CourtListener 10832076•In re D.S. CA2/2
Full text
Filed 4/2/26 In re D.S. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re D.S. et al., Persons Coming B346344
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 24CCJP02986)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAVIER S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile Court
Referee. Affirmed as modified.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Javier S. (father) appeals from
the final custody order (exit order) issued by the juvenile court
upon the termination of dependency jurisdiction over his
children, D.S. (born June 2011), S.S. (born May 2019), and J.S.
(born Nov. 2023) (collectively minors). (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 362.4.)1
We modify the exit order to clarify that the restriction
placed on communication between father and minors’ mother,
N.D. (mother), is limited to custody and visitation matters. As
modified, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In November 2024, the juvenile court sustained three
counts in a dependency petition filed by the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based on father’s history of and
current abuse of methamphetamine and alcohol, father’s
possession of methamphetamine in minors’ home, and a history
of violent altercations between father and mother. The court
declared minors dependents of the court, removed them from
father’s custody, and placed them in mother’s home under DCFS
supervision. The court granted father unmonitored visitation
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise stated.
2
with D.S. and monitored visitation with S.S. and J.S. Father’s
case plan consisted of a full drug and alcohol program with
aftercare, random and on-demand weekly drug testing, a 12-step
program, a 52-week domestic violence program, parenting
classes, and individual counseling.
In early May 2025, DCFS reported that father had failed to
comply with any component of his court-ordered case plan,
including failing to submit to scheduled drug tests. Father
blamed his work schedule as a truck driver.
The juvenile court held a section 364 judicial review
hearing on May 19, 2025. Over DCFS’s objection, the court
terminated its jurisdiction, finding that the conditions that
justified the initial assumption of jurisdiction under section 300
no longer existed and were not likely to reoccur in the absence of
supervision. Mother had provided “a safe home environment” for
minors and did not present a risk to them. The court explained,
however, that there was “absolutely zero legal basis” for it to
release minors to father’s custody, as father had demonstrated
“absolutely zero compliance” with his case plan.
The juvenile court issued an exit order granting mother
sole legal and physical custody of minors. The exit order
permitted father to have unmonitored visitation with D.S. and
monitored visitation with S.S. and J.S. a minimum of three times
per week for three hours per visit. The court also ordered that
father and mother could only communicate with each other
through an electronic application that recorded conversations.
The exit order explained that father was restricted to
supervised visitation with S.S. and J.S. because he had neither
completed nor made substantial progress in his court-ordered
3
drug and alcohol abuse treatment programs, domestic violence
treatment program for offenders, and individual counseling.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal from the exit order.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by granting mother sole legal custody, “overstepped”
its jurisdiction by specifying the conditions under which the
family court could modify the custody and visitation orders, and
erred by ordering father and mother to communicate only
through an electronic application.
I. Sole Legal Custody to Mother
Section 362.4 “empowers the juvenile court, if it terminates
its jurisdiction over a dependent minor, to issue ‘an order
determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.’
[Citation.]” (In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 862–863
(C.W.).) “When making a custody determination under
section 362.4, ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration must
always be the best interests of the child.’ [Citations.]” (In re T.S.
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) “An order granting a parent sole
legal custody ‘means that one parent shall have the right and the
responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health,
education, and welfare of a child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of
Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 227.) Such an order does not
terminate the other parent’s parental rights nor does “it
terminate [the other parent’s] due process interest in parenting.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
We review custody determinations in an exit order for an
abuse of discretion. (C.W., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 863.) We
may not disturb the order “unless the court made an
4
‘ “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its “broad discretion to
make custody orders” upon termination of jurisdiction when it
granted mother sole legal custody of minors. (In re Nicholas H.
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4.) Father failed to
demonstrate compliance with any aspect of his court-ordered case
plan. There was no evidence that father’s methamphetamine and
alcohol abuse or his tendency to engage in domestic violence had
abated. Under these circumstances, the court could reasonably
conclude that minors’ interests were best served by granting sole
legal custody to mother.
Relying on In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090 (N.M.),
father argues that the juvenile court failed to consider minors’
“best interests and the love and bond they shared with father”
and, instead, made custody determinations in order to punish
father. N.M. does not aid father. In that case, a parent who had
“never been deemed an offending parent” was denied physical
custody of his children based on his failure to comply with a case
plan despite the lack of any “evidence suggest[ing] that his drug
use, lack of a parenting class, or visitation practices impacted the
children in any way.” (Id. at p. 1095.) The Court of Appeal
reversed, explaining that “an exit order must serve the best
interests of the children, not reward or punish one parent or
another for failing to comply with the case plan.” (Ibid.)
Here, in contrast to the parent in N.M., father was an
offending parent based on his history of and current abuse of
methamphetamine and alcohol, possession of methamphetamine
in minors’ home, and history of domestic violence. And, unlike in
N.M., nothing in the record here suggests that the juvenile court
5
denied father legal custody as a punishment for his
noncompliance or that the court failed to consider minors’ best
interests.
Father identifies nothing arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd about the juvenile court’s custody ruling.
II. Purported Limitations on Family Court’s Authority
We review de novo father’s argument that the juvenile
court improperly limited the family court’s authority to modify
the custody and visitation orders. (See In re Dezi C. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1112, 1128 [question of law reviewed de novo]; Bridget A.
v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 301 [issue
“concern[ing] the scope of the juvenile court’s discretion . . . is a
question of law”].)
Father is mistaken that the juvenile court “condition[ed]
any future change in custody and visitation orders on father’s
completion of drug tests and other programs[.]” The exit order’s
references to counseling and substance abuse and parenting
programs explain why the court placed a supervision restriction
on father’s visitation with S.S. and J.S. They do not impose any
limitation on the family court’s authority and discretion to modify
custody and visitation orders if warranted. (See § 302, subd. (d)
[exit order may be modified in proceeding under Family Code
section 3021 if the family “court finds that there has been a
significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court
issued the order and modification of the order is in the best
interests of the child”].)
In re Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444 is
distinguishable. In that case, the juvenile court expressly
conditioned modification of an exit order on a parent’s completion
6
of certain programs and counseling. (See id. at pp. 1451, 1456.)
That did not occur here.
III. Restriction on Communication
Father contends that the exit order’s requirement that
father and mother communicate only through an electronic
application that records conversations “was akin to a no-contact
and stay away . . . restraining order” and violated his federal
right to due process as well as sections 213.5 and 304. We
disagree. (See In re Marriage of R.K. & G.K. (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 14, 22 [whether a party has been denied due
process is a question of law subject to de novo review].)
The exit order issued here is not a restraining order subject
to the requirements of sections 213.5 and 304. It is “ ‘an order
determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.’
[Citation.]” (C.W., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 863.) Read in that
context, the challenged provision merely requires father and
mother to communicate about custody and visitation in a manner
that provides an electronic record—a reasonable condition given
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that they had a history
of violent altercations.
Father does not argue that he lacked notice of the
section 364 judicial review hearing during which jurisdiction was
terminated and the exit order was issued. We conclude that, as
required by due process, father was afforded both “notice that
[wa]s reasonably calculated to advise [him that] an action [wa]s
pending” and “an opportunity to defend.” (In re Jasmine G.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114.)
To avoid any confusion about the scope of the exit order,
however, we will modify it by interlineation to specify that the
7
restriction on the parents’ communication is limited to custody
and visitation matters.
DISPOSITION
We modify the May 19, 2025, exit order to add “as to all
matters relating to custody and visitation” to item 13. As
modified, the order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GILBERT, J.*
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
8
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.