People v. Espino CA4/2

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Filed 4/9/26 P. v. Espino CA4/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083132

v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1801390)

MIGUEL ANGEL ESPINO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Francisco Navarro,

Judge. Affirmed.

Benjamin Kington, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers and Adrian R.

Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Miguel Angel Espino of attempted premeditated murder,

aggravated mayhem, and arson. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 205, 451, subd. (b), 664; unlabeled

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statutory citations refer to this code.) The victim of the offenses was Espino’s father,

A.E. (Father). Espino argues that (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on

the “heat of passion” theory of attempted voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and

(2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request an instruction on

voluntary intoxication. He also argues that the court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry

into defense counsel’s motion for new trial based on counsel’s own ineffectiveness.

Espino asserts that we must remand for the court to conduct a further inquiry into the

claim of ineffective assistance. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Trial evidence

Espino lived in a trailer with Father in August 2018. Espino’s mother had moved

out of the trailer three or four months earlier. She found it difficult to live there and “was

in a lot of fear.” Father was an alcoholic and “would bring a lot of people to the house,”

and Espino used drugs and often argued with Father. Father verbally abused and insulted

Espino, and he also threw “whatever he could find” at Espino.

One morning, a neighbor saw Espino and Father arguing and yelling at each other

in the street. Espino’s brother spoke to Father on the phone that evening, and Father said

that Espino was outside barbecuing. Roughly 30 minutes later, at around 7:00 p.m.,

Espino’s friend arrived at the trailer and smelled smoke. She opened the door and saw

smoke coming from the area where the bedrooms were. The friend ran towards the

smoke and found Father lying on the floor in the hallway. Father had blood on his head,

and there were flames near his head and shoulder. The friend smelled burning flesh. She

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talked to Father to try to keep him conscious, but Father did not respond. The friend

grabbed the garden hose from outside, tried to extinguish the fire, and told a neighbor to

call 911.

Father was taken to the hospital, where he was treated for his injuries. He had

multiple lacerations on his head, and he suffered a “near complete amputation of the right

external ear.” The ear was “severely injured” and “appear[ed] similar to minced meat.”

Father also had a burn wound on his right shoulder, an incised wound on his arm, and

wounds on his fingers, including near “traumatic amputations” of fingers. The wounds

on Father’s fingers appeared to be defensive. His head wounds were consistent with

being hit with the claw end of a hammer.

In the trailer, officers found a hammer and a five-pound rock in the kitchen, and

there was blood on both objects. The DNA profile of the blood on the hammer and the

rock matched Father, and Espino was excluded as the source of the DNA.

A fire investigator found a partially burned pile of paper, wood, and fabrics in the

hallway of the trailer. There was also a bottle of rubbing alcohol, or isopropyl alcohol, in

the same area of the hallway and burned matches in the kitchen. Isopropyl alcohol is an

ignitable liquid and a fire accelerant. The fire investigator used a combustible gas

detector to determine whether there were any vapors in the air from an ignitable liquid.

The device alerted to the presence of such vapors in the 12 inches around the bottle of

isopropyl alcohol. An officer collected Father’s clothing from the hospital, and the fire

investigator also tested Father’s clothing with the combustible gas detector; the device

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alerted on the clothing. The investigator opined that the trailer fire originated in the area

of the isopropyl alcohol and that it was “an incendiary-caused fire.”

Espino approached the trailer at roughly 1:45 a.m. and was detained by officers

investigating the crime scene. Espino did not have any injuries except a small cut on his

forehead. Officers interviewed Espino twice. The first interview was at 3:30 a.m.,

shortly after his arrest. Espino was evasive and appeared confused. He said that he had

not seen Father for two days and denied doing anything to Father. The officers did not

mention a hammer or a rock during that interview.

Later that day, at 12:30 p.m., Espino left a voicemail for his mother asking about

Father and stating: “I want to know if he’s still alive and well—you already know how it

went, how things are and he wanted well—he wanted to he wanted to kill me well I

panicked and, well—and, well, you know, mom. I got there, well—these things happen,

but I don’t know why the fuck he wanted to kill me, well, why did he take the fucking

knife out and he did he did it like that and, well—I didn’t think at the time. And, well, he

grabbed the stone, he wanted to throw it at me, so then I threw it back and then he

grabbed the hammer (unintelligible) back and, well. But I—I didn’t do it on purpose

with bad intentions, mom. I did it to protect myself too.”

In a recorded jailhouse call several hours later, Espino told his mother that Father

tried to kill him. Espino asked, “Does he know it was me?” His mother said that Espino

was the only suspect. Espino also asked if “[e]verything go[t] burned,” and his mother

replied that only part of the trailer burned. She told him that Father had burn injuries, and

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Espino asked how bad those injuries were. She replied, “Well, don’t you know what you

did to him?” He responded, “No, well I wasn’t there.”

The next day, officers interviewed Espino for the second time. Espino said that he

found Father on the floor of the trailer “bleeding to death,” but he left once the

firefighters arrived. He did not want to be blamed “for something [he] didn’t do,” and he

did not know why someone would have started the fire. He said that he was mad and left

to search for the perpetrator.

Espino’s uncle described the relationship between Espino and Father as “toxic.”

Roughly two months before the fire, the uncle witnessed a fight between Espino and

Father. Father was screaming at Espino, and Espino was pulling and pushing Father.

Espino was “being a little bit aggressive.” Father screamed for help, so the uncle called

the police. The uncle had heard Father call Espino insulting names on five to eight

occasions, and Espino would call Father names in return.

Espino’s mother obtained a temporary restraining order against Espino in May or

June 2018, a few months before the charged incident. In the request for the restraining

order, Espino’s mother stated that Espino threatened her, attacked her husband, destroyed

her house, and threatened to destroy other property. The order identified both her and

Father as protected partes.

One of Espino’s neighbors told an investigator that on a prior occasion, she had

seen Espino break the trailer windows with his hands. Another neighbor told an

investigator that during a prior fight with Father, Espino dragged a mattress out of the

trailer and tried to light it on fire.

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Espino testified in his own defense. Father often picked fights with Espino and

often “talk[ed] shit” to him. Espino felt angry and upset when Father insulted him. It

would “get [his] blood boiling” and make him “lose [his] mind.”

Espino was using multiple drugs in the month or so before the charged incident,

including PCP, methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl. On the day of the charged

incident, he and Father were preparing to barbecue. Espino smoked some PCP with

marijuana and then went to grab the food that they were going to cook. He did not close

the refrigerator door securely, and the door hit Father in the back of the head. Father

thought that Espino had done it on purpose, got mad, and “started losing it.” Father hit

Espino with “anything he [could] grab.” Espino explained: “And from that point on, I

just started seeing a blur. I started hitting stuff because I was having trouble hearing the

devil in my mind and a bunch of demons were, like, having control of me at the time, and

kind of still do when I go to sleep at night.” Father pulled a knife at some point and gave

Espino a small cut on his forehead. That small cut was the only injury that Father

inflicted. Espino was “delusional” and thought he saw Father as “the devil.” Espino

“literally thought [Father] would try to kill” him because Espino “was drugged out of

[his] mind.” He did not remember lighting the fire, and he does not know how the fire

happened. He also did not remember hitting Father on the head with the hammer or the

stone. He did not “know how this happened”; he just knew that he “was being attacked.”

Father probably called him names, but he could not recall anything specific that Father

said.

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When the officers first interviewed Espino, he did not remember attacking Father.

He did not recall his first interview with the officers because he was “high” at the time,

nor could he recall his second interview. He also did not remember his voicemail to his

mother or the jailhouse call with her. He started to remember the incident with Father

about one year after it happened.

Espino’s two sisters also testified in his defense. According to them, Father was

verbally abusive. Father called Espino a “worthless piece of shit,” criticized him for not

working, and told him that he would never amount to anything. Father also kicked

Espino in the legs twice, and he threw a can of beer at Espino. On several occasions,

Father pointed a pocket knife at Espino and said, “[T]his is what you’re going to get if

you don’t get your shit together.” The sisters were not present during the charged

incident.

II. Verdict and sentence

The jury found Espino guilty of attempted premeditated murder, aggravated

mayhem, and arson of an inhabited structure. (§§ 187, 205, 451, subd. (b), 664.) In

connection with the attempted murder count, the jury found that Espino personally

inflicted great bodily injury on Father. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) In connection with the

attempted murder and aggravated mayhem counts, the jury found that Espino personally

used a deadly weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) And in connection with the arson count,

the jury found that Espino used an accelerant. (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(5).) The court

sentenced Espino to a 10-year determinate term in prison plus another seven years to life.

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DISCUSSION

I. Instruction on “heat of passion” voluntary manslaughter

Espino argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his request to

instruct the jury on the heat of passion theory of attempted voluntary manslaughter. We

agree that the court erred by failing to give the requested instruction, but the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A. Additional background

Espino asked the court to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 603, “Attempted

Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense.” He also requested

that the court give CALCRIM No. 604, which instructs jurors on the imperfect self-

defense theory of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The court denied the request to give

the heat of passion instruction, ruling: “So specifically, I think the big distinction

between self-defense and the heat of passion instruction is whether there was some

evidence that provoked the defendant. That’s different than having to protect himself or

others. [¶] And that’s what I’m struggling with. I’ve heard no evidence from the

defense as to what the specific facts are that would allow—that would justify this

provocation instruction being given. I think many of the arguments that you’re making,

[defense counsel], you can still make under—we’ll get to this in a second, but you can

still make this under a theory of self-defense. [¶] But at this point regarding any

evidence of provocation, any evidence that there was some sudden quarrel that inflamed

the defendant’s passion that explains his conduct, I’m just not seeing it.”

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The court concluded that there was some evidence to support the imperfect self-

defense instruction, because there was some evidence that there was a physical

altercation and that Father “came at [Espino] with a knife.” The court therefore

instructed the jurors on imperfect self-defense and lawful self-defense (CALCRIM No.

3470).

B. Error

“Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder.” (People v. Beltran (2013)

56 Cal.4th 935, 942 (Beltran).) The “trial court must instruct on a lesser included offense

if substantial evidence exists indicating that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser

offense.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 584 (Manriquez).) “‘Substantial

evidence’ in this context is ‘“evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable

[persons] could . . . conclude[]”’ that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was

committed.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 (Breverman),

disapproved on another ground by People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7

(Schuller).) “In deciding whether evidence is ‘substantial’ in this context, a court

determines only its bare legal sufficiency, not its weight” (Breverman, at p. 177) and thus

does “not evaluate the credibility of witnesses” (id. at p. 162). We independently review

whether the trial court should have instructed on a lesser included offense. (Manriquez,

at p. 584.)

One type of voluntary manslaughter is “a killing without malice ‘upon a sudden

quarrel or heat of passion.’” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 947, quoting § 192, subd.

(a).) “Heat of passion is a mental state that precludes the formation of malice and

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reduces an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter. Heat of passion arises if, ‘“at

the time of the killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to

such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to

act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, and from such passion rather than from

judgment.”’ [Citation.] Heat of passion, then, is a state of mind caused by legally

sufficient provocation that causes a person to act, not out of rational thought but out of

unconsidered reaction to the provocation.” (Beltran, at p. 942, footnote omitted.)

“The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal.” (Manriquez,

supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 583.) In addition, the “passion aroused need not be anger or rage,

but can be any ‘“‘[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion’”’ [citation]

other than” a desire for revenge. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163.) Fear or panic

may be the emotion that causes a person to act in the heat of passion. (People v.

Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163, 180 (Dominguez).)

Another theory of voluntary manslaughter is “a killing in the actual but

unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense,” or “imperfect self-defense.” (Beltran,

supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 951.) Imperfect self-defense “‘obviates malice because that most

culpable of mental states “cannot coexist” with an actual belief that the lethal act was

necessary to avoid one’s own death or serious injury at the victim’s hand.’ [Citation.] A

killing in imperfect self-defense constitutes, by definition, unreasonable conduct because

the belief in the need to defend is not reasonable. The killing is nevertheless mitigated

because of the defendant’s misguided but good faith belief. Thus, the societal

recognition of mitigation is the same. In both heat of passion and imperfect self-defense

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scenarios, the killer who acts unreasonably commits a crime. Yet the degree of

culpability is reduced from murder to manslaughter. Adequate provocation or an

unreasonable but good faith belief in the need to defend operates on the killer’s mental

state to prevent the formation of malice.” (Ibid.)

The two theories of voluntary manslaughter—imperfect self-defense and heat of

passion—have significant differences. “For example, a defendant’s cool calculation to

use deadly force in the face of a threat will defeat a heat-of-passion voluntary

manslaughter theory.” (Dominguez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 181.) But the two

theories “are not mutually exclusive” and “are closely related.” (Id. at pp. 180-181.)

“The victim’s conduct that justifies the use of some force in self-defense will often be the

reasonable provocation that causes a defendant to lose self-control in the heat of passion.”

(Id. at p. 181.) Thus, “[i]f there is substantial evidence that the defendant killed with a

good faith but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense, and also that the

defendant killed because his reason was obscured by passion in response to the victim’s

objectively provocative conduct, the trial court should instruct on voluntary manslaughter

under both unreasonable self-defense and heat of passion theories.” (Ibid.)

The record contains substantial evidence from which reasonable jurors could find

that Espino attempted to kill Father in the heat of passion, so the court erred by denying

the request to instruct on the theory. According to Espino’s testimony, Father got mad

because he thought that Espino intentionally hit him with the refrigerator door. Father

“los[t] it” and hit Espino with “anything he [could] grab,” and he also pulled a knife and

gave Espino a small cut on the forehead. Espino “started seeing a blur” and “started

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hitting stuff.” In his voicemail to his mother, Espino said that Father wanted to kill him,

and Espino panicked. He said that Father wielded a knife, a stone, and a hammer, and

Espino acted to protect himself. On the basis of the foregoing evidence, reasonable jurors

could conclude that Espino’s “reason was obscured by [panic or fear] to such an extent as

would cause an ordinarily reasonable person to act rashly and without reflection.”

(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 202; see Dominguez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at

p. 175 [“a defendant’s ‘immediate fear and panic’ can, in an appropriate case, provide

evidence from which ‘a reasonable jury could infer that defendant was aroused to

passion, and his reason was thus obscured’”]; In re Hampton (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 463,

480-481 [in addition to lawful self-defense and imperfect self-defense instructions, heat

of passion instruction was supported by evidence of a struggle between the defendant and

the murder victim in which the victim appeared to reach for a gun].)

C. Harmlessness

Nevertheless, the failure to instruct on the heat of passion theory of voluntary

manslaughter was harmless. If heat of passion is at issue, then the malice element of

murder requires the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not

done in the heat of passion. (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 462; see Schuller,

supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 243 [“When imperfect self-defense is at issue, the malice element

of murder requires the People to show the absence of that circumstance beyond a

reasonable doubt”].) “Thus, when there is substantial evidence to support the theory, the

failure to instruct on [heat of passion] amounts to an incomplete instruction on an actual

element of murder, namely malice.” (Schuller, at pp. 243-244.) That form of

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misinstruction qualifies as federal constitutional error subject to the harmless “‘beyond a

reasonable doubt’ standard for evaluating prejudice” under Chapman v. California (1967)

386 U.S. 18 (Chapman). (Schuller, at p. 260.)

In this context, the Chapman standard “compels the reviewing court to reverse the

conviction unless it concludes that no ‘rational juror who made the findings reflected in

the verdict and heard the evidence at trial could have had reasonable doubt regarding the

findings necessary to convict the defendant [absent the instructional error].’” (Schuller,

supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 244.) We reach that conclusion in this case: No rational juror

who heard the evidence and made the findings reflected in the verdict could have had

reasonable doubt that Espino was not acting in the heat of passion. In particular, the

jury’s finding that Espino committed attempted murder with premeditation and

deliberation shows that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

As relevant here, the instruction on the heat of passion theory of voluntary

manslaughter states that the defendant attempted to kill someone in the heat of passion if

the “attempted killing was a rash act done under the influence of intense emotion.”

(CALCRIM No. 603.) The instruction also states that the People have the burden of

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in the heat of

passion. (Ibid.)

The court instructed the jury on premeditation and deliberation pursuant to

CACLRIM No. 601. The court thus informed the jurors: “The defendant deliberated if

he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the

consequences, decided to kill. [¶] The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided

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to kill before completing the acts of attempted murder.” The court further instructed the

jury: “A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration of the

choice or its consequences is not deliberate and premeditated.” And the court instructed

the jurors that the People had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

Espino attempted to kill with premeditation and deliberation.

In closing argument, the People summarized the evidence showing that Espino hit

Father in the head with the hammer multiple times, hit Father with the five-pound stone,

set a fire next to Father, and left him incapacitated. The People argued that those

circumstances showed that the attempted killing was “not rash and impulsive” but was

“cold, calculated.” The People then argued: “Let’s consider what a rash killing would

look like, right, or a rash attempted murder. Maybe he would have stopped after the

second strike with the hammer or the second strike with the first weapon, right? But

every strike thereafter, he’s thinking about it. He’s willfully choosing to pick up a

weapon, smash his father’s head, pick up another weapon, and start a fire. It was cold

and calculated.”

After hearing all the evidence and argument, the jury found beyond a reasonable

doubt that Espino attempted to kill with premeditation and deliberation. The jurors thus

found beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act “rashly, impulsively, or without

careful consideration.” (CALCRIM No. 601.) No rational juror who found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Espino did not act rashly could have had reasonable doubt that he

did not commit “a rash act.” (CALCRIM No. 603.) The two findings are “manifestly

inconsistent.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 572 (Wharton); Schuller, supra,

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15 Cal.5th at p. 265 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“voluntary manslaughter based on heat of

passion is ‘manifestly inconsistent’ with premeditation and deliberation”].) On this

record, the failure to instruct on the heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Peau (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 823, 830-

831 (Peau) [jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation rendered the failure to

instruct on the heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt]; People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1071-1072 [same];

People v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 891-894 [jury’s finding of premeditation

and deliberation rendered the trial court’s inconsistent instructions on heat of passion

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].)

Espino argues that under People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509 (Berry), we may

find the error prejudicial. “Berry held that the failure to give a requested heat-of-passion

instruction was not rendered harmless just because the defendant was convicted of first

degree murder, explaining, ‘While the instructions made passing reference to heat of

passion and provocation for the purpose of distinguishing between murder of the first and

second degrees, such reference was casually made[,] [and] [t]here was no clear direction

to the jury to consider the evidence of [the victim]’s course of provocatory conduct so as

to determine whether [the] defendant, as an ordinary man of average disposition [citation]

having been exposed to such conduct, was provoked into committing the homicide under

a heat of passion.’” (Peau, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 831, quoting Berry, at p. 518.)

But more recently in Wharton, our Supreme Court held that the trial court’s

erroneous instruction on the heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter was

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rendered harmless by the jury’s finding that the defendant committed murder with

premeditation and deliberation. (Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 572.) The court

reasoned: “This state of mind, involving planning and deliberate action, is manifestly

inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion—even if that state of mind was

achieved after a considerable period of provocatory conduct—and clearly demonstrates

that defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to give his requested instruction.” (Ibid.)

At least two appellate courts have noted the apparent “tension” between Berry and

Wharton, and they decided to follow Wharton. (Peau, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 831;

People v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 892.) Those courts reconciled the two

cases by concluding that Berry’s discussion concerned only “whether the error was

harmless because the jury received some instruction on the concepts of heat of passion

and provocation.” (Peau, at p. 831; Franklin, at p. 894.) Berry did not even mention that

the relevant form of “first degree murder must be willful, deliberate and premeditated.”

(Peau, at p. 831; Franklin, at p. 894.) By contrast, Wharton’s “more recent reasoning”

directly addressed how premeditation and deliberation “‘is manifestly inconsistent’” with

the heat of passion theory, so that case was “on point.” (Peau, at p. 831; Franklin, at

p. 894.) We agree with those courts that Wharton is on point and supports our conclusion

that the error in this case was harmless, and Berry does not foreclose that conclusion.

(Peau, at pp. 831-832; Franklin, at pp. 893-894; but see People v. Ramirez (2010) 189

Cal.App.4th 1483, 1488 [without mentioning Wharton, relying on Berry to conclude that

the failure to instruct “on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter is not rendered

harmless by” a finding of premeditation and deliberation].)

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In sum, the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the heat of passion theory

of attempted voluntary manslaughter, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

II. Ineffective assistance and instruction on voluntary intoxication

Espino argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

request the jury instruction on voluntary intoxication, CALCRIM No. 625. The argument

lacks merit.

A. Additional background

CALCRIM No. 625 states that jurors may consider evidence of the defendant’s

voluntary intoxication only in deciding whether the defendant acted with intent to kill,

premeditation and deliberation, or another specific intent required for the charged

offense. It further states that jurors “may not consider evidence of the defendant’s

voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.” (CALCRIM No. 625.)

At the hearing on jury instructions, defense counsel did not ask the court to

instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication. However, he did ask the court to give

CALCRIM No. 3428, the similar jury instruction regarding mental impairment.

CALCRIM No. 3428 states that jurors may consider evidence that the defendant suffered

from a mental disease, defect, or disorder “for the limited purpose of deciding whether, at

the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the intent or

mental state required for that crime.” The court denied the request, ruling: “[T]here is no

evidence here from anybody that’s qualified to give that evidence that the defendant

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suffered from any mental disease or defect or disorder. There’s been no such evidence of

that, other than what the defendant stated but was stricken from the record.”1

In closing argument, defense counsel argued that Espino did not act with

premeditation and deliberation, given that he did not remember the attack. Counsel

emphasized that in Espino’s mind, he saw the devil and reacted. Counsel also argued that

Espino was “not aware of his conduct at the time he picked up whatever he picked up and

struck his father.” Counsel suggested that “[w]hen you drink a lot,” you do not always

remember what happened. He then argued: “Who had excessive drugs? Miguel Espino

had excessive drugs. Do you know that for a fact? Yes, you do. So what am I asking

you? I’m asking you to believe that as a result of habitual abuse of all the drugs he

mentioned and the blue—I don’t know the name of them. The last one was fentanyl . . . .

Crystal meth. He became (descriptive sound). It affected him. It’s realistic. It’s

believable.”

After the jury returned its verdict, defense counsel made an oral motion for new

trial. Counsel argued in part that he rendered ineffective assistance. He asserted that

after trial, he learned about “a condition called [a] blackout in which the defendant while

he was on the stand said he does not remember.” Counsel suggested that he was

ineffective because he “did not bring any competent witness or experts the way the

1 During direct examination, Espino stated that he was admitted to a mental
institution at some point before the attack on Father. The People objected and moved to
strike that testimony, and the court granted the motion to strike.

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People did,” although he “did try to tell the jurors that quite often they may have

experienced themselves or other people who drink, get drunk, and don’t remember.”2

B. Analysis

“Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or

not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with

murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice

aforethought.” (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) Voluntary intoxication evidence therefore is relevant

only for limited purposes. With respect to imperfect self-defense, evidence of voluntary

intoxication is not admissible “on the question of whether a defendant believed it

necessary to act in self-defense.” (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 970.) “‘If you

voluntarily choose to become intoxicated and then kill someone, you may not claim that

you were so intoxicated you were unaware your victim posed no threat to you when you

killed, although you may claim you were too intoxicated to intend to kill or premeditate

or have the specific intent to commit some other felony.’” (Id. at pp. 978-979.)

“To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, [the defendant] ‘must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’”

(People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165.) “On direct appeal, a finding of

deficient performance is warranted where ‘(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel

had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked

for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory

2 We further discuss the motion for new trial in the following part.

19
explanation.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]here counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for

challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance

of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or

omissions.’” (Ibid.)

Espino fails to establish deficient performance, because there is a conceivable

tactical reason for counsel’s failure to request the instruction on voluntary intoxication.

Besides Espino’s statements, there is no evidence about how the combination of PCP and

marijuana would have affected him during the attack on Father. Espino said that his

intoxication affected him in two ways. First, he could not remember many details of the

attack. That is not relevant to any defense or any issue addressed by a voluntary

intoxication instruction. But second, he thought that Father was trying to kill him

because he was “drugged out of [his] mind.” Similarly, he said that he was delusional

and saw Father as the devil. The jury could have believed that testimony was relevant to

Espino’s self-defense theories—his drug-induced, delusional belief that Father was the

devil and was trying to kill him led him to believe that he had to defend himself. That

would, however, be a legally improper use of Espino’s testimony, and the jury would

have known that if it had been instructed on voluntary intoxication. Again, voluntary

intoxication can be considered only as to the issues of specific intent, premeditation,

deliberation, and express malice. It cannot be considered in determining whether the

defendant believed that self-defense was necessary. Consequently, counsel could have

made the reasonable tactical choice to have the jury remain ignorant of the law on

voluntary intoxication so that the jury might (improperly) consider Espino’s voluntary

20
intoxication testimony in support of his self-defense theories. And the absence of the

instruction did not prevent defense counsel from making any legally sound arguments to

the jury. There was nothing “hinder[ing] defense counsel from arguing that [Espino’s]

intoxication affected all the necessary mental states,” including the required specific

intents and premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009,

1017.)

Espino contends that there was no conceivable tactical reason for requesting the

mental impairment instruction but not the voluntary intoxication instruction. The

argument fails because unlike voluntary intoxication, mental impairment can properly be

considered in determining whether the defendant believed self-defense was necessary. A

defendant may present “evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder to support a claim

of unreasonable self-defense based on a mistake of fact.” (People v. Elmore (2014) 59

Cal.4th 121, 146.) Thus, a “defendant who misjudges the external circumstances may

show that mental disturbance contributed to the mistaken perception of a threat.” (Ibid.)

For these reasons, the mental impairment instruction did not have the negative

consequences for the defense theories that the voluntary intoxication instruction would

have had.

Espino also argues that the record confirms that counsel actually had no tactical

reason for failing to request the instruction, because counsel admitted in his oral motion

for new trial that he had made mistakes regarding voluntary intoxication. Again, the

argument is unpersuasive. Counsel’s argument for a new trial was that he erred by not

21
developing evidence regarding “a blackout,” not that he erred by failing to request the

voluntary intoxication instruction.

Even if Espino had established deficient performance, we would nevertheless

conclude that he fails to show prejudice. Counsel’s deficient performance is prejudicial if

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have

been more favorable to the defendant.” (People v. Sepulveda (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 291,

301.) Espino asserts in a conclusory fashion that if the jurors had been instructed on

voluntary intoxication, then it is likely that they would not have found that he acted with

premeditation and deliberation or formed the specific intent necessary to commit

aggravated mayhem, which is “the specific intent to cause a maiming injury.” (People v.

Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 86.) We are not persuaded.

The evidence that Espino made a premeditated and deliberate choice to try to kill

Father is particularly strong. The evidence shows that Espino struck Father repeatedly in

the head with the claw end of a hammer and nearly severed Father’s ear. The evidence

also shows that he used a five-pound rock to strike Father. In addition, after bludgeoning

and disabling Father, Espino built a pile of materials near Father, found a bottle of

isopropyl alcohol, poured it on the pile, and set it on fire. The fire burned Father’s

shoulder before he was found. The prolonged nature of the attack and the use of multiple

methods to try to kill Father amply show that Espino “had many opportunities to consider

and reflect on his actions” and chose to continue with his decision to try to kill. (People

v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 244.)

22
Similarly, the evidence that Espino intended to cause a maiming injury is strong.

Again, Father’s ear was nearly severed, and the area looked like minced meat, according

to his medical records. There is no reasonable probability that the jurors would not have

inferred an intent to cause the maiming injury from the evidence that Espino repeatedly

struck Father’s ear with the claw of a hammer to the point of nearly severing the ear.

In contrast to the strong evidence of Espino’s specific intent, premeditation, and

deliberation, there is no evidence from an expert witness that the drugs that he ingested

would have prevented him from forming the required mental states. There is only

Espino’s self-serving testimony that he could not remember many details and that he

thought Father was trying to kill him. But Espino was not a very credible witness. For

instance, he claimed to remember that Father got mad at him, “started losing it,” and

wielded a knife, but he purported to be unable to remember his own attack on Father.

However, in the voicemail to his mother shortly after his arrest, he remembered using the

hammer and the stone. He also told officers inconsistent stories. He first said that he was

never at the trailer and did not see Father, but he later said that he found Father disabled

and the trailer on fire, and he left to find the perpetrator.

Given the strong evidence that Espino harbored all of the mental states found by

the jury and the weak evidence concerning the effects of his intoxication, it is not

reasonably probable that the instruction on voluntary intoxication would have led to a

more favorable result.

23
In sum, Espino’s ineffective assistance claim lacks merit. There is a conceivable

tactical reason for defense counsel’s failure to request the instruction on voluntary

intoxication, and Espino fails to show that the omission prejudiced him.3

III. Motion for new trial

Defense counsel moved for a new trial on several grounds, including his own

ineffective assistance. Espino argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a

sufficient inquiry into counsel’s claim of ineffective assistance, and we therefore must

remand for the court to conduct further inquiry. We disagree.

A. Additional background

Defense counsel orally moved for a new trial. First, he argued that one or more

jurors concealed a bias against him during voir dire. Second, he argued that the court

improperly permitted the People to introduce prior acts evidence under Evidence Code

section 1109. Third, he argued that the court should have excluded the second police

interview with Espino. With respect to that interview, counsel asserted, “I felt I could

have been slightly more prepared.” Fourth, he argued that he rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to develop evidence concerning “a condition called [a] blackout.”

Counsel said that he had recently learned of the condition from a crime novel, and he

3 Espino argues that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the cumulative
effect of (1) the failure to instruct on the heat of passion theory and (2) defense counsel’s
ineffective assistance. The argument fails because Espino has not shown deficient
performance by defense counsel, so there are no “errors to cumulate.” (People v.
Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 417.) And assuming for the sake of argument that
counsel’s performance was deficient, we are not persuaded that the combination of
claimed errors rendered Espino’s trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. McKinnon (2011)
52 Cal.4th 610, 681.)

24
explained: “I did not bring any competent witness or experts the way the People did.

The People were overly thoroughly, overly exceptional. They brought scientists. I

brought nobody.” Counsel then stated that he was “ineffective as an attorney. . . . I felt I

was not as thorough, as alert.”

The court asked defense counsel if he intended to file a written motion for new

trial or whether he was prepared to proceed with his oral motion. The court thought that

“at least portions of what [he] stated should have been in a noticed motion.” Counsel

stated that he did not intend to file a written motion and that he was prepared to proceed.

The court denied the motion for new trial. The court reasoned that there was no

evidence of improper conduct by the jurors. Regarding admission of the prior acts

evidence and the police interview, the court concluded that it did not err. The court did

not mention defense counsel’s claim of ineffective assistance but stated: “[I]f there’s

additional information or anything else that defense wants to bring up via a written

motion, then I would be open to that, and that’s why I was asking about that.” Defense

counsel responded that he had “no other issues to bring before the Court regarding this

case, this trial.”

B. Analysis

A defendant may bring a nonstatutory motion for new trial on the basis of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582.)

“[T]rial judges are particularly well suited to observe courtroom performance and to rule

on the adequacy of counsel in criminal cases tried before them. [Citation.] Thus, in

appropriate circumstances justice will be expedited by avoiding appellate review, or

25
habeas corpus proceedings, in favor of presenting the issue of counsel’s effectiveness to

the trial court as the basis of a motion for new trial.” (Ibid.)

A conflict may arise when a defendant asks their trial counsel to argue counsel’s

own incompetence as a basis for a new trial. (People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d

388, 391, disapproved on another ground by People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 694.)

Stewart addressed that problem. (Stewart, at p. 391.) Defense counsel in that case

followed his client’s instruction to move for a new trial on the basis of counsel’s

incompetence, but the motion papers did not state why counsel was incompetent. (Id. at

p. 393.) At the motion hearing, the trial court asked the defendant and counsel why they

thought that counsel had acted incompetently, but both declined to say. (Ibid.) Counsel

stated that he could not argue his own incompetence and asked the court to appoint a new

attorney to represent the defendant for purposes of the motion. (Ibid.) The court did not

appoint new counsel but held an in camera hearing with the defendant and counsel, and

the defendant proffered two bases for counsel’s claimed incompetence. (Id. at p. 394.)

The trial court denied the motion for new trial. (Ibid.)

The Stewart court concluded that “where a defendant requests the substitution of

new counsel after trial in order to assist in the preparation of a motion for new trial based

on the inadequacy of trial counsel,” the trial court must elicit from the defendant the

reasons for the claim of inadequate representation, either in open court or at an in camera

hearing. (Stewart, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 395.) Stewart relied on our Supreme

Court’s decision in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). (Stewart, at

p. 395; Marsden, at pp. 124-125 [when a defendant seeks to discharge their appointed

26
counsel because of inadequate representation and requests new counsel, the court must

permit the defendant to explain the basis for their claim and relate specific examples of

counsel’s inadequacy].) Stewart reasoned that under “Marsden, a trial court cannot

thoughtfully exercise its discretion in a matter such as this without listening to the

defendant’s reasons for requesting a change of attorneys. ‘A trial judge is unable to

intelligently deal with a defendant’s request for substitution of attorneys [or for a new

trial on the basis of trial counsel’s incompetence] unless he is cognizant of the grounds

which prompted the request.’” (Stewart, at p. 395.)

Stewart further held that if the claim of incompetence “is based upon acts or

omissions that occurred at trial or the effect of which may be evaluated by what occurred

at trial,” then “the court may rule on the motion for new trial without substituting new

counsel. If, on the other hand, the claim of incompetence relates to acts or omissions that

did not occur at trial and cannot fairly be evaluated by what occurred at trial, then . . . the

court must determine whether to substitute new counsel to develop the claim of

incompetence.” (Stewart, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 397.) Stewart concluded that the

trial court erred by failing to inquire sufficiently into one of the bases that the defendant

asserted for counsel’s incompetence. (Id. at p. 398.) The appellate court therefore

remanded the matter for the court to conduct that further inquiry and to determine

whether the defendant had made a “colorable claim of ineffective assistance” warranting

appointment of new counsel. (Ibid.)

Espino relies on Stewart and a case following it (People v. Reed (2010) 183

Cal.App.4th 1137, 1143-1145 (Reed)), but his argument that we must remand for a

27
Stewart inquiry lacks merit. Stewart held that the court must investigate the claim of

ineffective assistance because the defendant requested new counsel for purposes of the

motion for new trial. (Stewart, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at pp. 395-396.) The situation was

analogous to a Marsden motion in which a defendant requests that the court appoint new

counsel.

But the same court that decided Stewart later clarified that when neither the

defendant nor defense counsel has requested the appointment of new counsel for

purposes of the new trial motion, the court has “no duty to make a Stewart inquiry.”

(People v. Gay (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1065, 1071.) “[A]bsent a request the court

appoint substitute counsel to prepare and present a motion for new trial based on

inadequate representation, the Stewart procedures concerning appointment of such

counsel are not required.” (Ibid.) Rather, when the defense does “not request substitute

counsel,” the court is “only required to consider and rule on defendant’s motion for new

trial.” (Ibid.)

That was all that was required in this case. Defense counsel, who was retained,

argued that he was ineffective, and he set forth reasons for that claim of ineffective

assistance. Counsel did not request that the court appoint new counsel to prepare the

motion for new trial, and Espino did not request substitution of counsel either. The court

gave defense counsel ample opportunity to present his motion for new trial, and the court

asked more than once whether counsel wanted to file a written motion. Counsel declined

the opportunity to present any further arguments or evidence, and he never argued that

the court had a duty to inquire further into his claims. The court’s only obligation at that

28
point was to consider and rule on the motion as presented by defense counsel. Espino’s

argument that we must remand for a further inquiry therefore fails.

Espino’s reliance on Reed does not change our conclusion. The Reed defendant

made two unsuccessful Marsden motions asking the court to discharge his appointed

counsel. (Reed, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1140-1141.) Later, at the sentencing

hearing, the defendant asked his counsel to move for a new trial on the basis of counsel’s

incompetence. (Id. at p. 1142.) Defense counsel told the court and the defendant that she

could not make that motion and that the defendant was better off having appellate counsel

argue her ineffective assistance. (Ibid.) The trial court agreed, did not make any inquiry

of the defendant at all, and proceeded with sentencing. (Id. at pp. 1142-1143.) Reed held

that the court erred by failing to make any inquiry into the basis for the defendant’s claim

of incompetent counsel. (Id. at pp. 1145, 1148.) The defendant’s “expressed desire to

pursue a motion for new trial based on counsel’s incompetence, the fact that defense

counsel said, ‘I cannot make it for him,’ and the context of [his] prior unsuccessful

Marsden motions, made it sufficiently clear that [he] was in fact requesting substitute

counsel to pursue the motion for new trial.” (Id. at pp. 1145-1146.) The trial court

accordingly had the “‘imperative duty’ to make the requisite Marsden inquiries.” (Id. at

p. 1148.)

Espino’s case is unlike Reed. There is no indication that Espino was making a de

facto request for new counsel, that counsel refused to argue his own ineffective

assistance, or that the court refused to hear the basis for the ineffective assistance claim.

29
For all of these reasons, the court did not err by failing to inquire further into

defense counsel’s claim of ineffective assistance in connection with the motion for new

trial. A remand for that purpose is not warranted.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

FIELDS
J.

30

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