CourtListener 10840442•People v. Martin CA2/2
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Filed 4/9/26 P. v. Martin CA2/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B327394
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA005658)
v.
LUCIEN MARTIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
Lucien Martin filed a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code1 section 1172.6 (former § 1170.952). Following an
evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied the petition. We
previously affirmed the ruling, determining that the record of
appellant’s trial contained substantial evidence to support the
superior court’s analysis under Banks and Clark3 that appellant
acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v.
Martin (June 18, 2024, B327394) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Supreme Court granted a petition for review filed by
petitioner and subsequently transferred the matter back to this
court “with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the
cause in light of People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867
[(Emanuel)].” In supplemental briefing (see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.200(b)), appellant argues that Emanuel provides further
support for his contention that the superior court erred by finding
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. We
disagree and affirm the superior court’s order.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)
3 People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks); People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
The robberies and murder
In the early morning hours of July 17, 1990, appellant and
his cousin, Paul Watkins, engaged in a string of armed robberies
during which one of the victims was shot and killed. Appellant
supplied the large nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol with a
“banana style” magazine containing over 17 live rounds, which
was wielded in each of the robberies.
Around 3:30 a.m., Anthony Orosco and Juan Gallegos were
sitting in Orosco’s black Nissan pickup truck in the parking lot of
an AM-PM Mini-Mart in Riverside. Orosco heard someone, later
identified as Watkins, say “get the fuck out of the truck,” and was
simultaneously struck in the temple with the gun by Watkins,
before Orosco saw either of the perpetrators. Leaving the keys in
the ignition, Orosco exited the truck as Watkins continued to
point the gun at him. Watkins then told Orosco to “get the hell
out of here.”
In the meantime, appellant went to the passenger side of
the truck where Gallegos was seated. After Gallegos exited the
vehicle, appellant took Gallegos’s wallet and a gold chain with an
engraved heart. Orosco and Gallegos then watched as Watkins
jumped into the truck bed and appellant got into the driver’s seat
and drove away. Appellant stopped at a gas station to allow
Watkins to enter the passenger seat in the cab before continuing
on the freeway to the next robbery.
4 The following factual summary is based on the clerk’s and
reporter’s transcripts from appellant’s trial, which were lodged
with this court in connection with respondent’s request for
judicial notice of the records in People v. Lucien Martin, Second
Appellate District No. B069142.
3
Sometime before 5:00 a.m., appellant pulled the truck into
a Greyhound bus station in Claremont where Jihad Muhammed
was standing alone waiting for a bus. Appellant stopped next to
Muhammed. Without exiting the vehicle, Watkins pulled out the
gun, pointed it at Muhammed, and demanded his money.
Muhammed threw about $12 in cash into the truck, and
appellant drove away.
Appellant then drove to a Holiday Inn in West Covina
where he and Watkins had decided to commit another robbery.
As they pulled into the driveway shortly after 5:00 a.m., while it
was still dark, they saw Raymond Shield and his family in front
of the hotel unloading luggage from a car to the sidewalk.
Appellant parked the truck nearby and popped the hood. As he
and Watkins quickly hopped out, Watkins tucked the gun into his
waistband. They hurried to the front of the truck, opened the
hood, and looked inside as if they were having engine trouble.
Watkins waved at Shield, who nodded and smiled. Shield
walked over to the truck and offered to help. He stood with
appellant and Watkins for about a minute as he appeared to look
at the engine. Shield then hurried away from the truck toward
his family. Fearing that Shield was going to call the police,
appellant and Watkins immediately put the hood down and
rushed to the cab of the truck. Appellant returned to the driver’s
seat as Watkins got in on the passenger side. The passenger door
remained open. Before pulling both legs into the truck, and while
facing outward, Watkins took the gun from his waistband and
fired a single fatal gunshot at Shield, who was about four or five
steps away from the truck. Shield fell to the ground, and the
truck sped away, tires screeching, with appellant at the wheel.
The passenger door closed as the truck was accelerating.
4
After fleeing the scene of the murder, appellant drove to
Gardena, a 35-minute drive from West Covina. There, he and
Watkins decided to commit another robbery. Either appellant or
Watkins entered Steve’s Market around 8:45 a.m., approached
the counter, and asked Kyung Sun Lee, the store’s owner, for a
pack of cigarettes. Lee responded that they cost $1.95 and put a
pack on the counter. Saying he needed to get another dollar, the
man walked out to a truck parked in front of the store. Lee
watched appellant and Watkins speaking, and then saw the
driver load a magazine into a gun. Lee hid behind a counter as
appellant and Watkins returned to the market. One man took
money from the cash register and picked up the cigarettes while
the other stood at the store entrance pointing his gun toward the
register.5 Lee then pulled out his own handgun and fired. The
man holding the gun dropped the gun’s magazine on the floor
before both perpetrators fled in opposite directions.
Appellant’s conviction
Appellant was convicted by jury in 1992 of the first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and attempted robbery
(§§ 664/211, count 2) of Shield, the second degree robbery of
Muhammed (§ 211; count 3), the second degree robbery of Lee
(§ 211; count 4), and the second degree robberies of Orosco (§ 211;
count 5) and Gallegos (§ 211; count 6). The jury found that the
murder occurred during the commission of an attempted robbery.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) As to all counts, the jury found true the
5 Lee testified at trial that Watkins was the gunman,
though he earlier testified that appellant held the gun. Watkins,
who testified in his own defense at trial, acknowledged wielding
the gun in all the other encounters, but testified that appellant
held the gun at Steve’s Market.
5
allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm in the
commission of the crime. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court
sentenced appellant to state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole plus one year for the murder, to be served
consecutively with the determinate term of nine years eight
months on counts 3, 4, 5, and 6.
This court affirmed the judgment in appellant’s direct
appeal. (People v. Martin (June 23, 1994, B069142) [nonpub
opn.].)
Section 1172.6 petition and appellate proceedings
Appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. The superior court found a prima facie case for
relief had been made, issued an order to show cause, and held an
evidentiary hearing in accordance with section 1172.6,
subdivision (d). At the hearing, the superior court noted that the
prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant could be convicted of murder on a theory that
remains valid under current law. It further recognized its duty to
sit as an independent trier of fact. To that end, the court stated
it had “spent substantial time reviewing the record in the case,”
and had “a good grasp of the facts” and the evidence.
The prosecution argued appellant is liable for murder
under current law as a direct aider and abettor to the murder
and also under a felony-murder theory as a major participant in
the attempted robbery of Shield who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. When the defense argued, the court
asked counsel to focus on why appellant should not be found
liable under a felony-murder theory as a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life pursuant to Banks
and Clark. The defense conceded that appellant was a major
6
participant in the attempted robbery of Shield as well as the
other robberies, but asserted there was no evidence appellant
acted with reckless indifference to human life, arguing that:
appellant did not encourage Watkins to shoot or otherwise
actively participate in the murder; given Watkins’s conduct
during the previous robberies, appellant could not have
anticipated that Watkins would shoot anyone when the men
attempted to rob Shield; and “the only thing [appellant] did . . .
was leave the scene, get in the driver’s seat, and drive away” with
his cousin in the car.
The superior court denied the petition. It rejected the
People’s argument that appellant could be convicted of the
murder under a theory of direct aiding and abetting, but
analyzing the evidence under Banks and Clark, the court found
appellant guilty of felony murder under current law. In so ruling,
the court emphasized appellant’s role in supplying the weapon
used to kill Shield, Watkins’s use of this very large, loaded gun to
threaten the victims in each of the robberies, appellant’s failure
to do anything in the aftermath of the shooting but help Watkins
to escape, and appellant’s commission of yet another robbery
using the same loaded firearm immediately after the murder. On
the strength of this evidence, the court declared, “[A]pplying the
Banks and Clark analysis, it was clear[] that [appellant] was a
major participant, [and] acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” Finding appellant ineligible for relief under section
1172.6, the superior court denied appellant’s petition for
resentencing.
This court affirmed the superior court’s order denying the
section 1172.6 petition. (People v. Martin, supra, B327394.) In
August 2024, the Supreme Court granted a petition for review
7
and later transferred the case with directions for us to vacate our
prior opinion and reconsider the cause in light of Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th 867.
DISCUSSION
Throughout these appellate proceedings, appellant has not
challenged the superior court’s finding that he was a major
participant in the attempted robbery and murder of Shield.
Instead, appellant asserts that there is no substantial evidence
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. We
previously rejected this argument, as well as a related claim that
any failure on the part of the superior court to consider
appellant’s youth constituted reversible error. (People v. Martin,
supra, B327394.)
Pursuant to Supreme Court direction, in light of Emanuel
we reconsider our prior conclusion that substantial evidence
supports the determination that appellant acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Appellant argues in his supplemental
briefing that the Emanuel decision weighs against the superior
court ruling. In particular, appellant asserts that the record does
not establish that he consciously disregarded the significant risk
of death his actions created, that his part in planning the armed
robberies did not show reckless indifference to human life, and
that his failure to restrain Watkins or aid the murder victim was
insufficient to prove reckless indifference to human life.
Considering all relevant factors, and examining the totality
of the evidence, we affirm the superior court order.
A. Prevailing Law
1. Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 was
enacted by the Legislature “ ‘to amend the felony murder rule
8
and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates
to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) In addition to substantively amending
sections 188 and 189 of the Penal Code, Senate Bill [No.] 1437
added section [1172.6], which provides a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 959.) Specifically with regard to felony-murder liability,
Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 189, subdivision (e) to add
the requirement that a defendant who was not the actual killer or
a direct aider and abettor with the intent to kill must have been a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 707–708.)
Once a defendant convicted of murder under the old law
has filed a facially sufficient resentencing petition under section
1172.6, the superior court must determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, and, if so,
the court issues an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c);
People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869 (Wilson); People v.
Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 469–470.)
The superior court then conducts an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing, the superior court sits as the trier
of fact, and the burden of proof rests with the prosecution “ ‘to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder’ under the law as amended by
9
Senate Bill [No.] 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)).” (Wilson, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 869.) “[T]he court may consider evidence previously
admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under
current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence,
and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “In
addition to evidence admitted in the petitioner’s prior trial, both
‘[t]he prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or
additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.’ ([§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3)].) ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and
the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.’
(Ibid.)” (Wilson, at p. 869; People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1065–1066 (Hill).)
2. Banks and Clark
Consistent with Senate Bill No. 1437, a person convicted of
first degree murder on the theory that he aided and abetted an
enumerated felony that resulted in death and who was not the
actual killer may only be sentenced to life without the possibility
of parole if he either acted with the intent to kill (§ 190.2, subd.
(c)), or if he was “a major participant” and acted “with reckless
indifference to human life” (§ 190.2, subd. (d)). These elements
were designed to codify the holdings of Tison v. Arizona (1987)
481 U.S. 137 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127] (Tison) and
Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [102 S.Ct. 3368, 73
L.Ed.2d 1140] (Enmund). (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.)
Banks explained that Tison and Enmund “collectively place
conduct on a spectrum” (Banks at p. 794), and that the
defendant’s “personal role in the crimes leading to the victim’s
death” must be examined (id. at p. 801).
10
In Banks, our Supreme Court identified several factors to
consider when a court determines whether a defendant was a
major participant “ ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death.’ ” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) With
respect to the requirement of reckless indifference to human life,
the defendant must have “ ‘subjectively appreciated’ ” that his
acts “ ‘were likely to result in the taking of innocent life.’ ”
(Banks, at pp. 801–802, quoting Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 152.)
A year after Banks, the high court in Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pages 614–623, provided further guidance for
determining whether a defendant acted with reckless disregard
for human life. Clark explained that the required mental state
“encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing)
to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Id.
at p. 617.) According to Clark, reckless indifference has “both
subjective and objective elements.” (Ibid.) “The subjective
element is the defendant’s conscious disregard of risks known to
him or her.” (Ibid.) With respect to the objective element, “ ‘[t]he
risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor’s situation.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Model Pen. Code, § 2.02,
subd. (2)(c); see also In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins).)
The specific factors referenced in Clark as relevant to the
determination of whether a defendant acted with reckless
disregard for human life are: (1) the defendant’s awareness that
a weapon would be used and his personal use of a weapon; (2) the
11
defendant’s “[p]roximity to the murder and the events leading up
to it”; (3) the duration of the crime and any restraint of the
victims; (4) whether the defendant had “advance notice” that an
associate was likely to kill; and (5) whether the defendant
“engaged in efforts to minimize the risk of violence in the felony.”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623; see also Hill, supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1074–1075.) In both Banks and Clark, our
Supreme Court emphasized that “ ‘[n]o one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.’ ” (Clark, at p. 618, quoting Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 803.)
3. Emanuel
In Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pages 881–885, our
Supreme Court applied the Banks and Clark standards and
considered Senate Bill No. 1437’s statutory amendments in
reviewing a resentencing petition filed under section 1172.6.
After conducting a “ ‘fact-intensive, individualized inquiry’ ”
(Emanuel, at p. 883) of a failed daytime robbery resulting in the
victim’s death, the court concluded that a finding that the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life was not
supported by substantial evidence, and accordingly directed that
the defendant’s murder conviction be vacated. (Id. at pp. 875,
883, 896.)
Although Emanuel in large part reiterated prevailing law,
it also provided further instruction on the analysis required for
review of a section 1172.6 petition, specifically as to the reckless
indifference prong. The court observed that “ ‘[t]he degree of risk
to human life is crucial to the analysis.’ ” (Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 884.) “ ‘ “Awareness of no more than the foreseeable
risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to
12
establish reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly
creating a ‘grave risk of death’ ” satisfies the statutory
requirement.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, participating in a typical armed
robbery—where reckless indifference is shown only by a
coparticipant’s use of a gun—is not enough. (Ibid.)
Emanuel applied the “ ‘nonexhaustive list of
considerations’ ” set out in Clark for “distinguishing those who
knowingly engage in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death from other felony perpetrators,” noting that “ ‘ “[n]o
one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient,” ’ ” and that “[t]he ‘totality of the
circumstances’ must be analyzed to determine whether the
defendant acted with reckless indifference.” (Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at pp. 884–885.)
Consistent with prevailing law, Emanuel applied the
applicable principles to the facts of the case, reviewing the denial
of the defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for substantial
evidence. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.) As is standard,
the court reviewed the record “ ‘ “ ‘ “in the light most favorable to
the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact” ’ ” ’ could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] acted with
reckless indifference.” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
In keeping with Emanuel, we review the denial of
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition for substantial evidence,
considering the facts relevant to the reckless indifference
determination as counseled by Banks, Clark, and Emanuel.
Based on the totality of the circumstances and applying the
13
relevant factors, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the superior court’s conclusion that appellant acted with reckless
indifference to human life as a major participant in the
attempted robbery of Shield.
1. Use of or awareness of the presence of weapons
and knowledge of cohort’s likelihood of killing
There is no question that appellant was aware of the
presence of the weapon and knew that it would be used to commit
armed robberies. Indeed, as the superior court found, appellant
set the whole criminal enterprise in motion by supplying the
weapon that was used in all four of the robberies as well as the
attempted robbery which resulted in Shield’s murder. The
weapon was a big “scary” gun that “looked like an Uzi.” It had a
magazine containing at least 17 live rounds, and the court
reasonably inferred that appellant knew the gun was loaded.
Both men handled the gun prior to the murder, passing it back
and forth between them. The evidence clearly shows that, after
appellant came up with a “proper gun” that he and Watkins could
use to “jack some people,” they jointly planned to use the gun to
commit robberies.
There is a significant overlap between being a major
participant and acting with reckless indifference to human life.
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 [“ ‘the greater the defendant’s
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life’ ”].) Appellant did not
only know that a gun would be used in the robberies. He
supplied the gun and intended for it to be used, as planned with
Watkins. These facts contrast sharply with Emanuel, where
there was “ ‘no evidence in the record demonstrating that, prior
to the robbery, Emanuel knew [the killer] possessed a gun, would
14
bring that gun to the robbery, or “was likely to use lethal
force.” ’ ” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.)
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the conclusion
that appellant was aware of the likelihood that Watkins was
willing to use the gun to kill. During the first robbery, Watkins
used the gun to strike Orosco on the temple, without any
provocation, and before Orosco had even spotted him. Watkins
then continued to point the gun at Orosco. Shortly afterward,
Watkins pointed the still-loaded gun directly at Muhammed as
they robbed him. It can reasonably be inferred that, after
appellant witnessed and participated in these violent and
dangerous incidents, he was aware that continuing on a course of
armed robberies was likely to result in escalation to the point of
shooting and killing, particularly if the victim offered any
resistance.
Appellant’s conduct following the attempted robbery and
murder of Shield provides additional support for the superior
court’s ruling. “[A] defendant’s conduct following the use of lethal
force may be reflective of his or her mental state during the
offense.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 893.) After Shield
was shot, appellant did not abort the plan to commit a series of
armed robberies. Instead, he drove around until the pair
identified their next victim. Appellant may have personally held
the still-loaded gun in the robbery of Lee. At a minimum, he
helped devise a plan to use the gun to rob Lee and was an active
participant in the encounter. Appellant’s actions do not reflect
the mental state of a person surprised by the fact that the
robbery of Shield had resulted in a shooting and probable death.
Rather, appellant’s conduct demonstrates that he was willing to
accept murder as an acceptable and foreseeable cost of the armed
15
robbery spree he had set in motion, reflecting a reckless
indifference to human life.
2. Duration of the crime
The attempted robbery of Shield was relatively short in
duration. After appellant and Watkins popped the hood of the
truck and pretended to look inside at the engine, Watkins lured
Shield over by waving at him. Shield stood with the two for
about a minute before hurrying away. Watkins shot Shield
shortly thereafter, just before appellant sped away.
The brief duration of this attempted robbery, however, does
not weigh strongly in appellant’s favor. Shield was shot out of
fear that he was going to call the police. (See People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 594 (Mitchell) [duration of
the crime was brief, not because the defendant showed
compassion or regard for the victim, but because the frightened
victim tried to flee].)
Moreover, the attempted robbery of Shield must be
considered in the context of the hours-long crime spree.
Appellant had ample time to seek to minimize violence prior to
the encounter with Shield. He failed to do so, and after the
Shield murder, appellant once more participated in a potentially
lethal robbery.
3. Efforts taken to minimize the risk of violence
In Emanuel, the court noted that the subject robbery was
planned to occur at 2:30 p.m., in a public park, where witnesses
were likely to be present. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 887.)
The defendant was unaware that his confederate would be
carrying a gun. (Id. at pp. 885, 887.) These facts were relevant
to the determination of whether the defendant made efforts at
the planning stage to minimize the risk of violence. (Id. at pp.
16
887–888.) Similarly, in Scoggins, the subject confrontation took
place in a public parking lot during the daytime, and the
defendant did not intend that weapons be used. (Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 683.) And in Clark the defendant planned that a
robbery would take place after business hours, with few
employees present, and involve only one unloaded gun. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621–622.)
In contrast, appellant actively sought out locations that he
and Watkins believed would provide a good opportunity to rob
someone. They specifically chose the Holiday Inn for this
purpose. It was still dark outside when appellant pulled into the
Holiday Inn parking lot. Shield and his family were the only
people present. Moreover, appellant certainly knew that the
attempted robbery would involve a loaded gun, as he procured
the weapon and passed it back and forth with Watkins
throughout their crime spree. Appellant actively participated in
each robbery, and joined in the deception which drew Shield to
the truck to facilitate robbing him.
Appellant had opportunities throughout the series of
crimes to minimize the risk of violence but did not do so. He
jointly planned to use the “proper gun” to “jack some people.” He
did not unload the gun, warn Watkins that it was loaded, or
caution Watkins not to shoot anyone. Instead, appellant’s
planning reflected the mindset of a person fully contemplating
the possibility that the gun would be used to shoot a victim, and
the record does not indicate that he did anything to minimize this
possibility.
17
4. Physical presence at the scene and opportunity
to restrain confederates or aid victims
Appellant was physically present and actively participated
in the attempted robbery that resulted in the fatal shooting of
Shield. Appellant hurried with Watkins to the front of the truck
and opened the hood to make it appear that they had engine
trouble. Watkins waved to Shield, drawing Shield over to the
truck and away from his family. As soon as Shield began to rush
back toward his family, appellant and Watkins closed the hood
and hurried to get back into the truck, fearing that Shield was
going to call the police. With the passenger door still open, one
foot hanging outside the vehicle, and facing outward, Watkins
fired the gun at Shield, who was only about four or five steps
away. The truck then immediately took off, tires screeching, with
appellant at the wheel. The passenger door closed as the truck
started to peel away.
This attempted robbery and shooting of Shield was, as
noted, just one in a continuing series of violent felonies
committed by appellant and Watkins. “ ‘Proximity to the murder
and the events leading up to it may be particularly significant
where . . . the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of
several intermediate steps, or where the [co]participant who
personally commits the murder exhibits behavior tending to
suggest a willingness to use lethal force. In such cases, “the
defendant’s presence allows him to observe his cohorts so that it
is fair to conclude that he shared in their actions and mental
state. . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives him an
opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous
cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a restraining influence,
then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting
18
murders.” ’ ” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 889, quoting
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.)
In contrast to Emanuel, where the defendant “attempted to
act as a restraining influence,” “saying ‘let’s go,’ ” and began
walking away from the robbery (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 91), appellant facilitated the attempted robbery that led to
Shield’s death. It is true that, based on the evidence, appellant
likely could not have physically interceded at the exact moment
Watkins took aim and fired at Shield. (See Emanuel, at p. 892
[“failure to restrain a cohort” “cannot be said to weigh in favor of
a finding of reckless indifference without some evidence in the
record indicating that the defendant had a meaningful
opportunity to do so”].) Unlike in Emanuel, however, appellant
had plenty of forewarning that his cohort was willing to use the
loaded gun in a violent manner, and he had abundant
opportunity prior to the shooting to prevent that from happening.
Watkins did not fire the gun in a sudden burst of anger or in the
midst of a physical confrontation, but instead shot Shield as he
attempted to walk away, just as he had struck Orosco in the
temple without provocation.
As counseled by Emanuel, appellant’s act of fleeing
following the shooting and his failure to render aid to Shield does
not, in itself, lead to the conclusion that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (See Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
894 [circumstances of the defendant’s flight made it difficult to
determine frame of mind concerning the victim’s death].) But,
unlike in Emanuel, where “it could be inferred that [the
defendant] was motivated to flee the scene as quickly as possible”
only for the purpose of evading arrest (ibid.), the evidence in this
case showed that appellant wished not only to avoid arrest, but
19
also to hurry on to his next armed robbery. (See ibid. [“postflight
conduct may shed light on a defendant’s state of mind”].)
Appellant asserts that the evidence provides no indication
that he knew Watkins would shoot at Shield, relying on
Watkins’s trial testimony that, immediately after the shooting,
appellant said, “What the fuck you doing?” and Watkins
responded that he shot Shield by accident. Watkins’s testimony
regarding the events surrounding the shooting of Shield,
however, can at most be accorded minimal weight, since the
testimony was effectively rejected by the jury. In addition to the
testimony relied on by appellant, Watkins also testified that he
and appellant never intended or attempted to rob Shield, that he
angrily told Shield that they did not want his help which caused
Shield to hurry away, and that he accidentally shot Shield only
because he used the same hand he was holding the gun with to
close the truck door. Despite these claims, the jury found
appellant and Watkins guilty of the first degree murder and
attempted robbery of Shield, and found true the allegation that
the murder of Shield occurred while appellant and Watkins were
engaged in the commission of armed robbery. It is clear from the
jury’s verdict that it found Watkins’s testimony not credible, and
there is no basis for us to accord the testimony greater weight
now.
5. Appellant’s youth
Appellant was 18 years old when he committed the string
of robberies that resulted in the murder in this case. In his
initial briefing in this appeal, appellant argued that the superior
court erred in failing to consider his “cognitive development and
the hallmark features of youth” in determining whether he acted
with reckless indifference to human life. Appellant repeats this
20
argument, in truncated form, in his supplemental brief. We
previously concluded that the superior court’s possible failure to
consider appellant’s youth at the time of the offense did not
require remand. Emanuel does not compel us to find otherwise.
A number of appellate courts have considered whether and
to what extent a defendant’s relative youth—which various
statutes refer to as being under the age of 26 (§§ 3051, subd.
(a)(1), 4801, subd. (c))—is relevant to assessing whether a
defendant has satisfied the subjective component of the reckless
indifference test. These courts have reached the general
consensus that the defendant’s age at the time of the offense is an
additional factor a court may consider in determining whether
the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.
(See, e.g., People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960
(Harris); In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 439 (Moore);
People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 990–991 (Ramirez);
Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 595; In re Harper (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 450, 468–470 (Harper); People v. Keel (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 546, 558–559 (Keel); People v. Jones (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1076, 1091–1093 (Jones); People v. Oliver (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 466, 488–489 (Oliver); People v. Pittman (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 400, 416–418 (Pittman).)
In Emanuel, the defendant argued that his youth at the
time of the offense was a relevant factor in assessing whether he
acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 885, fn. 6.) The Supreme Court declined to
address this claim on the basis that the defendant failed to make
this argument to the lower courts, and because it concluded that
the evidence was otherwise insufficient to support a finding of
reckless indifference to human life. (Ibid.)
21
Appellant likewise failed to raise this claim in the superior
court, despite relative youth being a widely recognized factor by
the time of the November 4, 2022 evidentiary hearing on
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition. Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th
939, the first case on this issue, was decided on February 16,
2021, nearly two years before the hearing in this case. After
Harris, at least five other cases—all decided before November
2022—held that youth is a relevant factor in the reckless
indifference analysis: Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 434 (decided
Aug. 31, 2021), Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 970 (decided
Nov. 23, 2021), Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 575 (decided
July 22, 2022), Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 450 (decided
Mar. 17, 2022), and Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 546 (decided
Oct. 21, 2022).
The hearing in this case occurred well after numerous
opinions held that a defendant’s youth should be considered as
part of the reckless indifference inquiry. In general, we presume
the superior court knew and applied the relevant law in
exercising its duties. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983,
1042 [“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial
court knew the law and followed it”].) Substantial evidence
supports the implied finding that appellant’s youth did not
override the strong evidence demonstrating appellant’s reckless
indifference to human life.
But even if the superior court did not consider the factor of
youth in its reckless indifference analysis, we find any error
harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.
(Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489, fn. 8 [applying Watson
harmless error analysis]; Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp.
417–418 [same].) There is no evidence in the trial record that
22
suggests appellant lacked the maturity to act with reckless
indifference to human life. To the contrary, the evidence showed
appellant to be a mature young man, who was married and had
loving relationships with his wife and stepson, and who was
described as a “[v]ery good worker.”
Significantly, appellant’s conduct prior to and during the
crime spree did not demonstrate an immaturity that would
suggest he was incapable or hindered in his capacity to consider
the consequences of his actions. As the court in Oliver explained,
“[T]he case law discussing the differences in brain development
among youthful offenders (in contrast to their adult counterparts)
stress two areas of divergence: (1) their relative impulsivity; and
(2) their vulnerability to peer pressure.” (Oliver, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) Here, there is nothing to indicate
appellant’s participation in this crime spree was due to peer
pressure, nor did the evidence suggest he behaved “like an
immature, naïve, or impulsive adolescent.” (Harper, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 472.) As explained, appellant was an equal
participant in the calculated plan to scour the area for easy
victims and rob them of their money using the loaded weapon
supplied by appellant himself. Nothing in the plan or its
execution reflected the impulsiveness or pliability of youth.
While “[y]outh can distort risk calculations,” we also
recognize that “[t]he fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other
factors.” (Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.) As set forth
above, the factor of appellant’s youth was outweighed by other
factors demonstrating his reckless indifference to human life.
Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the superior court’s
possible failure to consider appellant’s youth was harmless.
23
6. Totality of the circumstances
Considering each of the above factors, and weighing the
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the superior court
did not err in finding that appellant acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The attempted robbery of Shield, part
of an extended crime spree using the loaded gun supplied by
appellant—which was wielded to threaten, harm, or kill in the
numerous confrontations on the day of the murder—presented
risks greater than those “ ‘inherent in any armed robbery.’ ”
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 896.) Moreover, after Shield
was shot and killed, appellant simply continued on to the next
armed robbery, reflecting a state of mind motivated only by the
desire to commit robbery and an acceptance that murder could
likely result.
In sum, considering the totality of the circumstances,
substantial evidence supports the conclusion that appellant
“ ‘ “knowingly creat[ed] a ‘ “grave risk of death.” ’ ” ’ ” (Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
24
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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