CourtListener 10814833•Cotton v. Geraci CA4/1
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Filed 3/25/26 Cotton v. Geraci CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DARRYL COTTON, D084992
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No.
37-2022-00000023-CU-MC-CTL)
LAWRENCE GERACI,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
James A. Mangione, Judge. Motions to augment denied. Request for judicial
notice denied. Affirmed.
Darryl Cotton, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of James D. Crosby, James D. Crosby and Tereza L.
Callender, for Defendant and Respondent.
This appeal represents another chapter documenting the challenges
faced by self-represented litigants attempting to navigate the sometimes-
complex procedural requirements of the California legal system. Plaintiff
Darryl Cotton was sued on breach of contract claims by defendant Lawrence
Geraci in a prior action (Cotton I). Cotton made two arguments that he
continues to pursue in the current action: (1) that the contract Geraci sought
to enforce was illegal; and (2) that the trial judge in Cotton I made
statements indicating a bias against Cotton.
After Geraci prevailed in Cotton I, Cotton filed an appeal that was later
dismissed due to his failure to properly designate the appellate record. He
then filed this action in the superior court, seeking to vacate the now-final
judgment in Cotton I. The trial court ultimately denied his motion and
dismissed the second action. Because Cotton does not satisfy the narrow
requirements for an independent equitable action to vacate a judgment, we
are obliged to affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following certain changes in California law, defendant Lawrence
Geraci developed plans to open a medical marijuana dispensary. Plaintiff
Darryl Cotton owned a piece of property that Geraci thought might be suited
to his planned endeavor, and they engaged in negotiations for the sale of the
property. After a dispute arose, Geraci sued Cotton for breach of contract
and related claims in Cotton I. Among other things, Cotton argued that
the alleged contract Geraci sought to enforce was illegal. Judgment was
ultimately entered in favor of Geraci in August 2019 (the Cotton I Judgment).
The court later denied Cotton’s motion for a new trial. Cotton filed a notice
of appeal (Geraci v. Cotton, D077081), but the appeal was dismissed in
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February 2020 based on Cotton’s failure to timely designate the record
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121(a)) and deposit costs (id., rules 8.122(c),
8.130(b), 8.140).1
In January 2022, Cotton filed a new action in superior court that forms
the basis for this appeal. It was captioned a “Verified Complaint in Equity to
Set Aside Void Judgment” (Cotton II). The “void judgment” he sought to set
aside was the August 2019 Cotton I Judgment. Shortly after the action was
initiated, Cotton filed an unsuccessful motion to set aside the Cotton I
Judgment based on the alleged illegality of the underlying contract on which
the judgment was based. He tried to appeal that ruling, but the appeal was
dismissed on September 6, 2022 “on the ground that it is taken from a
nonappealable order.”
There appears to have been little activity in Cotton II for the next 18
months. Then in April 2024, Cotton filed another motion to set aside the
Cotton I Judgment.2 He continued to argue that judgment was void because
it “enforces an illegal contract whose object is defendant Geraci’s ownership
of a cannabis conditional use permit . . . that he is barred from owning
because he has been sanctioned for unlicensed cannabis activities.” Once
again, the trial court rejected this argument. Citing Kachig v. Boothe (1971)
22 Cal.App.3d 626 (Kachig), the court explained that “ ‘[a] direct attack on an
otherwise final, valid judgment by way of an independent action to set it
aside is permitted where it appears that the complaining party was
fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense in the prior
1 On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of our files in appeal
Nos. D077081 and D080460.
2 The motion was captioned “Notice of and Ex Parte Application (1) to
Vacate Void Judgment and Court Referral to the Department of Justice.”
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action.’ ” (See id. at p. 632.) In contrast here, the court found that Cotton
“was not precluded from presenting his illegality argument to the court”
in Cotton I. “Consequently,” in the court’s view, relief was “not available
pursuant to a direct attack against the judgment via independent action.”
The court’s minute order dismissed the case with prejudice. It later denied
Cotton’s motion for reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
The primary issue in this appeal is procedural: Having failed to appeal
the adverse judgment in Cotton I, can Cotton attack it in a separate and
independent equitable action arguing that the contract it sought to enforce
was illegal? But before we can resolve that question, we must first address
a preliminary procedural matter.
A. Appealability
Cotton filed two motions to set aside the Cotton I Judgment in the
Cotton II action. Both were denied, but no final judgment was ever entered
by the superior court. Nonetheless, the court’s July 12, 2024 signed minute
order, from which Cotton purports to appeal, explains that “[t]he case is
dismissed with prejudice.”
Although it is preferable to conclude a case with the filing of a
document labeled as a “judgment,” Code of Civil Procedure section 581d
provides that “[a]ll dismissals ordered by the court shall be in the form of a
written order signed by the court and filed in the action and those orders
when so filed shall constitute judgments and be effective for all purposes . . . .”
(Italics added.) The July 12, 2024 minute order met all the requirements of
Code of Civil Procedure section 581d and accordingly amounts to a final
appealable judgment. (See City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles
Employee Relations Bd. (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 150, 157; accord, Vitkievicz v.
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Valverde (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310, fn. 1 [“A signed order of
dismissal is an appealable judgment”].)
B. Independent Equitable Relief
As we previously noted, after he was the subject of an adverse
judgment on Geraci’s contract claims in Cotton I, Cotton filed a notice of
appeal but ultimately did not designate the record or brief any legal
arguments, and the appeal was dismissed. He nonetheless asserts he is
entitled to challenge the Cotton I Judgment in a new and independent
equitable action he filed, the sole purpose of which was to vacate that
judgment. He believes such an independent action is permissible whenever
losing party in the first action claims the judgment is “void.” In this case,
Cotton asserts the Cotton I Judgment is void because the contract on which
it was based is illegal. He also argues that the trial judge in Cotton I—
Judge Wohlfeil—should have been disqualified, and this likewise renders
the judgment void.
Under California law, an independent equitable action seeking to
vacate an existing judgment is considered a direct attack on that judgment.
(Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 558.) But in contrast to
other methods of direct attack—such as a motion to vacate the judgment or
a direct appeal of the judgment in the original action—the grounds for such
an independent attack are exceedingly limited. To warrant relief in an
independent action, the affected party must show that he was “denied a fair
adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the
action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from
presenting his claim or defense.” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467,
471; accord 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2021) Attack on Judgment in the Trial
Court, § 222.) If there was fraud or mistake, it must be “extrinsic or
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collateral to the questions examined and determined in the action” that
prevented the party “from having a trial.” (Kachig, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at
p. 633.) A claimed “lack of jurisdiction” must refer to jurisdiction in the
fundamental sense—personal jurisdiction over a party or subject matter
jurisdiction over the dispute. (Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 565–
566; see generally Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280,
288.)
Cotton’s assertion that the judgment against him for breach of contract
was void due to illegality does not create an exception that permits relief by
way of an independent equitable action. Cotton was not denied “a fair
adversary hearing” in Cotton I. He was in no way prevented from presenting
his illegality defense to Geraci’s breach of contract claims.3 He litigated that
issue in Cotton I and lost. His remedy was to appeal the Cotton I Judgment
and argue why the trial court erred. Even if his substantive arguments
regarding illegality were entirely correct, Cotton would demonstrate at most
an error of law by the trial court. It would not establish that the court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the judgment. Indeed, a judgment based on an illegal
contract is void only where the illegality appears on the face of the judgment
itself. (See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co. (1958) 49
Cal.2d 764, 778 [a judgment enforcing an allegedly illegal contract “is not
invalid merely because the court decided that question erroneously in the
first instance and it was subsequently determined that the contract was
illegal and void”].) Here, Cotton points to nothing on the face of the Cotton I
3 As Cotton himself characterized it, his “claim of Geraci being unable to
lawfully operate a cannabis business because of the judgments against him
sanctioning [him] for operating three illegal dispensaries was constantly
raised during the course of the Cotton I litigation.”
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Judgment that demonstrates the illegality of the contract on which Geraci’s
claim was based.
Cotton’s allegations of judicial bias by the trial judge in Cotton I
likewise provide no basis for an independent action in equity to vacate that
judgment. As a general rule, a litigant who believes a judge should be
disqualified on grounds of actual or apparent bias must follow the
disqualification procedures provided for in Code of Civil Procedure section
170.1. These procedures require a disqualification request “at the earliest
practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground
for disqualification.” (Id., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) The denial of such a motion
can only be reviewed on a petition for writ of mandate filed “within 10 days
after service of written notice of entry of the court’s order determining the
question of disqualification” (id., § 170.3, subd. (d); see People v. Panah (2005)
35 Cal.4th 395, 444), and the failure to seek immediate writ review generally
forfeits any argument based on the statutory disqualification factors. (People
v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000 (Freeman).)
Cotton argues that in some circumstances, a claim of judicial bias
may be raised for the first time on appeal. And it is true that in rare
circumstances, a showing of the “probability of actual bias” by the court that
entered a judgment may constitute a basis to claim a violation of due process
on appeal from that judgment. (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1000–
1001.) But Cotton is not appealing the Cotton I Judgment. Nor does he
allege he was denied a reasonable opportunity to make his disqualification
motion in the Cotton I proceedings. Indeed, he could not make such a claim.
Cotton’s motion to augment the record on this appeal contains a copy of the
verified statement of disqualification that he filed in Cotton I seeking the
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disqualification of Judge Wohlfeil.4 When his disqualification motion was
denied, Cotton did not file a petition for writ of mandate in this court
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3. Neither did he appeal
from the final judgment and argue he was denied due process. He cites no
authority, and we are aware of none, that would permit a litigant to wait and
file a new and independent equitable action to raise a disqualification issue
that could have been reviewed in a statutory mandate proceeding or on
appeal from the final judgment in the prior action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover his costs on appeal.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
4 We deny both the motion to augment the record and the supplemental
motion to augment on the ground that they contain irrelevant material that,
in many cases, was not before the trial court. On the court’s own motion, we
take judicial notice of the fact that Cotton filed a statement of disqualification
against Judge Wohlfiel in Cotton I. At the same time, we deny Cotton’s
request for judicial notice because it consists of material relevant, if at all,
to the merits of Cotton’s illegality argument, an issue we do not address.
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