People v. Griffin CA1/2

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Filed 3/23/26 P. v. Griffin CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172772
v.
RHYON T. GRIFFIN, (San Mateo County Super. Ct.
No. 24-NF-006270-A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Rhyon T. Griffin appeals from a judgment of conviction after
pleading no contest to felony grand theft and admitting his prior strike
conviction. Prior to sentencing, Griffin filed a Romero1 motion to dismiss the
strike prior, which the court denied. The court then sentenced Griffin to the
low term of 16 months in state prison doubled for a total of 32 months,
awarded custody credits, ordered victim restitution, and imposed fines and
fees.
Griffin’s court appointed counsel asks us to independently examine the
record in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), to
determine if there are any arguable issues that require briefing.2 Counsel

1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

2 Griffin did not obtain a certificate of probable cause and does not

challenge the validity of his plea; thus, our review is similarly limited. (Cal.

1
advised Griffin of his right to file a supplemental brief, but Griffin has not
done so. After an independent review of the record, we find no meritorious
issues. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND3
On April 6, 2019, construction site manager Kim Leowen reported the
theft of his tools from the job box inside the carport of a home on Linden
Avenue in the City of Atherton in San Mateo County. “The door into the
home from the carport was opened from brute force” and caused damage to
the wall of the home under construction that “cost about $20,000 to build.”
Security footage from the property on the date of the theft showed three
people exit a gray Ford Fusion with license plate No. 8HUY265. Subsequent
security footage showed the same vehicle returned to the home two days
later, on April 8, and three people took additional tools from the property.
The estimated value of the tools stolen was $6,500. Griffin was identified as
one of the people seen in the security footage.
On April 17, 2024, around 6:54 a.m., Asael Gonzalez Hernandez was
walking down Maple Avenue in the County of San Mateo, on his way to work,
when he saw two people break into the toolbox attached to the bed of his
truck (breaking the lock) and take $1,500 worth of construction tools.4 The

Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(3); further rules citations are to the California
Rules of Court.)
3 The incident descriptions are taken from the two separate

preliminary examinations held in seriatim on May 3, 2024, at which the
investigating officers testified as to the victims’ statements per Penal Code
section 872, subdivision (b). (Further statutory references are to the Penal
Code.)
4 Questioning the value of the tools, the court declined to hold Griffin to

answer for felony grand theft but instead issued a holding order for
misdemeanor petty theft. However, as noted below, the felony information
alleged grand theft in violation of section 487, subdivision (a). Nothing in the

2
individuals fled in a 2017 Lexus with license plate No. 8EZF901 that was
later determined to have been stolen and valued at $50,000.
Around 8:10 a.m. the same day, Gonzalez Hernandez called the police
again to report he saw the same two people at the Colma Home Depot. Law
enforcement subsequently detained the suspects in Oakland and recovered
Gonzalez Hernandez’s tools and an “Autel key programmer,” which is a tool
commonly used “to get into vehicles without having the original key because
the key programmer uses frequencies to be able to unlock and reprogram
another key.” Based on “stature size and tattoos on his arm,” Gonzalez
Hernandez identified Griffin in a field show up as “the one that took the tools
from my truck.”
On May 14, 2024, the People filed a felony information charging Griffin
(and his codefendant who is not the subject of this appeal) with five felonies
and one misdemeanor arising out of both incidents,5 as well as two prior theft
convictions (§ 666.5), a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and an
out-on-bail or court supervision enhancement alleged as to counts 1 through 3
(§ 12022.1).

record indicates the filed information was challenged pursuant to section 995
or other means; instead, Griffin pled no contest to felony grand theft and
stipulated to its factual basis. That conviction is the subject of this appeal,
but as stated, the plea itself is not challenged. (Rule 8.304(b)(3).)
5 Felony driving or taking a vehicle—beige Lexus—without consent

(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1); felony receiving stolen property in
the form of a motor vehicle—beige Lexus (§ 496d, subd. (a); count 2); felony
theft of personal property in excess of $950, to wit tools belonging to Gonzalez
Hernandez (§ 487, subd. (a); count 3); misdemeanor possession of burglary
tools (§ 466; count 4); felony second degree commercial burglary (§ 460,
subd. (b); count 5); and felony grand theft of personal property in excess of
$950 from Linden Avenue, Atherton. (§ 487, subd. (a); count 6.)

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On October 25, 2024, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Griffin pled
no contest to a single felony violation of section 487, subdivision (a), grand
theft of the tools belonging to Gonzalez Hernandez (count 3), and admitted
the prior strike conviction under section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1). He
acknowledged the associated maximum penalty of four years imprisonment
with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), $10,000 in
fines, $1,000 in restitution, $300 in “insurance restitution,” and DNA testing.
The represented disposition was that Griffin would be sentenced to 16
months in state prison, potentially doubled due to his strike prior for a “top”
of 32 months. He was referred to the probation department for preparation
of a presentencing report and reserved his right to make a Romero motion.
Prior to sentencing, the People filed a sentencing memorandum
summarizing Griffin’s criminal history, which included felony violations for
assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c)) in San
Mateo County in 2019, for which he was sentenced to three years in state
prison; possession of a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)) in Contra Costa
County in 2023, for which he was sentenced to 16 months in state prison; and
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) in Alameda County on a
separate date in 2023, for which he was sentenced to two years in state
prison. The People recognized the court’s discretion to strike Griffin’s strike
prior (see, e.g., § 1385, subd. (a); People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945–
947; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161), but urged it not to,
asserting that Griffin “falls squarely within the spirit of the three strikes
law.” The People explained Griffin “was on PRCS [postrelease community
supervision] when he committed the current offense”; performed poorly on
PRCS and parole; and served a three-year sentence for his “recent” prior
strike conviction from 2019. Following his release, Griffin served two

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additional prison sentences “both stemming from convictions that occurred
just last year.” The People asserted that Griffin “fails to take responsibility
for his actions” and, at the time of sentencing, had “pending cases out of
Alameda County, including a new case with an offense date of March 1, 2024,
and a PRCS violation.”
Griffin filed a two-page Romero motion to dismiss his prior strike
conviction, articulating three bases for consideration: (1) the grand theft to
which Griffin pled “is neither serious, nor violent”; (2) the prior strike
conviction for a violation of section 245, subdivision (c) took place in
April 2019; and (3) Griffin “has expressed remorse and responsibility by
pleading no contest rather than challenging the case at trial.” Further,
defense counsel represented that while serving in the Army, Griffin “was
injured and became addicted to opiates” and “at pre-trial, the court indicated
a strong likelihood that the motion would be granted.” Counsel therefore
requested that the court dismiss Griffin’s strike prior, sentence him to
probation, and allow him “to engage in treatment as directed.”
The confidential presentencing report prepared by the probation
department represented that the 38-year-old Griffin was “cooperative and
respectful” during his interview. Griffin reported previously undisclosed
sexual abuse as a child by a priest and his neighbor; he was diagnosed with
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder in the third grade, for which he “is
prescribed” Adderall and with posttraumatic stress disorder at age 25 but
was not prescribed medication. Griffin stated he suffers “from a nerve
condition called multiple sclerosis” and is diabetic, for which he is prescribed
medication. Griffin served in the Army from 2004 through 2010 and was
honorably discharged; prior to his current incarceration, Griffin worked at a
family business. Griffin admitted to using “marijuana, heroin,

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methamphetamine, and opioids daily between his mid-20’s and early 30’s”
but denied any alcohol consumption. Griffin “does not believe he currently
has an issue with drugs” but expressed interest in a substance abuse
program and stated that “between the ages of 23 through 34, he was battling
his ‘opiate drug addiction.’ ” Griffin has been married since 2018 and is the
father to young twins and financially provides for them.
Regarding the offense to which he pled, Griffin stated his neighbor
asked him to ride in his girlfriend’s new car to a family member’s house
across the bridge “to pick up some of his things.” He claimed it was the
neighbor who took the items from the truck. They were arrested at a home
improvement store on their way back to Oakland, and only then did the
neighbor tell him the car was stolen. Griffin stated he “ ‘made a poor
decision’ ” and is remorseful and takes responsibility for “ ‘being in the wrong
place at the wrong time.’ ” Griffin stated he is “truly sorry” and did not know
something was stolen; he also dictated a statement of remorse.
Although the probation report lists no factors in mitigation pursuant to
rule 4.423, the probation officer “considered the defendant’s expressed
willingness to comply with probation and to remain sober” but stated Griffin
“appeared to not take full accountability for his actions” and noted he
“continues to engage in criminal behavior despite the previous significant
sentences imposed on him.” The probation officer also contacted Griffin’s
PRCS officer in Contra Costa County, who represented that Griffin was a
“ ‘parole walkover,’ ” was out of compliance with his PRCS conditions—has
only reported once and was “ ‘very difficult’ ” to get in contact with—and had
two pending violations. Pursuant to rule 4.421, the probation officer
considered the circumstances in aggravation to include “that the crime
involved actual taking of great monetary value, and the defendant’s prior

6
convictions as an adult are numerous. Additionally, the defendant was on
PRCS when the crime was committed, and he has served prior prison terms.”
The probation officer concluded, “if a Romero motion is granted, the
defendant is considered a poor candidate for supervision services given his
continued disregard for court orders and supervision conditions.”
At the January 2025 sentencing hearing, Griffin, through counsel, was
given the opportunity to examine the probation officer who prepared the
report because “he had specific disputes with indications that were within the
Probation Report.” Thereafter, both attorneys briefly expounded upon their
written submissions, with the People requesting a sentence of 32 months in
state prison and defense counsel seeking a referral to “Veteran’s Treatment
Court” for sentencing. If the court was not inclined to grant Griffin’s request
for probation, defense counsel asked that “at least” the Romero motion be
granted to “let my client put this case behind him.” Griffin’s counsel
concluded, “And I have nothing but to ask the mercy of the court in this case
because as part of the plea bargain we were forced to admit the strike prior.”
Prior to ruling, the court represented its review of Griffin’s prior record,
“which deals with stolen vehicle cases first going back to 2016 in Oakland.”
The court summarized what it considered to be the mitigating and
aggravating factors “so I can accept what [defense counsel] is indicating as
mitigation concerning molest also concerning the fact that the Defendant is --
does have a dependent that would be negatively impacted by the Defendant
being incarcerated.” But the court also “note[d] in aggravation that the
Defendant’s history is lengthy. He is on [PRCS] when he picks up this case.”
The court challenged Griffin’s counsel’s representation that Griffin “took
responsibility for the stolen vehicle,” stating, “that’s not in any way
articulated in the Probation Report” and “really flew in the face of

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realistically his criminal history with the multiple stolen vehicle cases that
he’s had” and the “remote and wireless key recoder” in his possession at the
time of arrest.
The court found “that while the court did indicate to the defense that
Romero was more likely to be granted based on this type of offense that he
was pleading to, I’m left in a position based on his conduct, his history, his
unwillingness to take responsibility to find that this case does not fall outside
of the three strikes law” and declined to “strike the strike” but did “follow the
low term based on the mitigated factors that have been previously stated on
the record.” The court therefore denied the request for probation and
Veteran’s Treatment Court and sentenced Griffin to 16 months in the custody
of the CDCR, doubled pursuant to the strike admission for a total term of 32
months. The court awarded 275 actual custody credits plus 274 conduct
credits for a total of 549 as is noted in the abstract of judgment. The court
ordered restitution to Gonzalez Hernandez in an amount to be determined, a
$300 restitution fine to CDCR, and a $300 fine pursuant to section 1202.45A
stayed pending the successful competition of parole.
DISCUSSION
Griffin’s counsel filed a Wende brief identifying no error and asked us to
review the record for any arguable issues on appeal; Griffin was given the
opportunity to file supplemental briefing but did not. Pursuant to Wende, we
are required “to conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed
counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues or describes the appeal
as frivolous.” (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) Our independent review of
the record has disclosed no reasonably arguable issues requiring further
briefing.

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We highlight our examination of the court’s ruling on Griffin’s Romero
motion, for which we apply “the deferential abuse of discretion standard.”
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371 (Carmony).) The “Three
Strikes” law was “intended to restrict courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat
offenders.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.) To this end, it “ ‘does not
offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but
establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the
defendant has at least one qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court
“conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme should be made because, for
articulable reasons which can withstand scrutiny for abuse, this defendant
should be treated as though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes
scheme.” ’ ” (Carmony, at pp. 377–378 [clarifying the circumstances under
which a defendant can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes law must be “extraordinary”].) In considering these circumstances,
“ ‘ “ ‘[a]n appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Carmony,
at p. 377.) Because there is a strong presumption that a sentence conforming
to the Three Strikes law is “both rational and proper,” a trial court will
generally only be found to have abused its discretion in “limited
circumstances” such as where the court was unaware of its discretion to
dismiss a strike or considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss.
(Carmony, at p. 378.)
Here, no extraordinary circumstances exist; instead, in ruling, the
court demonstrated its intentional exercise of discretion, during which the
court accepted and considered the mitigating circumstances offered by

9
defense counsel6 while considering other permissible factors such as Griffin’s
ongoing criminal conduct, poor performance on PRCS, and the “wireless key
recoder” found on his person when he was arrested. Ultimately, it was
Griffin who “left [the court] in a position based on his conduct, his history, his
unwillingness to take responsibility to find that this case does not fall outside
of the three strikes law.” Thereafter, the low-term sentence imposed was
consistent with the plea agreement; the restitution ordered only included the
losses demonstrated by Gonzalez Hernandez.7 The fines, fees and
assessment appear to have been authorized by law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

6 “[S]o I can accept what [defense counsel] is indicating as mitigation

concerning molest also concerning the fact that the Defendant is -- does have
a dependent that would be negatively impacted by the Defendant being
incarcerated.” (See rule 4.423(a)(8) & (b)(3).)
7 Neither the plea agreement nor the transcript of the change of plea

indicates there was a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d
755, that would have authorized restitution on all counts.

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DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

STEWART, P. J.

RICHMAN, J.

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