CourtListener 10829831•People v. Lyons CA4/1
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Filed 3/30/26 P. v. Lyons CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D087346
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. RIF2206272)
v.
JOSHUA L. LYONS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Jerry C. Yang, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Attorney
General, Arlene Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie H. Chow and
Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Joshua Lyons of resisting an executive officer in the
performance of duty (Pen. Code,1 § 69) and assault on a peace officer (§ 241,
subd. (3)). The trial court considered and denied Lyons’s motion for a new
trial. Lyons appeals, challenging the factual sufficiency of his convictions.
He further contends the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury on
unanimity. Finally, he contends the trial court erred by not granting a
motion for a new trial. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2022, California Highway Patrol Officer Niko
Le Beau was driving his patrol vehicle when he noticed a truck whose driver
was “flipping” him off. The truck did not have license plates. Le Beau knew
that car thieves commonly avoid detection by not having license plates. He
activated his emergency lights, prompting the driver to pull into a parking
lot. Le Beau parked his patrol vehicle, exited, and saw defendant Joshua
Lyons exiting the truck. Le Beau considered Lyons’s action of exiting his
truck during a traffic stop a “red flag” that “raised concerns” regarding
Lyons’s intentions. While moving towards Lyons, Le Beau commanded Lyons
to return to his vehicle. Lyons took three steps towards Le Beau while
Le Beau walked towards Lyons to “close[ ] [the] distance.” Le Beau tried
twice to grab Lyons’s hands to gain control over the situation because “hands
are what kill.” Lyons swatted away Le Beau’s hands. After Le Beau’s second
attempt, Lyons hit Le Beau on the side of his head. Then, Le Beau tried to
grab Lyons’s legs to gain control over him, but Lyons put Le Beau in a
chokehold. Le Beau took Lyons to the ground, but Lyons put his arm against
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Le Beau’s esophagus, making it difficult for Le Beau to breathe. Le Beau felt
in fear for his life, and he struck Lyons’s torso to try to get him to release his
arms.
A bystander jumped on Lyons’s legs to help Le Beau gain control of and
handcuff Lyons. The bystander testified Lyons charged Le Beau unprovoked
and “started swinging and pummeling” him. He further testified that Lyons
was overpowering Le Beau and “it was very evident that [Le Beau] needed
help.”
Lyons was charged with resisting an executive officer in performance of
duty (§ 69) and assault on a peace officer (§ 241, subd. (c)). A jury found him
guilty on both charges. Lyons moved for a new trial under section 1181,
subdivision (6), which the court denied. The court denied probation and
sentenced Lyons to the low end sentence of 16 months.
DISCUSSION
A. Requirement that an officer must be acting lawfully under sections
69 and 241, subdivision (c)
Lyons contends there is insufficient evidence to support the two
charges under sections 69 and 241, subdivision (c), because Le Beau’s use of
force was excessive and not objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
In particular, he argues that Le Beau used excessive force by grabbing
Lyons’s hands without giving him an adequate opportunity to comply with
Le Beau’s commands and, therefore, was not acting in lawful performance of
his duties, as required under both statutes.
1. Applicable law
A defendant is guilty of violating section 69 when he or she resists the
officer by the use of force or violence as long as that officer was acting
lawfully at the time of the offense. (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232,
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241.) It is, therefore, an essential element of that offense that the officer at
the time of the arrest must be engaged in the lawful performance of his or her
duties, and use of excessive force by an officer to accomplish an arrest is
unlawful. (People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167 (White); see
CALCRIM No. 2652.) When a peace officer uses unreasonable or excessive
force in making the arrest or the detention, the person being arrested does
not violate the law if he or she uses reasonable force to defend himself or
herself against the use of excessive force. (People v. Sons (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 90, 102–103.)
Similarly, to be convicted under section 241, subdivision (c), the assault
of the peace officer “must occur while the officer is engaged in the
performance of his duties.” (Franklin v. County of Riverside (1997)
971 F.Supp. 1332, 1335.) A peace officer is not engaged in the performance of
his duties, within the meaning of section 241, subdivision (c), if he uses
excessive force in making the arrest. (Franklin, at p. 1336.) “[W]here
excessive force is used in making what otherwise is a technically lawful
arrest, the arrest becomes unlawful and a defendant may not be convicted of
an offense which requires the officer to be engaged in the performance of his
duties.” (White, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 164; see also People v. Sibrian
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 127, 133.)
Whether an officer used excessive force is an objective inquiry. An
officer’s actions must be “ ‘objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting [him], without regard to [the officer’s] underlying
intent or motivation.’ ” (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516,
527 (Ransweiler).) Courts must assess an officer’s reasonableness by
considering all relevant facts leading up to the critical moment. (Barnes v.
Felix (2025) 605 U.S. 73, 78–83 (Barnes).) Further, the reasonableness of an
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officer’s use of force “ ‘ “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
[Citations.]” ’ ” (Ransweiler, at p. 527.)
We review whether an officer’s conduct complied with the Fourth
Amendment de novo, and we consider the trial court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence. (See In re Edgerrin J. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 752, 759.)
Substantial evidence is “ ‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value . . . .’ ” (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.) We consider
this evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presum[e]
every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from that evidence.” (People v.
Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 319.) We “ ‘ “must accept logical inferences
that the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if [we] would have
concluded otherwise.” ’ ” (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811–812.)
2. Substantial evidence supports the implicit finding that
Officer Le Beau’s use of force was reasonable
We conclude sufficient evidence supports the finding that Le Beau used
reasonable force and, thus, was acting lawfully while performing his duties.
The parties do not dispute that an officer may take certain measures to
ensure the safety of a traffic stop, including ordering a driver to remain in his
car. Here, Lyons displayed erratic and aggressive behavior prior to Le Beau
reaching for his hands. First, Lyons “flipped off” Le Beau without
provocation. Second, after Le Beau initiated the traffic stop, Lyons opened
his car door and exited, which Le Beau deemed “not normal behavior” and “a
big, red flag.” Third, Lyons disobeyed Le Beau’s repeated commands to
remain in his car and instead took steps towards Le Beau. In fact, a witness
testified Lyons “charged [Le Beau] . . . out of nowhere.” When the gap had
closed between them, Le Beau attempted to grab Lyons’s hand to “gain
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control.” Le Beau grabbing Lyons’s hands—which caused no injury—was
reasonable and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances.
(See Barnes, supra, 605 U.S. at p. 80 [under the totality approach, “actions
the officer took during the stop, such as giving warnings or otherwise trying
to control the encounter” can “carry weight in the analysis”].) In reaction to
Lyons’s unprovoked hostility, unusual conduct, and failure to follow
commands, Le Beau reached for Lyons’s hands to gain control. Lyons has not
shown that this force used was excessive.
We are unpersuaded by Lyons’s argument that officers must provide
individuals an opportunity to comply with commands before resorting to
force. While an opportunity for compliance is a factor in assessing the
reasonableness of an officer’s use of force, it must be considered in the totality
of the circumstances context. (Ransweiler, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 812
[recognizing that peace officers “are often forced to make split-second
judgments, in tense circumstances, concerning the amount of force required”];
Barnes, supra, 605 U.S. at pp. 83–84 [“[A] court cannot thus ‘narrow’ the
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, to focus on only a single moment.”].)
Under these circumstances, we conclude that substantial evidence exists
from which a rational jury could find that Le Beau’s use of force was
reasonable.
B. Unanimity instruction
Lyons claims the trial court erred by failing to give a sua sponte
unanimity instruction on both counts, and he contends the court should have
instructed the jury to unanimously agree on which act constituted force. He
argues the instruction was required because, during closing argument, the
prosecutor identified multiple acts that could have substantiated the use of
force aspect for each offense including: (1) swatting away Le Beau’s hands;
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(2) hitting Le Beau on the head; and (3) choking Le Beau. He claims the
jury’s question during deliberations suggests that the jurors may have been
considering different acts or theories of guilt without a clear understanding of
what specific act needed to be unanimously agreed upon.
1. Applicable law
Under the state and federal constitutions, a unanimous jury verdict is
required to convict a person of a crime. (Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S.
83; People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) This requirement is
typically satisfied when the jury unanimously finds the defendant committed
the alleged crime. But that is not always the case. As the California
Supreme Court has explained, “[W]hen the evidence suggests more than one
discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the
court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (Russo, at p.
1132.) This requirement “ ‘is intended to eliminate the danger that the
defendant will be convicted even though there is no single offense which all
the jurors agree the defendant committed.’ ” (Ibid.)
There are “several exceptions to the unanimity rule. For example, no
unanimity instruction is required if the case falls within the continuous-
course-of-conduct exception, which arises ‘when the acts are so closely
connected in time as to form part of one transaction’ [citation], or ‘when . . .
the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts
over a period of time.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679
(Jennings).) Additionally, “[t]here also is no need for a unanimity instruction
if the defendant offers the same defense or defenses to the various acts
constituting the charged crime.” (Ibid.)
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We review de novo a claim that the trial court failed to properly
instruct the jury on applicable principles of law. (People v. Lueth (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 189, 195.)
2. “Continuous course of conduct” exception applies
Here, Lyons swatted, hit, and choked Le Beau during a single
encounter that lasted less than a minute. Crucially, these acts happened
during the same moments, in the same location, and in response to the same
event—Le Beau reaching for Lyons’s hands. There was no space or time
dividing the acts. In addition to the close connection in time, the acts were
part of the same “transaction”—in this case, the same assaultive conduct—
with no reasonable basis for a juror to distinguish between them. (See, e.g.,
People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282). Indeed, in a postverdict
discussion, the jurors stated they considered this entire course of conduct
from the traffic stop through the arrest, “rather than focusing on specific acts
of force.” The jury did not need to agree on a specific act where all acts were
part of a continuous course of conduct. (Compare People v. Mehaldo (1998)
60 Cal.App.4th 1529 [unanimity instruction required where defendant’s
multiple criminal threats were separated by several hours] with People v.
Lopez (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1508 [unanimity instruction not required
where defendant struggled with several officers while resisting an arrest].)
Additionally, Lyons’s defenses to all his acts were the same: the witnesses
lacked credibility, and Le Beau was not lawfully performing his duties.
Because Lyons’s acts constituted a continuous crime, and he offered the same
defense to the various acts, an exception to the unanimity instruction
requirement applies and Lyons’s claim of error fails. (See Jennings, supra,
50 Cal.4th at p. 679 [unanimity not required if the defendant offers the same
defense to the various acts constituting the crime].)
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C. Motion for a new trial
The court denied Lyons’s motion for a new trial under section 1181,
subdivision (6). Lyons contends the trial court abused its discretion in doing
so, alleging the jury (1) misapplied the law because it did not seek further
clarification on a question submitted to the court, (2) erroneously considered
Lyons’s failure to heed Le Beau’s commands as an element of the crimes, and
(3) engaged in misconduct by misapplying the law. Lyons argues that these
purported errors, taken together, denied him due process.
1. Additional facts
At 3:13 p.m. on the first day of deliberations, the jury submitted the
question “Does failure to comply go to resisting the officer?” to which the
court responded after 3:43 p.m., “Can you please re-state the question in a
different way, with different words?” The parties had stipulated to release
the jury at 4:00 p.m. The jury returned the next morning and, without
rephrasing their question, resumed deliberations at 9:15 a.m. They returned
with a verdict at approximately 9:30 a.m.
After the verdict, defense counsel moved for a new trial under section
1181, subdivision (6), arguing the verdict was contrary to law or evidence. In
the motion, defense counsel included information about a postverdict
discussion with nine of the 12 jurors. The jurors explained that, rather than
rewrite the question, they “collectively decided not to follow the court’s
suggestion and just use common sense.” Defense counsel argued that the
jury opted not to “follow the law” when they chose to use “common sense,”
alleging the jury inferred that Lyons’s noncompliance with Le Beau’s
commands was “sufficient” to complete the offense of “resisting a peace
officer.” At a hearing on the motion, however, defense counsel conceded no
juror “actually said the words” that the case was decided solely on Lyons’s
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noncompliance with Le Beau’s commands. The court rejected Lyons’s
argument that the jury convicted on both counts “merely because Lyons did
not comply with the officers’ directive to return to his car.” The court
concluded the verdicts were supported by the evidence and denied the motion
for a new trial.
2. Applicable law
A court may grant a new trial under section 1181, subdivision (6), if the
jury’s verdict is contrary to the law or the evidence. (§ 1181, subd. (6).) A
trial court reviewing a motion for new trial does not give deference to the
jury’s evidentiary findings. (Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125,
133.) It independently examines all the evidence and may conclude the jury’s
verdict is contrary to the evidence. (Ibid.) “In doing so, the judge acts as a
13th juror who is a ‘holdout’ for acquittal. Thus, the grant of a section
1181[, subdivision] (6) motion is the equivalent of a mistrial caused by a hung
jury. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “A trial court has broad discretion on ruling on a
motion for a new trial, and there is a strong presumption that it properly
exercised that discretion.” (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 524.)
“ ‘ “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” [Citations.] “ ‘A trial court’s ruling
on a motion for new trial is so completely within that court’s discretion that a
reviewing court will not disturb the ruling absent a manifest and
unmistakable abuse of that discretion.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lightsey (2012)
54 Cal.4th 668, 729.)
3. The court properly denied Lyons’s motion for a new trial
Lyons argues the jury (1) misapplied the law because it did not seek
further clarification on a question submitted to the court, (2) erroneously
considered Lyons’s noncompliance with Le Beau’s commands as an element of
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the crimes, and (3) engaged in misconduct as a result of misapplying the law.
Lyons’s claim that the jury must have misapplied the law because it did not
resubmit its question is not supported by the record. The jurors had complete
instructions on the law and continued to deliberate even with the pending
question. Although the jurors stated they “used common sense” to resolve
their question, they further attested they considered the entire course of
conduct—from the initiation of the traffic stop to when Lyons was placed in
handcuffs—in reaching their verdict. Thus, the jury’s decision not to
resubmit their question does not lead to the conclusion that they misapplied
the law.
Next, the record does not support Lyons’s contention that the jury
improperly considered Lyons’s noncompliance as an element of either offense.
While noncompliance is not an element of either section 69 or section 241, it
was a relevant factor to consider in determining whether Le Beau used
reasonable force when grabbing Lyons’s hands. In that way, the jury’s
consideration of Lyons’s noncompliance was relevant when evaluating the
reasonableness of Le Beau’s use of force under the totality of the
circumstances. (See Barnes, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 73.) The jurors also stated
they considered the entire course of conduct in reaching their verdict. The
record clearly shows the jury did not convict Lyons solely on his failure to
comply with Le Beau’s commands.
Finally, Lyons argues that the court erred in denying the motion for a
new trial under section 1181, subdivision (3), for jury misconduct. He
contends that the jury committed misconduct because it misapplied the law
by considering Lyons’s failure to heed Le Beau’s commands as an element of
the crime. At the outset, the basis for Lyons’s motion was predicated on his
claim that the verdict “is contrary to law or evidence,” and not on a claim of
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jury misconduct. He did not raise this jury misconduct argument in the trial
court. Thus, he has forfeited this challenge. (See People v. Stowell (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [“[A]n appellate court will not consider claims of error
that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court.”].)
Even if the claim was not forfeited, we would conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because the record does not
support Lyons’s contention that the jury improperly considered Lyons’s
noncompliance as an element of each offense. (See Barnes, supra, 606 U.S. at
p. 73.) Also, consideration of Lyons’s noncompliance was not legally
irrelevant, as Lyons claims, because it is a factor to consider when evaluating
the reasonableness of Le Beau’s use of force. (Ibid.) We conclude the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Lyons’s motion for a new trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
CASTILLO, J.
RUBIN, J.
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