Hansen v. Commission on Teacher Credentialing CA4/1

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Filed 3/25/26 Hansen v. Commission on Teacher Credentialing CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTIAN ROBERT HANSEN, D084576

Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No.
37-2022-00048594-CU-WM-CTL)
COMMISSION ON TEACHER
CREDENTIALING et al.,

Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Affirmed.

Christian Robert Hansen, in pro per, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Erin M. Sunseri, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,
and Alan K. Macina, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and

Respondent Commission on Teacher Credentialing.1

After Christian Robert Hansen pleaded guilty to two felony fraud

convictions, the Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) 2
revoked his teaching certificate and credential and denied his application for
a specialist credential. The trial court denied Hansen’s petition for writ of
administrative mandamus and affirmed the Commission’s decision.
On appeal, Hansen contends that the Commission abused its discretion
when it chose not to stay revocation of Hansens’s credentials for five years,
subject to probation, as recommended by an administrative law judge (ALJ).
Because the record contains substantial support for the trial court’s ruling,
we find no abuse of discretion.
The ruling is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between 2011 and 2013, and again in 2017, as he later admitted,
Hansen conspired with others to commit securities fraud. Between 2011 and
2013, while employed by an investor relations firm, Hansen received shares
from public companies into his personal brokerage account, but concealed
from the brokerage firm that the shares were given in exchange for stock
promotion services his employer provided to those companies. He then sold

1 San Diego Unified School District has not made an appearance in this
action and did not file a responsive brief. Appellant does not appeal any
order from San Diego Unified School District.

2 The Commission is responsible for the credentialing of public school
teachers, including issuing credentials and taking adverse actions against
applicants and credential holders. (See Ed. Code, §§ 44421, 44225.)
2
the shares and returned most of the proceeds from sale of those shares to his
employer. When he discovered that these stock transfers were illegitimate,
he resigned his position with his employer, he later testified. From January
through July 2017, Hansen received unregistered shares of a public
company’s stock through a coconspirator. He claimed to qualify for an
exemption to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) registration
requirements by making two false representations: that he did not act in
concert with anyone else for the purpose of selling the shares, and that he
would not share any of the proceeds from the sale to the person from whom
he acquired them. In contravention of those representations, he knew that
he obtained the shares through an agreement with a coconspirator, and after
he sold the shares, he returned some of the proceeds to his coconspirators.
This conduct violated federal securities laws. Hansen agreed that the gain
attributable to his role in the conspiracies totaled $76,847.
Hansen left the securities industry and began working in education.
The Commission issued Hansen a Certificate of Clearance, effective October

2017 to November 2022 (Certificate),3 and Hansen joined Garfield High
School to train as a special education teacher. He successfully completed the
credentialing process and in 2018, the Commission issued Hansen an intern
education specialist instruction credential, effective October 2018 to
November 2020 (Credential or Intern Credential). In 2018 Garfield High
School hired him as a special education teacher.
In spring 2018, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
approached Hansen about the securities fraud scheme. Hansen admitted

3 A Certificate of Clearance is a document, issued by the Commission,
which verifies that the holder meets personal qualifications necessary to
obtain a regular California teaching or services credential. (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 5, § 80028.)
3
wrongdoing and agreed to assist the FBI in its investigation. He reached a
plea agreement with the United States Attorney, and in November 2019,
pursuant to that plea agreement, Hansen pleaded guilty to two counts of
conspiracy to commit securities fraud in federal court. In April 2020, Hansen
consented to an entry of judgment against him in a civil action brought by the
SEC based on the same conduct. The judgment enjoined Hansen from
conducting certain securities trading activity and permanently prohibited
Hansen from trading penny stocks. In May 2020, the federal district court
sentenced Hansen to three years of probation and ordered him to pay
$12,520.74 in restitution.
In April 2020, while his Certificate and Intern Credential were still
valid, Hansen submitted an application for a preliminary five-year education
specialist instruction credential (Application).
In July 2020, after his criminal judgment was finalized, Hansen
informed the Commission of his criminal convictions and provided a
narrative of his crimes.
In September 2021, the Executive Director of the Commission
(Complainant) filed an accusation against Hansen (Accusation), alleging that
the conduct underlying Hansen’s felony convictions called for discipline
against Hanen’s Certificate and Credential (together, credentials) and the
denial of his Application. The Accusation sought disciplinary action against
Hansen’s credentials due to his: (1) unprofessional conduct, (2) immoral
conduct, (3) acts of moral turpitude, and (4) evident unfitness for service, and
alleged that the acts of moral turpitude warranted denial of his pending
Application.

4
Hansen requested a hearing to challenge the Accusation. The matter

was heard at an administrative hearing before an ALJ.4
The ALJ analyzed the factors set forth in government regulations and
case law that are relevant in evaluating an allegation of misconduct by the

holder of an educational credential.5 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 80302, subd.
(a); Morrison v. State Bd. of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 229.) The ALJ
found that, as Hansen’s conduct occurred in 2011 through 2013 and in 2017,
it was “unlikely that students or the educational community may have been
adversely affected by his conduct or conviction.” As to the crime’s proximity,
though the conduct occurred years earlier, Hansen was recently convicted
and remained on probation at the time of the 2022 administrative hearing.

4 A contested case may be heard by the agency itself or by an ALJ, at the
discretion of the agency. (Gov. Code, § 11517, subd.(a).)

5 These include:
“(1) The likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected
students, fellow teachers, or the educational community, and the degree of
such adversity anticipated;
(2) The proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct;
(3) The type of credential held or applied for by the person involved;
(4) The extenuating or aggravating circumstances surrounding the
conduct;
(5) The praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives resulting
in the conduct;
(6) The likelihood of the recurrence of the questioned conduct;
(7) The extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse
impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of the person involved,
or other certified persons;
(8) The publicity or notoriety given to the conduct.” (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 5, § 80302, subd. (a).) The ultimate question is “the relationship between
the alleged misconduct and the applicant’s or [credential]holder’s fitness,
competence, or ability to effectively perform the duties authorized by the
credential.” (Ibid.)
5
In aggravation, though Hansen resigned from his firm in 2013 when he
learned the transactions were illegal, in 2017 he again engaged in activity
which he acknowledged was illegal. The ALJ believed Hansen tried to
minimize the severity of his transgressions by characterizing his illegal
conduct as a “blemish” and “taking a ‘shortcut.’ ” In mitigation, the ALJ
acknowledged that since his criminal conduct, Hansen had earned his
bachelor’s and master’s degrees, obtained his teaching credential and was
working as a special education teacher and coach. But his motives were
purely financial and thus blameworthy. The ALJ found it unlikely that the
misconduct would occur again because Hansen had been barred from trading
securities.
The ALJ ultimately substantiated two of the four allegations in the
Accusation: that Hansen committed acts of unprofessional conduct and
immoral conduct when he violated securities laws and received about $77,000
in illegal share sale proceeds. The ALJ found unsubstantiated the allegation
that Hansen committed acts of moral turpitude, and concluded there was no
relationship between Hansen’s misconduct and his lack of fitness to
effectively perform the duties authorized by his Certificate and Credential.
The ALJ concluded that the facts warranted discipline, but not revocation, of
Hansen’s credentials.
The ALJ proposed that the Commission grant Hansen’s Application for
the five-year education specialist credential, revoke that credential and his
existing Intern Credential, and immediately stay the revocation. The ALJ
further proposed that the Commission place Hansen’s credentials on
probation for five years subject to a list of conditions, including cooperation
with the Commission, regular interviews and reports to the Commission, and
notice of his probationary status to his employers.

6
The Commission rejected the ALJ’s proposed decision.6 In additional
submissions, the Attorney General, on behalf of the Complainant, challenged
the ALJ’s findings that Hansen’s convictions for securities fraud were not
acts of moral turpitude and that Hansen remained fit to teach. For his part,
Hansen disputed the ALJ’s characterization of his conduct as aggravated and
emphasized his fitness for service and rehabilitation, but ultimately urged
the Commission to accept the ALJ’s proposed decision.
The Commission issued a final decision, effective November 2022, that
included additions and amendments to the ALJ’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. The Commission concluded three of the four causes for
discipline had been substantiated: unprofessional conduct, immoral conduct,
and acts of moral turpitude. The Commission concluded the Attorney
General had not demonstrated that Hansen was unfit to serve due to a
“temperamental defect” or other “fixed character trait,” but had
demonstrated “a relationship between [Hansen’s] misconduct and his lack of
fitness to effectively perform the duties authorized by his credential and
certificate.” The Commission revoked Hansen’s Certificate and Intern
Credential and denied his Application.
Hansen filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the
superior court. The superior court ordered the Commission to stay the order
of revocation while it considered the writ petition.
Ultimately the superior court denied Hansen’s petition. Reviewing
using its independent judgment, the court concluded that “the weight of the

6 After an ALJ hears the case, he or she prepares a proposed decision in
a form that may be adopted by the agency as its final decision in the case.
(Gov. Code, § 11517, subd. (c)(1).) The agency may thereafter adopt the ALJ’s
proposed decision in its entirety, adopt it with changes, or reject it and
conduct further proceedings. (Gov. Code, § 11517, subd. (c)(2).)
7
evidence supports [the Commission’s] decision revoking [Hansen]’s
certifications.” The court added that while it could “easily conclude the
revocation decision constitutes an overly harsh penalty,” the court recognized
it “cannot substitute its own discretion for that exercised by the
administrative agency. Reasonable minds can differ as to the propriety of
revocation, but the administrative record confirms that [the Commission]
acted within its discretion.” The court took special notice of the “the
undisputed contention that [Hansen] continues to competently teach special
education students and coach high school sports,” but acknowledged again it
“is not free to substitute its opinion for that of the Commission,” and that
“[a]fter an independent review, it cannot be concluded that the
administrative record does not contain evidence supporting the revocations
ordered by the Commission.”
Hansen timely appealed. We granted Hansen’s request for a stay of the
Commission’s decision pending resolution of this appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
A petitioner may file a writ of administrative mandamus to challenge
the validity of a final administrative order or decision. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.5.) The basis for the challenge may extend to whether the agency has
proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial;
and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) Abuse of discretion is established if the order or decision
is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the
evidence. (Ibid.)
The superior court reviews the record employing either an independent
judgment standard or substantial evidence standard. (Code Civ. Proc.,

8
§ 1094.5, subd. (c); Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 811
(Fukada).)
“When an administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental
vested right, such as the revocation of a professional license, the independent
judgment standard of review applies. [Citations.] The superior court must
examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its
independent judgment upon the evidence.” (Evans v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 958, 967, fn. 1 (Evans); see also Frink v. Prod
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 175 (Frink) [“Once the agency has initially exercised its
expertise and determined that an individual fulfills the requirements to
practice his profession, the agency’s subsequent revocation of the license calls
for an independent judgment review of the facts underlying any such
administrative decision.”].)
An exercise of independent judgment requires the trial court to reweigh
the evidence and examine the credibility of witnesses. (Barber v. Long Beach
Civil Service Com. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 652, 658.) In this process, however,
the administrative agency’s decision is entitled to a “strong presumption of
correctness,” and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the
burden of convincing the court that the agency’s findings are contrary to the
weight of the evidence. (Fukuda, supra, at p. 817.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, which applies to
administrative decisions that do not affect a fundamental right, the superior
court does not reweigh the evidence presented at the administrative level but
instead determines whether the administrative decision is supported by
substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5,
subd. (c); Fukada, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 811.)

9
If the superior court concludes that the agency properly found
misconduct, the appropriate penalty for that misconduct is left to the sound
discretion of the agency and will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings
absent an abuse of discretion. (Spanner v. Rancho Santiago Community
College Dist. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 584, 591 (Spanner) [trial court “may not
exercise its independent judgment when reviewing the penalty”]; see also
Dresser v. Bd. of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 506,
510 (Dresser) [“In cases involving the Board’s decision to revoke a
professional license, the independent judgment standard is the standard to
be used by the superior court except as to the determination of the penalty
imposed.”].)
On appeal, regardless which test the superior court applied, we review
for substantial evidence to support the superior court’s determination.
(Fukada, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824.) Because judgments of the trial court
are presumed to be correct, the appellant bears the burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error and must show that the error was prejudicial. (Ibid.)
“ ‘[O]ur function on appellate review is solely to decide whether credible,
competent evidence supports that court’s judgment.’ ” (Shenouda v.
Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 512 (Shenouda).) If the
record contains facts to support the judgment, we must affirm. (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
1. Standard of Review in the Trial Court
As an initial matter, we conclude that the trial court applied the correct
legal standards in its review of the Commission’s decision. The trial court
properly reviewed the Commission’s findings using its independent judgment,
while affording a “strong presumption of correctness” to the Commission’s
decision (Fukuda, supra, at pp. 811-812), and properly reviewed the

10
Commission’s determination of the appropriate penalty for abuse of
discretion. (Spanner, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 591.)
The Attorney General contends that the trial court only needed to
apply the substantial evidence standard, citing Flanzer v. Bd. of Dental
Examiners (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396 (Flanzer). But Flanzer
concerned the standard of review for an applicant seeking to reinstate a
professional license that had already been revoked, who, the Flanzer court
reasoned, “is in the same position as a person seeking a license in the first
place,” and thus entitled only to substantial evidence review. (Ibid.)
Hansen had already been granted a Certificate and Intern Credential.
While these had expired while Hansen’s Application was pending, the
Commission chose as part of its discipline to revoke “all teaching credentials
and certificates issued to” Hansen, citing its authority to take disciplinary
action even against an expired credential. (Ed. Code, § 44440, subd. (a).)
While it also denied Hansen’s Application, the Commission’s reasoning
focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the grounds for adverse action
against Hansen’s credentials. The Commission relied upon its findings of
unprofessional conduct, immoral conduct, and acts of moral turpitude to
justify revocation of Hansen’s credentials, while citing only the acts of moral

turpitude to deny the Application.7 Since the Commission chose to impose

7 The Commission relied on the same factor–its finding of acts of moral
turpitude–to support both adverse action against Hansen’s credentials and
denial of the Application. Consequently, we need not decide if a hybrid
approach would have been necessary: that is, independent judgment review
of the revocation of the credentials as a decision implicating a fundamental
vested interest, and review of denial of the Application for substantial
evidence. Once the trial court affirmed the Commission’s findings using its
independent judgment, those same findings, including as to moral turpitude,
would necessarily have withstood substantial evidence review.
11
discipline on Hansen’s expired but unsullied credentials, Hansen was not
solely a person seeking a license in the first place, and it would seem to us
that that the heightened standard for an agency decision that implicates a
vested fundamental right should apply. (See Evans, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at
p. 967, fn. 1; Dresser, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 510; Frink, supra, 31 Cal.3d
at p. 175; Housman v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 308,
312).
2. Hansen’s Challenges
On appeal, Hansen contends that the Commission abused its discretion
in rejecting the ALJ’s proposal and revoking his credentials based on
“aggravating factors” that were not supported by the evidence. He concedes
that his conduct was “undoubtedly unprofessional” but argues it should not
be considered immoral. He asserts that the ALJ correctly concluded his
conduct did not amount to acts of moral turpitude. And because the conduct
occurred before Hansen began teaching, he avers, the finding of harm to
students was unsupported. Moreover, there was evidence that Hansen’s
violation could not be repeated. Hansen recites facts in mitigation, including
his many volunteer hours promoting youth programs and coaching student
athletes, endorsements by educational professionals as to his dedication and
fitness as a teacher, and his leadership roles within the school and

community.8 He concludes that to “exile” such a person from a career in
teaching “is the very definition of an arbitrary decision.”

8 Hansen provided no citations to the record for most of these
statements. He refers to a document–a 2024 performance evaluation by the
principal of his current school–that is not properly part of the record. We
grant the Attorney General’s motion to strike pages 200-201 of Hansen’s
appendix, which were not part of the record below.
12
To begin with, we review the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, not
the underlying agency’s decision. (Shenouda, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p.
512.) Accordingly, we do not assess anew Hansen’s challenges to the
Commission’s decision, but consider his arguments only in evaluating
whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.
Second, Hansen fails to support those arguments with sufficient
citations to the record or to legal authorities. His three citations point to: a
document that is not properly part of the record, the ALJ’s proposed decision

that the Commission opted not to follow, and dictum9 of the superior court.
It is a “cardinal rule of appellate review that a judgment or order of the trial
court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively
shown.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
181, 187.) The “appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error through
reasoned argument, citation to the appellate record, and discussion of legal

We deny the motion to strike as to Hansen’s appendix pages 1 through
136 and writ exhibits 1 through 19. While Hansen’s appendix 1 through 136
may duplicate some portions of the administrative record, an administrative
record must ordinarily be transmitted directly to the court and not included
in an appendix (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124(b)(3)), we have already
granted the Attorney General’s motion to file a duplicate administrative
record that contains pagination, and to augment the record with several
pleadings filed in superior court. The Attorney General contends that 1
through 19 are nonrecord items since they were “[n]ot introduced or admitted
at administrative hearing nor during writ proceedings at trial court.” But the
register of actions reflects that these pages, which comprise Hansen’s exhibits
in support of his amended writ petition, were filed in the superior court writ
proceedings in July 2023. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124(b)(4)
[exhibits are deemed part of the record, whether or not the appendix contains
copies of them].)

9 Statements that are not necessary to the determination of a case
are dictum and lack precedential impact. (United Steelworkers of America v.
Board of Education (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 823, 834-835.)
13
authority.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655,
685.) When a party makes an assertion but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citation to authority, the assertion may be treated as waived.
(Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
Third, even were Hansen’s arguments not waived by his failure to
adequately support them, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s ruling after its independent judgment review that the
Commission did not abuse its discretion. While the trial court did not
expound greatly on its reasoning, it had “carefully reviewed the
administrative record” to conclude that the weight of the evidence supported
the Commission’s decision.
Our own review of the record supports this conclusion. The record
primarily consisted of: Hansen’s statements to the Commission, both in
correspondence and under oath at the administrative hearing; endorsement
letters submitted by Hansen; and the records of the federal civil and criminal
cases, including the admissions Hansen made in his plea agreement. Hansen
raised no objection to these documents at the administrative hearing and
does not challenge their authenticity or reliability on appeal. Hanson instead
appears to challenge how the Commission applied the agreed-upon evidence
to the statutory factors for discipline.
The credible and competent evidence in the record supported the trial
court’s ruling affirming the Commission’s decision, including as to each of the
Commission’s findings Hansen now challenges on appeal. In his criminal
plea agreement, Hansen admitted that he concealed information from his
brokerage firm to effectuate the transactions in 2011 to 2013, and falsely
represented that he qualified for a registration exemption in 2017 by
concealing his coordination with his coconspirators and his intentions for the

14
proceeds. The same plea document recites the elements of securities fraud,
which include the element that the defendant “willfully used a device or
scheme to defraud someone, made an untrue statement of material fact,
failed to disclose a material fact that resulted in making the defendant’s
statement’s misleading, or engaged in any act, practice, or course of business
that operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” While
he argues that the conduct was not moral turpitude in the absence of malice
or theft, and “returning capital to help the company succeed cannot be
reasonably considered immoral,” the statements in his plea agreement and
his criminal convictions for offenses requiring fraud or deceit are substantial
evidence supporting the conclusion that Hansen’s acts amounted to immoral
conduct and acts of moral turpitude. (Golde v. Fox (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 167,
185 [“moral turpitude is inherent in crimes involving fraudulent intent,
intentional dishonesty for purposes of personal gain or other corrupt
purpose”]; In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243, 247 [“a crime in which an
intent to defraud is an essential element is a crime involving moral
turpitude”]; Palo Verde etc. Sch. Dist. v. Hensey (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 967, 972
[immoral conduct includes “conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
of corruption,” or that showing “an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and the public welfare.”].)
Although the conduct occurred before Hansen began teaching,
sufficient evidence supports the Commission’s reasoning that if students or
fellow teachers learned of Hansen’s criminal conduct, they could question
whether Hansen was honest and truthful in his dealings with them. Hansen
himself agreed in his testimony that teachers need to set a positive example
for students and the Commission has a duty to ensure people holding
credentials are trustworthy people.. Teaching imposes greater

15
“responsibilities and limitations on freedom of action” upon its practitioners
compared to other professions, and an individual’s “ability to inspire children
and to govern them, his power as a teacher, and the character for which he
stands are matters of major concern in a teacher’s selection and retention.”
(San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1463.) This accepted view of teachers as role
models with influence over students, and Hansen’s convictions for fraud
which are a matter of public record, supply substantial evidence to support
the Commission’s inference that students or staff would be impacted to learn
that a trusted coach, teacher, and faculty leader was a felon for crimes
involving dishonesty and deceit. (See id. at p. 1461 [on review, we give the
prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence].)
And while Hansen was barred from trading securities, substantial
evidence supported the Commission’s broader concern that his crimes
presented the risk that Hansen would again engage in unprofessional and
immoral conduct and acts of moral turpitude, which are not limited to the
sphere of securities trading. The evidence supporting this conclusion
included that Hansen engaged in fraudulent conduct in 2017 even after
learning the transactions from 2011 through 2013 were illegal. Hansen also
characterized the crime in ways that the Commission and ALJ interpreted as
an effort to minimize the severity of his conduct. All of this created the risk
he could engage again in something similar.
Finally, the Commission acknowledged and did not ignore the
mitigating circumstances that Hansen recites again in his appeal.
Once the trial court concluded after its independent review that
grounds existed for discipline of Hansen’s credential, it appropriately
deferred to the Commission to choose the appropriate sanction. The

16
Commission, carrying out its statutory responsibility to identify and impose
discipline for educator misconduct (Ed. Code, § 44000.5) and with the

expertise of its constituent members,10 analyzed Hansen’s crimes, drew
reasonable inferences from the evidence, and weighed the aggravating and
mitigating factors, to decide that revocation of his credentials and denial of
his Application were the appropriate penalty. The SEC saw fit to enjoin him
from securities trading for his conduct, and we cannot say it was an abuse of
discretion for the Commission to enjoin him from teaching. As discussed
above, substantial evidence supports this conclusion.

10 The Commission’s 15 voting members include a school superintendent,
six practicing teachers from public elementary and secondary schools, one
member of the governing board of a school district, school administrators, one
college faculty member, and three representatives of the public. Members
must be drawn from different school districts around the state. (Ed. Code,
§ 44210 (a), (c).)
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

RUBIN, J.

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