CourtListener 10814831•People v. Horspool CA1/1
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Filed 3/25/26 P. v. Horspool CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171515
v.
(Contra Costa County
STEVEN RAY HORSPOOL, Super. Ct. No. 01001378249)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Steven Ray Horspool appeals an order committing him to a state
hospital that expired before briefing in this appeal concluded, rendering the
appeal moot. As neither party advances a reason for us to reach the merits
notwithstanding the expired order, we dismiss the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2008, after Horspool tried to lure an 11-year-old girl into a store
bathroom for sex, he was convicted of annoying or molesting a child under 18
years of age with a prior qualifying sex crime conviction. (Pen. Code, § 647.6,
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
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subd. (c).)2 The following year, he was released to Atascadero State Hospital
as an offender with a mental health disorder. This state hospital
commitment was extended without interruption through the entry of the
order now before us.
In June 2024, the People filed a petition to continue Horspool’s
involuntary commitment and treatment pursuant to sections 2970 and 2972
of the Mentally Disordered Offender Act. (§ 2960 et seq., the Act.) A trial
was held three months later, where the court granted the petition after
finding “beyond a reasonable doubt[] that Mr. Horspool is a person who
suffers from a severe mental disorder, [that] said severe mental disorder is
not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without continued treatment,
and because of his severe mental disorder he presently represents a
substantial danger of physical harm to others. (. . . Section 2970(c)).” The
court also considered but denied ordering Horspool to be treated on an
outpatient basis instead of through a renewed involuntary hospital
commitment, concluding his lack of insight and lack of remission prevented
him from being safely and effectively treated in that manner. The court
committed Horspool to the State Department of State Hospitals until
December 5, 2025.
Horspool’s sole contention on appeal is that substantial evidence does
not support the trial court’s conclusion that he could not be treated in the
community safely and effectively. In a responsive brief filed in January 2026,
the Attorney General contends Horspool’s appeal is now moot because the
commitment order expired on December 5, 2025. Alternatively, the Attorney
General argues that the court’s decision regarding Horspool’s unreadiness for
treatment in the community was supported by the evidence at trial. Horspool
2
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
did not file a reply brief on appeal or otherwise respond to the Attorney
General’s claim of mootness.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Appeal is Moot
“The Mentally Disordered Offenders Act (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.)
provides for involuntary civil commitment as a condition of parole for
prisoners who are found to have ‘a severe mental disorder’ if certain
conditions are met. (§ 2962, subds. (a)–(f).) The commitment is for a term of
one year and may be extended annually for an additional year on petition of
the district attorney. (§ 2972, subds. (a)[–(c)].)” (People v. Dunley (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442, fns. omitted.) These features render appeals
from commitment orders under the Act susceptible to moving too slowly to
provide relief. (Id. at p. 1445.)
Because the order under review expired in 2025, the Attorney General
asserts this appeal is now moot and should be dismissed. On appeal, it is the
court’s duty “ ‘ “ ‘to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be
carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” ’ ” (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042,
1051.) “[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical
effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.” (Lincoln Place
Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454.) This
includes the situation where, as here, an appeal is based on a state hospital
commitment order that has expired. (People v. McCray (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
260, 267–269.) Horspool does not dispute that this appeal is moot given that
the challenged commitment order expired in December 2025.
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Still, mootness does not automatically obviate appellate review. Courts
have the “ ‘inherent power’ ” to address cases that are “ ‘technically moot’ ”
but merit consideration for other reasons. (People v. Alsafar (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 880, 886.) These reasons might include “[w]hen an action
involves a matter of continuing public interest that is likely to recur”
(Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 852, 867), when there is “a likelihood of recurrence of the
controversy between the same parties” (In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th
633, 653–654), or when the appellant raises “an important procedural issue
that is not only of ‘important and of continuing interest’ but is also one
capable of repetition, but evading review” (People v. Alsafar, supra,
8 Cal.App.5th at p. 886; People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897–898
[reaching a moot issue of public interest it viewed as “likely to recur while
evading appellate review”]). “[T]he common thread running through the
cases is that [deciding an otherwise moot appeal] is appropriate only if a
ruling on the merits will affect future proceedings between the parties or will
have some precedential consequence in future litigation generally.” (In re
David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.)
Neither party here contends that an issue in the case falls within this
“common thread” to warrant the exercise of our discretion to review a moot
claim. (In re David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.) The fact-specific
inquiry suggested by Horspool’s sufficiency of the evidence argument does not
appear to raise issues of broad public importance, questions of law, or issues
that are likely to recur while evading appellate review. (See People v.
Dunley, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445; People v. Gregerson (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 306, 321.) The Attorney General asserts that “the resolution
of circumstances unique to [Horspool] alone would not provide helpful
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guidance in future cases,” and, in the absence of any indication to the
contrary, we agree. Nor does Horspool address the present status of his state
hospital commitment or whether the issues presented on this appeal will
remain relevant in his own case going forward.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
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_________________________
SMILEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
HUMES, P. J.
_________________________
BANKE, J.
People v. Horspool / (A171515)
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