Goldstein v. Ramachandran CA2/2

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Filed 4/8/26 Goldstein v. Ramachandran CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JEFF GOLDSTEIN, B344324

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV32837
v.

NISHANT RAMACHANDRAN,

Defendant;

KATY RAMACHANDRAN,

Third Party Claimant
and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen P. Pfahler, Judge. Affirmed.
Zohar Law Firm and Daniel Yehuda Zohar for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Kahana & Feld, Sharon Oh-Kubisch and Michelle Martin
for Third Party Claimant and Respondent.
_______________________________
This is a dispute between two individuals who were each
victimized by Nishant Ramachandran.
Plaintiff and Appellant Jeff Goldstein worked for Nishant
for years and had to resort to litigation to seek full compensation
for that work. He obtained a judgment against Nishant in an
amount exceeding $2 million.
Third Party Claimant and respondent Katy Ramachandran
was married to Nishant for several years and shares three
children with him. Katy suffered abuse by Nishant for many
years before she fled the family home with her children to a
domestic violence shelter. In subsequent divorce proceedings,
Katy and Nishant agreed Katy was entitled to exclusive
ownership of two parcels of real property in Redondo Beach that
had been titled in both their names.
At issue here is the extent to which the properties are
subject to enforcement of Goldstein’s judgment against Nishant.
We agree with the trial court that the properties are not subject
to such enforcement, albeit for different reasons than relied upon
by the trial court.
As further explained below, Katy and Nishant’s agreement
with respect to ownership of the properties was effective before
Goldstein recorded the abstract of his judgment against Nishant.
Accordingly, Nishant had no interest in the properties to which
Goldstein’s judgment lien could attach. As such, Goldstein had no
right to enforce against the properties.
We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying
Goldstein’s applications for the sale of the properties.
BACKGROUND
Goldstein began working with Nishant on Nishant’s
technology ventures in 2000. Nishant did not pay Goldstein all

2
amounts due for his work. In 2015, Nishant acknowledged in
writing that he owed Goldstein annual compensation, dating
back to the start of their relationship, ranging from $120,000 to
$250,000 per year.
Katy and Nishant married in 2009. In 2011, they
purchased a house located at 2104 Plant Avenue in Redondo
Beach. Record title to this property was taken in the names of
“Nishant Ramachandran and Katy Ramachandran, Husband and
Wife as Community Property.”
According to Katy’s declaration, she used separate property
she had accumulated prior to marriage to purchase a neighboring
property, 2106 Plant Avenue in Redondo Beach, in 2012.
Nevertheless, record title to this property was taken in the names
of “Nishant Ramachandran and Katy Ramachandran.”
In 2016, Katy and Nishant executed a “Property
Agreement.” It recites that 2106 Plant was acquired using funds
that were Katy’s separate property, the parties always intended
it would be her separate property, and rental revenue from the
property exceeded its debt service and maintenance costs. The
agreement identified, among other assets, 2106 Plant as Katy’s
separate property. Because 2104 Plant was not assigned to either
spouse as separate property, the agreement treated it as “joint
marital property.” The agreement was never recorded and no
change to 2106 Plant’s record title was made pursuant to the
agreement.
In 2018, Katy filed a petition for dissolution of her
marriage to Nishant.
In 2019, Goldstein commenced his action against Nishant
to recover unpaid compensation.

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In February 2023, Katy and Nishant executed a marital
settlement agreement (MSA) entitled “Stipulated Judgment of
Dissolution of Marriage.” As relevant here, the MSA provides
that both the properties, “whether separate or community
[assets], are awarded and confirmed to Katy as Katy’s sole and
separate property, with the right of immediate possession, free
and clear of any claim, right, title or interest of Nishant.”
In April 2023, Goldstein obtained a judgment against
Nishant in the amount of $2,269,250 plus $15,359.55 in costs. He
caused an abstract of the trial court’s judgment to be recorded
with the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder’s/County Clerk
Office on June 23, 2023.
In August 2023, the family court entered a judgment of
dissolution of Katy and Nishant’s marriage, which included the
MSA.
In January 2024, Goldstein filed ex parte motions for
orders directing the sales of the properties. The trial court issued
orders to show cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 704.770, subdivision (a), which were both set for hearing
on March 15, 2024.
On March 1, 2024, Nishant filed a voluntary petition for
relief under chapter 7 of title 11 of the United States Code in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of
California. Nishant claimed an interest in both properties in his
bankruptcy case. He also filed a homestead declaration under
Code of Civil Procedure section 704.910 with respect to 2104
Plant.
In April 2024, Goldstein moved for relief from the
automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362) in Nishant’s bankruptcy case to
permit Goldstein to proceed with enforcement against the

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properties. In response to Goldstein’s motion, Katy filed a
declaration, refuting Nishant’s claims to any interest in the
properties. On May 1, 2024, after what he termed “a diligent
inquiry into [Nishant’s] financial affairs,” the chapter 7 trustee
filed a notice of his intention to abandon any interest Nishant
may have had in the properties. On May 10, 2024, the
bankruptcy court granted Goldstein his requested stay relief. On
May 20, 2024, Nishant quitclaimed his interests in the properties
via interspousal transfer deed to Katy. Katy caused the deeds to
be recorded in the Los Angeles County Registrar-
Recorder’s/County Clerk two days later.
With the bankruptcy stay lifted, proceedings in the trial
court resumed. Katy appeared and opposed Goldstein’s
enforcement efforts. In November 2024, she filed an opposition
and declaration in support of her position that the properties
were her separate property and thus immune to Goldstein’s
enforcement. The evidence she submitted was largely duplicative
of what she had filed months earlier in response to Goldstein’s
stay relief motion in the bankruptcy court.
Goldstein filed a reply arguing the properties were
community property insofar as a third party creditor was
concerned when his judgment lien attached, such that he was
entitled to proceed with their sale. He also accused Nishant of
fraudulently transferring the properties to Katy but did not
develop the argument, factually or legally.
The trial court heard the matter on December 5, 2024, and
took it under submission. Four days later, it entered an order
refusing Goldstein’s request to proceed with the sale of the
properties. The court concluded the family court’s August 2023
dissolution judgment barred Goldstein’s enforcement because

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“the Family Court . . . clearly intended for the properties to be
[Katy’s separate property and] not . . . be used to satisfy
[Goldstein’s] Judgment against [Nishant] in the instant action.”
It rejected Goldstein’s fraudulent transfer claims as undeveloped
and, alternatively barred on the basis that “a Dissolution
Judgment from a family court is clearly not a fraudulent
transfer.”
Goldstein timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
As the trial court’s decision rested on no disputed factual
issues, our review is de novo. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994)
8 Cal.4th 791, 799 [“When the decisive facts are undisputed, we
are confronted with a question of law and are not bound by the
findings of the trial court.”].)
II. Applicable Law
The resolution of this appeal involves several provisions of
the Enforcement of Judgments Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 680.010 et
seq.) and the Family Code.
Code of Civil Procedure section 695.020, subdivision (a)
provides that “[c]ommunity property is subject to enforcement of
a money judgment as provided in the Family Code.” (Ibid.)
In turn, Family Code section 910, subdivision (a) provides
that, subject only to express statutory exceptions, “the
community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse
before or during the marriage, regardless of which spouse has the
management and control of the property and regardless of
whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a
judgment for the debt.” (Ibid.) In contrast, “[t]he separate

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property of a married person is not liable for a debt incurred by
the person’s spouse before or during marriage.” (§ 913,
subd. (b)(1).)
In general, property acquired by a married person during
marriage while domiciled in California is community property—
i.e., it is part of the community estate. (Fam. Code, § 760.)
Separate property of a married person includes “[a]ll property
owned by the person before marriage.” (§ 770, subd. (a)(1).) Even
though acquired during marriage, “[p]roperty purchased with [a
married person’s] separate property funds is [such person’s]
separate property.” (Mix v. Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 610.)
Community property may lose its community character by
transmutation—an agreement by both spouses making
community property the separate property of one. (Fam. Code,
§ 850, subd. (a).) Community property may also be divided in the
context of a marriage dissolution. In such a scenario, community
property may be divided either by the family court or by
agreement of the parties. (§ 2550; Litke O’Farrell, LLC v. Tipton
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1184 (Litke).) So too may liability
for community debts. (§§ 2550, 2622, subd. (a); see also § 916,
subd. (a)(2); Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 665–666; Litke,
at pp. 1181–1182.)
The effects of division of community property and
community debts are set forth in Family Code section 916. Most
relevant here is subdivision (a)(2), which provides: “The separate
property owned by a married person at the time of the division
and the property received by the person in the division is not
liable for a debt incurred by the person’s spouse before or during
marriage, and the person is not personally liable for the debt,
unless the debt was assigned for payment by the person in the

7
division of the property. Nothing in this paragraph affects the
liability of property for the satisfaction of a lien on the property.”
The holder of a money judgment may obtain a judgment
lien in real property subject to enforcement by recording an
abstract of judgment in the county where the real property is
located. (Code Civ. Proc., § 697.310, subd. (a).) Such a lien
“attaches to all interests in real property in the county where the
lien is created . . . that are subject to enforcement of the money
judgment against the judgment debtor . . . at the time the lien
was created . . . .” (Ibid.) Importantly, “ ‘ “the lien of a judgment
does not attach to a naked title, but only to the judgment debtor’s
interest in the real estate; and if he has no interest, though
possessing the naked title, then no lien attaches. [Citation.] Thus
a creditor who attaches property for his debt obtains a lien only
upon the title or interest which the debtor has in the property at
the time of the levy, and if at that time all title and interest has
[sic] passed from him to a third person, the creditor gets nothing
by the levy.” ’ ” (Barisich v. Lewis (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 12, 19.)
Once a judgment lien attaches to property, it is not affected
by any subsequent transfer or encumbrance of the property, and
“the money judgment may be enforced against the property in the
same manner and to the same extent as if it had not been
transferred or encumbered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 695.070,
subd. (a); see also § 697.390.) This is true even where the transfer
is effected by a family court judgment awarding to a nondebtor
spouse community property subject to a lien resulting from a
judgment against the debtor spouse. (Lezine v. Security Pacific
Fin. Services, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 56, 65 (Lezine); see also Fam.
Code, § 916, subd. (a)(2).)

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III. Analysis
Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, the
dispositive question is as follows: As of June 23, 2023, when
Goldstein recorded the abstract of his judgment against Nishant,
did Nishant hold an interest in the properties beyond bare record
title? To the extent the answer is “no,” Goldstein’s lien did not
attach to the properties and is of no effect. To the extent the
answer is “yes,” Goldstein holds a valid judgment lien in such
interest, and such lien is enforceable as provided in the
Enforcement of Judgments Law. For reasons different from those
stated by the trial court, the answer is “no.”1 (See D’Amico v.
Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [“ ‘[A] ruling
or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal
merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory
of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless
of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its
conclusion.’ ”].)

1 Because we conclude Katy properly prevailed on the merits,
we need not address her argument that Goldstein failed to
adequately raise in the trial court his arguments concerning the
enforceability of his lien.
However, to the extent Goldstein separately argues the
MSA constituted a fraudulent transfer, we agree with the trial
court he failed to properly raise this fact-dependent issue below.
It is therefore forfeited. (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v.
Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 698 [“ ‘Ordinarily the failure to
preserve a point below constitutes a [forfeiture] of the point.’ ”].)

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A. The Trial Court Erroneously Determined the
Family Court’s Dissolution Judgment Affected
Goldstein’s Rights as a Lien Creditor
The trial court concluded the properties were Katy’s
separate property based on a judicial act of the family court—
entry of the “Dissolution Judgment” manifesting the family
court’s “clear[] inten[t]” that “the properties . . . be [Katy’s
separate property and] not . . . be used to satisfy [Goldstein’s]
Judgment.”
There is no question that, if they were not before, the
properties were Katy’s separate property after the family court
entered the dissolution judgment. (See Fam. Code, § 2010,
subd. (e) [family court has “jurisdiction to inquire into and render
any judgment and make orders that are appropriate concerning
. . . . [¶] . . . [t]he settlement of the property rights of the parties”];
Buic v. Buic (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1600, 1603–1604 [property
award in dissolution judgment effects transfer of interest even
without transfer of record title].) However, this does not resolve
the extent of Nishant’s interest in the properties as of June 23,
2023, to which Goldstein’s judgment lien might have attached. If
Nishant’s interest were terminated only by an August 2023 order
of the family court, it would have no effect on Goldstein’s rights
as a judgment lien creditor. (§ 916, subd. (a)(2); Lezine, supra,
14 Cal.4th at p. 65.)
We reject Katy’s assertion that the family court, by the
dissolution judgment, “confirm[ed] that the [p]roperties are
Katy’s separate properties and Nishant never held a true
ownership interest.” Again, though the judgment awarded any
interest Nishant had in the properties to Katy, it did not declare
their status prior to entry. Each of the properties were “awarded

10
and confirmed to Katy,” “whether [they were] separate or
community” property.
Accordingly, to the extent the properties were Katy’s prior
to entry of the dissolution judgment, it has to have been for a
reason other than the family court’s act of entering the judgment.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 664 [“In no case is a judgment effectual for
any purpose until entered.”].)
B. From and After Executing the MSA in February
2023, Nishant Held Only Bare Record Title to
the Properties
The evidence is undisputed that the parties entered into
the MSA in February 2023 before Goldstein recorded the abstract
of judgment in June 2023. As further explained below, the MSA
was enforceable as between the parties before the family court
entered it as a dissolution judgment in August 2023. The effect of
the MSA was to transmute the properties, to the extent they were
previously community property, to Katy’s separate property. As a
result, when Goldstein recorded his abstract of judgment,
Nishant had no interest in the properties to which Goldstein’s
judgment lien could attach.
Litke guides our analysis. The plaintiff in Litke obtained a
judgment against Richard Tipton in 2009. A proceeding for the
dissolution of Richard’s marriage to Marcia Tipton commenced in
December 2010. (Litke, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1181.) On
January 18, 2011, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 708.320, subdivision (a), the judgment creditor-plaintiff
began serving notices of a motion for a charging order against

11
corporate and partnership interests held in Richard’s name but
did not serve Richard.2 (Litke, at p. 1181.)
The same day, Richard and Marcia executed an MSA
assigning half of Richard’s corporate and partnership interests,
formerly community property, to Marcia, while assigning full
liability for the plaintiff’s judgment to Richard. (Litke, supra,
204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1181.) The MSA provided it would be
incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, but also provided it
would be independently valid and binding whether or not that
occurred. (Ibid.)
The plaintiff did not serve Richard with notice of its motion
for a charging order until January 24, 2011—after Richard and
Marcia executed the MSA. (Litke, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1181.) On January 28, 2011, the plaintiff served both Marcia
and Richard with a second motion for a charging order relating to
the interests of Richard, and now Marcia, that were the subject of
the first motion. (Ibid.)
The family court entered a judgment of dissolution
incorporating Richard and Marcia’s MSA on January 31, 2011.
(Litke, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1181.)
Over Marcia’s objections, the trial court granted the
plaintiff’s charging order, continuing the lien on the interest
imposed by service of notice of the charging motion. (Litke, supra,
204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1181; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 708.320,

2 Code of Civil Procedure section 708.320, subdivision (a)
provides: “A lien on a judgment debtor’s interest in a partnership
or limited liability company is created by service of a notice of
motion for a charging order on the judgment debtor and on either
of the following: [¶] (1) All partners or the partnership. [¶] (2) All
members of the limited liability company.” (Italics added.)

12
subd. (b).) Marcia appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed the
order granting the charging order.
The Litke court’s analysis began with Family Code
section 916, subdivision (a)(2)’s provision that, after division of
community property, “the property received by a [married] person
in the division [of community property] is not liable for a debt
incurred by the person’s spouse before or during marriage, and
the person is not personally liable for the debt, unless the debt
was assigned for payment by the person in the division of the
property.” (See Litke, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.) There,
as here, the question therefore came down to when the division
occurred. (Ibid.)
Turning to Family Code section 2550, the Litke court
observed the default rule is the family court divides property at
the time of judgment or after, but this rule is subject to
exceptions, including “ ‘the written agreement of the parties.’ ”
(Litke, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1182, 1184.) When the
parties make such a written agreement, the court concluded it is
the parties, and not the family court, that effect the division. (Id.
at p. 1184.)
In addition to Family Code section 2550, the Litke court
identified sections 1500 and 1502, subdivision (b) as establishing
the parties’ authority to privately divide their property. (Litke,
supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183.) Section 1500 provides “[t]he
property rights of the parties prescribed by statute may be
altered by a . . . marital property agreement.” Confirming the
operative effect of such an agreement without a court order,
section 1502, subdivision (b) provides that “[r]ecording or
nonrecording of a . . . marital property agreement has the same
effect as recording or nonrecording of a grant of real property.”

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Because these sections allow married persons to “contract with
each other at any time regarding property,” the Litke court
concluded “court approval in a dissolution proceeding is not a
prerequisite to the enforcement of an MSA in an independent
action, unless the agreement requires such approval.” (Litke, at
pp. 1183, 1184.)
Turning to the facts before it, the Litke court held: “Because
[Richard and Marcia’s] MSA divided the community estate prior
to [the plaintiff’s] motion to charge interests in certain assets
subject to that division, [the plaintiff] could not satisfy its
judgment against [Richard] by resort to [Marcia’s] interest in
those assets.” (Litke, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.) It
further clarified, “the MSA transmuted [Marcia’s] community
property interest in the properties in question into separate
property prior to the time [the plaintiff] pursued its motion for
charging orders against the property. Charging liens therefore
did not attach, and [the plaintiff] was not entitled, to orders
charging [Marcia’s] confirmed separate property.” (Id. at p. 1185.)
The same reasoning applies here. Katy and Nishant
executed their MSA before Goldstein recorded his abstract of
judgment. Thus, at the time he recorded his abstract of judgment,
division of the community property had already been
accomplished and Nishant had no interest to which Goldstein’s
judgment lien could attach. Yes, the titles to the properties
continued to show Nishant was a joint owner. But Katy and
Nishant’s failure to earlier record deeds reflecting the
transactions effected by the MSA did not change the effect of the
MSA as to a judgment creditor like Goldstein. (Davis v. Perry
(1932) 120 Cal.App. 670, 676 [“An unrecorded deed takes
precedence over a subsequent judgment against the grantor.”];

14
see also Spear v. Farwell (1935) 5 Cal.App.2d 111, 114 [“a court of
equity will always permit the real owner to show that the
apparent ownership of another is or was not real; and when the
judgment debtor has no other interest except the naked legal
title, the lien of judgment does not attach”].)
Despite Katy arguing in her respondent’s brief, and citing
to Litke in support of the proposition, that “[a]n enforceable
settlement agreement suffices to accomplish a division of
community property into sole and separate property without need
to await a valid judgment of dissolution” such that the MSA was
effective in February 2023, Goldstein did not address it on reply,
continuing to treat the MSA as having first come into existence
when the family court entered it as part of its judgment of
dissolution.
Goldstein did, however, address Litke at oral argument,
raising two distinctions between this case and Litke that we
conclude are not material. First, he noted the MSA did not
expressly provide it was effective even without family court
approval, and claimed it lacked language giving it immediate
effect. And second, he noted this case involves the transfer of real
property as opposed to the intangible property involved in Litke,
and asserted Family Code section 852, subdivision (b) rendered
any transfer effected by the MSA ineffective against him because
it was not recorded before he recorded his abstract of judgment.
We disagree.
The Litke court held “court approval in a dissolution
proceeding is not a prerequisite to the enforcement of an MSA in
an independent action, unless the agreement requires such
approval.” (Litke, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.) Although
the MSA in that case expressly provided it would be enforceable

15
in the absence of court approval, such language is unnecessary
under the rule stated in Litke.
For the reasons explained in Litke, preapproval
enforceability is both warranted and important in the context of
MSA’s. First, the court’s role in such agreements is ministerial:
“[T]he court does not have a role in approving or disapproving
property divisions agreed to by the parties. Its only role is to
accept the agreement and, if requested, incorporate the
disposition into the judgment.” (Litke, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1184.) Second, “it would be unfair to require parties to an MSA
to await entry of a judgment in some uncertain, future date in
order to effect the disposition of property to which they have
already agreed.” (Id. at p. 1185.)
Here, although unnecessary under Litke’s presumption of
immediate effectiveness, the MSA contains provisions that
affirmatively show it was to have immediate effect. The parties
stipulated it was their “mutual desire and wish to immediately
effect a full, complete, and final settlement and to irrevocably
adjust and determine forever all property rights which may exist
with respect to each other and by reason of their marriage, and to
resolve fully and completely all issues related thereto, except as
specifically set forth herein.” (Italics added.) That this division
was intended to be “immediate[]” upon execution is confirmed by
other provisions. For example, “[e]ach party recognize[d] and
acknowledge[d] by execution of this Stipulated Judgment that . . .
each party accepts the division of community as full and complete
satisfaction of all community property rights.” (Italics added.)
And, the parties did not have to await the family court’s order to
document the division: “The parties shall, concurrently herewith,
or at any time after this Stipulated Judgment is approved and

16
made the [family court’s] order, on the demand of the other party
[take such action] as may be necessary, appropriate, reasonable,
or convenient to carry out the terms and conditions of this
Stipulated Judgment . . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, by its terms,
Katy could have demanded deeds to the properties when she
signed the MSA.
Finally, we note Goldstein recognized Katy and Nishant
intended the MSA take effect upon execution when he accused
Katy in the trial court of “attempt[ing] to ‘convert’ the Properties
to her separate property . . . in February 2023.”
Family Code section 852, subdivision (b) provides: “A
transmutation of real property is not effective as to third parties
without notice thereof unless recorded.” We do not interpret this
reference to “third parties” as affording protection to judgment
creditors like Goldstein. First, the rights of a judgment creditor
are entirely derivative of those of his judgment debtor. (See
Juarez v. Ward (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 730, 740–741 [“Because a
judgment is a lien only on the interest of the judgment debtor,
latent equities against the debtor may be asserted against his
judgment creditor, who ‘is subject to all prior interests in the
property, whether known or unknown, recorded or
unrecorded.’ ”].) Thus, if the debtor spouse is bound by a
transmutation agreement, so too must be his judgment creditor.
Second, this interpretation aligns Family Code section 852,
subdivision (b) with the parallel section 1502, subdivision (b).
Again, the latter states: “Recording or nonrecording of a . . .
marital property agreement has the same effect as recording or
nonrecording of a grant of real property.” This language more
precisely states what the Law Review Commission comments say
section 852, subdivision (b) means: “Section 852 makes clear that

17
the ordinary rules and formalities applicable to real property
transfers apply also to transmutations of property between the
spouses.” (Citing Civ. Code, §§ 1212–1217 as to the effect of
recording.) Reading these statutes in harmony is necessary to
avoid treating a section 850 transmutation agreement differently
than a section 1500 marital settlement agreement, even though
they may achieve the same purposes. (See Gately v. Cloverdale
Unified School Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 487, 494 [“Statutory
provisions that are . . . related to the same subject[] should be
construed together as one statute and harmonized if possible.”].)
Under California real property law, the “grant of an estate
in real property is conclusive against the grantor, also against
everyone subsequently claiming under him, except a purchaser or
encumbrancer who in good faith and for a valuable consideration
acquires a title or lien by an instrument that is first duly
recorded.” (Civ. Code, § 1107.) A judgment creditor is not a good
faith encumbrancer for value. (Fulkerson v. Stiles (1909) 156 Cal.
703, 705–706; Wells Fargo Bank v. PAL Investments, Inc. (1979)
96 Cal.App.3d 431, 438.) Similarly, only a good faith purchaser or
encumbrancer for value is protected against unrecorded prior
transfers. (§ 1214.) Therefore, an unrecorded transfer of real
property takes precedence over a judgment lien. (Wells Fargo, at
p. 438.) Thus, Nishant’s February 2023 grant of his interests in
the properties to Katy is conclusive against Goldstein.
In short, the analysis in Litke remains dispositive on the
undisputed facts presented here.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Katy is entitled to her costs on
appeal.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GILBERT, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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