People v. Rivera CA2/8

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Filed 3/24/26 P. v. Rivera CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B342234, B342236

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA130759,
v. BA129027

ROSARIO RIVERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Edgar J. Cervantes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Nikhil Cooper,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Rosario Rivera sought to vacate two old convictions under
section 1473.7 because he had not understood the immigration
consequences of his pleas. The trial court denied relief. We
reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an order granting
Rivera’s application under section 1473.7. Undesignated
statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
In March 1996, a complaint charged Rivera with corporal
injury to a cohabitant and genital penetration by a foreign object
with force and violence. The victim in both counts was his
partner and the mother of his children, Mercedes Ibarra. At a
March 21 hearing, Rivera entered an open plea to the first charge
and moved to dismiss the second count. The court advised Rivera
that his plea “could” have immigration consequences. The court
released Rivera on his own recognizance and set sentencing for a
later date.
About three weeks later, Rivera again inflicted corporal
injury on Ibarra. On June 3, 1996, the parties agreed to a
negotiated disposition in both cases. Rivera would remain in
custody until a sentencing hearing on December 12 for both
cases. The court again advised Rivera that his plea “could” have
immigration consequences. Rivera confirmed that he understood.
Rivera then entered a plea of no contest to the new charge of
corporal injury on a cohabitant.
On December 12, 1996, the trial court sentenced Rivera to
367 days in county jail and three years of probation for both
cases. On July 30, 1999, the court found Rivera had violated the
terms of his probation, revoked probation, and sentenced Rivera
to concurrent two-year terms in state prison.
In August 2024, Rivera filed a motion to withdraw his
pleas in the two cases pursuant to section 1473.7. The

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prosecution opposed. After argument, the trial court denied relief
in an oral ruling, finding Rivera was not credible in his assertion
that he had not understood the immigration consequences of his
plea, especially given the court’s advisement and Rivera’s lengthy
rap sheet, and that the motion was untimely.
Rivera filed an appeal in each of his cases. We
consolidated the two appeals.
Rivera correctly argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion for relief.
Section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have served their
sentences to vacate their convictions if they can establish that
their convictions are invalid due to prejudicial error impairing
their ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential immigration
consequences of their conviction. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) To
show prejudicial error, the noncitizen must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the noncitizen would have rejected
the plea if the noncitizen had correctly understood the
immigration consequences. (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th
311, 316 (Espinoza).)
In making this determination, we consider the totality of
the circumstances. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.)
Those circumstances include the noncitizen’s ties to the United
States, the importance the noncitizen placed on avoiding
deportation, the noncitizen’s priorities in negotiating a plea
bargain, and whether the noncitizen had reason to believe an
immigration-neutral disposition was available. (Ibid.) However,
this list is not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is
necessary for relief. (Id. at p. 321.) Any assertions by the
noncitizen must be corroborated with objective evidence.

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(Ibid.) Objective evidence can include facts in declarations,
contemporaneous documentation of the noncitizen’s immigration
concerns, and the charges the noncitizen faced. (Id. at p. 321.)
We review independently whether noncitizens have
demonstrated a reasonable probability they would have rejected a
plea offer had they understood its immigration consequences.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) Where the trial court has
based its rulings on a “cold record,” or, in other words, only
documentary evidence, we need not defer to trial court fact
finding. (Id. at pp. 319–320.)
We apply these guidelines to this case.
The error Rivera alleges is that he subjectively failed to
understand the mandatory immigration consequences his plea
would have. Case law establishes that the noncitizen’s subjective
misunderstanding qualifies as sufficient error under the statute.
(People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 909–910
(Manzanilla) [focus is on noncitizen’s own error in not
understanding the plea would subject him to mandatory
deportation and permanent exclusion].)
Objective, contemporaneous evidence supports Rivera’s
assertion. The trial court advised Rivera only that his pleas
“could” have immigration consequences. The Supreme Court has
held there is a critical difference between being notified the plea
may have immigration consequences and being told the plea will
make one immediately deportable. (People v. Vivar (2021) 11
Cal.5th 510, 523 (Vivar) [failure to advise of certain immigration
consequences of plea rendered representation constitutionally
deficient].) When counsel provides only the first advisement in a
situation calling for the second, the advisement is insufficient.
(Id. at p. 533 [advisement that plea might have adverse

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immigration effects insufficient where deportation would be
mandatory].)
Here, Rivera was pleading to an aggravated felony, as the
prosecution concedes. (Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp.
903–904.) Under immigration law, that made him deportable
and provided grounds for permanent exclusion. (Ibid.) There is
no evidence counsel or the trial court advised him of this. The
only evidence we have points to the opposite. The trial court’s
advisement used the improper ambiguous language, and Rivera
declared his counsel did not discuss mandatory immigration
consequences.
The prosecution argues Rivera’s counsel had a duty not to
misadvise him, and the presumption is the counsel performed his
duty. In 1996, however, Rivera’s counsel did not have a duty to
discuss mandatory immigration consequences as they would now.
That duty arose only with the decision Padilla v. Kentucky (2010)
559 U.S. 356. (See Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 905–
906 [where immigration consequences clear and virtually certain,
after 2010 counsel now must advise client of those
consequences].) When counsel had no professional obligation, we
cannot infer that counsel in 1996 told Rivera of the mandatory
immigration consequences. The lack of any proper advisement in
the record corroborates Rivera’s claim.
We turn next to whether the error was prejudicial. In
making this determination, we consider whether there was a
reasonable probability Rivera would have refused the plea if he
understood the immigration consequences.
Rivera declares that he did not understand his plea had
mandatory immigration consequences, and that, if he had, he
would not have accepted the offer. We consider the totality of the

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circumstances to see if objective evidence corroborates these
claims.
The first factor we consider is Rivera’s ties to the United
States. Rivera came to the United States when he was 16. At
the time of his plea, he had lived here for over 20 years. He had
worked consistently for the majority of his time here. At the time
of the plea, he had been with Ibarra in the United States for
nearly 20 years, and they had three United States citizen
children together. (They later married and had been together for
46 years at the time of the section 1473.7 motion.) Rivera’s
mother was a permanent legal resident. His father had passed
away. Rivera declared his whole life was in this country, which
has been his home since he was 16. Mexico was a foreign country
to him.
These ties are sufficient evidence Rivera would have
focused on mandatory immigration consequences. (People v.
Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 771 [deep ties to the United
States constitute contemporaneous evidence that avoiding
deportation would have been a primary concern].) People v.
Abdelsalam (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654 does not undermine this
conclusion. In Abdelsalam, the court explicitly told the
noncitizen, orally and in writing, he would be deported as a result
of his plea. (Id. at p. 658, 663.)
The prosecution points out convictions for domestic
violence can undermine an assertion that a noncitizen would
have prioritized staying for the victim. (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 323.) While true, the facts here do not support that
conclusion. In People v. Bravo (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1063, the
perpetrator had only been with his girlfriend for a year and a half
when he attacked her and their infant son. (Id. at p. 1068.)

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Here, while serious, the domestic violence occurred in the context
of a relationship that had already lasted about 20 years and that
involved three children. That Rivera and Ibarra remained – and
remain – together corroborates that these ties to his family would
have motivated him.
We next consider the importance Rivera placed on
immigration consequences and his priorities in negotiating a plea
bargain. In his declaration, Rivera asserts he would not have
accepted the plea bargain had he understood the mandatory
immigration consequences. He further states his counsel did not
discuss the mandatory immigration consequences with him. If he
had, Rivera would have asked him to seek an immigration-safe
plea. The transcript shows Rivera did focus on avoiding a
lengthy prison sentence. This is typical: few prefer long
sentences. This fact does not conflict with Rivera’s professed
desire to avoid mandatory deportation. (Cf. Vivar, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 532 [rejection of immigration-neutral offer did not
show failure to value immigration consequences where noncitizen
not advised of immigration risk].) The prosecution asserts Rivera
declared he did not care about remaining in the United States.
This assertion is incorrect. Rivera explicitly stated that, if he
understood the mandatory immigration consequences, he would
not have accepted the plea, and he would have asked counsel to
negotiate an immigration-safe disposition. Although the court
can consider Rivera’s failure to provide a declaration from his
plea counsel, the absence of that declaration is not fatal to
Rivera’s case, given the rest of the record.
We turn next to whether there was reason for Rivera to
believe an immigration-neutral disposition was possible. Here,
as Rivera notes, the negotiated disposition was for him to serve

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367 days. (Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 909 [where
opening offer was 365 days, reasonable to think reduction to 364
days might be accepted].) As the prosecution notes, this was a
very lenient offer. But there is little reason to believe the
prosecution would have automatically rejected a 364 day
sentence, as the prosecution now urges. The term of 367 days is
close to a term of 364 days. The prosecution has not explained
why a three-day difference would have been a deal point.
The trial court found Rivera’s assertion that he did not
understand the immigration consequences was not credible. The
court ruled the transcript of the sentencing hearing showed
Rivera understood and participated in the proceedings. This
inference addresses the wrong issue. When the court said only
that immigration consequences “may” occur, it is not enough to
ask whether Rivera understood what the court said. (Bravo,
supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1073–1074 [advisement given in
1997 insufficient to satisfy section 1473.7].) Rather, the key
question is whether Rivera understood the immigration
consequences, which here were undisclosed. We do not disagree
Rivera appeared to understand the proceedings. But it does not
follow that he understood immigration consequences never
explained.
The trial court also drew a different problematic inference.
It found that Rivera’s previous experiences with the criminal
justice system undermined his credibility. That experience may
prevent Rivera from claiming unfamiliarity with certain aspects
of the justice system, but there is no evidence he had previously
entered a plea or that he had received a proper immigration
advisement in the past. Moreover, despite his previous felony
robbery conviction, the United States granted Rivera lawful

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permanent residency. This experience would make him less
likely to understand the new felony conviction would result in
deportation and permanent exclusion.
The trial court found Rivera’s motion was untimely. The
prosecution admirably concedes this was error and admits
Rivera’s motion was timely. We agree. (People v. Perez (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 1008, 1016 [where noncitizen is no longer in custody
and triggering events in the statute have not occurred, the
motion is timely].)
DISPOSITION
We reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an order
granting Rivera’s motion pursuant to section 1473.

WILEY, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

VIRAMONTES, J.

SCHERB, J.

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