People v. Kayser CA4/1

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Filed 3/25/26 P. v. Kayser CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D087608

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI20000567)

ERIC HANS KAYSER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Sarah Oliver, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded with directions.
Bruce L. Kotler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Caelle Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Eric Hans Kayser of possession for sale of
methamphetamine with a firearm enhancement and possession of
methamphetamine while having a loaded, operable firearm. Kayser first
contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine. Without
determining whether there was error, we conclude any error was harmless.
Second, Kayser argues the trial court erred by failing to apply Penal

Code section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(A) and (B),1 regarding mandatory
supervision, after sentencing him to county jail. The People agree, and we
accept their concession.
Accordingly, we remand the case for resentencing. Otherwise, we
affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On February 25, 2020, law enforcement, including Officer Justin Carty,
executed a search warrant on Kayser’s residence in Hesperia, California. In
the living room, officers found multiple instruments used for cutting or
separating narcotics and a metal spoon with a white crystalline substance
consistent with methamphetamine. In the office, Kayser had a laptop with
wires connected to many surveillance cameras located inside and outside the
house. The office closet had an open safe, where law enforcement found: a
large bag of methamphetamine, two smaller bags of methamphetamine, a
digital scale, a box of clear bags commonly used to package narcotics, an
envelope with $400 cash in various denominations, a loaded revolver, and two
other firearms. The large bag of methamphetamine weighed 52.66 grams.
The revolver belonged to Kayser, and it was operable. Kayser also had $385

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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in cash in different denominations in his wallet. In the master bedroom of
the residence, officers found a glass pipe with what appeared to be
methamphetamine residue, hypodermic needles that could have been used to
inject methamphetamine, syringes or vials containing a clear substance
which may have been methamphetamine, and additional ammunition. The
garage had two additional gun safes with several other firearms. All
windows of the residence had nails or screws drilled into them so they could
not be opened, and the doors had locks on both sides.
Kayser told police that he locked the windows because he had issues
with people breaking in and stealing things. He admitted to being a
methamphetamine user and stated the methamphetamine present was for
personal use. He also gave a small amount of methamphetamine away.
Kayser said he last purchased one ounce, or 28 grams, of methamphetamine
approximately two months before, and he uses around six grams per week.
He explained he bought methamphetamine in bulk because he travelled to
purchase it. Kayser said he was unemployed but had money from disability
and a settlement, and he withdrew the cash he had from the bank. He also
reported selling or bartering machinery that he stored in his yard.
Law enforcement had conducted surveillance of Kayser’s home for one
or two hours during the two days prior to executing the warrant. They did
not see anyone coming to or going from the residence during that time.
The People charged Kayser with possession for sale of a controlled
substance while personally armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11378, 12022, subd. (c); count 1) and possession of a controlled substance
while armed with a loaded, operable firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1,
subd. (a); count 2).

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At trial, in addition to explaining the events of February 25, Officer
Carty testified that factors indicating drugs are for sale rather than personal
use include having larger quantities of narcotics, money in different dollar
amounts, digital scales to weigh products, and bags for packing products. A
seller’s residence often has a complex security system, high fences, good
lighting, and other things to protect the home. He further explained that
users typically possess less than one gram of methamphetamine, although
addicts may possess up to one week’s worth of methamphetamine at a time
and use up to one gram per day. He testified it would not be common for a
user to have 52 grams of methamphetamine. He stated that it is common for
drug dealers to use their own product. While the search did not uncover a
“pay/owe” sheet that some sellers use, Officer Carty explained that law
enforcement does not find one in all sales cases. Based on the evidence, he
thought that the evidence indicated that Kayser was selling drugs, not just
personally using them.
The trial court instructed the jury on both charges—possession for sale
of a controlled substance and possessing a controlled substance while having
a loaded, operable firearm. The court did not instruct the jury as to the lesser
included offense in count 1 of simple possession of a controlled substance.
The jury found Kayser guilty on both counts and found true the count 1
allegation that he was personally armed with a firearm. The court sentenced
Kayser to the middle term of two years on count 1 plus four years for the
firearm enhancement, to be served in state prison. The court stayed the
sentence on count 2 under section 654.
Following sentencing, California’s Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation sent the trial court a letter suggesting that the court review
Kayser’s commitment to state prison rather than county jail considering

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section 1170, subdivision (h). The court did so, issuing a corrected order
committing Kayser to county jail.
DISCUSSION
Kayser contends the trial court erred by: (1) failing to instruct the jury
on possession of a controlled substance as the lesser included offense of
possession for sale; and (2) failing to apply section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)
after ordering him to serve his sentence in county jail.
A. Lesser Included Instruction
Without deciding whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the
jury on possession of methamphetamine, we conclude that any such error was
harmless.
“[A] trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a
lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence.”
(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 149, disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 261.) When the trial
court does not provide a sua sponte lesser included offense instruction, we
review any error under the standard announced in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Breverman, at p. 165.) Prejudicial error exists when “it
appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have achieved a more
favorable result had the error not occurred.” (Id. at p. 149.) Reasonable
probability means “ ‘ “merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract
possibility.” ’ ” (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 422.) In this
analysis, the reviewing court considers “what such a jury is likely to have
done in the absence of the error.” (Breverman, at p. 177.) “In making that
evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the
evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the
evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there

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is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains
affected the result.” (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence that Kayser possessed methamphetamine to sell it
was very strong. He possessed a large amount of methamphetamine, a
digital scale, cutting tools, packing materials, a loaded firearm, and a large
amount of cash in different denominations, which Officer Carty explained
indicate drug sales. While Officer Carty testified methamphetamine addicts
usually possess no more than seven grams of methamphetamine, Kayser
possessed at least 52 grams of methamphetamine. Further, Kayser had an
extensive security system with cameras inside and outside the home,
consistent with drug sales, and the windows in his residence were nailed
shut. Considering the entirety of this evidence, the jury was unlikely to have
found simple possession of methamphetamine even if the court had provided
that instruction.
This is particularly true given that count 2 did not require the sale of
controlled substances. The jury could have convicted Kayser only on count 2,
which required possession, but not sale, of controlled substances—yet the
jury convicted him on both counts. Thus, the concern did not exist that “[a]
jury without an option to convict a defendant of a lesser included offense
might be tempted to convict the defendant of an offense greater than that
established by the evidence instead of rendering an acquittal.” (People v. Eid
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 650, 658.) The jury’s conviction of Kayser on the possession
for sale count, when it could have convicted him only of possession of
methamphetamine while having a loaded firearm, shows that the jury would
not likely have convicted him of the lesser included offense in count 1 had it
received the instruction.

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The strong evidence and conviction on count 2 makes this case unlike
those cited by Kayser. In People v. Hayes (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 175, 183,
the jury was “presented with an unwarranted all-or-nothing choice between
conviction of the charged offense and complete acquittal” and the issue
involved the severity of injuries from a battery of a police officer, which the
appellate court determined supported a verdict on the lesser included offense.
In People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 154–155, the court
determined there was prejudice where the jury’s only option was to convict of
the charged offense, the jury convicted the defendant on a lesser included
offense of a different charge, and the Attorney General only argued harmless

error based on the conviction of the greater offense.2 The evidence of sales in
People v. Walker (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 111, 117–118, was weaker compared
to the evidence of personal use—while the defendant possessed small
packages of marijuana and large amounts of cash, he had a medical
marijuana card and law enforcement did not find a scale. And the jury there
did not have the option of convicting the defendant of a different
possession-only offense. (Id. at p. 116.)
Any error in the court’s failure to instruct on simple possession of
methamphetamine was harmless.
B. Sentencing
Kayser next contends we should remand for resentencing because the
court did not comply with Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)(5) when it

2 Since the parties submitted their briefs, the California Supreme Court
has disapproved of People v. Brown, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 140, concluding
assault was not a lesser included offense of the charged offense, resisting an
officer by force or violence. (People v. Morgan (2026) 19 Cal.5th 132.)

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ordered him to commitment in county jail. We accept the People’s concession
that the trial court erred.
Punishment for a conviction of possession for sale of methamphetamine
is governed by section 1170, subdivision (h). (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.)
Section 1170, subdivision (h)(1) provides that punishment shall be by
imprisonment in county jail. Although the section 12022, subdivision (c)
firearm enhancement directed imprisonment in state prison, section 1170,
subdivision (h)(9) required the sentence to be punishable as directed by the

underlying offense.3 Under section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(A) and (B), a
court imposing a sentence under subdivision (h)(1) must “suspend execution
of a concluding portion of the term for a period selected at the court’s
discretion,” known as mandatory supervision, unless it “finds, in the interest
of justice, that it is not appropriate in a particular case.” This section creates
“a statutory presumption in favor of the imposition of a period of mandatory
supervision in all applicable cases,” and, if the court denies mandatory
supervision, it must state its reasons on the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.415(a), (d).)
Given that the court ordered a term of imprisonment in county jail
under section 1170, subdivision (h), it is appropriate to remand for
resentencing for consideration of mandatory supervision.

3 Section 12022, subdivision (c)(2) now provides for imprisonment in
state prison as punishment for a violation with a firearm enhancement under
that section, not under section 1170, subdivision (h). The People point out
that applying this statute retroactively may violate the ex post facto clause.
(U.S. Const., art. I, §§ 9, 10; People v. White (2017) 2 Cal.5th 349, 360 [“A
statute violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws if it . . . increases
the punishment for a crime after it is committed”].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent
with this opinion, section 1170, subdivision (h), and California Rules of Court,
rule 4.415. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

RUBIN, J.

HUFFMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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