CourtListener 10831487•In re Stephen O. CA4/1
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Filed 4/1/26 In re Stephen O. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re STEPHEN O., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
D085670
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. J243624)
v.
STEPHEN O., A Minor,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Tilisha T. Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
Elisabeth R. Cannon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Eric Tran, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The People filed a juvenile wardship petition against Stephen O., then
17 years old, in connection with an alleged murder. Proposing to try him
as an adult, the People moved to transfer his case to criminal court. The
juvenile court granted the People’s motion after finding clear and convincing
evidence that Stephen would not be amenable to rehabilitation before he
turned 25 years old, when its jurisdiction over him would end.
Stephen, now nearly 21 years old, requests that we return his case to
juvenile court. He claims the judge erred as a matter of law in granting the
People’s motion because they did not call any expert witness to opine as to
whether he could be rehabilitated before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
expired. Further, Stephen argues, the judge should have found that the
mitigating evidence supported the juvenile court retaining jurisdiction over
his case.
We review the transfer order for abuse of discretion and its underlying
findings of fact for substantial evidence. There is no inflexible requirement
that the People always support their motion with expert testimony, and the
record shows that the trial court considered all the evidence presented when
making its factual findings. Absent insufficient evidence for these findings,
an error of law in the court’s analysis, or arbitrariness in the court’s decision,
we must defer to the court’s conclusion that transferring Stephen’s case was
appropriate. Having identified no such deficiencies, we affirm.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charged Offenses1
Around 9:30 a.m. on October 5, 2022, the San Diego Police Department
received a 911 call about a shooting in a residential neighborhood of the Mira
Mesa community. Officers found a male victim of multiple gunshot wounds
lying in the street in front of his house where he lived with his family. He
was pronounced dead at the scene.
Police first linked Nicholas Forehand to the shooting based on videos of
his car fleeing the scene. The day after the shooting, Forehand and his lone
male passenger, I. Rodriguez, were arrested during a traffic stop. While the
men were in a holding cell, Forehand made comments to Rodriguez that
appeared to relate to the killing. Among them was that they should have told
“Daps”—who investigators later learned was Stephen’s moniker within the
Asian Crips gang—to leave. That same night, the police discovered Stephen
in Forehand’s apartment when they arrived to execute a search warrant.
Investigators found messages in Rodriguez’s, Forehand’s, and
Stephen’s social media accounts that appeared to be related to the killing.
Early in the morning of the murder, Forehand messaged Stephen asking for
gas money so he could pick him up. At 7:44 a.m., Stephen asked Forehand,
“U wanna pick me up [right now]?” Forehand replied that it would take
him about 40 minutes to get to Stephen’s house in the City of Poway.
1 We derive the facts mainly from the report of Stephen’s behavioral
patterns and social history (transfer report) prepared by the probation officer
(PO) after the People filed their transfer motion. The juvenile court must
assume the youth committed the charged offense when deciding whether to
transfer his or her case to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (People v. Superior
Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 676, 682.)
3
At 7:51 a.m., Rodriguez messaged someone that “Nic just got here, but he
finna get daps rn, lol.”
Forehand arrived at Stephen’s house at 8:42 a.m. Stephen’s phone
left his house a few minutes later, arrived at the scene of the shooting at
9:24 a.m., and then traveled to Forehand’s apartment. After being arrested
on suspicion of committing this murder, Forehand spoke to undercover
operatives disguised as inmates in his jail holding cell. He told them that
he drove to Stephen’s house the morning of the killing, picked him up, drove
him to the victim’s house, and watched him get of the car and shoot the
victim to settle a “personal beef.”2
The source of this disagreement, investigators believe, was gang
related. In 2018, when Stephen lived in Mira Mesa, he joined a gang that
the victim had started in their neighborhood. When Stephen was 14 years
old, which would have been in either 2019 or 2020, he was “jumped in” to the
rival Asian Crips gang. Rodriguez appeared to be a leader within the Asian
Crips, whereas Stephen was a “soldier” who, at times, also suggested to
Rodriguez how he should recruit new members. Stephen’s phone contained
what appeared to be rap lyrics written after the shooting, which described
it as having been committed on behalf of the Asian Crips. According to
Forehand, the shooting was Stephen’s initiation into the gang.
In January 2023, Stephen was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a)) in a juvenile wardship petition filed by the People under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 6023 (murder petition). The People also alleged
2 Forehand is appealing his July 2023 conviction as an aider and abettor
of first degree murder for his role in the killing.
3 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
4
that Stephen personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and
death to the victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)).
B. Stephen’s Prior Delinquency History
Stephen has been involved in the juvenile justice system since he was
14 years old. In December 2019, he stole four flavored cigarettes from a
convenience store. Sheriff’s deputies offered him the opportunity to address
the matter through diversion, but he refused over his parents’ objection. In
March 2020, deputies were called to Stephen’s high school because he was
under the influence of Xanax.
In November 2020, the district attorney filed the first juvenile
wardship petition against Stephen, charging him with the misdemeanors of
petty theft and public intoxication (theft petition). The juvenile court allowed
Stephen to complete a program of informal supervision in lieu of commencing
delinquency proceedings. His supervision conditions included abiding by a
curfew, regularly attending school, leaving his home only with permission,
completing antitheft and seeking safety courses, and submitting to random
drug testing.
In May 2021, the probation department learned Stephen had been
involved in a fight at school that resulted in a three-day suspension. His
conditions of supervision were amended to include a requirement that he
undergo individual therapy through the Substance Abuse Services program.
Stephen started therapy in July, but stopped going at some point when he
left home without permission, something the probation department learned
happened frequently, often for days or weeks at a time. During Stephen’s
time in therapy, he tested positive for drugs twice—both times for marijuana.
The juvenile court scheduled a review hearing in October 2021 on
Stephen’s progress on informal supervision. Delinquency proceedings were
5
reinstated and a bench warrant issued after he failed to appear for this
review. Stephen turned himself in, claiming that he had been living away
from home and had forgotten about the hearing. After admitting to both
counts alleged in the theft petition, Stephen was adjudged a ward of the court
in December 2021 and placed on probation. The conditions of Stephen’s
probation included to abide by a curfew; not to use, sell, or possess drugs; and
to submit to drug testing.
In January 2022, Stephen was again referred to the Substance Abuse
Services program, which he again failed to complete. About six weeks later,
he was referred to the Mobile Adolescent Services Team—which provides
services to children identified as having serious emotional disturbances—
after he expressed feelings of anxiety and restlessness. It appears he stopped
participating in this program before counselors could schedule a session his
parents were also able to attend.
Stephen reported to the probation department in March 2022 that he
had taken his mother’s car without her permission and crashed it. As a
consequence, he was referred to yet another program—CHOICE—which
provides “high-risk youth on probation” with “intensive support through daily
contact to encourage positive decision-making and fulfillment of court orders
and probation case planning goals.”
In May 2022, while Stephen was still on probation for his theft and
intoxication offenses, police stopped him and found in his possession a white
powdery substance divided into several small plastic baggies, a bottle
containing another baggie of white powder and 55 Xanax pills, two containers
of marijuana, and a loaded firearm that had been reported stolen out of Los
Angeles. The district attorney filed a second juvenile wardship petition
charging Stephen with felony possession of cocaine while carrying a loaded
6
firearm, felony unlawful possession of a concealable firearm without
permission of his parent and while not accompanied by his parent, felony
possession of Xanax for sale, and misdemeanor firearm-related offenses and
possession of cocaine (the drug petition). It also alleged that Stephen’s
commission of these offenses violated the terms of his probation.
The juvenile court adjudged Stephen a ward of the court after he
pleaded guilty to the felony drug and gun charge and a misdemeanor charge
of carrying a loaded firearm in public. The remaining counts were dismissed.
He stated in a later message to Rodriguez, “I said I was using all da drugs I
had on me . . . gotta act like that when it hits the fan.”
Stephen was sentenced to a commitment of no more than 130 days at
Urban Camp to be followed by probation. He served the custodial part of
his sentence from the middle of June to the beginning of September 2022.
During that period, Stephen took part in high risk substance abuse
counseling groups, individual therapy, and anger management. But he
was also involved in several gang-related fights due to his claimed
membership in the Asian Crips.
The conditions of Stephen’s probation included a prohibition against
leaving home without permission and a requirement that he complete the
inpatient McAlister drug detoxification program. In November 2022, he
returned to juvenile court to answer for the violations of two probation
conditions: failing to complete the McAlister program and for leaving home
several times without permission. Stephen entered the detoxification
program about three weeks after his release from Urban Camp but was
7
kicked out after only seven days for, among other infractions, writing “Asian
Crips” on the wall of his room.4
The probation department recommended that Stephen be placed with
his father while waiting for another spot to open up in the McAlister
program. The court instead remanded Stephen into custody until he could
be reaccepted into the program. Stephen successfully completed the program
on his second try.
Stephen has been in custody pending resolution of the murder petition
since January 2023. In the two years between being detained and the
hearing on the People’s transfer motion, Stephen earned his high school
diploma and took some college courses. He also participated in programs for
career development, creative expression, self-control, trauma-informed
cognitive behavioral therapy narrative, and forward-thinking responsible
behavior.
Despite these interventions, Stephen was involved in several
altercations, including at least three gang-related fights, the most recent of
which occurred in September 2024. He has also shown a lack of respect for
authority. For example, in response to a command from an officer to go to his
room, Stephen called him a racial slur and said, “fuck you, I have been here
longer than you.” After the command was repeated, he responded, “I don’t
give a fuck, [I’m] Asian Crip.” As another example, a few months later, he
squared up to a different officer and said, “I’ll beat your ass, go back to your
country.”
4 About a week after leaving the program, Stephen allegedly committed
the killing at issue here.
8
C. Motion to Transfer
1. Statutory Framework
“A juvenile court can retain jurisdiction over a minor . . . for the offense
of murder until he or she attains 25 years of age, or upon the expiration of a
two-year period of control, whichever occurs later.” (In re J.S. (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 205, 213 (J.S.).) The People may move to transfer the case of
such a minor aged 16 years or older to criminal court. (§ 707, subds. (a)(1) &
(b)(1).5) The baseline term for a murder conviction by the juvenile court is
between four and seven years (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.806(d)), whereas a
person convicted of first degree murder in criminal court is subject to a
minimum sentence of 25 years to life (Pen. Code, § 190, subd. (a)).
Upon the filing of a transfer motion, the juvenile court must order the
probation department to prepare and submit a transfer report that describes
“the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor.” (§ 707(a)(1).) This
report must discuss specified criteria and recommend whether the juvenile’s
case should be transferred. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.768(a) & (b).) Based
on the contents of the transfer report “and any other relevant evidence that
the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit, the juvenile court shall
decide” the motion. (§ 707(a)(3).) If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction,
it “shall recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes,
which shall include the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.” (Ibid.)
The minor’s case will be transferred to criminal court only if the People
prove by “clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
5 For brevity, we omit the word “subdivision” when referring to any
subdivision of section 707.
9
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(§ 707(a)(1)(3); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a).) In making this
determination, the juvenile court must consider five criteria: (1) the “degree
of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor”; (2) whether “the minor can
be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”6;
(3) the “minor’s previous delinquent history”; (4) success of “previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor”; and (5) the
“circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been
committed by the minor.” (§ 707(a)(3)(A)(i)–(E)(iii).) Each criterion is
followed by a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider. (Ibid.)
2. The Trial Court’s Decision
Over the course of 10 days in late January and early February 2025,
San Diego Superior Court Judge Tilisha T. Martin received testimony on the
People’s transfer motion from numerous witnesses: the PO who wrote the
transfer report recommending that Stephen’s case be moved to criminal
court; Stephen’s parents and other family members; defense expert and
clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Kristina Malek, who wrote a report
recommending that Stephen’s case remain in juvenile court; the director of
the programming for the Youth Development Academy (YDA), where Stephen
would be committed were to be adjudged a ward under the murder petition;
and Stephen’s recent therapists, educators, counselors, and mentors. The
6 Although this criterion sounds similar to the overall assessment the
juvenile court must make, the former is limited to whether there is
“ ‘insufficient time to rehabilitate the minor’ ” whereas the latter “concerns
a global assessment of the minor’s suitability to rehabilitated within the
juvenile court system, and not just a comparison of the time needed with the
time remaining.” (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 167 (Miguel
R.).)
10
court also judicially noticed Stephen’s court file and considered the
documents submitted by the parties.
The juvenile court granted the People’s motion for the reasons stated in
an oral ruling spanning 35 pages of the reporter’s transcript. The judge
found that each section 707(a)(3) criterion favored transferring Stephen’s
case and that the People proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was
not amenable to rehabilitation within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Steven immediately appealed.7
DISCUSSION
Stephen’s broad-based attack on the transfer order starts with an
assertion that the juvenile court erred as a matter of law because it reached
the ultimate conclusion that he was not amenable to rehabilitation without
the benefit of testimony by an expert witness for the People. Were that claim
to fail, he asserts there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court’s
findings that each section 707(a)(3) criterion supported the transfer motion
because the judge failed to properly consider the mitigating evidence. The
People respond that the PO gave expert testimony and that Stephen’s
substantive challenges to the order amount to a request that we reweigh
the evidence, in contravention of the standard of review.
Resolving these issues requires us to examine the juvenile court’s order
for abuse of discretion. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The
court’s “ ‘findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions
of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (Ibid.) Under this standard,
“we do not reweigh the evidence and we do not substitute our discretion for
7 This order is appealable within 30 days and “may not be heard on
appeal from the judgment of conviction.” (§ 801, subd. (a).)
11
the discretion exercised by the trial court.” (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 211.) Rather, we ask whether “any reasonable trier of fact” could make the
challenged finding under the corresponding standard of proof, which in this
case is clear and convincing evidence.8 (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1005 (O.B.).) This heightened standard of proof “reinforc[es] the
important policy of maintaining youth offenders in the juvenile court system
when the evidence of their resistance to rehabilitation is less than clear and
convincing.” (In re O.F. (Mar. 13, 2026, A166528) __ Cal.App.5th ___, ___
(O.F.) [2026 WL 708930, at p. *16].)
A. Requirement for Expert Testimony From the People
Citing J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706 (J.N.) and
pointing out that People did not call an expert witness, Stephen argues that
we must reverse the transfer order because, as a rule, “[a] juvenile court
abuses its discretion when the record lacks expert testimony indicating that
the juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation,[9] even when the record
contains a probation report that so concludes.” The People recognize that
expert testimony on a transfer motion is “often important,” but do not agree
that such testimony is needed. In any event, they contend that the PO who
wrote the transfer report provided expert testimony on their behalf.
8 Stephen suggests that the court’s finding on each individual section
707(a)(3) criterion must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 707(a)(3), however, requires courts to apply this heightened standard
of proof only to the ultimate conclusion that the youth is not amenable to
rehabilitation. (Accord Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165 [applying
this approach].) In any event, the juvenile court expressly stated that clear
and convincing evidence supported its findings on four of the five criteria.
9 Stephen refers to the ultimate question of amenability to rehabilitation,
not the section 707(a)(3)(B)(i) criterion.
12
We start with the language of the statute. As noted, section 707(a)(2)
requires the PO to provide a transfer report that, among other things, makes
a recommendation on the transfer motion. Upon receipt of that report, “and
any other relevant evidence that the petitioner or minor may wish to submit,”
the court will decide the motion. (§ 707(a)(3), italics added.) This permissive
language suggests that as a statutory matter, the People were not inevitably
required to provide expert testimony.
The cases Stephen cites do not support his proposed bright-line rule.
During the hearing on a transfer motion in J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at
p. 706, the PO opined that the minor was not amenable to rehabilitation by
the juvenile court even though “[t]here was no evidence as to the efforts
necessary to rehabilitate J.N. and no evidence as to why available programs
were unlikely to result in rehabilitation in the time allotted.” (Id. at
pp. 714, 722.). The panel explained that “[t]his lack of evidence rendered
any opinion based on the report without evidentiary value.” (Id. at p. 722.)
It went on to fault the People for not “present[ing] any expert testimony
concerning the programs available, the duration of any of the programs,
or whether attendance would rehabilitate J.N. before termination of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
The J.N. panel cited Jimmy H. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 709
to support its rationale. There, the Supreme Court explained if the time
required for rehabilitation “is the determinative factor in the court’s decision
. . . there must be substantial evidence in the record that successful
treatment might require the extra time.” (Id. at p. 715.) But the high court
also observed that expert testimony was not the only means to provide such
evidence, explaining that courts “may consider a minor’s past record of
delinquency . . . and [m]ust take into account his behavior pattern as
13
described in the PO’s report,” factors about which an expert witness may
provide guidance. (Id. at p. 714.) The reason the evidence was insufficient in
J.N. is because there was nothing else in the record to corroborate the PO’s
conclusion that the minor was unlikely to be rehabilitated in the juvenile
system. (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 721–722.)
In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1286 (S.S.), on which Stephen
also relies, is in accord. In the portion of the opinion Stephen cites, the court
posited that “expert testimony will likely be necessary for a complete
analysis” as to whether a minor would be amenable to rehabilitation by the
juvenile court. (Id. at p. 1287, italics added; accord, O.F., supra, __
Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2026 WL 708930, at *18].) Relying on J.N., the S.S.
panel stated that a “proper analysis” of this question “generally requires
‘expert testimony concerning the programs available, the duration of any of
the programs, or whether attendance would rehabilitate [the minor] before
termination of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.’ ” (S.S., at p. 1291, italics
added.) As was the case in J.N., the prosecution “presented no evidence to
demonstrate what minor’s rehabilitative needs were, much less why they
could not be met within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (S.S., at p. 1291.)
Absent this evidence, the juvenile court’s conclusion that S.S. could not be
rehabilitated before its jurisdiction was lost was an abuse of discretion.
(Ibid.)
We read these cases as standing for the principle that expert testimony
can be used to fill a gap in the evidence supporting a PO’s recommendation
that a minor’s case be transferred to criminal court. But here there was no
gap. The PO thoroughly discussed Stephen’s history, his reluctance to give
up “his delinquent and gang lifestyle,” and his “lack of implementation of
skills learned through the intervention services provided to him while in
14
custody” on the murder petition. Based on these observations, the PO
concluded there would not be “sufficient time in the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction to provide adequate rehabilitation.” And as discussed below,
this conclusion was informed by the PO’s understanding of what programs
would be available to Stephen through the YDA.
While we recognize that the juvenile court will often benefit from
expert testimony offered by the People, the law does not mandate it either as
a general rule or in this specific case.10
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. Criminal Sophistication and Gravity of the Offense
The juvenile court was required to examine Stephen’s degree of
criminal sophistication (§ 707(a)(3)(A)(i)) by looking at “ ‘the whole picture,
that is, all the evidence that might bear on [his] criminal sophistication,
including any . . . manifested in the present crime.’ ”11 (Kevin P. v. Superior
Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 192 (Kevin P.).) As for “the circumstances
and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by”
Stephen (§ 707(a)(3)(E)(i), the judge was to take into account “any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the
mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime,
10 We therefore need not address the People’s argument that the PO
provided expert testimony.
11 Accord section 707(a)(3)(A)(ii) (“the juvenile court may give weight to
any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity,
intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time
of the alleged offense, the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks
and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer
pressure on the minor’s actions; and the effect of the minor’s family and
community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s criminal
sophistication”).
15
the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and
emotional development.”12 (§ 707(a)(3)(E)(ii).)
Judge Martin considered these criteria together after concluding that
they involved overlapping facts. Substantial evidence supports her findings
that both criteria weighed in favor of transferring Stephen’s case.
Stephen’s criminal sophistication, the juvenile court believed, was
“evidence[d] in part from the instant offense” and “by his conduct while
detained and . . . while on probation in the community.” The judge observed
that the severity of Stephen’s criminal misconduct had escalated from minor
misdemeanor offenses to murder, with the latter occurring just a month after
his release from Urban Camp and the intensive programming he had
received there. As for the alleged murder itself, Judge Martin concluded that
the method of its commission and Stephen’s conduct beforehand and
afterward showed that he intentionally killed the victim to gain status within
the Asian Crips gang. Nothing suggested to the court that this “was an
impulsive act[,] that Stephen was acting in self-defense,” or that, as Dr.
Malek opined, his actions were the result of significant peer pressure from
adult gang members. Stephen’s involvement in gangs for three years prior to
the alleged offense, his long history of criminal behavior, and his role helping
to recruit new gang members led the court to conclude that he had the
emotional and mental wherewithal to appreciate the risks and consequences
of committing the alleged offense.
Turning to the criterion of the gravity and circumstances of the alleged
murder, Judge Martin incorporated the previous analysis and further
observed that the victim’s family members were “affected psychologically,
12 The court should also consider any evidence indicating the victim
trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered Stephen. (§ 707(a)(3)(E)(iii).)
No such evidence was produced in this case.
16
suffering from grief and loss and suicidal ideations and adjusting to life
without their loved one.” She recounted that the victim’s mother was
hospitalized based on the shock of the loss of her son and has since moved
from her home “so she does not have to wake up each morning to see the
place where she saw her son . . . lying dead on the street.”
The court also discussed at length the mitigating evidence put on by
Stephen, some of which was provided by Dr. Malek. The judge acknowledged
Stephen’s age and that, while in custody under the current wardship petition,
he earned his high school diploma, took some college classes, and participated
in behavioral programming. She also took note of evidence that Stephen
claimed to have started using drugs and alcohol in middle school, that his
parents separated when he was three years old, and that he expressed
resentment about the fact that his mother traveled to the Philippines for 45
days each year. Recognizing that these negative experiences “may have
contributed to Stephen’s personality and his functioning and emotional well-
being,” and might explain why he “gravitated to gang life,” Judge Martin did
not find them mitigating as to his criminal sophistication and the gravity and
circumstances of the offense.
Dr. Malek opined that Stephen had been “clinically significantly
impacted by adverse childhood experiences” to include that his mother
suffered from mental illness and that his parents were “emotionally
neglectful.” But this conclusion, the court determined, was lacking in
credibility and thus did not mitigate either the degree of Stephen’s criminal
sophistication or the severity of the gravity and circumstances of the murder.
In particular, Judge Martin found no evidence corroborating the assertion
that Stephen’s mother suffered from a mental illness. Moreover, the judge
pointed out, Stephen had “described his relationship with his parents as
17
supportive and he denied any abuse,” which was consistent with his parents’
testimony and the judge’s review of the record.
The court also considered as a potential mitigant Stephen’s mental
state and his mental and emotional development at the time of the alleged
murder, which occurred when he was 17 years old. In particular, Dr. Malek
testified that Stephen’s brain was likely still developing at the time of the
offense. Judge Martin disagreed that this fact was significantly mitigating
because the “offense was a willful premeditated shooting, it was not an
impulsive act, and it was it was not in self-defense . . . and it was committed
without provocation.”
On appeal, Stephen claims the court’s findings on these criteria must
be reversed because Judge Martin gave “no weight to mitigating evidence
that adult gang members pressured Stephen to be involved in the alleged
shooting.” But the court’s order makes clear that it carefully considered this
and all the other evidence Stephen presented, analyzed it in the context of
the statutory factors, and concluded that it did overcome the circumstances
that supported transfer of his case. The standard of review does not
authorize us to reweigh the evidence to reach the outcome Stephen desires.
2. Potential for Rehabilitation During Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction
As noted, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over Stephen could end no
later than his 25th birthday. (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 213.) Given
Stephen’s age of 19 years and 10 months when the court decided the People’s
transfer motion, at most its jurisdiction would have lasted about five years.
Judge Martin was required to consider “the minor’s potential to grow and
mature” during that time period. (§ 707(a)(3)(A)(ii).) The court’s finding that
this criterion, too, weighed in favor of transfer is supported by substantial
evidence.
18
According to the transfer report, were Stephen to be committed to the
YDA, he “would collaborate with a multi-disciplinary team . . . to develop an
individualized rehabilitation plan . . . based on his assessed needs and
strengths.” This plan would likely include “cognitive behavioral therapy . . . ,
gang intervention, prosocial development, career technical education . . . ,
positive youth development classes, academic services, and care services.”
(Some capitalization omitted.) It could also incorporate “programs such as
Thinking for Change, Moral Recognition Therapy . . . , Seeking Safety,
Trauma Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy . . . and Aggression
Replacement Training.”
As for Stephen’s likely success in such a commitment, the PO
recognized that in the time Stephen had been detained under the current
petition, he had “shown an effort to participate in programming,” had earned
his high school diploma, and had taken a few college courses. He was “been
able to utilize healthy coping skills and seek support when needed.” The
transfer report also credited comments by Stephen’s family members that
he had shown “growth and maturity” because of the programming he had
received while in custody. But at the same time, the PO—whose experience
included supervising youths for gang offenses—observed that “Stephen
continues to display gang entrenched violent and aggressive behavior despite
the programming and services offered thus far.”
The PO went on to state his belief that Stephen’s “commit[ment] to
maintaining his delinquent and gang lifestyle” would make it “difficult to
rehabilitate him until he had a desire to remove himself entirely from the
gang.” In the officer’s view, “[o]ne must consider Stephen’s age as he has
reached the age of maturity, yet he still engages in gang activities and
violence despite the possibility of getting transferred to an age-appropriate
19
facility.” “At this point,” the officer continued, “it appears Stephen does not
recognize the detrimental effects of his gang involvement. . . . As such it will
take a considerable amount of time to help him change his outlook on gangs
in order to remove himself from future risky endeavors.” Based on “Stephen’s
current performance in custody and lack of implementation of skills learned
through the intervention services provided to him while in custody thus far,”
the PO concluded, “it appears he will not have sufficient time in the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction to provide adequate rehabilitation.”
Stephen’s witnesses tried to paint a different picture of his progress
while being detained and the likely outcome of the juvenile court’s efforts to
rehabilitate him. In summary, the percipient witnesses testified that he
meaningfully participated in and benefitted from in-custody programming.
His resilience coordinator also testified that Stephen felt bad for letting his
family down, which supported an inference that they were invested in his
well-being. The juvenile court mostly found these witnesses’ testimony to be
credible.
Yet Judge Martin did not assign it significant weight. The watch
commander’s testimony, in her view, also “highlighted the continued struggle
of Stephen to moderate his behavior just over the last year in 2024, despite
his consistent participation in therapy [and] programing . . . whether it was
instigating peers, or disrespecting staff on his gang name, posturing,
threatening to beat an officer’s ass when being redirected, and then
ultimately engaging in a fight.” As for the remaining witnesses, the court
recognized that Stephen had done well in the past while under supervision.
But this recent history showed that whether in custody or not, he “picks and
chooses when he wants to implement th[e] therapeutic skills that he is
learning.” Further, the court found concerning that his therapists and drug
20
counselor appeared to be relying mostly—if not solely—on Stephen’s self-
reporting of his therapeutic needs, which the judge inferred was not totally
accurate.
On this point, as noted earlier, Stephen’s description to Dr. Malek of
his family dynamics differed from other evidence in the record, some of which
he provided. Likewise, Stephen was inconsistent in reporting the extent of
his drug use. In December 2021, he reported having used only marijuana
and denied using other drugs. But in May 2022, in an attempt to avoid a
harsh sentence under the drug petition, Stephen claimed the drugs police
thought he was selling—cocaine and Xanax—were for personal use and that
he had used them every day for “a couple of years” And in 2023, Stephen
disclosed his use of certain drugs before December 2021 that he did not
previously report and changed the frequency of his use of other drugs that he
did report. In truth, Stephen tested positive for drugs on only the first two of
the fifteen tests administered between July 2021 and October 2022—both
times for marijuana—despite claiming to have taken other drugs during this
time period. Even Malek conceded that she could not say whether Stephen
had used all the drugs he claimed.
Dr. Malek concluded that Stephen could be rehabilitated by the
juvenile court based in large measure on aspects of the percipient witnesses’
testimony favorable to him and what programs would be available at the
YDA. The court, however, was surprised by the fact that Malek had not
assessed Stephen’s risk for violence given that he had been charged with “one
of the most serious and grave offenses that exists of which Stephen was
allegedly intimately involved in by shooting the victim.” Malek attempted to
rationalize this omission by claiming that this assessment is usually
21
administered closer to the juvenile’s release date, a response the judge
believed reflected a bias toward Stephen.
“When considering the totality of the circumstances,” Judge Martin
explained, “it appears to this [c]ourt that Stephen has learned to perform well
within the structure of the [c]ourt’s rehabilitative custodial program in order
to successfully complete the programs and return to the community.” But
Stephen “chose not to use those skills” on the date of the murder and he has
struggled to use them while in custody for that offense. The court concluded
that “considering the extensive prior intervention, Stephen’s overall progress
while on probation and in custody, his statement on more than one occasion
that his behavior will be different, and then his immediate inability or lack of
desire to sustain behavioral progress while detained and . . . even after a
custodial release where he programmed well while in custody, the [c]ourt
finds the People have proven by clear and convincing evidence that Stephen
is not amenable to rehabilitation under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
Accordingly, Judge Martin found this criterion supported transferring
Stephen’s case.
Stephen raises two challenges to this finding. First, he claims the
People failed to present evidence of the programs he would require were he
committed to the YDA because the PO’s report was missing this information
and the prosecutor called no expert to provide it. Stephen thus contends that
the only evidence on this point is the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Malek who,
he asserts, “identified specific therapies and programs at YDA that would
meet Stephen’s needs” and that he had “more than enough time for
rehabilitation.”
We read the record differently. Not only did the PO describe a likely
plan for Stephen’s rehabilitation while under juvenile jurisdiction, but in
22
certain respects he did so with more specificity than Dr. Malek. With the
caveat that the exact rehabilitation plan would be figured out upon Stephen’s
commitment, the PO identified particular therapies and named specific
programs that would benefit him. Malek, by contrast, merely concluded in
the portion of the transcript cited by Stephen that after looking at a list of
programs which might be available to him through the YDA, “I don’t see any
one that would not be helpful.” Although an expert’s opinion on whether
programs exist that would rehabilitate a minor is generally entitled to “great
weight,” that does not mean an expert’s opinion must be credited. (Jimmy H.,
supra, 3 Cal.3d. at pp. 714–715.) As the trier of fact, the juvenile court was
free to discount Malek’s conclusory opinion that programs offered by the YDA
would successfully rehabilitate Stephen (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p.
212), and we must give due deference to that determination (O.B., supra, 9
Cal. 5th at p. 996).
Second, Stephen argues that the juvenile court misunderstood the
length of time he could remain under its jurisdiction. The PO stated that the
court would be required by subdivisions (b)(1) and (e) section 875 to review
Stephen’s progress every six months and would be permitted to reduce his
sentence by up to six months following each review. As a result, the PO
suggested that Stephen could be released within two years if the court
imposed the minimum baseline term of four years. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.806(d).) Although Judge Martin noted the officer’s statement, she made
clear she was assuming that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over this case
could extend until Stephen turned 25 years old. Thus, contrary to Stephen’s
assertion, the facts here are materially distinguishable from Kevin P., supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at pages 198 through 199, where the juvenile court
23
erroneously treated the date of the minor’s first parole hearing as the
baseline for evaluating section 707’s rehabilitation criteria.
Even considering the evidence of Stephen’s progress in the programs
and therapies in which he took part while in custody and assuming that the
programs available at the YDA would likely be more intensive, there was
substantial evidence for the juvenile court’s finding that this criterion
supported transferring his case. Indeed, because Stephen was not an
accurate source about his own therapeutic and rehabilitative needs, the court
was justified in giving less weight to the testimony of Stephen’s counselors
and Dr. Malek that he could be rehabilitated. The failure of the recent, prior
interventions to instill lasting positive changes in Stephen could lead a
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that his rehabilitative needs would not all
be met while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
3. Previous Delinquent History
When evaluating the criterion of Stephen’s earlier delinquent history,
the juvenile court was required to “give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor's previous
delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community
environment and childhood trauma on the minor's previous delinquent
behavior.” (§ 707(a)(3)(C)(ii).)
The juvenile court recited these factors and determined that this
criterion favored transferring Stephen’s case. The judge described Stephen’s
history with the juvenile justice system, determined that his behavior showed
an unwillingness to take seriously the conditions of supervision that had been
imposed, and noted that the seriousness of his misconduct had escalated from
petty theft to much more serious charges despite multiple interventions.
The court rejected Dr. Malek’s opinion that Stephen’s misconduct could be
24
traced to his parents’ neglect and failure to supervise him, noting again that
her testimony was inconsistent with other statements he had made about his
family dynamics. While recognizing that Stephen’s parents were not always
around, the court described their extensive efforts to help him comply with
the conditions of his supervision throughout the years.13
Stephen urges us to view the record differently on appeal. He asserts
his “prior delinquent history indicates he is amenable to rehabilitation
because it showed some fights and nonviolent incidents.” (Italics added.)
But he disregards the fact that many of those fights were gang related and
that his past convictions include possessing two drugs (cocaine and Xanax)
he was apparently trying to sell while armed with a loaded gun.14 Stephen
also tries to minimize the misconduct he admitted in the two prior wardship
petitions, characterizing it as “nonviolent and therefore indicat[ive] of
amenability,” despite that he engaged in more serious misconduct at every
step. Finally, he recounts the witness testimony he believes portrayed his
parents as neglectful and unavailable, suggesting it mitigates his
responsibility for his delinquent history.
Even were we to agree with Stephen’s interpretation of this evidence,
the result here would be no different because we may not simply substitute
13 The parents moved Stephen from Mira Mesa to Poway, changed his
school, disciplined him by taking away privileges, met with the PO even
without him, made him go to work with his father as a way to keep him out of
trouble, changed the locks to keep him from leaving without permission,
increased their time with him, drug tested him, supported his participation
in extracurricular activities, and encouraged him to pursue his dream of
owning a jewelry business.
14 We reject Stephen’s suggestion that who started the gang-related fights
is somehow determinative. The larger point is that Stephen’s posturing as a
gangmember showed his unwillingness to leave the gang life behind even at
the risk of provoking physical confrontations from members of rival gangs.
25
our judgment for that of the juvenile court. We have no basis to conclude
that a trier of fact would act outside the bounds of reason by finding
Stephen’s delinquent history supported transferring his case, considering the
escalating nature of his misconduct, his disregard for the court’s authority in
supervising him, and his propensity for violence—at times either gang-
related or directed toward figures of authority—while in custody for that
misconduct. This finding, therefore, was supported by substantial evidence.
4. Previous Rehabilitation
When evaluating the juvenile court’s earlier attempts to rehabilitate
Stephen, Judge Martin was to consider “the adequacy of the services
previously provided to address the minor’s needs.” (§ 707(a)(3)(D)(ii).) The
court received evidence on this factor from both the PO and Dr. Malek and
found that this criterion supported transferring Stephen’s case to criminal
court.
The transfer report described Stephen’s contacts with the juvenile
justice system and discussed his unwillingness to abide by conditions of
supervision while out of custody. The PO noted that after Stephen was
released from Urban Camp, he “did not take advantage of the services being
offered to him” and “[o]nly after being detained for this matter did he decide
to concentrate on services.” “Despite the probation department and juvenile
court’s involvement along with interventions and services offered to him,” the
PO observed, “Stephen continued to participate in criminal and delinquent
activities.” He went on to describe that Stephen’s criminal offenses
“increased in severity over time [and] displayed extremely poor decision-
making skills coupled with violent acts that displayed his commitment to
his gang.” Accordingly, the PO concluded that the programming offered to
Stephen “was clearly not beneficial.”
26
Dr. Malek agreed with this conclusion and blamed two causes:
(1) Stephen “needed more services than he received” and (2) his parents
“could not provide adequate supervision.” She claimed that the supervision
Stephen received while out of custody was inadequate because, for example,
it was not tailored to his behavior of associating with gangs and abusing
drugs. As for the programming he received while at Urban Camp, Malek
thought the counselors needed more time to work with him and that they
should have placed him in a residential drug treatment facility immediately
upon his release rather than have him wait for a spot at the McAlister
program.
The juvenile court was not persuaded by Dr. Malek’s opinions. Judge
Martin thoroughly described the history of previous attempts to rehabilitate
Stephen, starting with his refusal to enter diversion to address his first petty
theft through his detention under the current petition. According to the
court, “Stephen was provided adequate services to address his needs and
services at his request, even though he chose to be absent at times from home
and to follow through at times with the services offered.” And “[d]espite
successfully completing a lengthy custodial commitment” to Urban Camp, “as
well as engaging in all programming during that commit and acknowledging
that he needed to do better, immediately upon his release from that commit,
Stephen re-engaged in same and similar behavior.” As to Malek’s theory that
Stephen’s family did not provide adequate supervision, the court reiterated
that Stephen’s self-reporting of his family dynamics to her contradicted other
evidence that was more credible. Accordingly, the court found this criterion
supported transferring Stephen’s case.
On appeal, Stephen argues that the juvenile court gave short shrift to
Dr. Malek’s opinions and did not appreciate the difficulties he had in
27
obtaining care. In particular, he focuses on the probation department’s
alleged mishandling of “a kid who was addicted to multiple substances”
during and after his Urban Camp commitment. The record does not support
the underlying premise that Stephen was actually addicted to multiple
substances because, again, even Malek conceded that there was no proof that
Stephen had used any drugs other than marijuana during the time period he
was drug tested. But to the larger point, without any basis in the record to
infer that the juvenile court ignored any of the evidence Stephen cites on his
behalf, we may not second guess how the judge weighed it against the
significant contrary evidence that he chose not to implement the skills he
learned through the programming that he was offered. Accordingly, a
reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that this criterion weighed in
favor of transferring Stephen’s case to criminal court.
5. Clear and Convincing Evidence of Amenability to Rehabilitation
We now turn to the juvenile court’s ultimate conclusion that clear and
convincing evidence established Stephen would not be amenable to
rehabilitation before its jurisdiction would end. “[C]lear and convincing
evidence demands a degree of certainty greater than that involved with the
preponderance standard, but less than what is required by the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 998.) The
evidence must “leave no substantial doubt.” (In re Terry D. (1978) 83
Cal.App.3d 890, 899.) The weight given to each of the criteria is within
the court’s discretion. (Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.)
We find that the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could make this finding. (O.B., supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 1005 [“when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence,
28
the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made
the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof”].) The
increasing severity of Stephen’s misconduct, his behaviors that consistently
frustrated the probation department’s and juvenile court’s efforts to
rehabilitate him, and his unwillingness to abandon the gang-life mentality
even while in custody for murder—and presumably aware of the detrimental
impact this behavior might have on his effort to oppose the People’s transfer
motion—sufficiently supports Judge Martin’s conclusion that Stephen would
not be amenable to rehabilitation within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
The recent decision from the First Appellate District in O.F. does not
alter our view. In that case, the 16 year old minor was charged with two
counts of murder arising from a 2020 gang-related shooting that killed both
occupants of a vehicle. (O.F., supra, __ Cal.App.5th at pp. ___ ___ [2026 WL
708930, at pp. *2-*4].) The minor’s amenability hearing was conducted in
2022, prior to several significant statutory changes, only some of which the
juvenile court was able to anticipate and attempt to apply. (Id. at pp. ___ ___
[2026 WL 708930, at pp. *12, *15, *16].) Concluding that these changes
applied retroactively to the minor’s case, the Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded for a new amenability hearing consistent with all aspects of the
current law. (Id. at p. ___ [2026 WL 708930, at p. *1].)
Significantly, the amenability hearing in this case took place in 2025,
some time after all the statutory changes highlighted in O.F. had become
effective. Indeed, Judge Martin began the hearing by articulating the
statutory burdens, standards and criteria she was obligated to apply,
including the recent changes referenced in O.F. As a result, the primary
29
problem with the juvenile court’s order in O.F.—application of an outdated
legal standard—is simply not an issue in this case.
In contrast, the principal issue before us is the sufficiency of the
evidence to support Judge Martin’s conclusion that Stephen is not amenable
to rehabilitation within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and this finding was
based on her analysis of all five criteria in section 707(a)(3). The appellate
court in O.F. analyzed only one of those five criteria in terms of sufficiency of
the evidence—what it termed the “second criterion” inquiring “[w]hether the
minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction.” (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i).) Because “all the testimony at the
amenability hearing, including that of the probation officers, was that there
was sufficient time for O.F. to be rehabilitated” (O.F., supra, __ Cal.App.5th
at p. ___ [2026 WL 708930, at p. *17]), the Court of Appeal concluded that the
juvenile court’s contrary determination was not supported by substantial
evidence. (Id. at p. ___ [2026 WL 708930, at p. *19].)
In Stephen’s case, as we have noted, there was no unanimity in the
testimony as to the amount of time that would be necessary for successful
rehabilitation. Unlike as to O.F., the evidence here did not “uniformly
suggest” that Stephen “has the potential to overcome his gang roots before
jurisdiction expires.” (O.F., supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2026 WL 708930,
at *18].) And particularly because it arises in a different procedural context,
O.F. does not compel a different result when analyzing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings.
Finally, Stephen argues reversal is required because the juvenile court
focused too heavily on the severity of the alleged crime at the expense of
whether he was amenable to rehabilitation. We cannot accept this argument
because the court stated at the outset that “[t]he sole issue to be decided is
30
whether Stephen is amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.” It further noted that the facts of the offense are relevant
only “as [they] relate to the transfer criteria that this court needs to
consider.” Both of these legal principles are correct, and both were faithfully
applied by the juvenile court in reaching its conclusion.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
KELETY, J.
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