People v. Perez

CourtListener 10812841CalctappMar 20, 2026

Full text

Filed 3/20/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064219

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22NF0712)

ULISES PEREZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Larry Yellin, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant Ulises Perez challenges his convictions for firearm and
drug offenses, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his suppression
motion. He contends police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
ordering him out of a residence without probable cause and without a
warrant. We agree that Perez’s in-residence seizure was unconstitutional and
required suppression of certain evidence. We therefore reverse the judgment
and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
At around 11:00 p.m., officers responded to a 911 call reporting a
man walking around with a gun in an area known to have gang activity. A
follow-up call detailed the man’s appearance and said he had placed a gun
inside a white Kia in a nearby parking lot. A responding officer realized he
had seen a man matching that description—later identified as Perez—pacing
back and forth near a white Kia.
Perez was seen entering an apartment nearby.1 An officer walked
up to the open front door, shined his flashlight through the closed screen
door, and saw Perez sitting on a couch facing the door.
Gun drawn, the officer told Perez that he was being detained and
ordered him out. Perez initially did not move. After another officer drew his
gun and several more orders to come out, Perez complied.
Once he was outside, officers placed Perez in handcuffs. He
declined to answer any questions. The reporting party identified Perez as the
man who had placed the gun in the white Kia. The car, which was blocking
the alley, was impounded; an inventory search found a gun and drugs.
Officers then formally arrested and searched Perez, finding his I.D., cash,

1 It is undisputed Perez was a guest with a reasonable

expectation of privacy inside the residence.

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pay-owe notations, a cellphone, and a receipt relating to the white Kia. A
records check revealed he had been convicted of felonies and was prohibited
from possessing firearms.
After being charged with several firearm and drug offenses, Perez
moved to suppress the evidence against him. (See Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) He
contended the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting
him inside a residence without a warrant or probable cause.
In opposition, the prosecution claimed probable cause was not
required for Perez’s initial seizure because officers merely detained him
based on reasonable suspicion—he was not arrested until police learned he
was a convicted felon and the reporting party identified him. And it asserted
that officers did not need a warrant to order Perez out of the residence,
noting they never entered it.
The trial court denied the suppression motion, concluding Perez
had been properly detained based on reasonable suspicion. Perez then
pleaded guilty to all counts. The trial court sentenced him to three years in
prison, in addition to concurrent and stayed terms.
DISCUSSION
We agree with Perez that the officers violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by seizing him inside the residence without probable
cause and without a warrant. On appeal from the denial of a motion to
suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence but independently apply constitutional principles to
those findings. (People v. Session (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 723, 730.)
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” (U.S. Const. amend. IV.) A person is seized when an
officer restrains their liberty by using physical force or making a show of

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authority to which the person submits. (California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499
U.S. 621, 626 (Hodari D.).) An arrest, the typical form of a seizure, requires
probable cause.2 (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328.)
“‘[N]owhere is the protective force of the fourth amendment more
powerful than [within] the sanctity of the home’ . . . .” (United States v.
Washington (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 1060, 1067–1068.) “[W]hen it comes to
the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment’s
‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” (Florida v. Jardines (2013)
569 U.S. 1, 6.)
Thus, an arrest in the home requires more than just probable
cause. It also requires either a warrant or exigent circumstances. (People v.
Lujano (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 183 (Lujano).)
Here, Perez was seized while still inside the residence, when he
submitted to the officer’s authority and complied with their orders—
supported by drawn guns—to come out. (Hodari D., supra, 499 U.S. at
p. 626.) At the suppression hearing, it was undisputed that there had been
neither probable cause to arrest him, nor a warrant, nor exigent
circumstances.3 Without those necessary elements, his seizure in the
residence was unlawful.

2 Probable cause to arrest involves information “sufficient to

warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or
was committing an offense.” (Beck v. Ohio (1964) 379 U.S. 89, 91.)

3 In response to our request for supplemental briefing on whether

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry) applies to in-home seizures, the
Attorney General argues for the first time that the officers had probable
cause to believe that Perez had violated Penal Code section 26350 (openly
carrying an unloaded handgun). We decline to consider this new theory,

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We are unpersuaded by the Attorney General’s contentions that
Perez’s seizure was nevertheless lawful because (1) it was merely a detention
that did not require probable cause, and (2) the officers did not enter the
residence and thus did not need a warrant.
First, Perez’s initial seizure did not qualify as a lawful
detention—a limited seizure short of an arrest justified by mere reasonable
suspicion. Under Terry, reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in
criminal activity is sufficient for an officer to “stop the person for a brief time
and take additional steps to investigate further.” (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 185.) But this
exception to the probable cause requirement generally “‘does not apply to in-
home searches and seizures.’” (Lujano, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 182;
accord, United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3d 1160, 1165 [“the
usual rules pertaining to Terry stops do not apply in homes”].) The cases the
Attorney General cites are inapposite, as they involved officers who were
already lawfully inside the residence. (See United States v. Romain (1st Cir.
2004) 393 F.3d 63, 66, 72 [after entering with consent, officers were justified
in detaining person acting in threatening manner]; United States v. Campa
(1st Cir. 2000) 234 F.3d 733, 736, 738 [officers lawfully inside detained
persons as they entered residence].)
Second, an in-home arrest requires a warrant, even if the officers
remain outside. Courts have disagreed on whether warrantless in-house
arrests without entry are permissible (Compare Knight v. Jacobson (11th Cir.

which was not responsive to our question. (People v. Wilkinson (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1554, 1574 [“the People may not . . . tender a new theory not
raised at the original suppression hearing”]; Boston v. Penny Lane Centers,
Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 944, fn. 6 [appellate court will not entertain
theory first raised in supplemental brief].)

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2002) 300 F.3d 1272, 1277 [officer may order suspect out and then arrest him
without warrant], with United States v. Allen (2d Cir. 2016) 813 F.3d 76, 78
[prohibition on warrantless arrests “primarily triggered by the arrested
person’s location”].)
Lujano adopted the latter approach: “‘[I]t is the location of the
arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an
arrest occurs within a home.” (Lujano, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 187.)
There, officers suspecting a possible burglary peered into a partially open
door and ordered the defendant out of his residence, ultimately finding
contraband and other evidence. (Lujano, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)
Although the defendant was initially only “detained” and the officers did not
enter, the Court of Appeal concluded the officers needed both probable cause
and a warrant to seize the defendant while he was inside the residence. (Id.
at p. 179.) Because they had neither, the detention was unlawful and
required suppression of the evidence. (Ibid.)
We find this approach compelling and reach a similar conclusion
here. The Terry exception did not permit the officers to order Perez out of the
residence without both probable cause and a warrant.
The 40-year-old case the Attorney General cites in support of
warrantless arrests without entry carries little weight. (See People v. Trudell
(1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1221 (Trudell).) In that case, involving similar facts,
the majority opinion relied in large part on its conclusion that “the arrest
occurred outside of [the defendant’s] residence” (id. at p. 1228), even though
police summoned him out through “bullhorned orders delivered at gunpoint”
(id. at p. 1233 (dis. opn. of Poché, J.).) No published California case has ever
endorsed this analysis, which predates both Hodari D. and Lujano. We
decline to follow it. Under the exclusionary rule, the evidence seized due to

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Perez’s illegal seizure must be suppressed.4 (Davis v. United States (2011)
564 U.S. 229, 232.)
The parties agree that if Perez’s detention was unconstitutional,
all evidence seized on his person must be suppressed. It is also undisputed
that Perez’s statements—in this case, his refusal to answer questions—
should be excluded. (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 486–487
[defendant’s statements after unlawful arrest excluded].) And although the
Attorney General suggests that Perez’s in-field identification by the reporting
party should not be excluded, the exclusionary rule applies to that kind of
evidence as well. (People v. Teresinski (1982) 30 Cal.3d 822, 832 [victim’s
identification of defendant’s booking photo—taken after illegal detention—
was inadmissible].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded. The trial
court is instructed to (1) permit Perez to withdraw his guilty plea and
(2) grant his suppression motion to the extent it sought to exclude his in-field

4 Unlike this case, Trudell involved an arrest based on probable

cause. (Trudell, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 1229.) Thus, we need not decide
whether the officers here could rely on Trudell in good faith in executing a
warrantless seizure, as the Attorney General contends. Nothing supports
application of the good-faith exception to this in-residence seizure without
probable cause.

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identification, his statements during his initial seizure, and all items seized
on his person.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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