People v. Gonzalez CA4/3

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Filed 3/23/26 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064060

v. (Super. Ct. No. 18CF1661)

CARLOS ALEXANDER GONZALEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Patrick H. Donahue, Judge. Affirmed and remanded as directed.
Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Carlos Alexander Gonzalez
(Defendant) of first degree murder. At trial, he admitted to killing the victim
(Victim) but claimed it was not planned. He testified that Victim had sexually
assaulted his girlfriend, Jolene L., two months before the killing. The night of
the killing, Jolene L. ran into Victim at a convenience store, became
distraught, and then informed Defendant that she had seen Victim.
Defendant testified that he unexpectedly saw Victim later that night and
killed him in a fit of rage.
During voir dire, Defendant stated that he might call Jolene L. as
a witness to corroborate his account of the night of the killing. The trial court
appointed Jolene L. counsel to determine whether her potential testimony
might implicate her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
(the privilege). After a discussion with her court-appointed counsel, Jolene L.
asserted the privilege, which the court accepted without question.
On appeal, Defendant primarily argues that the trial court erred
by failing to conduct a particularized inquiry into Jolene L.’s assertion of the
privilege. We disagree. Defendant wanted to question Jolene L. about her
actions on the night of the murder. Based on the information the court had at
the time, it was evident that her responses to this line of questioning “‘might
be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.’” (People v. Cudjo
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617.) Thus, the court did not err by allowing Jolene L. to
invoke the privilege.
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his request to continue the sentencing hearing. We find no error.
While Defendant wanted to gather more evidence, he did not explain how
such evidence would impact sentencing. Defendant also claimed he needed
more time to prepare a new trial motion. But he had already been allowed

2
four months to prepare one. Further, he was unsure of the basis for this
purported motion, nor could he estimate when the motion would be ready.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed and remanded as directed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
SENTENCE
A jury found Defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a)),1 and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246). It also
found true that he personally used a firearm in the commission of both
offenses (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total term of 50 years to
life in prison, comprised of 25 years to life for the murder charge plus a
consecutive term of 25 years to life on the accompanying firearm
enhancement. As to Defendant’s conviction for shooting at an occupied motor
vehicle, the court imposed a determinate sentence of three years plus 25
years to life for the related firearm enhancement, and ordered these terms to
run concurrent to his murder sentence.
II.
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
A. Defendant and Victim’s Relationship
Defendant and Victim were former friends. They used to hang
out together, sometimes with Jolene L., who had been in an on-and-off
relationship with Defendant since they were in middle school.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.

3
One night in March 2018, Victim and Jolene L. were drinking
and smoking with a group of friends at a park. Defendant was not there, and
it appears that he and Jolene L. were on a break from their relationship at
the time. Witnesses testified that Jolene L. was flirting with some of the
males in the group, including Victim. She and Victim kissed and then began
making out in the backseat of a friend’s car. That friend dropped off Jolene L.
and Victim near an apartment complex and drove off.
It is unclear what happened that night between Jolene L. and
Victim after their friend dropped them off. But Defendant believed that
Victim had taken advantage of Jolene L. and raped her. There was testimony
at trial that Defendant told his friends that he hated Victim and wanted to
“retaliate” against and kill Victim.
B. The Stabbing
On the night of April 7, 2018, Victim was drinking and smoking
in a parking lot in front of Taqueria Zamora in Santa Ana with some friends.
Victim wanted Defendant to join them, so he and a friend drove to pick up
Defendant. On the drive back to the parking lot, Victim asked Defendant for
some pills. Defendant offered Victim three pills that a witness believed to be
Xanax bars. Victim took all three. Eventually, around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m.,
everyone in the group had left except for Defendant and Victim.
Victim arrived at his father’s house in Santa Ana the next day
around 7:00 a.m. Victim looked like he had “gotten beat up.” He had a bruise
on his eye, his mouth and lips were swollen, he was missing a fingernail and
had lacerations to his eye, the back of his ear, and two on his back. The
lacerations on his back looked like knife punctures.

4
Victim told his father that Defendant had beaten him up.
However, Victim indicated that he did not want to identify Defendant as his
attacker because he was afraid of retaliation.
After the stabbing, Defendant sent messages to Victim and other
people calling Victim “a rapist” and accusing him of trying to digitally
penetrate Jolene L. while she was sleeping.
C. The Shooting
Around midnight on May 19, 2018, Victim and a friend went to
buy beer at an AM/PM market. They ran into Jolene L. and her friend while
they were exiting the store. A witness testified that Jolene L. responded
negatively to Victim and his friend and aggressively said “‘what?’” to them.
The same witness stated that after the encounter Jolene L. “looked confused,
scared . . . she was just in shock.”
Victim and his friend then drove in Victim’s car to the Taqueria
Zamora parking lot. They drank and smoked while sitting in the car.
Taqueria Zamora’s parking lot was across the street from the Adagio
Apartments (Adagio). A friend of Victim testified that Victim and his friends
“would always be around that area.”
Meanwhile, Defendant testified that one of his friends told him
that Jolene L. had run into Victim and “really need[ed] [him] right now.”
Defendant explained that his friend arranged for an Uber to take Defendant
to meet Jolene L. at about 1:00 a.m. in a parking lot near Adagio.
Defendant and Jolene L. then walked to Adagio to get some
privacy. Defendant testified that Jolene L. was “real quiet” at first. But once
they got inside Adagio, “she [broke] down and start[ed] to cry.” He attempted
to ask her questions, but she was crying too much, and he could not get any
answers from her. Eventually, however, Defendant stated that Jolene L.

5
disclosed that she ran into Victim. She “looked like a wreck.” Defendant felt
“[v]ery anxious, furious, depressed.”
Gina A. is a friend of Jolene L. She lived with Jolene L. and her
mother, Leticia L. Gina A. was at home when she received a text message
from Jolene L. at 3:13 a.m. Jolene L. asked to be picked up from Adagio,
which was about 10 to 12 minutes away. Gina A. then drove with Leticia L. to
Adagio.
Around this time, a witness saw a male in the Adagio parking lot
wearing dark colored clothing and a mask or beanie covering his face. The
individual then crossed the street towards Taqueria Zamora. At 3:24 a.m.,
surveillance cameras from an alleyway that wraps around Taqueria Zamora
captured an individual dressed in black who was armed with a gun. The
individual was wearing gloves and had his face covered. Defendant admitted
at trial that he was the person in this surveillance footage.
Shortly before 3:39 a.m., Defendant approached the driver’s side
of Victim’s car, where Victim was sitting, and started shooting. Victim’s
friend heard Defendant scream “‘f*ck [Victim’s nickname]’ or ‘f*ck’
something.” After the shooting stopped, Victim’s friend had to search the car
for his mobile phone and then called 911 at 3:39 a.m. Victim suffered four
gunshot wounds and died.
D. Events After the Shooting
After the shooting, Defendant ran across the street to the Adagio
parking lot. A witness testified that he appeared to be looking for someone.
About a minute or two later, Gina A. and Leticia L. arrived at the Adagio
parking lot. Leticia L. exited the vehicle. Before she exited, she told Gina A.
to meet her at the home of Jolene L.’s father. A witness saw Defendant
“jump” in the backseat of the car, and he and Gina A. “sped out of the parking

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lot.” Gina A. drove to the home of Jolene L.’s father, which was not far from
Adagio. Gina A. hid the jacket that Defendant had been wearing, and
Defendant got rid of his gloves. Neither Leticia L. nor Jolene L. were at the
home.
Gina A. and Defendant then drove to Leticia L.’s home, where
they met Jolene L. and Leticia L. From there, Defendant, Jolene L., Leticia L.
and Gina A. went to the home of one of Leticia L.’s friends. Defendant still
had the gun from the shooting. There was testimony that while they were at
the friend’s home, Defendant told Gina A. he had shot the person “who
messed with Jolene [L].” Gina A. also remembered Defendant saying that
“the gun had to go back to his boys.” At trial, Gina A. could not remember the
context of this statement. However, when interviewed by police in 2018, Gina
A. explained that Defendant had made this statement during a conversation
with Leticia L. about getting rid of the gun.
E. The Defense’s Case
1. Defendant’s Testimony
Defendant testified that Jolene L. had told him in March 2018
that she had gotten “very intoxicated and that someone sexually assaulted
her and [was] trying to rape her.” She could not remember the person’s
identity, but he later learned that Victim was the alleged offender.
Defendant admitted to both stabbing Victim with a box cutter on
April 7, 2018, and then fatally shooting him on May 19, 2018.
As to the stabbing, Defendant claimed that Victim had told him
on April 7, 2018, that he had penetrated Jolene L. with his hands while she
was sleeping. Defendant became enraged and started choking Victim. Victim
fought back. Defendant testified that he stabbed Victim with a box cutter and
smashed his face into the ground in self-defense.

7
Defendant also conceded shooting Victim but testified that it was
not planned. He explained that he carried a gun nearly every day for
protection because he bought and sold drugs. Prior to meeting Jolene L. the
night of May 19, 2018, he had drunk two 32-ounce beers and taken some
Xanax. After talking to Jolene L. at Adagio, he was upset. The two parted
ways so he could clear his head.
After they separated, Defendant testified that he began looking
for unlocked cars to burglarize in the Adagio parking lot, which is why he
covered his face. He could not find any unlocked cars there, so he crossed the
street to the Taqueria Zamora parking lot to check more cars. He claimed to
have walked through the alley with the surveillance cameras because he was
trying to access a back parking lot.
Defendant claimed that while he was looking for cars to
burglarize at Taqueria Zamora, he saw Victim’s car, which he immediately
recognized. He “was blinded by rage.” He walked up the car, said “‘what the
f*ck,’” and then fired his gun. Defendant explained, “I just had a lot of hate in
my heart, and I felt like [Victim] was trying to hurt my family and I just -- I
thought I did the right thing.”
After the shooting, he ran back across the street toward Adagio.
He saw Gina A. sitting in a car and dove into it because he did not know what
else to do. He admitted to trying to conceal the crime by throwing away his
gloves and shirt and having Gina A. dispose of his jacket.
2. Jolene L. invokes the privilege
During voir dire, outside the presence of the prospective jurors,
defense counsel stated that if Defendant chose to testify at trial, he might call
Jolene L. to corroborate Defendant’s account of the shooting. Defense counsel
continued, “if the court determines that she has a 5th Amendment issue and

8
then she is appointed counsel, and after her discussions with counsel decides
that she doesn’t want to testify, [Defendant] could be left with a critical
witness being unable to tell her side of the story to the jury. And that’s
critical information that may help to bolster [Defendant’s] credibility.”
Defendant’s credibility was significant “if we are dealing with degrees of
homicide, whether this is a first degree murder or second degree murder or
manslaughter, or not.”
Defense counsel then argued that Jolene L. had no valid reason
to assert the privilege. Based on the police and defense investigations, she
might be guilty of an accessory charge (§ 32) along with Leticia L. and Gina
A. for arranging a getaway car for Defendant.2 But the statute of limitations
for such a charge had already run. Further, defense counsel claimed “[t]here
[was] no evidence that [Jolene L. was] involved in the actual killing or that
she actually directly aided and abetted in this killing.”
The trial court then appointed Jolene L. counsel. It explained, “I
am doing this out of an abundance of caution . . . . We are not exactly sure
what she is going to say, and I just want someone to talk to her and say here
is perhaps something that -- you know, maybe there is nothing. The lawyer
will say there is absolutely nothing to discuss. I don’t know. But I just want
to have that conversation before she takes the stand.”
The prosecution agreed with the appointment of counsel. The
prosecutor stated, “I don’t know if there is a 5th Amendment issue or not. But

2 “Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors,

conceals or aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal
may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having
knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has been charged
with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony.” (§ 32.)

9
I do know that when she was previously interviewed by police with regard to
this case, she did invoke [it]. [¶] She has already indicated that she didn’t
want to speak about these things based on whatever reasons she might have.
And so that raises a concern with me that she might do that on the stand.
And so I think it is better if we get that resolved beforehand.”
Jolene L. and her appointed counsel appeared the next day of
trial. Jolene L.’s counsel informed the trial court, “Jolene [L.] does not want
to testify. I have advised her not to because her 5th Amendment rights are
implicated, based on our conversation.” The court then asked, “So you believe
that there is a 5th Amendment issue on it?” Jolene L.’s counsel replied, “I do,
your Honor. And she would like to invoke.”
The trial court accepted Jolene L.’s assertion of the privilege. But
it informed the parties that her on-call subpoena would remain in effect “[o]ut
of an abundance of caution.” Jolene L.’s counsel would be contacted “if there
[was] any chance later in the trial that [Jolene L.] would potentially testify.”
Defense counsel then repeated his belief that there was no Fifth
Amendment issue for Jolene L. because the evidence only indicated she could
be charged as an accessory. “And everybody here agrees that the statue on
[an accessory charge] . . . has run.” Further, nothing in the police reports or
the defense investigation indicated “that [Jolene L.] was an aider and abettor
to a homicide in this case.”
The trial court agreed that the statute of limitations had run on
an accessory charge. But it noted “that there is just a period of time where,
about three hours before . . . the alleged murder in this matter, Jolene [L.]
was seen at an AM/PM mini mart or something like that.” “[M]y concern was
just the time frame involved in there . . . your direct might not address some
of those time issues. But on cross-examination I can see where, potentially,

10
she might be cross-examined and say questions like, ‘where were you after
you saw the people in the AM/PM mini market? Did you ask questions? Did
you . . . call [Defendant] and say, “I saw these people together”? How did you
know to direct people to the scene?’ [¶] And those type of questions I just had
concerns with. And that would have been on cross. So that’s the reason why I
had [Jolene L.’s counsel] come over.”
III.
THE APPEAL
Defendant appeals his first degree murder conviction and
sentence. As to his conviction, he argues the trial court failed to conduct a
particularized inquiry into whether Jolene L.’s invocation of the privilege was
valid. He likewise argues that the prosecution interfered with his right to
present a defense by urging the court to appoint Jolene L. counsel. As to his
sentence, he asserts the court abused its discretion by failing to consider his
request to continue the sentencing hearing.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Particularized Inquiry
1. Applicable law
Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants have the right
“‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’” (In re
Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 29.) But this right does “not entitle the defendant
to compel a witness to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege” against self-

11
incrimination (the privilege).3 (People v. Woods (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 929,
938.) “‘It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law . . . that
witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves. [T]his privilege
“must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to
secure.”’” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 267.)
“A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to
apprehend danger from a direct answer.’” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th
291, 304–305.) The “witness need not be guilty of any offense; rather, the
privilege is properly invoked whenever the witness’s answers ‘would furnish
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute’ the witness for a criminal
offense. [Citations.] To satisfy this standard, ‘it need only be evident from the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.’
[Citation.] [O]ur Evidence Code provides that when a witness grounds a
refusal to testify on the privilege against self-incrimination, a trial court may
compel the witness to answer only if it ‘clearly appears to the court’ that the
proposed testimony ‘cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the
person claiming the privilege.’” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617,
italics added.)
Generally, a witness may not make a blanket assertion of the
privilege. “A witness’s ‘say-so does not itself establish the hazard of
incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified . . . .’
[Citation.] In other words, a trial court ‘must make “a particularized inquiry,

3 “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)

12
deciding, in connection with each specific area that the questioning party
wishes to explore, whether or not the privilege is well-founded.” [Citation.]
Although the witness may have a valid claim to the privilege with respect to
some questions, the scope of that privilege may not extend to all relevant
questions. The witness may be totally excused only if the court finds that he
could “legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] This has long been the rule in California in both
criminal and civil proceedings.” (People v. Trujeque, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp.
267–268.)
We review the trial court’s ruling de novo. (People v. Seijas,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304.)
2. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court erred by relying on a blanket
assertion of the privilege by Jolene L.’s counsel instead of conducting a
particularized inquiry into whether the privilege applied. Defendant also
claims the court improperly speculated as to whether Jolene L. might be
liable for the murder under an aiding and abetting or conspiracy theory
because there was little evidence to support either charge.
To begin, we disagree that the trial court allowed Jolene L. to
make a blanket assertion of the privilege. Rather, it granted the privilege as
to a specific area of questioning. The record indicates that Defendant wanted
to call Jolene L. as a witness to corroborate his story of the events on May 19,
2018. Thus, the court granted Jolene L. the privilege as this limited scope,
i.e., to questions concerning Jolene L.’s actions the night of the killing.
Significantly, the court did not completely bar Jolene L. from testifying. It let
the witness subpoena remain for her in case the defense sought to call her
during trial. (See, e.g., People v. Brooks (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 323, 334 [a

13
witness’s assertion of the privilege to a line of questions “about her
potentially assaultive behavior” was not a blanket assertion of the privilege].)
To the extent Defendant sought to have Jolene L. take the stand
and “invoke the privilege on a question-by-question basis,” “defense counsel—
not the trial court—[bore] responsibility for failing to insist that [Jolene L.]
invoke the privilege in a particular manner.” (People v. Brooks, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 335.)
We also note that Defendant did not express below any intent to
question Jolene L. about any topics aside from her actions after encountering
Victim the night of the killing. Nor does he do so in this appeal. Rather,
Defendant argues that Jolene L. “was the only person who could corroborate
[Defendant’s] testimony about how the nature of the encounter between
Jolene [L.] and [Victim] in the AM/PM and her reaction to it affected his
mental state, which was the only issue for the jury.”
Next, the trial court did not err by allowing Jolene L. to assert
the privilege as to this area of questioning. About three hours passed between
the time Jolene L. ran into Victim at AM/PM and his murder. As the court
discussed, Jolene L. could have been asked what she and Defendant
discussed during this timeframe, if she knew Victim was in the Taqueria
Zamora parking lot, whether she directed Defendant to go there, and how she
seemingly knew to direct Gina A. to the Adagio to pick up Defendant right
after the shooting occurred.
Jolene L.’s responses to the above questions (or other similar
questions) “‘might [have been] dangerous because injurious disclosure could
[have] result[ed].’” (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 617, italics added.)
Her responses may have exposed her to liability beyond an accessory charge.

14
For example, they may have “‘furnish[ed] a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute’” Jolene L. for conspiracy to commit murder.4 (See Ibid.)
We are also unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that nothing
in the record shows that Jolene L. could be liable for murder under an aiding
and abetting or a conspiracy theory. The absence of such evidence in the
record does not mean that Jolene L. could not have provided testimony
exposing her to liability for such charges. Indeed, the record indicates Jolene
L. invoked the privilege when questioned by the police. Thus, it could be
reasonably inferred that there was no such evidence in the record because
Jolene L. exercised the privilege during the police investigation, and
Defendant’s account of his interactions with Jolene L. were inaccurate.
B. Prosecutorial Interference
Next, Defendant contends the prosecution interfered with his
right to present a defense by urging the trial court to appoint Jolene L.
counsel. Defendant suggests that this action “conveyed to [Jolene L.] the
danger of providing any corroboration of [Defendant’s] account” and
discouraged her from testifying. The prosecution’s conduct was not improper.
The prosecution “‘cannot substantially interfere with a defense
witness’s decision to testify.’” (United States v. Pablo (10th Cir. 2012) 696
F.3d 1280, 1295–1296.) To prove prosecutorial interference, Defendant must
show (1) “‘conduct that was “entirely unnecessary to the proper performance

4 The crime of conspiracy “has four elements: (1) the existence of

an agreement between at least two persons; (2) the specific intent to agree to
commit an offense; (3) the specific intent to commit the offense that is the
object of the agreement; and (4) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
which may be committed by any conspirator.” (People v. Ware (2022) 14
Cal.5th 151, 163.)

15
of the prosecutor’s duties and was of such a nature as to transform a defense
witness willing to testify into one unwilling to testify”’”; (2) “the prosecutor’s
misconduct was a substantial cause in depriving the defendant of the
witness’s testimony”; and (3) “the testimony he was unable to present was
material to his defense.” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 457.)
Defendant has not established either the first or second prong of
the above test. Based on the record, Defendant initially raised the idea of
appointing Jolene L. counsel. Defense counsel explained the Jolene L. was a
potential witness that could corroborate Defendant’s account on the night of
the killing. Defense counsel then stated, “if the court determines that she has
a 5th Amendment issue and then she is appointed counsel, and after her
discussions with counsel decides that she doesn’t want to testify, [Defendant]
could be left with a critical witness being unable to tell her side of the story to
the jury.”
After defense counsel had set forth his position, the trial court
stated its intent to appoint Jolene L. counsel out of an abundance of caution.
The prosecution then agreed with the court’s assessment. The prosecution did
not take any independent action to discourage Jolene L. from testifying, and
its agreement with the court’s ruling cannot reasonably be construed as
misconduct.
Defendant also argues that the prosecution discouraged Jolene L.
from testifying by seeking counsel for her but not for Gina A., who also faced
potential accessory liability. But, as explained above, Jolene L. and Gina A.
were not similarly situated. Jolene L.’s testimony could have potentially
subjected her to criminal liability beyond an accessory charge. Thus, there
was good reason for the prosecution to support the appointment of counsel for
Jolene L. but not Gina A.

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II.
CONTINUANCE OF SENTENCING
A. Background
Defendant was represented by the alternate public defender’s
office during trial. Following his conviction on October 18, 2023, Defendant
moved to represent himself. A hearing was held on December 15, 2023.
Before ruling, the trial court cautioned Defendant that he would get no
special treatment from the court and would be required “to follow all the
technical rules of law and procedure and evidence.” It also stated, “I want to
make sure you are clear that we will do the sentencing on January 19th.”
Defendant said he understood. The court then reiterated, “And I am going to
hold you to that.” Defendant responded, “Yes, sir. You have got my word.”
The court then granted Defendant’s request to represent himself.
The parties appeared again on January 9, 2024. The trial court
stated that it had not ordered a probation and sentencing report. It continued
the sentencing hearing to February 23, 2024, so the report could be prepared.
At the January 9 hearing, Defendant explained that he was still waiting for
his prior counsel to give him the rest of the police reports. The court stated
that it would facilitate that process.
On February 2, 2024, the trial court held a hearing with
defendant, his former counsel, and the prosecution. The hearing was
intended “to make sure [Defendant] ha[d] everything because [the court]
want[ed] to go forward with the sentencing on February 23rd.”
Defendant claimed he was still missing some documents,
including pages of police reports and transcripts from body camera footage.
The court explained it had not heard of body camera transcripts, and the
prosecution stated that such transcripts were not typically made unless a

17
party intended to introduce them at trial, which had not been done here.
Defendant insisted that he needed them. So, the court explained that he
would likely need to submit a request or hire an investigator to obtain them.
The prosecution also reported that it had provided Defendant
with all the police reports. Former defense counsel likewise stated that he
had given Defendant “all the police reports that he would need to understand
what the case is, to understand what the evidence is, to have meaningful
conversations with his attorney about trial strategy, about the strengths and
weaknesses of his case.” Former defense counsel opined that any missing
pages likely contained immaterial information or were duplicates.
At the sentencing hearing on February 23, 2024, the trial court
noted that it had received a letter that morning from Defendant.5 In the
letter, Defendant requested a continuance of the sentencing hearing so he
could obtain (1) a psychiatric review because he had purportedly suffered a
mental breakdown and had hallucinations weeks prior to the killing, (2) more
files from his former counsel, and (3) evidence to support a Racial Justice Act
claim.
After the trial court mentioned the letter, Defendant explained
that he had been appointed an investigator on February 16, 2024, who was
looking into mitigating factors relevant to a Franklin proceeding.6 He also

5 The Defendant’s letter was received by the trial court on

February 23, 2024, but is dated February 14, 2024, and postmarked February
21, 2024.
6 “Broadly speaking, a Franklin proceeding allows youth

offenders sentenced to long prison terms an opportunity to introduce into the
record mitigating evidence relating to their youth.” (People v. Howard (2021)
74 Cal.App.5th 141, 145.)

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stated that he had spoken to an attorney on February 13, 2024, about filing a
new trial motion, and she had advised him to ask for a continuance.
The prosecution contested the continuance request. It argued
that Racial Justice Act issues could be raised after sentencing and Defendant
had not explained how any mental health issues prior to the commission of
the crime were relevant to sentencing.
The trial court reminded Defendant that he had previously
represented that he would be ready for sentencing on January 19, 2024. The
court had then continued the hearing to February 23, 2024 “to give
[Defendant] more time.” However, Defendant was now raising new issues.
The trial court asked Defendant how long it would take to
prepare the new trial motion. Defendant replied, “[H]onestly, your Honor, I
am not sure.” The court inquired, “Like a year?” Defendant responded, “I
don’t know how long the attorney will need, but I will tell him to speed it up.”
The trial court then denied Defendant’s request for a
continuance. It explained that it had just received Defendant’s continuance
request that morning, and it had raised new issues. The court noted that
when it “asked [Defendant] when we would be ready to do this, these motions
here, and he didn’t really have an answer for me at that time.” Thus, the
court concluded that “to continue the sentencing at this point . . . would
interfere with the orderly administration of justice. Because . . . I have no
idea when this would get going. And so we are going to do the sentencing
today.” The court also clarified that Defendant’s Franklin proceeding would
be done after sentencing. It then sentenced Defendant to a total term of 50
years to life in prison.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his request
to continue the sentencing hearing.

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B. Analysis
“We review the trial court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Seigler (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 596, 609.) “A reviewing
court considers the circumstances of each case and the reasons presented for
the request to determine whether a trial court’s denial of a continuance was
so arbitrary as to deny due process. [Citation.] Absent a showing of an abuse
of discretion and prejudice, the trial court’s denial does not warrant reversal.”
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450.)
Here, the trial court acted within its discretion. When it granted
Defendant’s motion to represent himself, it informed him that sentencing
would occur on January 19, 2024. Defendant confirmed he would be ready.
The court then continued the hearing to February 23, 2024, giving Defendant
another month to prepare. Yet Defendant was not ready by that date.
Further, he provided no convincing argument below as to why a continuance
was needed. He did not explain how obtaining body camera footage or any
other missing files would impact sentencing.7 His mental health evaluation
was purportedly needed for his Franklin proceeding, which could be done
after sentencing. Similarly, Defendant did not show how any evidence
concerning the Racial Justice Act would affect sentencing. Nor did he explain
why he could not submit a Racial Justice Act claim after sentencing.
To the extent Defendant sought more time to file a new trial
motion, he had already been allowed sufficient time to prepare one. He was
convicted on October 18, 2023, and was not sentenced until February 23,

7 Defendant did claim that the body camera footage would show

one of the testifying officers committed perjury. But he did not explain how
this impacted sentencing.

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2024. Defendant was also unsure of the basis for his purported new trial
motion, stating that “[i]t might cover the mental health stuff . . . .” (Italics
added.) Nor could Defendant provide any estimate of how long it would take
to prepare a new trial motion.
Given that Defendant had four months to file a new trial motion,
he could not explain the basis for his proposed motion, and could not provide
any estimate as to when it might be ready, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying his request to continue the sentencing hearing. (See
People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 933–935 [no abuse of discretion
where court denied defense counsel’s continuance motion because he had
already been given five weeks to file a new trial motion and had previously
represented that his caseload would not interfere with the motion’s
preparation].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed and remanded. On remand, we direct
the trial court to schedule a Franklin proceeding at Defendant’s request if it
has not yet occurred.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

DELANEY, J.

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