CourtListener 10831484•People v. Fifita CA4/2
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Filed 4/1/26 P. v. Fifita CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085748
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF2205026)
FILIMONE KINI FIFITA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Stephen J. Gallon,
Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and
Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A jury found defendant, Filimone Fifita, guilty of making criminal threats (Pen.
Code, § 422)1 (Count 1), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)) (Count
2), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (Count 3), and battery on an intimate
partner (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) (Count 4). The jury found true the allegations that in the
course of the threats and assault, defendant personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a).)
The trial court imposed a suspended prison sentence of six years, and granted
defendant three years of formal probation, with the condition that he serve one year in
the custody of the Riverside County Sheriff. Within that suspended six-year prison
sentence, the trial court ordered that the sentence for the criminal threats conviction
(Count 1) be served concurrently with the sentence for assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (Count 2). Defendant contends the trial court erred by not staying the criminal
threats sentence pursuant to section 654 because the threat (Count 1) and the assault
(Count 2) involved the same intent and objective. We modify defendant’s suspended
sentence and affirm.
FACTS
A. DEFENDANT’S CRIMES
In October 2022, the victim and defendant had been dating for approximately
two years and they lived together, in Moreno Valley. One day that month, defendant,
the victim, and the victim’s family attended a funeral in Riverside. The victim and her
1 All subsequent statutory citations will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
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children left the funeral and went home, while defendant stayed behind “partying” with
the victim’s cousins.
Around midnight, the victim and defendant argued on the telephone because the
victim refused to drive back to Riverside to pick up defendant. Approximately one hour
later, defendant, who was drunk, arrived home. Defendant grabbed the victim by the
hoodie she was wearing and pulled her around the living room. In an attempt to resist
being pulled, the victim moved to the floor. Defendant instructed the victim to stand up
and walk outside to the front of the house. Defendant pointed a loaded .45-caliber
Glock at the victim and said, “[C]ome outside, I’m gonna kill you.” The victim cried.
Defendant went outside and sat down on a chair, while the victim stood in the
front doorway. Defendant was “waving the gun everywhere because he’s drunk.”
Defendant pointed the gun directly at the victim five or six times while calling her a
“ho” and a “bitch” and saying, “I’m gonna kill you.”
The victim’s mother and sister were in the kitchen. Under the guise of going to
the kitchen to ask her sister for a cigarette, the victim actually asked her mother and
sister to go to the victim’s daughter’s room and have her daughter call 9-1-1. The
victim returned to the front entryway. Defendant had passed out while sitting in the
chair in the front yard. Defendant awoke when the police arrived.
B. CLOSING ARGUMENT
During closing argument, as to the criminal threats charge, the prosecutor argued,
“[D]efendant threatened to kill her when she was outside multiple times, he pointed the
gun [at] her five to six times.· He made the threat clearly.” The prosecutor explained
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that an element of the threat offense is defendant’s specific intent for his statement to be
understood as a threat, which the prosecutor explained was demonstrated by defendant’s
use of the firearm. In particular, the prosecutor said, “How do we know that he
intended his threat to be understood as a threat?· Well, he’s got a gun with him.” As to
the firearm enhancement on the threat charge, the prosecutor argued, “[W]e know that
the gun was pointed at her in a menacing manner. That’s why she was scared for her
life. He pointed the gun at her five to six times.”
In regard to the charge of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, the prosecutor
argued the crime occurred when “defendant had pointed the firearm at her five to six
times.”
C. SENTENCING
The trial court designated the prison term for assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (Count 2) as the principal term. The trial court imposed three years for the
substantive offense of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Count 2) and three years
consecutive for the firearm enhancement, for a total of six years. The court stayed the
sentence for the assault with a firearm conviction (Count 3) pursuant to section 654.
As to the criminal threats conviction (Count 1), the trial court did not mention
section 654. Instead, the trial court imposed a 16-month term for the substantive
criminal threats offense and a three-year term for the associated firearm enhancement
and ordered that the sentence for Count 1 be served concurrently with the sentence for
Count 2. As set forth ante, the trial court suspended the prison sentence and granted
formal probation.
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DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not staying his criminal threats
sentence pursuant to section 654 because the threats and assault involved the same
intent and objective.
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides, in part, “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under
either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under
more than one provision.”
“ ‘ “Section 654 has been applied not only where there was but one ‘act’ in the
ordinary sense . . . but also where a course of conduct violated more than one statute and
the problem was whether it comprised a divisible transaction which could be punished
under more than one statute within the meaning of section 654.” [Citation.] Whether a
course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act
within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If
all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any
one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ ” (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d
625, 637.) We apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Leonard
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465, 499.)
The People contend defendant had separate intents and objectives. The People
contend that in verbally threatening the victim, defendant intended to inflict mental and
emotional harm on the victim, whereas in pointing the firearm, defendant intended to
inflict physical harm on the victim. The evidence reflects that, when defendant was on
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the front porch, he was sitting down and the victim was standing in the doorway. There
is nothing indicating that defendant tried to move closer to the victim by standing up
and/or approaching the victim. There is also no evidence that defendant attempted to
fire the gun. Without some gesture by defendant toward touching the victim, we cannot
conclude that defendant’s intent and objective was to physically harm her. Rather, as
the prosecutor argued in closing argument, defendant used the firearm to cause the
victim mental anguish.
The People assert defendant held the gun to the victim’s head. When describing
the charged incident, the victim said defendant pointed the gun at her five or six times—
she did not say that he held the gun to her head. Rather, the victim said that she was
standing in the front doorway, while defendant was sitting on a chair on the front porch.
Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Lobatos also testified that when she arrived at the
house, defendant was sitting on a chair on the front porch. Given that defendant was
sitting, while the victim was standing, the evidence does not indicate that defendant held
a gun to the victim’s head.
The victim’s comments to the officer about defendant holding a gun to her head
described uncharged prior incidents of domestic violence. When speaking with the
sheriff’s deputy, the victim explained that “every other day,” defendant threatened to
kill her while he held a firearm. When asking about the current incident, the sheriff’s
deputy asked the victim, “Was he holding the gun to your head[?]” The victim replied,
“Well, he was pointing it at me. But there were several times he’s had it to my head.”
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The victim’s statement means that, during this charged incident, defendant pointed the
gun at her, but during uncharged prior incidents, he held the gun to her head.
In sum, because there is no evidence of defendant attempting to touch the victim
during the charged course of conduct, we reject the People’s contention that he intended
to inflict physical harm. Thus, substantial evidence does not support a finding of
separate intents and objectives.
The evidence that defendant pointed the gun at the victim when threatening her
supports a finding that defendant used the gun to emphasize his threat and cause the
victim mental anguish. Accordingly, defendant held a single intent and objective during
the course of conduct—to cause the victim to fear for her life. We will modify
defendant’s suspended prison sentence.
DISPOSITION
Within defendant’s suspended prison sentence, for Count 1, the 16-month term
for criminal threats (§ 422) and the three-year term for the associated firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) are modified from concurrent to stayed (§ 654). In
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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