crimes anyway because he didn’t
care about the consequences.” She further testified that the act
of using duct tape to affix a plastic bag to someone’s head “could
possibly indicate psychologically that the person that’s doing that
could be enraged, interested in terrorizing or scaring or controlling
the person.” Finally, Dr. Gaines testified that, to the extent Smith
made the comment, “Did you see the look on Johnny’s face,” that
“certainly . . . [would be] pointing at a markedly reduced empathy.”

3. Trial Court’s Findings
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the
trial evidence—including evidence that Smith orchestrated the
crimes, taped the plastic bag around Donna’s head, and witnessed
Allison threaten and assault the Landaus with the gun before
firing any shots—established beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith
acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court further
found that Dr. Gaines’s testimony did not negate this evidence. It
explained that, while it found Dr. Gaines to be “very hard working,
dedicated, and prepared” and would “giv[e] her testimony some
weight,” her analysis had limited probative value because she
was attempting to analyze Smith’s ability to assess risk at age 19
based on tests administered to Smith during his mid-40s. The court

16
therefore denied Smith’s request for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6.
Smith timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s factual findings at a section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 885.) “Under this standard, ‘we review the record
“ ‘ “in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact” ’ ” ’ could find beyond a reasonable doubt” that the
petitioner is guilty of murder under a still-valid theory. (Ibid.)
“ ‘Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in
deciding the petition. [Although] the trial judge must review all
the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable
doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support
a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 509
(Davis).) “ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted
unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the [fact finder]’s
verdict.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 510.) “ ‘ “Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

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B. Substantial Evidence Supports that Smith Acted
with Reckless Indifference to Human Life
Smith contends no substantial evidence supports that
he acted with reckless indifference to human life, as required
to support his convictions under a felony-murder theory.5 We
disagree.
“[R]eckless indifference to human life ‘encompasses a
willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a
distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that
death as the outcome of his actions.’ [Citation.]” (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 883.) “ ‘Examples include “the person who tortures
another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber
who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent
to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended
consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s
property.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Further, “reckless indifference encompasses both subjective
and objective elements. [Citations.] ‘As to the subjective element,
“[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,”
and he or she must consciously disregard “the significant risk of
death his or her actions create.” ’ [Citations.] ‘As to the objective
elements, “ ‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ ” ’
[Citations.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)

5 Smith concedes he was a major participant in the
underlying robbery.

18
“We analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether [Smith] acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 (Scoggins).) Relevant
considerations include (1) “use of or awareness of the presence
of a weapon or weapons,” (2) “physical presence at the scene
and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims,”
(3) “the duration of the crime,” (4) “knowledge of any threat the
confederates might represent,” and (5) “efforts taken to minimize
risks.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706, citing Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623.) But “ ‘ “[n]o one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.” ’ ” (Scoggins, supra, at p. 677.) “Courts of Appeal [also]
have recognized that ‘a defendant’s youth is a relevant factor in
determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life.’ [Citations.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885,
fn. 6.)

1. Awareness of Weapons and Confederate’s
Potential for Violence
Substantial evidence supports that Smith knew a gun would
be used during the incident. Thricia’s testimony provides direct
evidence of such knowledge: She testified that, while driving to
the Landaus’ residence, she saw the gun in the car and asked
Allison about it in Smith’s presence. Further, Jonathan’s testimony
supports an inference that Smith supplied the gun: Jonathan
testified that he previously had seen Smith in possession of a
.22 caliber gun—the same caliber used in the crimes.
Smith argues, correctly, that mere knowledge that a
co-perpetrator is armed is insufficient to establish reckless
indifference to human life. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 809, fn. 8 [disapproving an earlier decision “to the extent it
holds the knowledge one’s accomplice is armed can, by itself,

19
establish reckless indifference to human life”].) But here, there
is more. Circumstantial evidence—including Smith’s preexisting
relationship with the Landaus, Smith’s conversations with Allison
before and after the robbery, and the absence of any signs of forced
entry into the Landaus’ home—supports that Smith orchestrated
the crimes. This gives rise to an inference that Smith knew that
Allison intended to use the gun to carry out the robbery. (See
Davis, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 510 [substantial evidence
includes reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial
evidence].)
Further, Thricia’s testimony supports that Smith did not
express any surprise that the Landaus had been shot. (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [“[a] defendant’s actions after the
shooting may also bear on the defendant’s mental state”].) Rather,
in the immediate aftermath of the incident, Smith made what he
characterizes as “bravado statements” concerning a necklace he
had stolen and “the look on Johnny’s face” during the incident.
Although these facts are themselves substantial evidence
of Smith’s awareness of Allison’s potential for violence, we further
observe that Thricia testified that Smith and Allison were cousins,
and that Allison shared with her that he had killed someone in
the past. Although Smith was not present when Allison made this
statement to Thricia, Allison’s willingness to share this information
and Smith’s familial relationship with Allison further support
Smith’s awareness of Allison’s potential for violence.
We therefore conclude that these factors support the court’s
finding of reckless indifference.

2. Presence at Scene, Opportunity to Restrain,
and Duration of Crime
Smith concedes that he was present at the scene, and that he
personally applied duct tape to the victims. These concessions are

20
significant: “ ‘[P]roximity to the murder and the events leading
up to it may be particularly significant where . . . the murder is a
culmination or a foreseeable result of several intermediate steps, or
where the participant who personally commits the murder exhibits
behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal force. In
such cases, “the defendant’s presence allows him to observe his
cohorts so that it is fair to conclude that he shared in their actions
and mental state. . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives
him an opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous
cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a restraining influence, then
the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting murders.” ’
[Citation.]” (See Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 678.)
Smith contends his culpability nonetheless is diminished
because (1) the duration of the incident was relatively short
(see In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1024 [describing
minutes-long encounter as “negligible”]), (2) he had no opportunity
to restrain Allison from shooting the Landaus, as the shots occurred
only seconds apart, and (3) Allison “asserted dominance over
[Smith]” by issuing orders during the robbery and by threatening
Thricia as they fled the scene. Smith argues these factors
demonstrate that he “lacked the power or agency to intervene
or aid the victims without risking his own life.”
Smith, however, ignores that Allison demonstrated a
willingness to use potentially lethal force at the very outset of
the robbery when he struck Richard in the head with the gun.
And Smith made no effort at that point to restrain Allison or to
otherwise deescalate the level of violence. To the contrary, the
fingerprint evidence supports an inference that Smith himself
increased the level of violence during the robbery by taping the
plastic bag on Donna’s head. Smith likewise ignores that Allison’s
dominant demeanor during the robbery is consistent with an

21
inference that, as part of a preconceived plan, Smith was posing
as a victim of the robbery to avoid being identified by any survivors
of the incident. And the trial court was free not to credit Thricia’s
statement concerning Allison’s purported threat, which Thricia
admitted she had failed to disclose to the lead homicide detective.
We therefore conclude that, with the exception of the duration
of the incident, these factors support that Smith acted with reckless
indifference.

3. Opportunity to Render Aid
The record supports that Smith took, at most, only one step to
aid one of the three victims: It is possible it was Smith who popped
the hole in the plastic bag taped around Donna’s head. Critically,
however, the record also supports that Smith had an opportunity to
aid the Landaus after the shootings but elected not to do so. This
failure strongly supports that Smith exhibited reckless indifference
to human life. (See, e.g., People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
575, 580 [defendant exhibited reckless indifference to human life
by, inter alia, failing to “render or summon aid for the victim,” who
had sustained five gunshots].)
Smith insists that “no evidence suggests that [he] was
aware, at [the] time [of the incident], that Allison had shot or killed
anyone.” But Thricia’s testimony gives rise to an inference that
Smith was in the house when the shots were fired. And Jonathan
testified that, immediately after being shot, Richard exclaimed,
“ ‘I’ve been shot; I’ve been shot. He shot me.’ ” This evidence
supports that Smith was aware the Landaus had been shot before
he fled the scene. This factor therefore weighs in favor of the
reckless indifference finding.

22
4. Efforts to Minimize Risk
Apart from the possibility that Smith popped a hole in the
plastic bag around Donna’s head, there is no evidence that Smith
made any effort to minimize the risk of violence during the incident.
Rather, substantial evidence supports that Smith planned the
robbery and thus knew the plan included bringing a gun and duct
tape to the Landaus’ home. This gives rise to an inference that
Smith anticipated the possibility that the Landaus would resist
the robbery and that violence and the use of weapons would be
necessary to restrain them.
We therefore conclude this factor supports the court’s finding
of reckless indifference.

5. Smith’s Youth at the Time of the Offenses
Finally, we agree that Smith’s age at the time of the offense,
along with his adverse childhood experiences, tend to weigh against
a finding of reckless indifference. But Dr. Gaines herself conceded
the limitations of the analysis she performed concerning this factor.
And she opined only that “it’s possible” that Smith might have
failed to appreciate the potentially lethal risks of his conduct. We
therefore are not persuaded that this single factor outweighs the
other, substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding that
Smith acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Accordingly, we affirm the order denying Smith’s
section 1172.6 petition.

C. The Trial Court Must Correct Clerical Errors
in the Amended Abstract of Judgment
The parties agree, as do we, that the amended abstract of
judgment contains a clerical error. In Smith I, we directed the trial
court to modify the abstract of judgment to reflect the imposition of
section 12022, subdivision (a) enhancements on counts 1 through 7.

23
The amended abstract of judgment, however, erroneously provides
that the court imposed enhancements under section 12022.5. We
therefore order the court on remand to issue a further amended
abstract of judgment that removes the references to section 12022.5
and reflects the imposition of section 12022, subdivision (a)
enhancements on counts 1 through 7. (See People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [the appellate court may direct the trial court
to correct clerical errors in an abstract of judgment].)

DISPOSITION
The order denying Smith’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
On remand, the trial court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment that removes any references to section 12022.5
and reflects the imposition of sentence enhancements on counts 1
through 7 under section 12022, subdivision (a). The court shall
forward the amended abstract of judgment to the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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