CourtListener 10831833•In re D.M. CA2/1
Full text
Filed 4/1/26 In re D.M. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re D.M., a Person Coming Under B347131
the Juvenile Court Law.
_________________________________ (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00723)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Y.V.,
Objector and Appellant;
D.M., a Minor,
Respondent.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Reversed.
Lori London, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Objector and Appellant Y.V.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent D.M., a Minor.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services.
_________________________________
In March 2025, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 300 petition alleging that Y.M. (Father),
who resides in California, had physically abused his then-nine-year-
old daughter, D.M. The petition did not include any allegations
against D.M.’s mother, Y.V. (Mother), who resides in Honduras.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations against Father
and removed D.M. from his custody. Father waived his right
to reunify with D.M. and told the court he was not interested in
regaining custody. Mother requested that the court place D.M.
with her in Honduras, pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (a).
That subdivision requires the court to place a child with a
nonoffending, noncustodial parent unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence “that placement with [the] parent would
be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).)
To aid it in evaluating possible detriment, the juvenile court
ordered DCFS to interview Mother, Father, and D.M. about “[e]ach
of their respective positions concerning whether [D.M.] remains in
the [United States] or returns to her home country,” and about the
“nature and quality of [the parents’] visitation” with D.M. DCFS,
1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
however, failed to do so. Notwithstanding this failure, the court
went forward with the disposition hearing and denied Mother’s
request for placement. The court noted that D.M. “ha[d] a
[removal] action pending in . . . immigration court,” and found that
placement in Honduras “would be detrimental not just to [D.M.’s
immigration] case, but also to the relationships she’s established
here [in the United States].” The court then entered dispositional
orders removing D.M. from both parents and ordering Mother to
complete a case plan.
Mother now asks us to reverse the orders. She argues
D.M.’s immigration proceedings cannot support a section 361.2,
subdivision (a) detriment finding, and that no other clear and
convincing evidence supports the finding. Neither DCFS nor
minor’s appellate counsel contends that a juvenile court may
rely on a child’s pending immigration proceedings to support a
detriment finding. But they insist other evidence in the record—
including a representation by minor’s trial counsel that D.M. did
not wish to return to Honduras—adequately supports the finding
here.
The record, however, demonstrates the juvenile court focused
primarily on D.M.’s immigration proceedings in conducting the
detriment analysis. And we conclude the remaining evidence on
which DCFS and minor’s counsel relies is insufficient to support the
detriment finding. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new
dispositional hearing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.
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A. DCFS Referral and Resulting Investigation
On March 6, 2025, DCFS received a referral alleging
that D.M. had suffered physical abuse. The caller reported that
D.M. had purple and blue bruises on her arm, as well as marks that
looked like scratches. The caller further reported that D.M. said
she “didn’t eat the other day” because her stepmother had “told her
to make her own food.”
A social worker, as well as law enforcement, visited D.M.’s
home to investigate the referral. D.M. shared the home with
Father, stepmother, two younger half siblings (the biological
children of Father and stepmother), and several nonrelative
roommates.
Father reported that he and D.M. originally are from
Honduras, and that Mother still resides there. He and Mother
separated when D.M. was one year old. Father “was not
allowed to see [D.M.] for a while,” but “later, [D.M.]’s maternal
grandmother . . . called [him] to report that [Mother had] left [D.M.]
with her and left with her new boyfriend.” Maternal grandmother
“asked . . . [F]ather to pick [D.M.] up because she could not care for
her.” He “agreed and has had [D.M.] since [she] was two or three.”
Father said he did not have Mother’s mailing address or phone
number and had no means of contacting her.
Stepmother reported that she, Father, D.M., and D.M.’s half
siblings came to the United States in 2022. She further reported
that Mother “sometimes call[ed] [D.M.]” In addition, stepmother
shared that “she nearly left the relationship with . . . [F]ather
because of the issues with [D.M.],” but “reconsidered when
[D.M.] started therapy.” The social worker later obtained medical
records indicating D.M. had been diagnosed with “oppositional
defiant disorder, conduct disorder unspecified, sleeping disorder,
unspecified urinary incontinence, acute stress reaction, depression,
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decrease[d] appetite, other feeding difficulties, failure to
thrive, superficial burns, sleep disturbance, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder[ ] (combined type), nonpsychotic mental
disorder, unspecified mood disorder, major depressive disorder[,]
and underweight.” (Capitalization omitted.) The records further
indicated a medical provider had prescribed D.M. Adderall and
Clonidine, among other medications.
As to the allegations of physical abuse, Father initially
denied that he harmed D.M. intentionally. Upon further
questioning, however, Father admitted that he struck D.M. with
an extension cord because she had urinated in her bed. He insisted
that “he only hit her once” and that “this was an isolated incident.”
Stepmother told social workers she was unaware of the bruising on
D.M.’s body. She explained, “I don’t check her. I don’t touch her
because I don’t want her to say that I touch her.”
A physical examination of D.M. by law enforcement revealed
that, in addition to the bruises on her arm, she had a bruise above
her right breast and a large bruise on her upper right thigh that
appeared to be “from a solid object.” In the social worker’s view,
“the injuries appear[ed] to indicate that [D.M.] was struck multiple
times with an object rather than the single . . . incident [Father]
described.”
DCFS detained D.M. and her half siblings from Father
and stepmother on an emergency basis. The social worker placed
D.M. with a foster caregiver. The foster caregiver told the social
worker that, if reunification efforts failed, she would like to keep
D.M. in her home.
B. Section 300 Petition and Adjudication Hearing
Five days later, on March 11, 2025, DCFS filed a section 300
petition on behalf of D.M. The petition alleged that Father had
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physically abused D.M., and that the abuse placed her at serious
risk of harm. (See § 300, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) At the initial hearing
on the petition, Father appeared, represented by counsel. DCFS
was unable to contact Mother in advance of the hearing, and she
did not appear. The court ordered that D.M. remain detained from
Father, and set the adjudication and disposition hearing for May 7,
2025.
Two days before the scheduled hearing, Father told the
social worker he had obtained Mother’s contact information,
which he provided. The social worker interviewed Mother
telephonically. Mother confirmed that she lived in Honduras.
She told the social worker that, before DCFS began its
investigation, she had calls with D.M. at least once a week and
sometimes “more frequently/daily.” Mother further reported
that, after DCFS removed D.M. from Father’s care, Father and
stepmother stopped answering Mother’s calls. Mother said that
she was unaware of Father’s physical abuse of D.M., and that
“[D.M.] never said anything about being hit or mistreated.” As to
D.M.’s placement, Mother told the social worker she “ ‘would like
to wait and see what happen[ed] prior to making a decision on
D.M. returning to [her in Honduras] or to a relative in the United
States.’ ”
At the May 7 hearing, both Father and Mother appeared.
The court sustained the petition’s allegations against Father,
finding in pertinent part: “The bruises on [D.M.] have history.
Some are healed, some are more recent. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The
juxtaposition [with] the other children who are not subject to
this kind of behavior is . . . eviden[ce] that [D.M.] is being singled
out for this type of abusive treatment . . . . [¶] Father’s fanciful
explanation for the [extension cord] dropping and landing on [D.M.]
and then later on acknowledging that he struck [D.M.] with the
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[cord] is concerning. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he evidence suggests
that . . . manufactured stories . . . came from . . . Father and the
stepmother.”
The court then asked Mother for her position concerning
D.M.’s placement. Mother’s counsel responded: “[A]t this point in
time, [Mother] is okay with where the minor is currently at[,] . . .
but would like to ask for the return of the minor to her in her home
country.”
Minor’s trial counsel told the court that Mother’s request
raised “immigration implications,” and the court continued the
disposition hearing to May 30, 2025, to permit counsel adequate
time to discuss those issues with D.M.
The court later continued the hearing a second time, to
June 6, 2025, and granted Mother’s counsel’s request that
DCFS conduct supplemental interviews of Father, Mother, and
D.M. “about [D.M.’s] possible return to Honduras and what their
relationship was like, each . . . parent and [D.M.], before coming
here to America.” The court ordered DCFS to interview the
parties about the “nature and quality of visitation” and “[e]ach of
their respective positions concerning whether [D.M.] remains in
the [United States or] returns to her home country.” The court
further ordered DCFS to file a report summarizing the interviews
in advance of the hearing.
C. Disposition Hearing
In preparation for the June 6 disposition hearing, DCFS filed
two “last minute information” reports identifying a family friend
and a maternal uncle (both living in the United States) as possible
placements for D.M. (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) But
neither report included the information the court had ordered
DCFS to provide—namely, summaries of supplemental interviews
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with the parties concerning visitation and the parties’ positions
concerning D.M.’s possible return to Honduras.
Notwithstanding DCFS’s failure to provide any information
responsive to the juvenile court’s order, the court went forward with
the disposition hearing. At the hearing, Father waived his right to
reunification services and submitted a form JV-195 in which he
attested he did not wish to have D.M. returned to his custody.
Minor’s counsel urged the juvenile court to keep D.M. in
her foster care placement in the United States, insisting that
placement with Mother would result in detriment. Minor’s counsel
acknowledged that DCFS had failed to conduct the court-ordered
“interview of [D.M.] reflecting on her past experience of living
with Mother in Honduras.” But “as an officer of the court,”
minor’s counsel represented that D.M. “ha[d] disclosed to [him]
that previously she did live with Mother and Father until she was
about four years old in Honduras. Then she lived separately with
Father from that point forward, partially in Honduras[,] and also
in the United States. As to any contact with Mother, once she
lived separately with Father, [D.M.] reported that she would have
occasional phone calls with Mother while in the [United States], but
this is only when Father would call Mother from his personal phone
to have [D.M.] talk to her. [¶] [D.M.] does recognize Mother as her
biological mother, but there is not a significant mother-daughter
relationship there. [D.M.’s] desire is not to return to Honduras but
to remain in the [United States].”
Minor’s counsel further argued that “all of [D.M.’s] ties”—i.e.,
her half siblings, school, and friends—were in the United States.
Finally, minor’s counsel argued that, because D.M. was “currently
in immigration removal proceedings,” placement in Honduras
“would effectively deport [her].” He clarified, however, that his
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“detriment argument . . . [was] not based solely on immigration
implications,” but rather on D.M.’s “ties to the United States.”
DCFS agreed that D.M. should remain in her foster care
placement in the United States, noting Mother was “noncustodial”
and “whereabouts unknown” for “a large part of th[e] case.”
In response, Mother’s counsel reiterated Mother’s request
that the court place D.M. with her in Honduras. He urged the court
to disregard minor’s counsel’s representations concerning D.M.’s
placement preferences, arguing in pertinent part: “[U]nfortunately,
[D.M.] is not here to be cross-examined. These statements that are
being made are being portrayed by counsel without [our] being able
to ask our version of questions to this minor. So I would ask that
the court either one, disregard that testimony; or secondly, give
it due weight at this point but not admit it as evidence in making
its decision.” Mother’s counsel further argued that Father had
prevented Mother from having more contact with D.M., and that
Mother had made herself available to DCFS and the court as soon
as DCFS contacted her. Finally, Mother’s counsel argued that
D.M.’s immigration proceedings were not relevant to the detriment
inquiry.
The court denied Mother’s request that it place D.M. in her
custody, explaining:
“The court is mindful that the minor has a legal action
pending in the immigration court. There’s certain elements of that
litigation that she is heavily vested in, along with Father, that she
has extensive family ties here, including with Father. [¶] Those
ties are meaningful to her in terms of her immigration matter as
well as to continue that relationship. The relationship with Mother
has been largely abbreviated, and the desires of this minor are not
as in every other case where it’s simply moving from one state to
the next or returning to a home country. The minor has an active
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action before the immigration court. With that, I think to comply
with it and not lose the right she’s trying to assert in that regard,
return would be detrimental not just to her case, but also to
the relationships she’s established here. [¶] . . . [¶] I do note
that making that clear and convincing finding, I do accept the
representations of [minor’s counsel] as an officer of the court.
Those are consistent with the path that [D.M.] has chosen in
terms of proceeding with her immigration case.”
The court then entered dispositional orders removing
D.M. from both parents, directing DCFS to refer D.M.’s case to the
special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status unit,2 and requiring Mother
to complete a case plan consisting of parenting classes.
2 “Congress created the [SIJ] classification in 1990 to protect
certain immigrant children and allow them to remain in the United
States when it would not be in their best interests to be returned
to their home countries. [Citations.] As amended, the law permits
an immigrant ‘ “child” ’—a term defined as ‘an unmarried person
under twenty-one years of age’ [citation]—to apply for SIJ status
if: (1) the child is a dependent of a juvenile court, in the custody
of a state agency by court order, or in the custody of an individual
or entity appointed by the court; (2) it would not be viable to
reunify the child with one or both parents because of ‘abuse,
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law’;
and (3) ‘it would not be in the [child’s] best interest to be returned
to the [child’s] or parent’s previous country of nationality or country
of last habitual residence.’ [Citation.] Each of these predicate
findings must be made in state court proceedings. [Citation.] A
state court order containing these findings is a required component
of an immigrant child’s application to United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services for special immigrant juvenile status,
which allows the child to seek lawful permanent residence in the
United States. [Citation.]” (Guardianship of Saul H. (2022) 13
Cal.5th 827, 837–838 (Saul H.).) “A court may . . . make a referral
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Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends we must reverse the orders because
substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding
that placement with Mother in Honduras would be detrimental
to D.M.’s physical or emotional well-being. (See In re C.M. (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402 (C.M.) [appellate court reviews
detriment finding underlying dispositional order for substantial
evidence].) We agree.
“ ‘A parent’s right to care, custody and management of a
child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the federal
Constitution that will not be disturbed except in extreme cases
where a parent acts in a manner incompatible with parenthood.’ ”
(In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 461 (Abram L.).)
Section 361.2, subdivision (a) governs the rights of a noncustodial
parent to custody of a dependent child.3 The statute provides, in
to the local child welfare agency to assist in gathering evidence of
eligibility for SIJ predicate findings. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 844.)
3 The parties here agree that section 361.2—rather than
section 361, subdivision (d), which concerns removal of a dependent
child from a parent with whom the child does not reside—is the
relevant statute. We, however, note that “[t]here are questions
regarding the interplay between [section] 361[, subdivision] (d) and
[section] 361.2 (placement with noncustodial parent).” (1 Seiser &
Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2025) § 2.126.)
“Under [section] 361[, subdivision] (d), the standard for removal
is higher—requiring substantial danger and a no reasonable
means of protection without a removal finding—as opposed to the
[section] 361.2 standard that placement would be detrimental to
the child’s ‘safety, protection, physical or emotional wellbeing.’
It may be that [section] 361.2 . . . applies to a noncustodial parent
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pertinent part: “If a court orders removal of a child pursuant
to [s]ection 361, the court shall first determine whether there is
a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at
the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the
child within the provisions of [s]ection 300, who desires to assume
custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court
shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement
with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2., subd. (a).)
Section 361.2, subdivision (a) thus “evinces the legislative
preference for placement with the noncustodial parent when safe
for the child.” (In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262
(Patrick S.).)
The noncustodial parent does not have to prove lack of
detriment. (C.M., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1401.) Rather, the
party opposing the placement bears the burden of demonstrating by
clear and convincing evidence that the child would suffer detriment
if placed with the noncustodial parent. (Ibid.) Clear and convincing
evidence requires “a high probability, such that the evidence is so
clear as to leave no substantial doubt.” (Patrick S., supra, 218
Cal.App.4th at p. 1262.) Thus, the question before us is “ ‘ “whether
the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the
fact was true.” [Citation.]’ ” (In re A.T. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 722,
736.)
who ‘requests custody’ when a child is removed from a custodial
parent and [section] 361[, subdivision] (d) applies when the
noncustodial parent does not request custody.” (1 Seiser & Kumli,
supra, § 2.126.) In any case, we need not resolve these questions,
because we conclude that DCFS failed to meet its burden here
even under section 361.2’s less demanding “detriment” standard.
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Neither DCFS nor minor’s counsel relies on D.M.’s
immigration proceedings to support the detriment finding here.
Rather, they argue the following factors support the finding: D.M.
did not wish to live with Mother in Honduras; D.M. had not lived
with Mother since she was a toddler and the two “did not have a
‘significant mother-daughter relationship’ ”; Father, stepmother,
and D.M.’s “half-siblings, friends, and school were all in [the United
States]”; and finally, D.M. was receiving therapy and psychotropic
medications in the United States, and there was no evidence she
could obtain such services and medications in Honduras.
But the transcript of the disposition hearing makes clear that
the juvenile court relied primarily on D.M.’s pending immigration
proceedings in assessing detriment. And DCFS’s argument
concerning the absence of evidence in the record that D.M. could
obtain necessary services in Honduras seeks improperly to shift the
burden to Mother to prove lack of detriment. (See C.M., supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 1402 [“The nonoffending parent does not have
to prove lack of detriment. Rather, the party opposing placement
with a nonoffending parent has the burden”].) We therefore
conclude that substantial evidence does not support the detriment
finding in this case.
Minor’s appellate counsel’s discussion of the law governing
SIJ status does not alter our conclusion. In her separate
respondent’s brief, she includes a summary of the analysis in
Saul H., where our high court held that a probate court erred by
denying a petition for SIJ predicate findings from an 18-year-old
petitioner who had fled gang threats in El Salvador. (Saul H.,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 836, 840.) In addition, she asks us to
take judicial notice of SIJ status findings the juvenile court made
concerning D.M. on December 30, 2025 (i.e., six months after the
disposition hearing at issue here). Minor’s counsel, however, fails
13
to explain why these materials are relevant to the detriment finding
Mother challenges on appeal.4 (Cf. Saul H., supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 853 [“issuance of SIJ predicate findings to a child does not in any
way restrict the rights of the child’s parent”].)
Finally, we decline to direct the juvenile court to consider
on remand the factors enumerated in In re Karla C. (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 1236, as DCFS and minor’s counsel request.
“On remand, the court may consider new evidence or changed
circumstances that may have occurred during the pendency of
this appeal.” (C.M., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1405.) As such,
we leave it to the juvenile court to determine whether the factors
identified in Karla C. are pertinent to its analysis.
Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence does not
support the detriment finding here. We therefore reverse the
finding and the dispositional orders premised on the finding,
and we remand to the juvenile court with directions to hold a new
dispositional hearing on the issue of placement with Mother under
section 361.2, subdivision (a).
4 We therefore deny Mother’s request that we take judicial
notice of the SIJ status findings.
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DISPOSITION
The dispositional orders Mother challenges are reversed. On
remand, the court shall conduct a new dispositional hearing on the
issue of placement with Mother under section 361.2, subdivision (a).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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