CourtListener 10840458•Crede v. Abrahamson CA2/5
Full text
Filed 4/9/26 Crede v. Abrahamson CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
TIMOTHY CREDE, JR., as B346197
Trustee, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
22STPB11111)
v.
CONSTANCE J.
ABRAHAMSON,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ruben N. Garcia, Judge. Reversed.
Decker Law, James D. Decker, Griffin R. Schindler, and
Christopher M. Jones for Plaintiff and Appellant.
The Burbank Firm, James G. Morris, and Jasmin Arya for
Defendant and Respondent.
******
After the deaths of their former spouses, a woman and a
man began a romantic relationship and mutually agreed to sell
their individual family homes and, with the pooled proceeds, buy
a home together. The man died before their plan came to
fruition, but he already had—by that point—sold his family home
and given the woman a cashier’s check for $550,000. The
successor trustee of the man’s trust sued the woman in probate
court for an order as well as for breach of contract and fraud—
seeking a refund of the $550,000 paid to the woman, “one half of
the appreciation in value” of the new home, double damages,
punitive damages, and attorney fees. The probate court granted
summary judgment for the woman. Because there are triable
issues of fact as to the terms of the couple’s agreement, we
reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Wolfgang Buettner (Wolfgang)1 was married to Nancy
Moses (Nancy) when Nancy died in December 2019. At the time
of Nancy’s death, they had a trust—The Wolfgang Buettner and
Nancy Moses 2018 Revocable Trust (Buettner Trust)—that
governed the disposition of their assets. Under the Buettner
1 For clarity’s sake, we will use first names where multiple
parties share the same last name. We mean no disrespect.
2
Trust, Wolfgang (as the surviving spouse) had the power to sell
any of the trust’s assets, and those assets included the family
home in Lomita, California. The Buettner Trust also provided
that, upon Wolfgang’s death, half of the trust’s residue was to be
distributed to beneficiaries designated by Wolfgang (including his
two children, Luka and Lilith) and the other half was to be
distributed to beneficiaries designated by Nancy (including one of
her nephews, Timothy Crede, Jr. (Crede)). The Buettner Trust
named Crede as the successor trustee upon the death of both
Wolfgang and Nancy.
In early 2020, Wolfgang met Constance J. Abrahamson
(Constance) on an online dating website. At that time, she was
recently widowed and owned a family home in Northridge,
California. At some point before or during the summer of 2020,
Wolfgang and Constance orally agreed to sell their respective
family homes and, with the proceeds, purchase a home together
in San Pedro, California, which they would renovate and reside
in together. The San Pedro home was purchased in August 2020
with Constance’s money, and title was initially transferred to the
trust Constance had previously created with her deceased
husband. Constance thereafter sold her Northridge home in
September 2020, and Wolfgang thereafter sold his Lomita home
in October 2020. On November 17, 2020, Wolfgang gave
Constance a $550,000 cashier’s check from the proceeds of the
sale of his Lomita home.
The specific terms of the oral agreement between Wolfgang
and Constance are unclear. According to Constance, she and
Wolfgang had agreed that each would contribute half of the San
Pedro home’s purchase price; that, upon the death of one, the
survivor would become the “complete[]” “own[er]” of the home and
3
be permitted to reside in the home; and that “[t]he only condition”
was that, upon the survivor’s death or sale of the home, the
survivor would pay the other’s heirs the other’s $550,000
contribution amount plus interest (of 2 percent per year) starting
at the time of the other’s death. When Wolfgang gave Constance
the $550,000 cashier’s check, she gave him a handwritten note,
with her signature, that stated: “Receipt of Cashier’s Check
#517046 Dated 11/17/2020 from California Credit Union from
Wolfgang Buettner for 50% of ownership of property [in San
Pedro].” The same day, Wolfgang sent a copy of that receipt in an
email to his brother in Germany, explaining that he “paid” the
check “to [his] partner Con[stance] . . . to take possession of 50%
of the newly purchased ho[me].”
Wolfgang died a month later, in late December 2020, from
complications related to COVID-19.
In February 2021, Constance created a new trust in her
own name, transferred title to the San Pedro home to that trust,
and designated Wolfgang’s two children as beneficiaries of
$275,000 each upon her death (unless Constance outlived them
both).
II. Procedural Background
In November 2022, Crede—acting as successor trustee to
the Buettner Trust—filed a petition in probate court against
Constance. The petition (1) requested an order requiring
Constance to repay the Buettner Trust $550,000 as well as
awarding double damages under Probate Code section 859 and
attorney fees, and (2) sued Constance for (a) breach of the
“written contract” (namely, the November 17, 2020 receipt), for
failing to transfer half of the San Pedro home’s ownership to
Wolfgang, (b) common counts (based on the indebtedness
4
embodied in the receipt), and (c) fraud; for those civil claims,
Crede sought damages of $550,000 plus “one half of the
appreciation in value” of the San Pedro property as well as
punitive damages and attorney fees.
Constance filed an objection to the petition, and then
moved for summary judgment. After full briefing and a hearing
in September 2024, the probate court granted summary judgment
for Constance. Specifically, the court found that Constance had
carried her “initial burden” of showing that (1) she was not in
breach of the terms of the oral agreement between herself and
Wolfgang “to take joint ownership of the property subject to a life
estate[2] in favor of the second of them to die” (because she did not
owe Wolfgang or his estate any money until her death or the sale
of the San Pedro home), and (2) the statute of frauds did not bar
enforcement of that oral agreement because Constance had
detrimentally relied upon that agreement when selling her home.
The court also found that Crede had not carried his responsive
burden of raising a triable issue of material fact merely by
attacking Constance’s declaration, which set forth the terms of
the oral agreement, as self-serving and uncorroborated.
Crede moved for a new trial. Following another round of
briefing and a hearing in March 2025, the probate court denied
the motion. Specifically, the court ruled that the “undisputed
fact[s]” showed (1) that, under the terms of the oral agreement
“attested to by [Constance],” Constance’s failure to transfer 50
2 Although Constance at one point inaccurately described the
survivor’s right to remain in the home as a “life estate,” she has
consistently maintained that the right granted—whatever it was
called—was the right to retain possession of the home. Her
mistaken use of legal terminology does not by itself create any
conflict regarding that testimony.
5
percent ownership of the San Pedro home to Wolfgang was not a
breach because “it was agreed that the survivor . . . was to hold
the entirety of the property following the first of them to die,
repaying the first to die’s heirs from the proceeds upon the sale of
the property or the survivor’s death,” and (2) that there was an
“absence of substantial evidence disputing these terms.”
Following a judgment dismissing Crede’s petition, Crede
filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Crede argues that the probate court erred in granting
summary judgment for Constance on his petition.3
Summary judgment is warranted, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where (1) the movant
carries her initial burden of showing the nonexistence of one or
more elements of the claims, and (2) the non-movant fails to show
“the existence of a triable issue of material fact” as to that
element. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
850, 853; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a), (c), (o)(1), (p)(2).)
While evaluating those shifting burdens, we must liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve all doubts concerning that evidence in favor
of that party. (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution,
Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286; Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33
Cal.3d 868, 874; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review de
novo a grant of summary judgment. (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5
Cal.5th 322, 338.)
3 Because Crede’s legal arguments attacking the denial of his
new trial motion are identical to those attacking the preceding
grant of summary judgment, we need only examine the propriety
of the grant of summary judgment.
6
The portions of Crede’s petition seeking a probate order
rest on the same premise as the portions of his petition alleging
breach of contract and fraud4—namely, that Constance breached
the contract between herself and Wolfgang (and also committed
fraud) by failing to grant Wolfgang (and, by extension, the
Buettner Trust) a 50 percent ownership interest in the San Pedro
home (which is what entitles the Buettner Trust to a refund of
the $550,000 plus appreciation in the value of the San Pedro
home). To prevail on the claims asserted in the petition, Crede is
required to show that Wolfgang (and, by extension, the Buettner
Trust) has a current, enforceable right to that ownership interest.
(See Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811,
821 [elements of breach of contract including existence of
enforceable contract]; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th
631, 638 [elements of fraud include a misrepresentation].) To
defeat those claims on summary judgment, Constance must show
that the undisputed facts establish that Wolfgang (and, by
extension, the Buettner Trust) have no such right. As framed by
the parties, the existence of this right turns on (1) whether the
statute of frauds bars enforcement of any agreement between
Wolfgang and Constance, and (2) the terms of that agreement.
I. Statute of Frauds
The statute of frauds provides that any agreement for “the
sale of real property, or of an interest therein” is invalid unless it
is “in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.”
(Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).) “To satisfy the ‘writing’
4 Because Crede’s “common count” claim seeks the same
relief as his breach of contract claim, we need not address it
independently. (E.g., McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 379, 394-395.)
7
requirement of the statute of frauds, the writing may be cobbled
together from various documents [citations], but must still
‘identif[y] the subject of the parties’ agreement, show[] that they
made a contract, and state[] the essential contract terms with
reasonable certainty.’” (Smyth v. Berman (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th
183, 197, quoting Sterling v. Taylor (2007) 40 Cal.4th 757, 766.)5
In his briefs, Crede argues that Constance’s testimony
regarding the terms upon which she and Wolfgang orally agreed
should be excluded. However, Crede’s briefs were unclear why:
Was it because that testimony improperly expounded upon the
meaning of the agreement embodied in the written receipt, or
was it because Constance’s testimony itself created a whole new
oral agreement? During oral argument, Crede clarified that it is
the former—namely, that the written receipt embodies the
agreement at issue and that Constance’s testimony contradicting
that agreement is inadmissible.
So clarified, Crede’s statute of frauds-based argument fails.
Crede’s position that the receipt is an agreement means that
there is already a writing signed by Constance, which satisfies
the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).)
What Crede appears instead to be arguing is that
Constance’s testimony constitutes inadmissible parol evidence.
This argument also fails. The parol evidence rule bars the
consideration of “extrinsic evidence” to interpret an “integrated
written agreement.” (Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-
5 Because Constance did not raise the issue, we have no
occasion to consider the separate question of whether the
handwritten receipt that Crede attempts to enforce as a contract
satisfies the statute of frauds’ requirement of a writing that
contains all essential contract terms or otherwise falls into an
exception to the statute of frauds.
8
Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1174;
Code Civ. Proc., § 1856; Civ. Code, § 1625.) By its terms, the
parol evidence rule does not apply to written contracts that are
not “integrated”—that is, to contracts that are not intended by
the parties as the “complete,” “final,” and “exclusive” “expression
of their agreement” and its terms. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd.
(b); Riverisland, at p. 1174; cf. Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 343 [parol evidence rule “does not . . .
prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence ‘to explain the
meaning of a written contract’”].) The receipt, while in writing,
falls short of being an integrated written agreement.
Thus, the trial court properly considered Constance’s
declaration in interpreting the agreement.
II. Terms of the Agreement
It is undisputed that Wolfgang and Constance had an
agreement of some sort regarding how they would jointly
purchase a new residence from the sale of their prior family
homes. As a result, the propriety of summary judgment turns on
whether there are any triable issues of fact as to the terms of that
agreement. Unlike the probate court, we conclude that there are.
On the one hand, there is evidence that Constance and
Wolfgang agreed to share ownership of the San Pedro home.
Constance at one point stated that the survivor would “own” the
home. The written receipt also purports to grant Wolfgang “50%
of ownership of” the San Pedro home. (Italics added.) At oral
argument, Constance’s attorney indicated that the use of the
word “ownership” could connote a transfer of title, although there
was no evidence as to when such a transfer of title must occur—
that is, whether it was to be immediate or upon the sale of the
property and/or death of the survivor.
9
On the other hand, there is evidence that Constance and
Wolfgang agreed to share possession of the San Pedro home, with
the survivor owing the heirs of the first to die a repayment of the
$550,000 amount plus two-percent interest running from the date
of that person’s death. This interpretation comes in part from
Constance’s testimony that “the only condition” to the right of the
survivor to stay in the home was repayment of this amount, as
well as from the letter that Wolfgang wrote to his brother
indicating that he gave $550,000 to Constance so he could “take
possession”—but not necessarily ownership—“of 50% of the newly
purchased house.”
The evidence is therefore disputed on the question of
whether Wolfgang’s $550,000 contribution was meant to confer
(1) ownership (at the time he paid the contribution or at some
point in the future) or, rather, (2) an immediate right to joint
possession with a promise to repay the contribution amount at a
two-percent interest rate. Ownership and possession are not
necessarily the same: Although possession is an “indicia” of
“ownership” (Evid. Code, § 637; Hoffman v. Connell (1999) 73
Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200), any renter knows that possession is not
ownership. Where, as here, “the evidence” regarding the terms of
a contract “is conflicting or admits of more than one inference,”
there is a dispute of fact. (Alexander v. Codemasters Group
Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 141-142; Harden v.
Maybelline Sales Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1550, 1556; Wolf v.
Superior Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1351.) And here,
that dispute is material because the viability of Crede’s petition
turns on whether Wolfgang had merely a right to possession, had
a right to ownership at some point in the future, or had an
immediate right to ownership (as only an immediate right to
10
ownership would entitle the Buettner Trust to $550,000 plus any
appreciation in the value of the San Pedro home at this point in
time). Although it may be possible to resolve the conflict in the
evidence (as Constance urges) as indicating that Wolfgang’s
“ownership” did not take effect until Constance’s death or the
sale of the San Pedro home, we must liberally construe the
evidence in Crede’s favor and resolve any doubts against
summary judgment and in favor of a jury resolving these
ambiguities.
In its rulings granting summary judgment and denying a
new trial, the probate court seemed to accept Constance’s account
of the oral agreement involving joint possession as the sole
evidence of the agreement, and the court did not discuss the
conflict in the evidence caused by Constance’s other accounts of
the agreement or by the receipt’s explicit reference to joint
ownership. Because this conflict presents a triable issue of
material fact that precludes summary judgment, the probate
court erred.6
6 The probate court acted within its discretion in refusing
Crede’s request to reject Constance’s declaration regarding her
account of the oral agreement as not credible under Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (e). That provision grants
trial courts the “discretion” whether to reject as not credible “an
affidavit or declaration made by an individual who was the sole
witness to [a material] fact” when it is “the only proof of [that]
fact.” (Ibid., italics added.) Crede cites several cases for the
proposition that a court is required to reject a declaration in such
circumstances, but all of the cases rest on hearsay objections
inapplicable here (Fowler v. Security-First National Bank (1956)
146 Cal.App.2d 37, 45-46, 48-49) or no longer valid after our
Legislature’s enactment of Evidence Code section 1261 (e.g.,
11
* * *
In light of our disposition, we have no need to confront
Crede’s remaining arguments attacking the summary judgment
ruling.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Crede is entitled to costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
Estate of Ballard (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 799, 802; Monsen v.
Monsen (1916) 174 Cal. 97, 103).
12
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.