CourtListener 10842082•People v. Massen CA2/6
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Filed 4/13/26 P. v. Massen CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B339365
(Super. Ct. No. 2022008707)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
DIANA LYNN MASSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Diana Lynn Massen appeals after she was convicted by
jury of evading an officer and driving under the influence of a
drug. (Veh. Code,1 §§ 2800.2, subd. (a), 23152, subd. (f).) At trial,
the jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 2110 that it
may consider evidence of appellant’s driving manner, but that
this evidence “is not enough by itself” to establish whether she
was “under the influence.” Appellant contends reversal is
required because CALCRIM No. 2110 improperly restricted her
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code
1
unless otherwise indicated.
right to present a defense by instructing the jury that evidence of
her “careful driving,” standing alone, could not acquit her. We
affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
On April 10, 2022, at around 11:38 p.m., California
Highway Patrol Officer Robert Ruckman observed appellant’s
white Toyota Camry traveling northbound on U.S. 101 near
Victoria, “driving abnormally.” The vehicle was “jerking, making
sharp jerking movements to the left and to the right within its
lane,” maneuvering around slower moving vehicles, and crossed
over the solid yellow line delineating the center-divide from the
fast lane.
Officer Ruckman attempted to conduct a traffic stop by
activating his emergency lights and sirens, but appellant did not
stop. She continued driving, reaching a speed of approximately
100 miles per hour. During this time, she changed lanes several
times without signaling, drove in multiple lanes at once, and
nearly collided with the traffic cones on the freeway in a
construction zone.
Law enforcement deployed a spike strip, deflating
appellant’s left front tire, but she continued driving. Multiple
patrol vehicles were involved and northbound traffic on U.S. 101
was stopped. Officer Ruckman forcibly disabled appellant’s
vehicle after executing two PIT maneuvers. The pursuit lasted
for 25 to 30 minutes, over 20 to 30 miles, and included two
separate counties.
Officer Ruckman described appellant as “very erratic,”
unable to keep still, and making rapid jerking movements. Her
eyes were “red and watery,” her pupils were dilated, and her
mouth was dry. Officer Ruckman believed appellant had been
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driving under the influence of a controlled substance, specifically
a stimulant.
Highway Patrol Officer Aaron Limon-Guerrero, a certified
Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) conducted a 12-step DRE
examination of appellant at approximately 1:52 a.m. During his
evaluation, he observed several indicators of “drug impairment,”
including appellant’s “very erratic” demeanor, she was unable to
sit still, she had “raspy speech,” her pulse was high, her pupils
were dilated, and there was no involuntary jerking of her eyes.
She fell asleep at random times throughout the evaluation, had
heat bumps on the back of her tongue, and her teeth were “black
and . . . rotting,” which indicated appellant may have smoked
methamphetamine. During the Romberg balance test, appellant
estimated 30 seconds after 19 seconds had elapsed.
Officer Limon-Guerrero was not able to complete the entire
DRE examination out of concern for appellant’s safety. Based on
the tests he administered, he formed the opinion that appellant
was under the influence of a central nervous system (CNS)
stimulant at the time of driving.
After the evaluation, appellant was taken for a blood draw.
Blood tests revealed appellant’s blood contained over 1,000
nanograms per milliliter of methamphetamine. Therapeutic
levels of methamphetamine in blood would be approximately 10
to 15 nanograms per milliliter.
In an amended information, the Ventura County District
Attorney charged appellant with evading a police officer with
willful disregard (§ 2800.2, subd. (a), count 1) and driving under
the influence of any drug (§ 23152, subd. (f), count 2). The
information also alleged appellant committed the offense within
two counties (Pen. Code, § 781), and that she had prior
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convictions of increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(b)(2)). As to count 2, it was alleged appellant had two prior
convictions pursuant to section 23152, subdivision (b).
At trial, the jury was instructed on the charged offense of
driving under the influence of a drug (§ 23152, subd. (f)) pursuant
to model instruction CALCRIM No. 2110.2 Appellant made no
objection.
In April 2024, a jury found appellant guilty on both counts.
The trial court found true the special allegations. Appellant was
sentenced to 280 days in county jail, placed on five years formal
probation, and ordered to pay various fines and fees.
2 CALCRIM No. 2110 instructed as follows: “The defendant
is charged in Count Two with driving under the influence of a
drug in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(f). ¶ To prove that
defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: ¶ 1.
The defendant drove a vehicle; AND 2. When she drove, the
defendant was under the influence of a drug. ¶ A person is under
the influence if, as a result of taking a drug, his or her mental or
physical abilities are so impaired that he or she is no longer able
to drive a vehicle with the caution of a sober person, using
ordinary care, under similar circumstances. ¶ The manner in
which a person drives is not enough by itself to establish whether
the person is or is not under the influence of a drug. However, it
is a factor to be considered, in light of all the surrounding
circumstances, in deciding whether the person was under the
influence. ¶ A drug is a substance or combination of substances,
other than alcohol, that could so affect the nervous system, brain,
or muscles of a person that it would appreciably impair his or her
ability to drive as an ordinarily cautions person, in full possession
of his or her faculties and using reasonable care, would drive
under similar circumstances.”
4
Discussion
Appellant contends reversal of count 2 is required because
CALCRIM No. 2110 limited the jury’s ability to consider critical
and relevant evidence in violation of her Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The People contend appellant forfeited her
challenge by failing to object at trial. As we shall explain, we
agree with the People.
“Generally, a party forfeits any challenge to a jury
instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence
if the party fails to object in the trial court. [Citations.]” (People
v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 719.) However, a
defendant need not assert an objection to preserve a contention of
instructional error when the error affects the defendant’s
“substantial rights.” (Pen. Code, § 1259.) “In this regard, ‘[t]he
cases equate “substantial rights” with reversible error’ under the
test stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.” (People v.
Felix (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 849, 857; People v. Mitchell (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 442, 465.)
We review de novo whether a jury instruction correctly
states the law. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) Our
task is to determine whether the trial court “‘fully and fairly
instructed on the applicable law.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) “It is well established in
California that the correctness of jury instructions is to be
determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a
consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular
instruction.” (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Reyes (1998) 19
Cal.4th 743, 753-756.) “‘Instructions should be interpreted, if
5
possible, so as to support the judgment rather than to defeat it
. . . .’” (Ramos, at p. 1088.)
“It is uncontroversial that DUI model instruction,
CALCRIM 2110, correctly states the law in its directive about a
defendant’s manner of driving.” (People v. Stockman (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 1093, 1097-1098 (Stockman), citing People v. Rice
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 647, 652-653.) It is also “well established
that a defendant’s manner of driving may be considered, along
with any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a
defendant was driving under the influence.” (Stockman, at p.
1098; People v. Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 83-84;
People v. Torres (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 36, 38.) The standard
language of CALCRIM No. 2110 captures this principle by
instructing that a defendant’s manner of driving is a factor to be
considered, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, in
deciding whether a person was under the influence. (See fn. 2,
ante, p. 4.)
CALCRIM No. 2110 thus “correctly states that . . . the
manner of driving alone is not enough to sustain a finding that
the defendant was under the influence . . . .” (Stockman, supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.) This is because “‘[t]he determining
factor [in trial of a DUI charge] relates . . . to the mental and
physical condition of the driver, that is, his ability to operate his
car, and not to the manner in which the car is being actually
driven, nor the result of its operation. The commission of the
crime is complete when such person engages in the act of driving
an automobile . . . while under the influence . . . even though
there are no other travelers on the highway at the time [citation],
or, if there are, that he has driven his car in such manner as did
not in fact endanger their safety.’” (Ibid., quoting People v.
6
McGrath (1928) 94 Cal.App. 520, 524; see also People v. Grabham
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 549, 553.)
Appellant contends that by instructing the jury with the
standard language of CALCRIM No. 2110, she was prevented
from successfully presenting her defense because the jury was
told that additional evidence beyond her “careful driving” was
necessary to acquit her. For support, she relies on Cool v. United
States (1972) 409 U.S. 100. But Cool is inapposite. There, the
defense presented testimony from an accomplice that was
“completely exculpatory.” The trial court instructed the jury that
it should ignore the testimony “unless it believes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the testimony is true.” (Id., at pp. 100,
103, fn. 4.) The Supreme court explained that the instruction
was both confusing and fundamentally unfair because it
substantially reduced the government’s burden of proof. (Id., at
pp. 103, fn. 4, 104.)
Appellant does not contend that evidence of her driving
manner was excluded. Rather, she contends it was not given
sufficient weight. But as we have explained, CALCRIM No. 2110
correctly states the law. In any event, “[i]t would be
inappropriate . . . for a jury to find that a defendant was or was
not driving under the influence based solely on evidence of
manner of driving, even though such evidence may be considered
as one factor among others. Doing so would contravene not only
CALCRIM NO. 2110 instruction for DUI, but also CALCRIM No.
224, which applies to any circumstantial evidence presented at
trial . . . .” (Stockman, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1099-1100.)3
3 Appellant’s jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 224,
which provides that for the jury to find “that a fact necessary to
find the defendant guilty” has been proven beyond a reasonable
7
Furthermore, the record shows defense counsel cross-
examined the state’s witnesses “strenuously” to elicit evidence
regarding appellant’s good driving, which counsel argued showed
that appellant was not impaired. Counsel also emphasized
appellant’s careful driving during closing argument. The jury
was not persuaded. We conclude there was no miscarriage of
justice, and the forfeiture rule applies.
Appellant responds that defense counsel’s failure to object
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. This contention fails
because appellant cannot show counsel’s representation was
deficient or that she was prejudiced by any such deficiency. (See
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694.)
CALCRIM No. 2110 correctly states the law. Counsel’s failure or
“election” not to object might well have been based on the
reasonable assumption that an objection would be overruled.
“Counsel’s failure to make a meritless objection does not
constitute deficient performance.” (People v. Mitcham (1992) 1
Cal.4th 1027, 1080.)
First, appellant’s contention that the language in
CALCRIM No. 2110 violated her right to the presumption of
innocence by shifting the burden to the defense is meritless.
CALCRIM No. 2110 did not address the burden of proof and
other instructions properly instructed the jury as to the
presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proof.
(See People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 248-249 [instructional
error harmless because jury was otherwise properly instructed];
People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1133 [erroneous
doubt based on circumstantial evidence, it must be convinced
that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the
circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty.”
8
instruction harmless where it did not directly or indirectly
address burden of proof].)
Second, her contention that there was not overwhelming
evidence that the drugs affected her driving ability is not
supported by the record. Officer Ruckman testified that
appellant’s driving was “abnormal,” which he described as
making sharp jerking movements within her lane. Her speed
varied from 40 to 100 miles per hour as she maneuvered around
slower moving vehicles. She crossed over the solid yellow line,
changed lanes without signaling, drove in multiple lanes at once,
and “nearly collided” with the traffic cones in a construction zone.
When Officer Ruckman activated his emergency lights and
sirens, appellant did not stop. The pursuit, which was captured
on Officer Ruckman’s Motor Vehicle/Audio Recording System
(MVARS) and played for the jury, lasted approximately 25-30
minutes, spanned two counties, and only ended after appellant’s
vehicle was forcibly disabled. Officer Ruckman opined
appellant’s driving was “unsafe” and consistent with being under
the influence.
There was also overwhelming evidence that appellant was
under the influence of methamphetamine when she was driving.
Both Officer Ruckman and Officer Limon-Guerrero described
appellant’s demeanor as “erratic.” She had “red and watery”
eyes, and her pupils were dilated. Appellant’s blood contained at
least 1000 nanograms per milliliter, which was the maximum
level capable of being measured based on the equipment used.
After conducting the DRE evaluation, which was recorded and
played for the jury, Officer Limon-Guerrero opined that appellant
was under the influence at the time of driving.
9
In short, the jury was fully and fairly instructed on the
applicable law, and any arguable error was not prejudicial.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
10
Maureen M. Houska, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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