Community Education Foundation v. Eshoo CA6

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Filed 4/9/26 Community Education Foundation v. Eshoo CA6
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COMMUNITY EDUCATION H052717
FOUNDATION, (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 23CV421976)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GEORGE P. ESHOO et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

The Court1
This is an appeal from an order granting monetary sanctions of $6,081.28 on a
motion to compel further responses to interrogatories. Appellant George P. Eshoo argues
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sanctions on him because respondent
Community Education Foundation’s (CEF’s) interrogatories were premature and were
based on writs of attachment that had been secured by insufficient bonds. We conclude
that this argument is based on a misinterpretation of the statutory language and a
misunderstanding of the trial court’s authority under the Civil Discovery Act. We affirm.

1 Before Danner, Acting P. J., Bromberg, J., and Chung, J. (Judge of the Santa
Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section
6 of the California Constitution).
I. BACKGROUND
CEF brought the present action against Eshoo and co-defendant 32 & Bruce
Partners LLC (32 & Bruce) on August 29, 2023, alleging that they breached their
obligations under a promissory note for the principal sum of $100,000.00, plus interest,
late fees, and attorney’s fees. After filing the complaint, CEF filed applications for writs
of attachment against both defendants, seeking to secure $133,000.00 against them
“[j]ointly and severally.” Eshoo is the “manager” of 32 & Bruce, as well as its attorney
and agent for service of process.2
On March 7, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the writ applications and
granted them, issuing right to attach orders and orders for the issuance of writs of
attachment. In addition, the court ordered CEF to file bonds totaling $10,000 (i.e.,
$5,000 per defendant) as security for the writs. The hearing was unreported, and so we
have no transcript for it.
The next hearing on August 21, 2024 was reported, and the trial court heard
several matters together, including the discovery motion at issue on this appeal. The
other matters were: (1) defendants’ application to set aside the prior right to attach order
and to increase the amount of the bonds, (2) two applications from CEF for additional
writs of attachment against Eshoo and 32 & Bruce, and (3) a claim of exemption by
Eshoo as to any additional writ of attachment. During the hearing, the parties and the
court agreed that the amount of the bonds that had previously been set should be
increased to $10,000 per defendant, as requested by Eshoo and 32 & Bruce. At the same
time, the court also noted that at the previous hearing in March, it had asked the parties
about the appropriate “amount of the bonds . . . for the two writs of attachment that were

2
Although 32 & Bruce is listed on the notice of appeal and in the briefs as an
appellant, the appealed order was directed only to Eshoo. As a general matter, a client
does not have standing to appeal discovery sanctions that were imposed only against its
attorney. (See Dalessandro v. Mitchell (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1090-1091.)
2
granted already,” and Eshoo had “said nothing” on behalf of defendants: “And so [the
court] was not aware that you had any issue with [$5,000 per defendant;] the opportunity
was given for you to address that. You did not.”
In addition to granting the application to increase the bond amounts, the trial court
granted CEF’s applications for additional writs of attachment against Eshoo and 32 &
Bruce ($42,000, jointly and severally), and it granted Eshoo’s claim of exemption as to
the new writs but not as to the previously issued writs.
Finally, with respect to the discovery motion, the court ordered Eshoo to provide
the requested interrogatory responses (or post a separate bond) within 10 days of its
formal order. It found “that the objections that were made were not meritorious and were
frivolous and overbroad,” and based on that conclusion, it ordered monetary sanctions
against Eshoo. This ruling was confirmed in a formal order filed on September 16, 2024.
The court identified and imposed discovery sanctions “in the amount of $6,000, plus
costs of $60 for filing fees of the motion and $21.28 for filing Mr. Skaggs’ declaration
ordered by [another judge] (for a total of $6,081.28).”
Eshoo filed a timely appeal of the discovery order, challenging only the imposition
of monetary sanctions. That is the sole issue presently before us. Although the trial court
subsequently issued a summary judgment ruling, those later proceedings are the subject
of a separate, consolidated appeal (Case Nos. H053402 & H053795).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
Interlocutory discovery orders are normally not appealable before a final judgment
is entered, but Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 makes an exception for “an order
directing payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a party if the

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amount exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000)3.” (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(12); see also Ellis v.
Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 868.) Because
the amount of sanctions at issue here is $6,081.28, we have jurisdiction over this direct
appeal of the trial court’s order.
B. The Standard of Review
Management of discovery is generally within a trial judge’s discretion, and we
review a discovery ruling for abuse of discretion. (O&C Creditors Group, LLC v.
Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 546, 561 (O&C); Cornerstone
Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 789
(Cornerstone).) That includes discovery sanctions: a trial court has “broad discretion in
deciding whether to impose sanctions and in setting the amount of monetary sanctions.”
(Cornerstone, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 789, citing Pratt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 165, 183.)
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s decision exceeded the
bounds of reason. [Citation.]” (Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 789.) A
discovery ruling will be set aside “ ‘only when it has been established that there was no
legal justification for the order.’ ” (O&C, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 561, quoting Save
Open Space Santa Monica Mountains v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 235, 245-
246.) “Appellate courts must keep liberal policies of discovery statutes in mind when
reviewing decisions denying or granting discovery.” (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 977, 987.)

3 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise indicated.
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C. Relevant Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure

1. The Civil Discovery Act
The Civil Discovery Act governs discovery in civil matters, and it is contained in
title 4 of part 4 of sections 2016.010–2036.050. Section 2017.010 describes the broad
scope of permissible discovery: “Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in
accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the
determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in
evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or
of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically
stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” A plaintiff is allowed to
propound interrogatories on another party without leave of court “at any time that is 10
days after the service of summons on, or appearance by, that party, whichever occurs
first.” (§ 2030.020, subd. (b).)
In this case, because CEF sought writs of attachment at the outset of the trial court
proceedings, the parties focus most of their briefing on section 485.230, which states:
“Where a right to attach order has been issued by the court, a plaintiff may discover,
through any means provided for by, and subject to the protections included in, Title 4
(commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4, the identity, location, and value of
property in which the defendant has an interest.” In other words, section 485.230
expressly invokes the Civil Discovery Act and provides that information regarding a
defendant’s property—its “identity, location, and value”—is discoverable after the court
issues a right to attach order against that defendant.

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2. Writs of Attachment
Section 485.230 is part of a series of code sections that describe the procedure for
obtaining a writ of attachment. (See pt. 2, tit. 6.5 (§§ 481.010–493.060).) Attachment is
a provisional remedy that provides for the seizure of a defendant’s property pending the
outcome of any trial if the plaintiff can show the “probable validity” of its claim. (Kemp
Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1476.) In
order to obtain a writ of attachment, a plaintiff must strictly follow the procedures set
forth in the code. In addition, the plaintiff must file a bond (or “undertaking”) that will
compensate the defendant if it turns out that property was wrongfully attached.
(§ 489.210.) The standard amount of such an undertaking is $10,000, though it may be
increased by the court upon an objection by the defendant. (§ 489.220, subds. (a) & (b).)

3. Monetary Sanctions
As for sanctions, there are various provisions in the Civil Discovery Act that
authorize sanctions for a party’s misuse of the discovery process, depending on the
method of discovery. Interrogatories are governed by section 2030.010 et seq. In
particular, section 2030.300, subdivision (d) states that the trial court “shall impose a
monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or
opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the
one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances
make the imposition of a sanction unjust.” Thus, a monetary sanction is generally
required and expected against the losing party (“shall impose”), with only limited
exceptions.
The purpose of discovery sanctions is compensatory, not punitive. (Kwan
Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 57, 74.) They are
designed to put the requesting party in the same position it would have been in if it had
received the requested discovery, but not a better position. (Ibid.)

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D. Analysis

1. The Trial Court’s Authority to Impose Sanctions Under Section
485.230 and the Civil Discovery Act
In the present case, the trial court granted the motion to compel and determined
that monetary sanctions were called for because Eshoo’s objections to the interrogatories
and his opposition to the motion to compel further responses were both “made without
substantial justification.” Eshoo’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court did
not have the authority (or as Eshoo puts it, “jurisdiction”) to impose these sanctions on
him because they were based on interrogatories that were premature, and the reason the
interrogatories were premature is that the court had not yet issued valid writs of
attachment supported by sufficient bonds. According to Eshoo, the minimum statutory
bond amount is $10,000 per defendant; because the bonds here were originally ordered to
be only $5,000 per defendant, they were a nullity, making any discovery based on them
improper under section 485.230.
As CEF points out, this argument misreads section 485.230. The statute does not
make discovery dependent on the issuance of valid writs of attachment; rather, the statute
permits a plaintiff to conduct discovery “[w]here a right to attach order has been issued
by the court.” (§ 485.230.) There is a material difference between a right to attach
order, which is issued by the judge, and a writ of attachment, which is issued by the clerk
of court after the judge has signed the right to attach order and “upon the filing of an
undertaking as provided by Section 489.210 and 489.220.” (§ 484.090, subd. (b) &
§ 485.220, subd. (a).) Section 485.230 requires only the former, not the latter, and so
Eshoo’s arguments under Vershbow v. Reiner (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 879 and North
Hollywood Marble Company v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 683—both of
which addressed the sufficiency of the undertaking for a valid writ of attachment—are
beside the point. In this case, there is no dispute that the trial court issued right to attach
orders on March 8, 2024 after a hearing on March 7, 2024, and so we conclude that the

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interrogatories propounded by CEF later that same month regarding the “identity,
location, and value” of Eshoo’s property were permissible under section 485.230.
There is nothing in section 485.230 that requires right to attach orders from the
trial court to be legally unassailable. Even if Eshoo were correct that the orders here
were flawed in that they originally identified an insufficient amount of bond—a question
that we do not need to decide and a question as to which Eshoo has identified no relevant
authority in any event—it does not negate the validity of discovery permitted by those
orders. To hold that discovery must await the issuance of an unimpeachable right to
attach order, or must await the filing of an indisputably sufficient undertaking, would be
inconsistent with the purpose of section 485.230, which was to ensure that a plaintiff
could obtain pre-judgment discovery regarding the identity, location, and value of a
defendant’s property in attachment proceedings, rather than having to wait for post-
judgment enforcement to find out this information. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, com. on
Assem. Bill No. 2616 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 12, 1992, pp. 4-5
[purpose of bill is to provide for pre-judgment discovery of a debtor’s assets].)4
Eshoo does not argue that his interrogatory responses were actually adequate, only
that the trial court should have sustained his objection that the discovery was premature.5

4 Indeed, even if Eshoo were correct that section 485.230 permits discovery only
after the filing of a sufficient bond, he does not explain why the more general provisions
of the Civil Discovery Act would not apply to this civil action. As mentioned above,
section 2017.010 allows “any party” to “obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or the
determination of any motion made in that action,” and section 2030.020, subdivision (b)
allows a plaintiff to propound interrogatories without leave of court “at any time that is
10 days after the service of summons on, or appearance by, that party, whichever occurs
first.” Nevertheless, because neither party addressed this point in their briefs our decision
focuses on the interpretation of section 485.230.
5 In his reply brief, Eshoo argues that discovery of his financial information would
violate his “constitutional rights to privacy,” but he does not appear to have made this
argument to the trial court. We also do not see it in the opening brief, and so it has been
8
Given our conclusion that the interrogatories were not premature under either section
485.230 or the Civil Discovery Act, we reject the notion that the trial court somehow
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion to compel or to order monetary sanctions.

2. The Trial Court’s Authority Under Rule 3.1312 of the California Rules
of Court
Eshoo raises an additional argument that does not change the outcome of this
appeal, but which we address here given the tremendous amount of briefing that he
devotes to it—over 20 pages. Eshoo argues that the trial court “violated” rule 3.1312 of
the California Rules of Court when, at the March 7, 2024 hearing, it instructed CEF to
email copies of the proposed orders after hearing directly to the Department 18 email
address, with a copy to Eshoo, rather than electronically file them with the court clerk’s
office. The trial court then “prematurely” signed the proposed orders on March 8, 2024
without giving Eshoo an opportunity to object to them. In doing so, the trial court
violated due process and also failed to preserve the record for appeal. We find this
argument to be unavailing for multiple reasons.
First, it fails to account for the plain language of the rule. Rule 3.1312(a)
provides, in relevant part: “Unless the parties waive notice or the court orders otherwise,
the party prevailing on any motion must, within five days of the ruling, serve by any
means authorized by law and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party
or parties no later than the close of the next business day a proposed order for approval as
conforming to the court’s order. Within five days after service, the other party or parties
must notify the prevailing party as to whether or not the proposed order is so approved.
The opposing party or parties must state any reasons for disapproval.” Rule 3.1312(b)
then states: “The prevailing party must, upon expiration of the five-day period provided
for approval, promptly transmit the proposed order to the court together with a summary

forfeited. (Estate of Bonzi (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1106, fn. 6 [“we do not
consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief”].)
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of any responses of the other parties or a statement that no responses were received.”
Thus, rule 3.1312 sets forth the default procedure for the submission of proposed orders
after hearing, but it is subject to an important caveat in the very first sentence: “Unless
the parties waive notice or the court orders otherwise.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1312(a), italics added.) In this case, the trial court noted that it had in fact ordered
otherwise (“I specifically directed otherwise”), in order to ensure that the documents did
not “get lost” by the clerk’s office or “go[] to the wrong queue.” Because rule 3.1312
expressly allows trial courts to set their own procedures for submitting proposed orders,
we have no basis for determining that the trial court’s instructions to the parties were
inconsistent with the rules of court.
Second, Eshoo provides no authority for the proposition that the trial court’s
departure from the default procedures set forth in rule 3.1312 was a due process violation.
In fact, the only case law on point indicates that such a departure is not a problem at all,
much less one of constitutional dimension. (See Sweeney v. California Regional Water
Quality Control Bd. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1145, fn. 11 [“[W]e are not aware of
any authority that concludes it is a violation of due process for the decision maker to
adopt a proposed decision in an administrative or judicial proceeding as its final ruling.
Respondents cite no authority that suggests simply the adoption of a proposed decision is
improper.”], citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.) Like the Court of Appeal in
Sweeney, we see no basis for holding that a trial court is required—after a hearing where
it has already announced who the prevailing and non-prevailing parties are and why—to
allow the non-prevailing party one more opportunity to object to the court’s final order.6

6 As noted above, the trial court clarified at the August 21, 2024 hearing that it had
already given Eshoo an opportunity to address the amount of the undertakings at the
March 7, 2024 hearing.

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Third, while Eshoo argues that the failure of the March 8, 2024 orders to require
sufficient bonds of $10,000 per defendant was the direct product of the trial court’s
“deviation” from rule 3.1312, we have already determined that the adequacy of the stated
bonds had no bearing on the ability of CEF to propound discovery and the ability of the
trial court to rule on a discovery motion. In other words, Eshoo cannot demonstrate any
prejudice arising from the trial court’s purported deviation from rule 3.1312. And for the
same reason, we lend no weight to his argument that the trial court “failed to protect the
trial court record.” The record before us is more than sufficient to establish that the trial
court had the authority to impose monetary sanctions on Eshoo for his conduct in
discovery.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s discovery sanctions order is affirmed. Respondent CEF is entitled
to its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).

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