Garcia v. Gordon CA2/6

CourtListener 10842085CalctappApr 13, 2026

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Filed 4/13/26 Garcia v. Gordon CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

ARIANA GARCIA, 2d Civil No. B343552
(Super. Ct. No. 24CV03233)
Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

STEVE GORDON, as Director,
etc.,

Respondent.

Appellant Ariana Garcia petitioned for a writ of mandamus
directing respondents California Department of Motor Vehicles
and its director, Steve Gordon (collectively DMV), to rescind the
suspension of her driver’s license. The trial court denied the
petition, deciding the weight of the evidence supported DMV’s
finding that appellant refused a chemical test of her blood alcohol
content. (Veh. Code,1 § 13350 et seq.) We will affirm.

1 All statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless

otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was in a car accident near Lompoc in March of
2024. Officer Nathan Burd of the California Highway Patrol
arrived at the scene shortly after. He spoke to appellant while
paramedics treated her injuries in an ambulance. He determined
appellant was not at fault for the accident but suspected she had
been drinking alcohol. Appellant stated she drank only one shot
of vodka at a friend’s house before driving.
Officer Burd interviewed appellant later that day at
Lompoc Valley Medical Center. She admitted feeling the effects
of the vodka but refused to perform breath and field sobriety
tests. Appellant also refused to take a chemical test to establish
her blood alcohol content. Officer Burd placed her under arrest
for drunk driving. (§ 23152, subd. (a).)
DMV suspended appellant’s driving privileges for refusing
a chemical test. (§ 13353, subd. (a)(2).) She requested an
administrative hearing. (Id., subd. (e).) Officer Burd submitted a
sworn statement to DMV (Form DS 367) stating that appellant
admitted to driving the vehicle involved in the collision, and
appeared to have “[b]loodshot/watery eyes,” the “[o]dor of
alcoholic beverage,” “[u]nsteady gait,” and “[s]lurred speech.”
The 367 form identified the violations as “Chemical Test Refusal”
and “PAS or Other Chemical Test Refusal.” The narrative
section briefly described Burd’s arrival at the accident and how
he initiated contact with appellant. It referred the reader to
“crash report # 9755-2024-00110 for further information.”
Officer Burd submitted the crash report to DMV as well. It
included an “intoxication narrative” describing his investigation
in detail. He stated appellant refused to look him in the eyes
when requested, then accused him of being racist and “trying to

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pin the crash on [her].” She refused blood testing after receiving
both preliminary alcohol screening and chemical test
admonishments. Appellant then actively resisted the
nonconsensual draw by tensing up, crossing her arms, and
placing her hands into her armpits. Officer Burd held her legs
while another officer held her right arm. Hospital staff
attempted to draw from the left arm but could not obtain enough
blood for the blood alcohol test kit. They used a second kit to
draw additional blood from her hand. Appellant continued to
tense up and stated several times that she was refusing to submit
to the test.
A DMV hearing officer found appellant “refuse[d] or fail[ed]
to complete the chemical test or tests after being requested to do
so by a peace officer” and reimposed the license suspension. The
written decision identified Burd’s sworn statement and the crash
report as the basis of these findings.2 Appellant sought review by
petitioning for a writ of administrative mandamus on the
grounds the decision was not supported by the weight of the
evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The trial court denied the
petition.
DISCUSSION
The trial court uses its independent judgment when
reviewing a decision by the DMV to suspend a driver’s license.
(Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d
392, 394; Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).) It must
independently weigh the evidence and make its own findings.
(Levingston v. Retirement Board (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 996,

2 The hearing officer also considered an arrest report and

video footage submitted by Officer Burd. These are not at issue
here.

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1000.) “[T]he party challenging the administrative decision bears
the burden of convincing the court that the administrative
findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v.
City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.) We generally review
the trial court’s rulings for substantial evidence, but “exercise
independent review to the extent we determine legal issues such
as the interpretation of statutes and administrative regulations.”
(Harbor Regional Center v. Office of Administrative Hearings
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 293, 304 citing Silver v. Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 338, 348.)
Our state’s administrative per se statutes authorize DMV
to revoke a person’s driving privileges for one year if the person
refuses an officer’s request to take a blood alcohol test when
suspected of driving while intoxicated. (§ 13350 et seq.) DMV or
an arresting officer initiates the process by serving the driver
with a notice of license suspension. (§ 13353.2, subds. (b) & (c).)
The arresting officer must “immediately forward to the
department a sworn report of all information relevant to the
enforcement action . . . .” (§ 13380, subd. (a).) The sworn report
“shall be made on forms furnished or approved” by DMV. (Id.,
subd. (b).) Form 367, titled “Age 21 and Older Officer’s
Statement,” serves this purpose. The agency automatically
reviews the merits of the suspension internally. (§ 13557, subd.
(a).) The driver may also request a hearing, which DMV must
hold before the effective date of the suspension. (§ 13558, subds.
(a) & (d).) DMV “shall consider the sworn report submitted by
the peace officer pursuant to [section] 13380 and any other
evidence accompanying the report” when determining whether to
sustain the suspension. (§ 13557, subd. (a).)

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Appellant describes Officer’s Burd’s sworn report as
“wholly devoid of relevant information” about the central factual
issue presented here—whether she refused to consent to a
chemical test. She notes Officer Burd wrote just one word,
“REFUSAL,” when filling in the blank section of the report
intended for “statements or actions by the driver that indicate a
refusal or failure of each test.” She contends DMV erred when it
relied on Officer Burd’s unsworn crash report to fill the sworn
report’s factual voids. Appellant argues DMV would have lacked
an evidentiary basis to suspend her license had it properly
excluded the crash report. We disagree.
Section 13557, subdivision (a) requires DMV to “consider
the sworn report submitted by the peace officer . . . and any other
evidence accompanying the report.” (Italics added.) DMV did not
err when it considered a crash report expressly referenced, by
number, in Officer Burd’s sworn report. To the contrary, the
agency would have erred had it not considered it given
subdivision (a)’s mandate to consider “any other evidence
accompanying the report.” We do not suggest an arresting officer
must expressly reference and incorporate a document for it to
“accompany” their sworn report, or that subdivision (a) limits the
evidence DMV may consider. An administrative hearing “need
not be conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence
and witnesses, except as hereinafter provided. Any relevant
evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which
responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
serious affairs, regardless of the existence of any common law or
statutory rule which might make improper the admission of the
evidence over objection in civil actions.” (Gov. Code, § 11513,
subd. (c), italics added.)

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MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150
acknowledged section 13380’s provision that a sworn report
include “‘all information relevant to the enforcement action,’” yet
declined to interpret the statute as prohibiting DMV from relying
on unsworn reports. “[T]he Legislature clearly anticipates the
sworn report will contain all or nearly all of the information
necessary to remove the offender's license. In light of this
legislative intent, the sworn report cannot be wholly devoid of
relevant information. However, so long as a sworn report is filed,
it is consistent with the relaxed evidentiary standards of an
administrative per se hearing that technical omissions of proof
can be corrected by an unsworn report filed by the arresting
officer. In this case, the arresting officer filed a sworn report.”
(Id. at p. 159.) MacDonald concluded the unsworn report at
issue, i.e., CHP Form 202 (DUI Arrest/Investigation Report), was
“‘the sort of evidence on which responsible person are accustomed
to rely in the conduct of serious affairs’” and properly considered
by DMV. (Ibid., citing § 11513, subd. (c).) We conclude the same
about Officer Burd’s crash report.
We also disagree with appellant’s characterization of the
sworn report as “wholly devoid of relevant information.” It
includes, among other facts relevant to appellant’s suspension:
the date, time, and place of the collision; his determination that
appellant drove one of the crashed vehicles; her “objective
symptoms of intoxication,” (capitalization and bold omitted) i.e.,
“[b]loodshot/watery eyes,” “[o]dor of alcoholic beverages,”
“[u]nsteady gait,” and “[s]lurred speech”; the date and time of her
blood test; the nature of the alleged violation, i.e., “Chemical Test
Refusal” and “PAS or other Chemical Test Refusal”; and the fact
of her refusal upon receiving three standard pre-test

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admonitions. He filled the narrative section of the report
entirely, then concluded with the statement “[s]ee the crash
report #9755-2024-00110 for further information.” He then
submitted this crash report to DMV along with the sworn
statement.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Patricia L. Kelly, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________

William C. Makler and Andrew F. Alire for Petitioner and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Gabrielle H. Brumbach, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Roza Patterson, and Amar Nair,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents.

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