People v. Stanberry CA4/1

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Filed 4/6/26 P. v. Stanberry CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085744

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SCE426526)
v.

RONJA NNAJI STANBERRY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter L. Gallagher, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Joshua P. Visco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ronja Nnaji Stanberry appeals from a probation order challenging a
probation condition that the trial court imposed requiring her to complete a
program of residential treatment if directed by the probation officer. The
People do not dispute that it is improper for a trial court to delegate to a

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probation officer whether to require a probationer to undergo residential
substance abuse treatment. The People, however, contend that the trial
court’s oral pronouncement did not contain this condition, and that the oral
pronouncement “controls.” Ultimately, the People maintain that we should
“correct” the written order to “reflect the correct term of probation” ordered
by the court orally.
In resolving whether a clerk’s transcript or the reporter’s transcript
controls in the event of a conflict, we do not apply a “mechanical rule” in favor
of the reporter’s transcript but instead consider the “circumstances of each
particular case” to determine which portion of the record “because of its
origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence.” (People v.
Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599.) For reasons we explain below, in this case,
we conclude that the clerk’s transcript best reflects the trial court’s intention
to delegate to a probation officer whether to require Stanberry to attend
residential treatment. Further, we agree with Stanberry and the People that
such delegation is improper. Accordingly, we strike the disputed condition
from the probation order. In all other respects, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2025, a jury found Stanberry guilty of assault with a
deadly weapon, and corporal injury to a dating partner, including a true
finding that Stanberry used a deadly weapon to cause corporal injury. (Pen.
Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 273.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The two
charges arose from an argument during which Stanberry used a knife to
strike her girlfriend. The victim sustained a small laceration to the forearm.
In March 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The
reporter’s transcript reflects the court’s determination that Stanberry’s
criminal behavior was heavily related to her use of alcohol. For example, the

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court stated, “As I look at your record, it all stems from alcohol in a lot
of ways.” The court also said that Stanberry’s “underlying problem[], as far
as I’m concerned, is your drinking.”
In imposing conditions of probation, the reporter’s transcript indicates
that the court orally stated a number of conditions related to alcohol
including the following: “Do not knowingly use or possess alcohol. I’m going
to say don’t drink. You are required as a condition of probation not to have
alcohol. . . . Plead [sic] to any kind of treatment or aftercare if directed by
probation. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Participate in substance abuse care within seven
days if directed by a [probation officer] enroll in substance abuse treatment if
directed by [probation officer].”
The court’s minute order, after recounting the period of probation and
stating certain conditions of probation, stated that “further conditions are
set forth in probation order.” The court’s probation order in turn contains
several substance abuse-related probation conditions. For example, the
order contains a box shaded in next to a statement that provides, “Do not
knowingly use or possess alcohol if directed by the [probation officer].” The
strikethrough is consistent with the court’s oral pronouncement referenced
above.
Provision number nine of the probation order provides, “Complete
a program of residential treatment and aftercare . . . if directed by the
probation officer.”
Finally, the order states, “Enroll in and adhere to substance use
treatment and recovery services, as clinically indicated if directed by
[probation officer].”

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DISCUSSION
On appeal, Stanberry challenges only provision number nine of the
probation order that requires her completion of residential treatment if
directed by a probation officer. Citing People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
897 (Smith), Stanberry argues the probation condition constitutes an
unconstitutional delegation of authority by the trial court to the probation
department and is therefore invalid.
A. Forfeiture
The People contend Stanberry forfeited her claim because she did not
object to the disputed probation condition in the trial court. We reject this
argument because Stanberry’s claim amounts to a facial constitutional
challenge to the trial court’s authority to delegate to a probation officer the
determination of whether to require a probationer to undergo residential
treatment that may be raised for the first time on appeal. (See Smith, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 901 [rejecting argument that probationer forfeited claim
that probation condition “improperly delegates judicial authority to the
probation officer” by failing to object to the condition in the trial court]; see
generally In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 884–886 [concluding
defendant’s claim that probation condition was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad was not forfeited for failure to raise it in juvenile court].)
B. The clerk’s minutes and the probation order accurately state the
intended version of the challenged condition
Before we reach the merits of Stanberry’s claim, we must determine the
substance of the probation condition the trial court intended to impose. As
noted above, the clerk’s minutes note that some of the probation conditions
are set out in the probation order. Provision number nine of that order
provides, “Complete a program of residential treatment and aftercare . . . if

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directed by the probation officer.” The reporter’s transcript, however, with
respect to this condition, states only, “Plead [sic] to any kind of treatment or
aftercare if directed by probation.” We must determine which of the two
versions reflects the court’s true intention.
As a general rule, courts will attempt to harmonize the record if a
conflict exists. (People v. Smith, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 599; see also People v.
Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880.) Historically, when a conflict
between the court’s oral pronouncement and the written record could not be
resolved, the oral pronouncement was “give[n] preference.” (People v. Pirali
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 (Pirali).) However, “the modern rule is
that if the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts cannot be reconciled, the part of
the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in
the circumstances of the case.” (Ibid., citing, inter alia, People v. Smith, at
p. 599.)
With respect to the type of record at issue here, when evaluating a
court’s oral pronouncement of probation conditions, a thorough explanation
of the conditions is not necessary if the defendant knows what the proposed
conditions are. (Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346.) Therefore, the
oral pronouncement may be less detailed than the probation order. (See ibid.
[recital of probation conditions in court is unnecessary because conditions are
spelled out in detail in the probation order].)
Turning to the record in this case, we first observe that it is clear
from a review of the reporter’s transcript and the proposed probation order
prepared by the probation department that the trial court addressed the
probation conditions at the hearing in the same order they were listed in the
probation department’s proposed order of probation. Further, in rendering
its oral pronouncement, the court made abbreviated references to this

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proposed order rather than reciting them verbatim to confirm which of the
requested probation conditions were being imposed. For instance, the court
stated it would not “impose the marijuana,” when referring to an enumerated
condition from the proposed probation order form, which read: “[n]o
marijuana use at all even with a card/recommendation/prescription.”
In addition, the court modified certain conditions from those proposed
by the probation officer. For example, while the proposed probation order
included a probation condition that Stanberry not knowingly use or possess
alcohol “if directed by the [probation officer],” (italics added) the court orally
stated that Stanberry was not to drink alcohol at all. The final order of
probation reflected this modification by striking out the “if directed by the
[probation officer]” language.
The trial court, however, did not express any intention to modify the
proposed condition requiring Stanberry to complete residential treatment if
directed by the probation officer. The final written probation order signed by
the court directing Stanberry to undergo a program of residential treatment
if directed by the probation officer is identical to the proposed probation order
prepared by the probation officer. Both state, “Complete a program of
residential treatment and aftercare . . . if directed by the probation officer.”
Further, the reporter’s transcript strongly suggests that the court reporter
misheard what the trial court said when it recited this condition orally.
Instead of using the phrase “complete a” program, the transcript uses the
words “plead to” a program, which would not make any sense. Instead of
“residential treatment and aftercare,” the transcript uses the words “any
kind of treatment or aftercare,” which also seems unlikely because the
reference to “aftercare” presumably means care following the residential
treatment.

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In light of the record recounted above, we conclude the court intended
to impose the conditions as specified in the written probation order. We
base this conclusion on the specific sequence in which the court recited the
conditions at the hearing, the trial court’s clear use of abbreviated references
to the proposed probation order in stating the conditions orally, its
modification or elimination of other proposed conditions as it imposed them,
the absence of any reliable indication the court intended to modify the
proposed residential treatment condition from that contained in the proposed
probation order, and the seemingly inaccurate reporter’s transcript of the
court’s oral recitation of this condition.
We therefore conclude that the minute order and the probation
order are to be given “greater credence” than the oral pronouncement in
determining the applicable probation condition under review. (People v.
Smith, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 599.)
C. Delegation of Authority
As noted above, Stanberry argues that under Smith, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th 897, the trial court unconstitutionally delegated judicial
authority to the probation department by allowing the probation officer to
decide whether Stanberry should participate in a program of residential
treatment. We review her claim de novo. (Id. at p. 902 [claim that probation
condition unconstitutionally delegated judicial authority “present[s]
question[] of law that we consider de novo”].)
The People concede that “a court may not delegate its decision to
impose residential treatment program” to a probation officer. For the
following reasons, we agree.
“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.
Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the

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others except as permitted by this Constitution.” (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)
Trial courts have the authority to determine if a defendant is eligible for
probation and if so, which conditions would be appropriate under the
circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (b)(3); People v. Olguin (2008) 45
Cal.4th 375, 379.) By ordering probation, a court may “ ‘impose reasonable
conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding
citizens.’ ” (Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Accordingly, a court
may require a defendant to complete a residential treatment program, even
though it would place a significant burden on a defendant’s liberty interests.
(Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 903.)
A probation officer, on the other hand, has discretion to oversee and
enforce the trial court’s orders. (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1351, 1358.) The probation officer “may not create conditions not expressly
authorized by the court.” (Ibid.)
In Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 897, the trial court imposed a
probation condition for the defendant to “ ‘participate in any treatment/
therapy/counseling program, including residential, as directed by the
probation officer.’ ” (Id. at p. 901, italics added.) On appeal, the Court of
Appeal held this condition was an unconstitutional delegation to the
probation officer to decide whether the defendant needed to complete
residential treatment, as opposed to an outpatient program. (Id. at p. 903.)
The Smith court reasoned in part: “Unlike outpatients, participants in
residential programs may be confined to the treatment facility for the
duration of the program, separated from family and friends, and unable to
maintain a job. [Citations.] Given the significant liberty interests at stake,
a court—not a probation officer—must make the decision to require a
defendant to attend residential treatment. . . . [E]ntrusting the decision

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whether to mandate residential treatment to the probation officer is an
improper delegation of judicial authority.” (Ibid.) The Smith court remanded
the matter “to the trial court with directions either to strike the words
‘including residential’ from the treatment condition or to specify that the
court requires Smith undergo residential treatment.” (Id. at p. 905.)
As in Smith, the trial court improperly enabled the probation
department to decide whether to require Stanberry to undergo residential

treatment. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 903.)1 As the People
acknowledge, such a delegation is improper. While in Smith, the Court of
Appeal remanded the matter to permit the trial court to determine whether
to require residential treatment (Smith, at p. 905), in this case, the People
maintain that we should “correct” the record to “reflect the correct term of
probation.” In reply, Stanberry agrees with the People that the probation
order should be modified to strike the residential treatment program
provision. In light of the parties’ agreement, we elect to strike the residential
treatment program provision rather than remand for further proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The probation condition requiring Stanberry to “Complete a program of
residential treatment and aftercare if directed by the probation officer,” as

1 As noted above, the trial court also ordered Stanberry to “participate in
substance abuse care within seven days if directed by a [probation officer]”
and to “enroll in substance abuse treatment if directed by [probation officer].”
Unlike the residential treatment order, the oral pronouncement regarding
these probation conditions is consistent with the clerk’s minutes and the
probation order; specifically, provision (c) under section 14 (“Further
Conditions”), reads: “enroll in and adhere to substance use treatment and
recovery services, as clinically indicated if directed by PO.” These conditions
have not been challenged and they remain unaffected by our opinion.

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listed on provision nine of the order granting formal probation, is stricken.
The order is otherwise affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.

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