CourtListener 10832498•People v. Jimenez CA4/1
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Filed 4/3/26 P. v. Jimenez CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086918
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2103205)
JOSEPH JIMENEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Timothy J. Hollenhorst, Judge. Affirmed.
Jill M. Klein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Joseph Jimenez had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, in addition to
several other mental illnesses, and had a history of experiencing auditory
hallucinations. In July 2021, he attended a movie with three of his friends.
The only other people in the theater were Rylee Goodrich and Anthony
Barajas, who were sitting several rows in front of Joseph and his friends.1
Partway through the movie, Joseph retrieved a gun from his car. Shortly
before the movie ended, Joseph’s friends left the theater because he was
acting strangely, and they felt uncomfortable. Joseph and his friends had
never interacted with the couple in front of them, but as the movie credits
began to roll, Joseph shot Goodrich and Barajas in the back of their heads,
took Goodrich’s wallet, and fled the theater.
Joseph pled not guilty by reason of insanity. During the bench trial,
Joseph testified that he had heard voices he thought were coming from
Goodrich and Barajas telling him they were going to get or kill him and his
friends and family. Although he struggled with the decision, he felt he had
no choice but to kill them before they harmed his loved ones. Joseph offered
the testimony of two expert forensic psychologists who opined that this
delusion overrode his sense of morality and, thus, he was not legally sane at
the time he committed the murders. The prosecution did not elicit any expert
testimony. The trial court found that Joseph was sane at the time he
committed the first degree premeditated murders and sentenced him to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murders plus 50 years
to life for two firearm enhancements.
On appeal, Joseph contends the evidence that he was insane at the
time of the murders was of such weight that the trial court could not
have reasonably rejected it, particularly where the People presented no
1 Because Joseph has the same surname as several of his siblings who
provided testimony during the trial, we use his first name for clarity. No
disrespect is intended.
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contrary medical testimony. In his view, the sanity finding was further based
on the trial court’s erroneous belief that his insanity defense required an
objective basis for his delusional beliefs. Accordingly, Joseph argues the
court’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
Under California’s governing standard for determining sanity, if
someone suffers from a delusion that causes them to believe others present
an imminent threat to their life or the lives of others, they can be found
legally insane if the facts as they perceive them would legally justify acting in
self-defense or defense of others. Because the court could find that Joseph’s
delusions as he described them did not present a threat of imminent harm to
himself or others, it could properly conclude they did not justify the killings
so as to absolve him of legal responsibility. Accordingly, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Joseph was sane
and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Joseph’s Family and Medical History
Joseph was the youngest of seven children, with six older sisters. One
sister, Rosa, described it as a close family and said Joseph was a playful,
funny, and caring child. His sisters described him and their mother as
inseparable. Joseph’s mother developed health problems during his early
preteen or teen years, and he would help take care of her. He was not as
close to his father, who was an alcoholic and verbally abusive. Sometimes he
would stand up to his father when he thought his father was out of line.
In the summer of 2019, Joseph’s mother developed a serious infection
and was on life support for two weeks. Joseph became quiet and angry
during this time. After the hospital discharged her and she went to stay with
another sister, Rosa described Joseph as being reclusive, depressed, and
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quiet. Another sister, Xochitl, said he stopped eating and probably lost 90
pounds.
Joseph’s mother suffered a severe heart attack in July 2020 that left
her brain dead, although she was kept on life support for some time. Joseph
was 19 years old at the time. Sister Daisy said Joseph started talking to
himself, and she became alarmed when he started saying, “They’re following
me. They’re going to kill me” each time a car passed. When Rosa saw Joseph
in August, she said he was acting “weird” and “paranoid.” He rambled
nonsensically and asked her to kill him. He also told her there were people
outside and then went out in the street and, “talking to nobody,” said, “I
know you’re looking at me. I’m right here. Come and get me.” She recalled
him talking about the Crips and the Bloods coming to cut him into pieces,
although to her knowledge, no one in the family had any gang affiliation.
Rosa called 911.
Based on what she was told, Rosa drove Joseph to Pacific Grove
Hospital on August 3, 2020, and he agreed to be admitted. Doctors there
diagnosed him with major depressive disorder, single episode, with psychotic
features. They noted he presented with worsening paranoia and thought
disorganization, believing people were out to kill him. Joseph recalled
thinking people at the hospital were going to kill him for his organs and body
parts. For that reason, he left against medical advice on August 8.
Joseph slept on a roof and was out on the streets until Daisy found him
two days later. He expressed surprise, and the first thing he said to her was
“I thought they killed you guys all.” He appeared stressed, anxious, manic,
and tired and was still saying nonsensical, paranoid things, so Rosa took him
to Loma Linda University Behavioral Medical Center. Joseph said he had
lost 180 pounds. Someone mentioned his excess skin at admission, and he
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became nervous they would take his skin for the black market. The staff
diagnosis was “[c]annabis-induced psychotic disorder with moderate or severe
use disorder with delusions” and prescribed medications to stabilize his
mood, aid in thought clarity, and help with insomnia.
Joseph was discharged from Loma Linda seven days later and moved
back in with his father. At some point in August, Joseph told two of his
sisters that they needed to kill him so they could have the money before
others came and turned him into a paraplegic.
Joseph’s mother died on December 23, 2020. Another sister, Cynthia,
and her children came to stay with him and his father. Five days later,
Joseph tried to kill his father. Cynthia heard her father struggling in the
other room and ran out to find Joseph choking him on the floor. As she
grabbed Joseph to pull him off, she described his face as blank. When she
asked him what was going on, he told her their father was trying to molest
her daughter, which she said never happened. Cynthia called the police.
Responding officers detained Joseph on a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 5150 hold following Cynthia’s report that her brother was
holding a knife and possibly schizophrenic. Officers took him to Riverside
University Health System, where he was diagnosed with schizophrenia,
cannabis dependence with psychotic disorder, and major depressive disorder.
Joseph told staff he was a Crip and his father was a Blood, and therefore he
had to kill his father. He was discharged on January 5, 2021.
Rosa spoke with a case worker about getting her brother admitted to a
facility for long term help. In February 2021, Daisy took Joseph to a facility
in Long Beach, where he reported that “[t]he voices are telling me to kill
people . . . [but] I don’t want to kill anyone” and that the voices had told him
to kill his father. They diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
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type. He was transferred to Southern California Hospital at Van Nuys but
discharged four days later.
In May or June 2021, Xochitl recalled being at a restaurant, and
Joseph kept looking over his shoulders and saying people were staring at
him, although he was not sure what they wanted. Another time, Joseph said
someone was coming after him and was going to cut his limbs. Xochitl once
heard him say, “I can’t do that. I can’t do that. . . . No, I can’t do that. That’s
my sister. No.”
Due to declining health, his father moved to Mexico in early July 2021,
leaving Joseph alone. The father passed away the next month.
B. Joseph Shoots Goodrich and Barajas at the Movie Theater
On the evening of July 26, 2021, Joseph met up with three friends—
Carlos G., Julian V., and Ramon F.—at a restaurant in Corona, California.
Ramon said when Joseph arrived at the restaurant, he told Ramon he had a
“strap” in his satchel, referring to the gun. Ramon did not believe him
because Joseph had been saying many things that did not make sense over
the preceding days. While they were at the restaurant, Joseph never
indicated anyone was threatening him or expressed concern for his friends’
safety. But he mumbled, gave strange responses to conversation, stared off,
and acted weirdly when it was time to pay.
When they reached the theater building, Carlos told Joseph he did not
think Joseph needed his bag because he did not think bags were allowed in
the theater. He did not ask what was in the bag, and Joseph returned it to
his car. Carlos and Joseph walked to the concession counter while the others
went to the restroom, and Carlos presented their tickets to the young female
employee. Carlos heard Joseph ask the woman for her phone number. He
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walked away when she started providing her number, and he thought Joseph
was still talking to the girl when he returned from the restroom.
Eventually they entered the theater, walking past the only other two
people there, later identified as Goodrich and Barajas. Joseph and his
friends sat in the back row. After they had been in the theater for about 15
minutes, Joseph switched to the seat to the left of Carlos. He did not explain
why, but Carlos could hear him mumbling constantly to himself. Carlos
asked if he was okay, and Joseph said he was fine. Joseph then half turned
his body toward his friends and mumbled in their direction. Carlos heard
him say, “I can’t do this this to them” a few times.
Ramon also noticed that Joseph continued to shift his attention
between the screen and the three friends. Eventually he fixated just on his
friends and seemed to Ramon to be directing all his mumbling and staring at
them. Ramon waved his hand in front of Joseph and pointed at the screen,
but Joseph did not respond.
About an hour to an hour and a half into the movie, Joseph stood up
and left without saying anything. He walked down the stairs past Goodrich
and Barajas, but did not interact with them or walk with any sense of
urgency. While he was gone, Carlos told Julian and Ramon he felt
uncomfortable because Joseph had been mumbling in his ear the whole time.
Joseph returned 10 to 15 minutes later, again walking normally. He did not
react to the couple or interact with them in any way as he passed.
Joseph returned with his bag. He sat and stared at an area right in
front of where they were sitting, although not at Goodrich and Barajas.
Ramon was concerned for his safety, so he took Joseph’s bag and passed it
down to Carlos. After the bag was passed around for a bit, Joseph stood up
and said, “I’m going to leave.” Ramon returned the bag thinking Joseph
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would leave, but then he sat back down and put his hand in the bag. He kept
looking between the movie and his friends, and Carlos heard him say, “I can’t
do this to them” one more time. Ramon felt “weirded out” so he said he was
going to the restroom and left. Carlos had also started feeling uncomfortable
and unsafe around Joseph, so he told Julian he was leaving. Carlos then told
Joseph they were going to check on Ramon and asked if he wanted to join
them. Joseph said no, and they left. Ramon did not recall Joseph ever
signaling to them to leave.
Carlos went home, and Ramon and Julian drove to another area of the
parking lot to watch and see if Joseph left. About 15 minutes later, Joseph
sprinted out of the theater, got in his car, and peeled out, running stop signs
on his way.
The movie ended at about 11:40 p.m., and an usher discovered
Goodrich and Barajas. Both had been shot in the back of their head.
Goodrich was sitting upright, and Barajas was on the ground. The manager
called 911, and the operator instructed them to lay Goodrich flat so they
could attempt to resuscitate her. By the time they laid her down, emergency
responders had arrived and took over. Goodrich died at the scene. Barajas
was transported to the hospital and later succumbed to his injuries.
After hearing about the shooting the next day, the three friends decided
to go to the police and let them know Joseph had been “acting weird” during
the movie.
The next morning, Joseph sent a text message to four of his sisters and
his father reading, “Watch out, hell’s blood.” It did not make sense to Rosa,
so she called him. Joseph was very energetic and asked if he could come over
because he needed to talk to her. She said he asked, “Are you guys okay?
Just want to make sure that you’re okay. You know, just making sure that
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they haven’t got you. How are the kids? Are the kids good?” Rosa reached
out to Daisy, who agreed to go pick him up and take him to another mental
institution. When she arrived, Joseph was in the middle of the road saying
there were trucks following him. He appeared stressed, unfocused, confused,
and scared, and was carrying a BB gun. He said, “They’re following me,” but
he did not clarify who he was referring to. She called 911 and turned him
over to police with an explanation about his mental health issues, not
knowing what he had done.
C. Joseph’s Testimony
Joseph testified that he started using cannabis at age 16 and usually
smoked or vaped three to four times daily. He had three jobs after high
school but was fired from one for smoking marijuana at work.
At some point after getting fired, Joseph started feeling like people
were following him every time he drove somewhere. Then, after using
cannabis, he started hearing voices from outside his apartment and seeing
lasers in his room. Joseph continued to hear voices and concluded that their
names were Ryan and Abigail. The female voice helped him, but the male
voice scared him.
After the first two hospitalizations, Joseph recalled being prescribed
two medications, but said he did not think they worked because he still heard
voices when taking them. As a result, he did not always take them as
prescribed. He claimed he stopped smoking marijuana until the morning of
December 23, 2020, when his mother passed away.
Joseph explained that he attacked his father because the voice he
called Abigail told him he needed to kill his father, or someone would get him
and his family. Initially, Joseph grabbed a kitchen knife but then put it down
because “[t]hat’s something that you don’t do” to your father. Instead, he
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decided to choke him with a broom handle, which he thought would be less
painful. His father pushed him away, so he tried again with his hands. He
cried the whole time because he did not want to hurt his father. He
remembered Cynthia telling him to stop, but he did not recall her pulling him
off his father or having said his father was going to molest Cynthia’s
daughter.
After being released from Riverside Hospital, Joseph returned to the
apartment alone. His father had moved out, ultimately moving to a trailer on
the same property. Eventually, he moved into the trailer with his father. He
took his medication for a few months but then stopped. He was hearing
voices and seeing red dots again.
Joseph described the day before the shooting as a regular day, although
he did hear more voices than usual. On July 26, 2021, he went out to eat
with his friends Carlos, Ramon, and Julian. He recalled telling his friends he
heard a male voice in the kitchen making food and that the guy was out to
get him. He had his satchel with him; inside the satchel was a gun loaded
with seven rounds. About a month earlier he bought the pistol online along
with a drum magazine capable of holding 50 to 100 bullets. He wanted
protection from the voices and the people who were following him. He
testified that he knew it was “completely wrong” to purchase the gun and to
carry a concealed weapon, but he did it anyway even though the voices were
not telling him to buy them. He had been regularly carrying the gun with
him.
Joseph went with his friends to the movie theater, but he testified that
he did not pay attention to the movie because he was listening to and talking
to the voices he was hearing. A voice told him that if he did not kill “us”—
meaning the people sitting in front of him in the theater—they were going to
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kill Joseph’s friends and family. Joseph looked to his right every time he
heard this threat and said Carlos would nod his head like he was saying yes.
Because he felt threatened, Joseph retrieved his gun from the car and sat
with his hand on the gun inside the bag. At that point, he started seeing
lasers on the theater walls.
He continued to hear voices threatening him, and he offered conflicting
testimony about whether the voices were coming from the male and female
sitting three to four rows in front of them or from Abigail and another
unknown voice near the couple. They did not turn around, and he never
interacted with them. Joseph did not really know what to make of it, but he
said he was not afraid of the victims. On the other hand, he said he felt
uneasy because they were making threats, and he thought the laser dots may
have been from handguns the victims were carrying. When asked if he felt
the voices “were expressing a sense of urgency” at that point, he responded,
“No.”
Joseph made a motion with his head to his friends to indicate they
should leave because he had decided what he was going to do to the people in
front of them. He had the impression his friends were anxious and scared,
and Ramon took the gun away from him. However, Joseph eventually
grabbed it back.
According to Joseph, the voices and red dots stopped toward the end of
the movie. When the movie credits started and the lights turned on, he fired
his pistol. He said he did not do it until the end of the movie because he was
struggling mentally with whether to kill them or not. He did not remember if
he felt he had a choice because he said the hallucinations were worse at night
and had prevented him from sleeping for a couple of weeks. He later
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acknowledged that part of the reason he had not been sleeping was he was
consuming a lot of energy drinks.
Defense counsel asked if, outside of this context, Joseph knew that
killing people was bad, and Joseph said, “Yes, I do.” Then counsel asked why
he felt it was okay in this case. Joseph replied, “I wouldn’t say I felt it was
okay, it’s just it just had like—it was just like, how do I say this? The lack of
sleep and insomnia, so I wasn’t really like clearly picturing it.” He did “not
necessarily” feel like they were a threat up until the point when he shot them
but said he “wasn’t thinking.” He repeatedly said he was “in the heat of the
moment.” He did not believe he had to shoot them, but rather it was an idea
the voices gave him, and he said it was a choice he made after struggling with
the decision. At one point during his internal debate, he started crying. He
acknowledged that part of the reason he was crying was because he knew it
was potentially morally wrong to kill people. When asked if it felt the same
as playing a shooter video game, Joseph said it felt different and real.
He said he shot the male first because he was closer and then shot the
female and grabbed her wallet. Later, he amended his answer and stated
that he shot Goodrich first. He thought he recalled the wallet being on the
ground and said it was just a “sudden reaction” that made him grab it. He
offered conflicting testimony as to whether he had to step over Barajas—who
at some point started screaming and crying—to reach the wallet. He
admitted he knew when he took the wallet that he had shot two innocent
victims. He saw the female victim moving, so he fired another shot before
running out.
After shooting them, he experienced “a lot of adrenaline,” and felt
nervous and scared. He ran because he “knew what [he] did was not right.”
He ran out a fire exit to his car and drove home. At some point, he removed
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cash from Goodrich’s wallet and put it in his own wallet. When his attorney
later asked if he took the wallet because he wanted to know who the people
were that he had just shot, he replied, “Not really.”
Later that evening, the voices started again and told him to go to
downtown Los Angeles and rob people, although he did not obey them this
time. He said he was not concerned when his sister later called the police
because he “was not in the right state of mind” and “wasn’t thinking.” He
said he did not feel anything when the police arrived.
Regarding both the shooting and the strangling of his father, Joseph
said he knew beforehand that the conduct was wrong, but he committed the
acts anyway because the voices made him feel he and his family were being
threatened. After he shot the people in the theater, however, he did not feel
at all relieved or like the problem had been solved. He said three or four days
later, he felt remorse, regret, and guilt.
Police officers interrogated Joseph on July 27. He explained that he
was not initially honest with the police because the voices were telling him he
did not do it. Eventually he was honest with the police. He knew he had
done something wrong.
Although Joseph said he last smoked marijuana the day his mother
died and had given up alcohol, the prosecution showed videos of Joseph
vaping marijuana and drinking on several occasions between January and
July of 2021.
D. Initial Charges and Pleas
The District Attorney of the County of Riverside charged Joseph with
two counts of first degree murder while lying in wait. (Pen. Code,2 §§ 187,
subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) As to each count, the information alleged a
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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multiple murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and that Joseph
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing death
(§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) Joseph initially pled not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity as to both counts, but subsequently
entered a new plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. He waived his right to
a jury trial on both the issues of guilt and sanity and admitted the allegations
against him.
E. Dr. Jennifer Bosch’s Testimony
Defense counsel first offered the opinion of Dr. Jennifer Bosch, a
forensic psychologist with 24 years of experience working with the courts and
examining criminally accused individuals. After reviewing Joseph’s medical
records from five mental health-related hospitalizations, police reports,
witness and family statements, jail records, and the results of her own
examination and testing, Bosch diagnosed Joseph with schizophrenia,
generalized anxiety disorder, and cannabis use disorder. She did not find any
indication of sociopathic tendencies or narcissism. She indicated that one
test placed him at a borderline level for malingering but said that ultimately
her review of his patient history and other materials ruled out malingering.
Dr. Bosch explained that the positive symptoms of schizophrenia
include hallucinations, delusions, paranoia, disorganized thoughts, and
disorganized behavior. Negative symptoms include having a flat and blunted
affect, using fewer words to articulate thoughts, lacking the ability to feel and
experience pleasure in activities the individual previously enjoyed, and
lacking interest in socializing. She explained that medication generally helps
stop the positive symptoms but often does not alleviate, or even worsens, the
negative ones.
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Schizophrenia also leads to cognitive impairments. Dr. Bosch listed
memory impairment, inability to focus and concentrate, and impaired
reasoning and decisionmaking as examples. She said part of the inability to
focus stems from the fact they are attending to the “clutter,” such as voices,
occurring internally. According to Bosch, the age of onset in males is
typically around 18 to 20 years old.
Stress, including the death of a parent, and drug use can trigger the
onset of schizophrenia. Although chronic marijuana use can cause similar
psychosis, Dr. Bosch explained that the symptoms diminish when the person
is no longer using, whereas they do not with schizophrenia. She also noted
that people with drug-induced psychosis typically report more paranoia and
visual hallucinations and have some insight into the behavior, while those
with schizophrenia experience more voices and disorganized behavior. But
cannabis use disorder can accentuate paranoia, delusions, and some of the
negative symptoms of schizophrenia. Bosch opined that Joseph lacked
insight into his mental illness; he did not believe that he suffered from a
mental illness or needed medication.
In Dr. Bosch’s view, schizophrenia was a major contributing factor to
the assault on his father. She noted he experienced command hallucinations
and was not able to ward off the voices. When presented with a hypothetical
based on the assault where Joseph struggled with whether to do it, Bosch
opined that Joseph knew what he was doing and knew the act was morally
wrong. But because of these firmly held delusional beliefs and voices, he felt
he had no choice but to engage in that behavior despite knowing that the acts
were not lawful. When asked to consider the same hypothetical where the
command voices told him that if he did not kill his father, his father might
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kill him or his family, Bosch believed Joseph could decide it was the morally
right thing to do even though it was legally wrong.
Turning to the night of the movie, Joseph’s testimony that he was only
able to focus five percent of his attention on the movie indicated to Dr. Bosch
that his schizophrenia symptoms were active—there was so much going on
internally that he could not attend to the outside world. She explained that
lack of sleep can exacerbate symptoms of schizophrenia, and said she was
aware Joseph had been sleeping very little in the days leading up to the
shooting.
Dr. Bosch believed that Joseph made the decision to end two people’s
lives because he felt there was a threat of more dire consequences if he did
not do so. When asked if her opinion would change if Joseph realized seconds
later that the individuals he shot were innocent, Bosch said no. She said he
weighed the consequences, did not feel he had a choice, and believed he was
doing the morally right thing. The fact that he ran from the scene afterward
did not change her view because he knew that killing was legally wrong and
would have consequences, but he still viewed it as the less morally wrong
path.
Dr. Bosch acknowledged that Joseph did not tell the detectives who
interviewed him after the shooting that he heard voices. But he did tell them
he took Goodrich’s wallet because he wanted to know who was threatening
him. The prosecutor then offered Bosch a hypothetical in which Joseph
realized after shooting Goodrich and Barajas that they were innocent and
what he did was morally wrong, but he stepped over a screaming Barajas to
pick up the wallet before sprinting out of the theater, leaving, and removing
Goodrich’s money from the wallet. Counsel asked if Joseph was acting under
a delusion regarding taking the wallet. Bosch expressed confusion as to
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whether the hypothetical was meant to exclude what Joseph had said to her.
The prosecutor said yes, and told her “There were no voices telling,
prompting him to do this, to take the wallet, okay? There is no—there is no
delusions that he’s—somebody’s following him or there’s some sort of threat
around him. There is no evidence of any paranoia whatsoever.” He said they
were just talking about taking the wallet. She responded that she would
argue from his statements that “there was some paranoia there” and “you
can’t turn on and off.” When asked if she could give an opinion, she said, “my
opinion would be contaminated knowing what was told to me, knowing that
we have cognitive limitations, knowing all the studies on memory just for the
basic everyday person, and we’re talking two years later, I would be hard
pressed to answer that question.” She elaborated that her struggle was with
answering a hypothetical where the person never had a mental illness.
The next day, the prosecutor posed the hypothetical again, and
Dr. Bosch asked, “do we know anything about previous mental health
issues?” The prosecutor replied that the hypothetical was about Joseph, as
she believed him to be, with delusions, hallucinations, and schizophrenia.
Under those circumstances, she said she would have had a discussion with
Joseph about why he took the wallet.
On redirect, defense counsel asked about the hypothetical to the extent
it asked her to consider the impact of the hallucinations stopping 10 to 15
minutes before the shooting. Dr. Bosch explained that delusions are fixed
beliefs, despite evidence to prove the contrary, and that a person under a
delusion will say the contrary evidence has been tampered with or is false.
So, even if there are periods when the voices stop, the delusional ideation
continues.
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Defense counsel also asked whether Joseph’s generalized anxiety
disorder further complicated his cognitive function and ability to recognize
other options such as calling 911, talking to security, or leaving the theater.
Dr. Bosch said it absolutely did—that he experienced a buildup of pressure
and anxiety and felt this was the only option, even though he was not
necessarily happy about the option. Just as with the attack on his father, she
said his mental defects overrode his sense of morality. In her view, Joseph
unquestionably met the legal requirements for insanity—she did not consider
this case a close call. Given his history, the records, her interview, and his
presentation, she also ruled out robbery as a motivating factor for the crimes.
F. Dr. Harry Goldberg’s Testimony
Defense counsel next offered the testimony of Dr. Harry Goldberg, a
psychologist who had worked on court-related forensic psychology matters
since 1986 and interviewed over one thousand individuals who had pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity to criminal charges or already been
adjudicated legally insane. Goldberg noted that he testifies on behalf of the
prosecution 90 percent of the time.
Dr. Goldberg diagnosed Joseph with schizoaffective disorder, depressed
type, and moderate cannabis use disorder. He explained that schizoaffective
disorder is different from schizophrenia in that, besides just having a thought
disorder, the individual has depression or mania. He indicated that
marijuana use can trigger or activate schizophrenia and can then exacerbate
the thought disorder and affective symptoms like depression. Like Dr. Bosch,
Goldberg said Joseph’s sleep disorder could also exacerbate the symptoms of
his thought disorder. He found very little evidence of any antisocial
personality condition. He agreed losing his mother may have accelerated the
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onset of Joseph’s schizophrenia, but said he would have developed it at some
point.
Dr. Goldberg believed Joseph had a general framework of morality.
With regard to the attack on his father, he thought Joseph struggled with the
morality of killing somebody and not really wanting to do so, but also with
the higher morality of believing that if he did not, something more terrible
would happen. In other words, because he was acting in defense of his
family, his schizophrenia overcame his usual sense of morality.
As to the night of the shooting, Dr. Goldberg opined that even though
the hallucinations may have stopped, Joseph still experienced the threat and
feeling of being compelled to act. In his view, Joseph’s history demonstrated
that he would not likely ask for help or call 911 because it was not something
he usually did, and he was lost in his own distorted thoughts and perceptions
of reality. When asked if Joseph’s painful deliberations that even brought
him to tears indicated to him that Joseph was struggling with the morality of
it, he said yes. But in the moments leading up to the offenses, Goldberg did
not believe Joseph had the ability to accurately discern between right and
wrong. He explained that in cases like this, he did not usually get an
accounting of how the individual was acting right before the incident. But
here, his three friends indicated he was acting in a very unusual manner that
made them afraid for their lives. Given all the evidence of his mental state
prior to the crime, Goldberg did not view this as a borderline case as to
whether Joseph met the standard for the criminally insane.
It did not change his opinion to learn that Joseph stated he felt sadness
and even regret immediately after shooting the people. While witnessing
what presumably was a gruesome scene could have changed his state of mind
briefly, Dr. Goldberg noted that Joseph was still hallucinating about robbing
19
someone later that evening and demonstrating psychiatrically unstable
behavior with his sister the next day. He did not think this indicated Joseph
knew he was doing something wrong at the moment he committed the act.
When asked if the fact that Joseph took the wallet and removed money
from it changed his opinion as to what caused him to kill the victims,
Dr. Goldberg said no. He did not believe it created a more probable motive
than schizophrenia because Joseph did not take Barajas’s wallet or
possessions and it was not a logical way to rob someone, so it simply
demonstrated the bizarre nature of the crime.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked him, over defense
objection, to assume a hypothetical where the voices were instead telling
Joseph to rob the female and kill them to get a wallet and asked if Joseph
would know that was morally wrong to do. Dr. Goldberg responded that it
would not rise to the level of insanity because it was not something Joseph
had to do to protect himself or his family. Through several additional
hypotheticals, Goldberg clarified that an insanity finding required the
individual to be committing the crime of killing someone to defend themself
or their family. The prosecutor implied the incident with his father was
different because the voices were incessant and Joseph believed there was an
imminent threat of great bodily injury or death, whereas the voices had
ceased at the theater. But Goldberg viewed that situation as “exactly
parallel” to the shooting in that Joseph did not think there was “a way out”
except to kill.
What carried the most weight for Dr. Goldberg was the objective
evidence of Joseph’s behavior versus his statements. He observed that
Joseph was very passive and wanted to please people, so his answers to open-
20
ended questions were more likely to be accurate. He did not strike Goldberg
as deceptive or callous or manipulative.
G. The Trial Court’s Decision
The trial court began by acknowledging there was no dispute that
Joseph suffers from schizophrenia and has a well-documented history of
hallucinations, delusions, mania, and depression. Although it recognized
that Joseph was not regularly taking his medication and made his mental
health issues worse with habitual marijuana consumption, the court stated
that Joseph’s use of drugs had no impact on its findings.
In deciding whether Joseph was capable of knowing and understanding
that his act was wrong, the evidence of Joseph taking Goodrich’s wallet
shortly after the killings “had a significant impact” on the court’s findings. It
noted there was no break in the chain between when he fired the shots and
when he walked by or over Barajas, who was still alive, to retrieve Goodrich’s
wallet before running away. Of interest to the court was how this
information impacted the experts’ opinions that Joseph was not capable of
knowing that the shooting was morally wrong. The court explained that
Dr. Bosch said she could not answer because her opinion was contaminated
by the fact that Joseph had told her something different about his motivation
in taking the wallet. Because she was unable or reluctant to offer an opinion
about a fact the court found significant, the court assumed her ultimate
opinion had changed and discounted her ultimate opinion accordingly.
As to Dr. Goldberg, the court said he simply asserted the fact did not
weigh heavily in his opinion. The court indicated it could not understand
how committing a separate crime did not affect the expert’s opinion one way
or the other. In the court’s view, either a delusion told Joseph to take the
wallet or it was a thoughtful action because he wanted or needed money (or
21
had some other reason the court would not speculate about). In stating that
the wallet aspect of the crimes had little bearing on his opinion, the court
found Dr. Goldberg undermined his own credibility.
In addition to the signs of Joseph’s mental illness surrounding the
events, the court:
“considered the circumstances before, during, and after the
offenses, including the defendant’s seemingly normal interaction
with a female concession stand worker at the movie theater
shortly before the shooting; his physical actions of gesturing his
friends to leave the theater prior to shooting because, in his
words, he knew he was going to do something; fleeing the theater
through the emergency exit immediately after the killings; racing
out of the parking lot, as well as a wide range of statements the
defendant has made that included not saying anything about
hearing voices to law enforcement shortly after his arrest for
these crimes.”
In rejecting the theory that Joseph acted in self-defense, the court used
People v. Leeds (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 822 (Leeds) for guidance. However,
because Goodrich and Barajas were facing away from Joseph and never had
any contact with him, the court found “there is not a shred of objective
evidence to show that Mr. Joseph was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily injury from Barajas or Goodrich.”
The court also rejected the self-defense claim because Joseph testified
the voices that he heard threatening him did not even belong to Barajas and
Goodrich and, although he said he shot at Goodrich twice because she was
still moving after the first shot, he only shot Barajas once even though he
clearly was not deceased after the first shot. Moreover, the court noted that
when his own attorney asked why he committed the murders, Joseph said it
was due to lack of sleep, it was in the heat of the moment, he was not
22
thinking, and he struggled with the decision because he knew it was wrong to
kill people.
After weighing the evidence, the court concluded Joseph understood the
moral wrongfulness of his actions and failed to meet his burden of proving
insanity.
The court sentenced Joseph to life without the possibility of parole for
the two murders plus enhancements to each count of 25 years to life for
personal use of a firearm.
DISCUSSION
The only question on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s determination that Joseph was sane at the time he
committed the murders. We conclude that it does.
A. Legal Principles and the Standard of Review
Individuals who are “mentally incapacitated” are not considered
capable of committing crimes. (§ 26.) “Mental incapacity under section 26 is
determined by the M’Naghten test [M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng.Rep. 718,
722] for legal insanity provided in section 25, subdivision (b).” (People v.
Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 955 (Powell).) This test provides that, “[i]n any
criminal proceeding . . . in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is
entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused
person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was
incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her
act [or] of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of
the offense.” (§ 25, subd. (b); People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 777, 782
(Skinner) [concluding that despite § 25, subd. (b)’s use of the word “and,” it
reinstated the M’Naghten test, which requires a defendant to prove one or the
other prong of the test to demonstrate insanity].) “[A] defendant may suffer
23
from a diagnosable mental illness without being legally insane under the
M’Naghten standard.” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 672.)
An individual suffering from delusions may be found incapable of
appreciating the wrongfulness of his or her conduct. (Skinner, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 781.) As the judges who first formulated the M’Naghten test
explained, if the defendant “ ‘labors under such partial delusion only, and is
not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same
situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion
exists were real. For example, if under the influence of his delusion he
supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and
he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence [sic], he would be exempt
from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a
serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for
such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.’ ” (Id. at p. 781,
fn. 13 quoting M’Naghten’s Case, supra, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 211 [8 Eng.
Rep. 718, 723].)
We review a finding of sanity for substantial evidence. (Powell, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 957.) A sanity finding is supported by substantial evidence if
the appellate court finds, after reviewing the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determination, that “it is supported by evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant sane by a preponderance of the evidence.”
(Ibid.)
B. Analysis
As the trial court recognized, it was undisputed that Joseph suffered
from a mental illness and had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. There also
appeared to be no dispute at trial as to the first prong of the M’Naghten
24
test—that Joseph knew and understood the nature and quality of his act.
(See Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 782.) In Skinner, the court found
evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant was aware of
the nature and quality of his homicidal act because “[h]e knew that he was
committing an act of strangulation that would, and was intended to, kill a
human being.” (Skinner, at p. 778.) Defense testimony here likewise
demonstrates that Joseph understood that guns kill people, and that shooting
Goodrich and Barajas would end their lives. For example, Joseph testified
that he bought the gun for protection. Although a voice told him that if he
did not kill Goodrich and Barajas, they were going to kill Joseph’s friends and
family, he did not shoot them until the end of the movie because he was
struggling mentally with whether to kill them or not. In other words, he
understood that if he shot them, they would die. Thus, this is not akin to a
case where the defendant experienced a blackout and was unaware of what
happened. (See People v. Richardson (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 166, 173.)
Moreover, Dr. Bosch testified that Joseph made the decision to end two
people’s lives. Most significantly, Joseph’s counsel conceded in his closing
argument that the first prong was not grounds for insanity, acknowledging
that Joseph knew what he was doing and understood that he was going to kill
someone. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion
that Joseph understood the nature and quality of his homicidal act.
This leaves the second prong of the M’Naghten test as the only path to
a finding of insanity. Cases applying M’Naghten have delineated two
primary routes to an insanity finding based on the defendant’s inability to
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the crime. First, there are cases
like Skinner where the defendant knew killing his wife was homicidal, but
did not think it was wrong because it was sanctified by God’s will and desire.
25
(Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 770, 783.) No one has argued that a higher
power led Joseph to believe the killings were morally justified in this case.
He believed the voices belonged to Abigail and an unknown male and
concluded they were somehow coming from the people sitting in front of him.
Furthermore, he testified that he knew killing people was wrong and,
specifically, morally wrong. And Dr. Goldberg conditioned his insanity
finding on there being a threat of something bad happening to Joseph or his
loved ones, not on the killings being ordained by a higher power.
The second category of cases are those asserting an insanity defense
akin to self-defense. As the M’Naghten court itself made clear, “ ‘if under the
influence of [a] delusion [the defendant] supposes another man to be in the
act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes
in self-defense, he would be exempt from punishment.’ ” (People v. Rittger
(1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 (Rittger) quoting M’Naghten’s Case, supra,
8 Eng.Rep. at p. 723.)
This is the primary argument upon which Joseph’s insanity defense
appears to rely. The thrust of the argument is that his delusions led him to
believe he had to kill Goodrich and Barajas because they had threatened his
friends and family. On a few occasions, he also mentioned that the voices
had threatened to kill him. “A claim of unreasonable self-defense based
solely on delusion is quintessentially a claim of insanity under the M’Naghten
standard of inability to distinguish right from wrong.” (People v. Elmore
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 140 (Elmore).) “Its rationale is that mental illness
caused the defendant to perceive an illusory threat, form an actual belief in
26
the need to kill in self-defense, and act on that belief without wrongful
intent.”3 (Ibid.)
The problem here is Joseph’s asserted delusional belief that there was a
“need” to kill the victims. Both perfect and imperfect self-defense require an
actual belief in the need to defend oneself or others against imminent death
or great bodily injury. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.)
“To satisfy the imminence requirement, ‘[f]ear of future harm—no matter
how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm—will
not suffice.’ ” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 270.)
The trial court here focused on whether there was objective evidence
that Joseph was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from
Barajas or Goodrich. That is not the test. (See Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
p. 146.) More to the point, however, is that here there is substantial evidence
to indicate that Joseph did not subjectively believe he or his loved ones were
in imminent danger.
As an initial matter, Joseph contends there is no imminence
requirement where a defendant seeks to prove insanity based on a delusional
belief. He suggests “[t]his is because an insanity defense is based on whether
a defendant was incapable of understanding the nature and quality of his act
3 One standard California jury instruction specifically extends this
principal to defense of others. Based upon Leeds, CALJIC 4.06 provides, “In
the case of [murder] . . . , if the facts the defendant perceived as a product of
the delusion would have justified the exercise of self-defense, or defense of
others, the defendant would be not guilty by reason of insanity, if the
defendant’s acts would have been justified had the perceived facts been real.”
(CALJIC No. 4.06 (2016).) The Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury
Instructions do not spell out the insane delusion rule in one jury instruction,
but do contain instructions covering the concepts of insanity, self-defense,
defense of others, and imperfect self-defense. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3450, 505,
571 (2025).)
27
or distinguishing right from wrong, and not on the objective characteristics of
the delusional threat.” Indeed, it appears the trial court made this error in
focusing on whether there was objective evidence that Joseph was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from Barajas or Goodrich.
That again is not the test. (See Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 146.)
But that does not mean that imminence is entirely irrelevant, as
Joseph seems to suggest. Rather, the imminence of the threat must be
assessed not on an objective basis consistent with reality, but from the
perspective of the defendant’s subjective belief consistent with his claimed
delusion. In the terminology of M’Naghten, the adequacy of the threat is
assessed based on the facts as the defendant “supposes” them to be.
On this point, Leeds, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 822 is instructive. In
Leeds, the defendant had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. (Id.
at p. 825.) He believed a Mexican drug cartel had infiltrated his family’s
business and that several of the business’s employees were working together
to turn it into a drug delivery business. (Id. at pp. 826–827.) After hearing
voices on the business’s walkie-talkies discussing how they were going to kill
him, Leeds prepared himself with a gun. (Id. at p. 826.)
When his father kicked down the door to the office Leeds was in, Leeds
thought he was brandishing a gun and shot him. (Leeds, supra,
240 Cal.App.4th at p. 826.) He then located and shot the other three
victims—the first was 20 to 30 feet away and walking in the other direction,
the second was running away, and the third was sitting on an idling tractor
with nothing in his hands. (Id. at p. 829.) Afterwards, he fled toward the
perimeter of the property, discarded his gun and outer clothing, and
attempted to scale a fence. (Id. at p. 827–828.) Charged with four counts of
first degree murder, Leeds pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. But a
28
jury found him sane and Leeds appealed, claiming instructional error in the
sanity phase.
Consistent with our conclusions, Leeds held that “[t]he sanity verdicts
turned on whether Leeds actually believed he was defending himself from
imminent peril, and thus could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his
actions, rather than on whether his belief was reasonable in light of the
objective circumstances.” (Leeds, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 832–833.)
Agreeing with Leeds that the jury instructions were erroneous, the appellate
court found that the error was prejudicial as to only one of the four victims—
Leeds’s father—because the evidence indicated that only he was shot in
response to an imminent perceived lethal threat. (Id. at p. 833.)
Consistent with Leeds and accepting that Joseph was operating under
the delusion that Goodrich and Barajas were threatening to kill him and/or
his loved ones, the court could find that this threat was not imminent.4
Joseph’s own testimony supported this conclusion. He left the theater 60 to
90 minutes into the movie to retrieve his gun, but did not shoot Goodrich and
Barajas until the end of the movie. Joseph said he signaled to his friends
during the movie by moving his head to indicate they should leave because he
had decided what he was going to do to the people in front of them. But the
4 The prior incident with Joseph’s father may have been similar to
Leeds’s killing of his own father because both victims were directly in front of
the defendants and, in their delusional view, posed an imminent threat to
them or, in Joseph’s case, his loved ones. But the killing of Goodrich and
Barajas was more like Leeds’s shooting of the other three employees. Joseph
observed Goodrich and Barajas to be sitting several rows away and facing
away from him. None of Joseph’s friends or relatives were in the theater, and
he knew he could safely exit as he had already done once before. Joseph’s
verbal hallucinations had abated, and even though he had already made the
decision about what he was going to do, he waited at least 10 to 15 minutes
before shooting them in the back of their heads.
29
voices were not expressing a sense of urgency, and he waited another 10 to 15
minutes—until after the movie ended and while the credits were rolling—
before shooting the couple.5 He also said the voices stopped before the movie
ended, and he did not know what would happen if he refused to kill Goodrich
and Barajas. Finally, although the threats were primarily directed at his
friends and family, Joseph knew none of them were present in the theater at
that point. This evidence suggests that although Joseph may have perceived
a threat, he did not view it as imminent.
To the extent he felt the voices had threatened him specifically, he
could have elected to leave the theater, having done so once already.
Furthermore, Joseph acknowledged that he never interacted with the couple,
that they never turned around, that he observed them to be seated several
rows away from him, and that he shot them in the back of the head. He
never claimed any visual hallucinations that they were physically closer to
him or looking at him. None of this suggests he perceived an imminent
threat to himself. Joseph also explained that he did “not necessarily” feel like
they were a threat up until the point when he shot them but said he “wasn’t
thinking.” Later he testified that he did not believe he had to shoot them, but
rather it was an idea the voices gave him, and he said it was a choice he
made after struggling with the decision.
His friends’ testimony also does not reflect that Joseph perceived an
imminent threat from Goodrich and Barajas. The layout of the theater
required Joseph to walk down a set of stairs past where the couple was
sitting to exit the theater. Yet both Ramon and Carlos testified that Joseph
did not interact with the couple when he walked in or out of the theater,
5 Ramon confirmed this timeframe, testifying that they waited outside
for 10 to 15 minutes before seeing Joseph run out.
30
gesture to his friends in the reference to the couple, or walk with a sense of
urgency as he passed them. Joseph also did not express any kind of concern
for his friends, or say anything such as “be careful” or “you guys need to get
out of here.” His friends felt he was staring at or just past them, as opposed
to at the couple.
Joseph points to his testimony that at some point he saw “little laser
dots” and believed the two people in the theater were carrying handguns.
While this might be some evidence in support of his argument, in light of all
the other evidence it hardly compels a conclusion that he subjectively
perceived an imminent threat.
In support of his insanity argument, Joseph relies primarily on the
expert testimony that the auditory hallucinations compelled him to believe he
was morally justified in carrying out the shooting. According to Joseph, as
“[b]oth Drs. Bosch and Goldberg explained, even if the voices waned, the
delusional belief that there was a threat, and that there was a need to act,
persisted.” Plaintiff contends this is the rare case where the expert evidence
of insanity is uncontested and, thus, the question on appeal is not so much
the substantiality of the evidence favoring the trier of fact’s finding as
whether the evidence contrary to that finding is of such weight and character
that the trier of fact could not reasonably reject it. (See Powell, supra, 5
Cal.5th at p. 956, citing People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 351 (Drew);
People v. McCarrick (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 227, 247–248.)
As an initial matter, a court is not required to reach a verdict that
comports with expert opinion. (Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 350.) In fact, our
high court has frequently upheld verdicts which found a defendant to be sane
in the face of contrary unanimous expert opinion. (Ibid.) As in all cases
involving expert testimony, the trier of fact may assess the material upon
31
which the opinion is based and the reasoning that purportedly justifies the
expert’s opinion. (Id. at pp. 350–351.)
Here, both experts grounded their opinions on the fact that Joseph
believed his friends and family were being threatened, but both experts also
implied that the threat to Joseph’s friends and family was not so much
imminent as inevitable. Both experts were probed as to whether it impacted
their insanity opinions that Joseph said the voices ceased 10 to 15 minutes
before the shooting. Dr. Bosch explained that delusions are fixed beliefs, so
even if the voices stopped, the delusional ideation continues. As a result,
Joseph felt this was his only option, and his mental illnesses prevented him
from recognizing other options such as leaving the theater. Bosch opined
that his mental defects overrode his sense of morality.
Dr. Goldberg agreed that even after the hallucinations stopped, the
perceived threat remained, as did Joseph’s feeling that he was compelled to
act. Goldberg said hallucinations and delusions may decrease in intensity,
but they are still there. In his view, having Joseph’s friends leave just
exacerbated the situation because that left him lost in his own thoughts,
fantasies, and perceptions of reality. As a result, he too concluded that
Joseph’s schizophrenia overcame his sense of morality.
The prosecutor proposed to Dr. Goldberg that the incident with
Joseph’s father was different because he and his sister’s kids were in the
home with the father, and the voices were incessantly telling him he had to
kill his dad. In other words, in Joseph’s mind, they were under imminent
threat of great bodily injury or death. Goldberg disagreed, explaining that he
viewed the episodes as “exactly parallel.” Even though the voices did not
persist right up until Joseph acted in the theater, Goldberg viewed the
incidents as the same because Joseph did not see any other way out and felt
32
he had no other option but to kill. He did not address whether the fact that a
subject of the delusion, Joseph’s niece, was present for the first incident, but
that Joseph’s friends and family were not in the theater for the second, was
something he considered relevant.
The problem is that while the experts’ opinions focus on inevitability,
they arguably fail to account for the imminence requirement. Our Supreme
Court has long held that for the threat to be imminent, “ ‘ “[t]he peril must
appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not prospective or
even in the near future. An imminent peril is one that, from appearances,
must be instantly dealt with.” . . . [¶] This definition of imminence reflects the
great value our society places on human life.’ ” (In re Christian S. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 768, 783.)
We are aware of no authority indicating this same definition of
imminence should not be applied when considering an insanity defense based
on defense of self or others. Thus, the trial court reasonably could conclude
that, under the legal standard requiring an imminent threat to establish the
need for self-defense, Joseph’s attacks on his father and the couple in the
theater were not the same. And it could discount Dr. Goldberg’s testimony as
failing to reconcile the facts with the applicable legal standard. The same
would be true of both experts’ failure to grapple with the evidence that
Joseph’s friends had left the theater, Goodrich and Barajas were seated
several rows away, and Joseph shot them in the back of the head. Even if he
believed he had no choice and would have to confront them eventually, the
legal standard requires that he view them as an imminent threat at the time
of the killing. (Cf. Rittger, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 734 [declining to find
insanity where the defendant claimed, according to his own distorted
standards, that he was justified in killing another inmate based on the
33
inmate’s threat that he might attack the defendant “at some future time”],
italics added.) Although the expert testimony in this case highlights that
there may be a disconnect between our developing understanding of the
realities of mental illness and the relevant legal standard, we are constrained
by the latter.6
Joseph contends this court should be guided by People v. Duckett (1984)
162 Cal.App.3d 1115. In Duckett, the defendant was found insane after
shooting people at a college and was confined to a state mental hospital. (Id.
at p. 1118.) Upon his release, he told a friend that he believed Faye Joiner
was a witch who was practicing voodoo on him, and he planned to kill her.
(Ibid.) The next month, he bought a shotgun and practiced firing it. (Ibid.)
He said he thought about shooting Joiner because she “would not let [him]
live.” (Ibid.) He drove to her home one night, waited an hour or two for her
to return home, and then asked her if she was going to leave him alone.
(Ibid.) She purportedly responded, “hell no, fuck you,” so he shot her and
drove away. (Ibid.)
At the sanity phase of the trial, three experts testified that Duckett
suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and, as a result, he could
“neither substantially appreciate the criminality of his conduct nor conform
6 As the Drew court commented, “inadequacy of the expert evidence to
prove insanity under the M’Naghten rule is essentially the result of the fact
that M’Naghten requires proof of a subjective cognitive state which is largely
unrelated to the reality of mental illness.” (Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 351.)
Studies show exaggeration of several cognitive biases in populations with
delusions indicates these individuals have an impaired capacity for moral
reasoning. (Johnston & Leahey, The Status and Legitimacy of M’Naghten’s
Insane Delusion Rule (2021) 54 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1777, 1823 (Johnston &
Leahey).) But whether California insanity law should be reformed is not the
issue before us in this case.
34
his conduct to the requirements of the law.” (Duckett, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 1119, 1123.) One expert explained that Duckett genuinely believed
Joiner was going to kill him unless he killed her first. (Id. at p. 1121.)
Although the jury found Duckett sane, the appellate court reversed, finding
the expert testimony of Duckett’s insanity was of such weight and character
that the jury could not reasonably reject it. (Id. at pp. 1120, 1123.) The court
also explained that it based its reversal on the independent ground that the
prosecutor made an incurably prejudicial remark misstating the law
regarding hospital commitments following an insanity verdict. (Id. at
pp. 1123–1124.)
We are not persuaded that Duckett mandates a different result here.
Initially, although the court did not make clear which definition of insanity it
applied, the experts’ opinions suggest the court applied the American Law
Institute (ALI) test instead of the M’Naghten rule that is relevant here. From
at least 1864, in People v. Coffman (1864) 24 Cal. 230, California courts used
the M’Naghten test to frame the definition of insanity. (Skinner, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 768.) In 1978, our high court decided in Drew, supra,
22 Cal.3d 333 to discard the M’Naghten rule and utilize the ALI test because
it comported with then-current legal and psychological thought and had been
widely adopted by other jurisdictions. (Id. at pp. 336, 345.) This test
specified that “ ‘[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.’ ” (Id. at
35
p. 345.) But in June 1982 the California electorate adopted an initiative
measure (Proposition 8) that, among other things, restored the M’Naghten
definition of insanity.7 (Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 768.)
It also is not clear from the Duckett opinion whether the test it
employed allowed a finding of insanity based on self-defense or defense of
others. Even if it did, this case appears distinguishable in that the threat
was more imminent—the woman Duckett perceived to be a witch who wanted
to kill him was right in front of him and confirmed that she was not going to
leave him alone.
The uncertainties of Duckett notwithstanding, we are not persuaded
this is one of the “ ‘rare case[s] when “the evidence is uncontradicted and
entirely to the effect that the accused is insane” [citation], that a unanimity
of expert testimony could authorize upsetting a jury finding to the contrary.’ ”
(Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 350.) Both experts testified that Joseph
struggled with the morality of killing Goodrich and Barajas. Dr. Bosch made
clear that Joseph knew it was legally and morally wrong to do so. For his
part, Dr. Goldberg stated that it would not be insanity if the voices had just
told a person like Joseph to kill someone without any threat of something
happening to him or his loved ones. Thus, the court could reasonably
conclude that, absent credible and persuasive evidence that Joseph believed
there was an imminent threat to himself or his friends and family, both
7 Although the new statutory test set for the in Penal Code section 25,
subdivision (b) required the accused person to prove “by a preponderance of
the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the
nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at
the time of the commission of the offense,” the Skinner court determined in
1985 that the electorate intended to restore the M’Naghten rule, which listed
the two prongs in the disjunctive (“or” versus “and”). (Skinner, supra, 39
Cal.3d at p. 769, italics added.)
36
experts would have agreed he understood the killings were morally wrong
and would not meet the definition of insanity. Given that their testimony did
not, in fact, adequately address the legal definition of an imminent threat or
its impact on their theory that his deluded compulsion to defend his friends
and family overrode his morality, the court could reasonably discount their
opinions and conclude the defense had not presented sufficient evidence of
insanity as that concept is legally defined.
The trial court placed significant weight on the evidence that Joseph
stole Goodrich’s wallet and the experts’ lack of a satisfactory explanation for
this fact. In particular, the court was troubled by Dr. Bosch’s responses to
some of the prosecutor’s hypothetical questions. Our review of the transcript
reveals there may have been an initial misunderstanding between the
prosecutor and Bosch as to whether he was asking her to assume Joseph did
not suffer from any mental illness at all. We need not evaluate the impact of
this misunderstanding, though, because the lack of an imminent threat
provides sufficient grounds for affirming.
In sum, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the
judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion
that Joseph was legally sane under the applicable legal standard at the time
of the murders.
37
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, J.
I CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
38
CASTILLO, J., Concurring in the result.
Like the majority, I agree substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s conclusion that Joseph Jimenez was legally sane at the time he killed
Rylee Goodrich and Anthony Barajas and would therefore also affirm. (Maj.
opn., at p. 37.) I concur in the result only, however, because I would not rely
on People v. Leeds (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 822 to reach this result.
Similar to here, the Leeds defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity to
multiple murder charges, claiming he was legally justified in shooting the
victims because, in his delusional state, he believed they were conspiring to
kill him. (Leeds, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) Leeds determined the trial court
misinstructed the jury, which “should have been instructed on self-defense
modified in the context of insanity: [the defendant] was legally insane if,
because of a mental disease or defect that [the defendant] had when [the
defendant] committed the crimes, [the defendant] actually believed that [the
defendant] was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily
injury and that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend
against the danger.” (Id. at p. 832.) As support for its statement of the rule
underlying the insanity defense, Leeds cited the pattern jury instruction for
imperfect or unreasonable self-defense and People v. Elmore (2014) 59
Cal.4th 121, 140. (Leeds, at p. 832.)
But Elmore does not support grafting the self-defense framework—
including its imminence requirement—onto the insanity defense. Indeed,
Elmore held that “[u]nreasonable self-defense and legal insanity are distinct
theories, and must be adjudicated separately.” (Elmore, 59 Cal.4th at p. 146,
italics added.)
To successfully claim self-defense, a defendant must fear “imminent
danger to life or great bodily injury.” (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768,
783.) “The peril must appear to the defendant as immediate and present and
not prospective or even in the near future. An imminent peril is one that,
from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.” (Ibid. [cleaned up], italics
omitted.) Imminence is thus a critical component of self-defense.
An insanity defense, on the other hand, appears not to require imminence, at
least as framed by leading authorities. In Elmore, for example, our high
court recognized that “[a] claim of unreasonable self-defense based solely on
delusion is quintessentially a claim of insanity under the M’Naghten[’s Case
(1843) 8 Eng.Rep. 718] standard of inability to distinguish right from wrong.
Its rationale is that mental illness caused the defendant to perceive an
illusory threat, form an actual belief in the need to kill in self-defense, and
act on that belief without wrongful intent.” (Elmore, 59 Cal.4th at p. 140.)
Absent from this statement of the insanity defense is any mention of
imminence. M’Naghten, on which California’s insanity defense is premised,
is equally silent on this score. (M’Naghten, at p. 723 [“[I]f under the influence
of [a] delusion [the defendant] supposes another [person] to be in the act of
attempting to take away [the defendant’s] life, and [the defendant] kills that
[person], as [the defendant] supposes, in self-defen[s]e, [the defendant] would
be exempt from punishment.”].)
Leeds’ basis for shoehorning the insanity defense into a modified rule of
self-defense, with its attendant imminence requirement, is thus unclear.
Self-defense’s imminence requirement obliges a defendant to synthesize the
facts as they appear to the defendant, determine the likelihood and
immediacy of any potential harm, and decide on that basis whether
instantaneous action is needed. (Christian S., 7 Cal.4th at p. 783.) I worry a
defendant claiming the discrete defense of insanity may not necessarily
possess the wherewithal to engage in such subjective calculation. Absent
2
further clarification from the Supreme Court, I would therefore avoid
resolving this matter under Leeds’ test.
Instead, I would conclude Jimenez was not legally insane because he
could appreciate right and wrong and discern between them at the time he
shot Goodrich and Barajas. As the majority recognizes, “[b]oth experts [in
this matter] testified that J[imenez] struggled with the morality of killing”
Goodrich and Barajas, and one expert “made clear that J[imenez] knew it
was legally and morally wrong to” kill them. (Maj. opn., at p. 36.) Among
other factors, Jimenez heard no voices in the ten to fifteen minutes directly
preceding the shooting but nonetheless shot both victims, took Goodrich’s
wallet, shot Goodrich again, quickly ran from the scene, and placed the
money from Goodrich’s wallet into his own. On such facts, I would conclude
Jimenez did not carry his burden of proving he was insane at the time he
killed Goodrich and Barajas.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the result only.
CASTILLO, J.
3
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