Pero v. Hussain CA2/4

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Filed 3/19/26 Pero v. Hussain CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MELISSA PERO et al., B344275

Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24VECV04712)
v.

ASIF ROBERT HUSSAIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Karen Moskovitz, Judge. Affirmed.
Wolf Wallenstein, Michael H. Wallenstein and Christopher J.
Cummiskey for Defendant and Appellant.
Gokal Law Group, Inc., and Ali Nicolette for Plaintiffs and Respondents
Melissa Pero and Kamran Hussain.
Reich Radcliffe & Hoover and Richard J. Radcliffe for Plaintiff and
Respondent Ludmila Seletskiy.
INTRODUCTION
This case stems from a family dispute over the probate of the estate of
Mohammed Hussain (decedent). After decedent passed away, one of his sons,
Asif “Robert” Hussain (Asif)1 took a document purporting to be decedent’s will
and instructed one of his friends to sign and backdate the witness attestation
clause so he could probate the will. The will named Asif the executor of
decedent’s estate and distributed most of the estate to Asif. Decedent’s other
heirs contested Asif’s petition to probate the will. Asif subsequently conceded
that the will was invalid and abandoned his probate petition.
Decedent’s other heirs then filed suit against Asif for malicious
prosecution of the probate action. In response, Asif filed a special motion to
strike the malicious prosecution claim under our anti-SLAPP statute.2 (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court denied the motion. Asif now appeals,
arguing the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence that he acted
without probable cause and with malice in filing the probate petition. We
disagree and affirm the trial court’s ruling.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following background facts are largely undisputed.

1 As this case involves multiple members of the Hussain family who
share a last name, we refer to certain parties by first name for clarity. No
disrespect is intended.

2 The term “SLAPP” stands for strategic lawsuit against public
participation.
2
I. Background Facts and Prior Probate Action
Decedent passed away in 2023 without a valid will, trust, or any other
estate planning document directing the disposition of his estate. After
decedent passed away, Asif approached a friend, Kelly Gorgone (Gorgone),
and presented her with a document he claimed was decedent’s will. The
document required two witness signatories to attest to the following facts:
“The last will and testament, which has been separately signed by
Mohammad Hussain, the testator, was signed, executed and declared by the
above named testator as his or her last will and testament in the presence of
each of us. We, in the presence of the testator and each other, at the
testator’s request, hereby subscribe our names as witnesses to the declaration
and the execution of the last will and testament by the testator, and we
declare that, to the best of our knowledge, said testator is eighteen years of
age or older, of sound mind and that this last will and testament was not
procured by duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. We further declare
that each of us is age 18 or older and a competent witness. [¶] Each of us
declares under the penalty [of perjury] under the laws of the state of
California that the foregoing is true and correct.” At the time he met with
Gorgone, Asif had already signed the attestation clause and dated his
signature July 5, 2022.3 There is no dispute that Gorgone did not witness
Asif or the decedent sign the will. Nonetheless, Asif asked Gorgone to sign
the attestation clause affirming that she had done so and told her to backdate
her signature to July 5, 2022. Gorgone complied with Asif’s instructions.
Asif then retained counsel, and in June 2023, he filed a petition to
probate the will and lodged a copy with the court. The will submitted by Asif

3 It is unclear from the record before us whether Asif signed the will
before or after decedent passed away.
3
distributed almost all of decedent’s assets to Asif and named Asif as the
executor of decedent’s estate.
Decedent’s other children, Melissa Jean Pero (Pero) and Kamran
Hussain (Kamran), contested Asif’s probate petition, as did decedent’s
surviving spouse, Ludmila Seletskiy (Seletskiy). Shortly before the parties
were scheduled to depose Gorgone, Asif filed a request to dismiss the probate
action. He later filed a notice of intention to abandon his probate petition.
On September 11, 2024, the probate court denied Asif’s petition, concluding
that Asif had abandoned it.

II. Malicious Prosecution Action
After the denial of Asif’s probate petition, Pero, Kamran, and Seletskiy
(collectively, plaintiffs) filed suit against Asif and Gorgone for malicious
prosecution stemming from Asif’s filing of the probate petition based on the
will falsely signed by Gorgone.4
In response, Asif filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike plaintiffs’ cause
of action for malicious prosecution. Asif argued that the malicious
prosecution claim arose from his protected activity of filing the probate
action. He also argued that plaintiffs could not establish a probability of
prevailing on their claim because he believed in good faith that the will was
valid when he filed the petition in the probate court.

A. Asif’s Declaration
Asif submitted a declaration in support of his motion attesting to the
following facts. In 2022, decedent told Asif that he intended to distribute his

4 Plaintiffs’ operative complaint also alleged a cause of action for elder
abuse which is not relevant to issues presented by this appeal.
4
home in Granada Hills to Asif and Seletskiy, with 60 percent going to Asif
and the remainder to Seletskiy. Decedent also indicated that he prepared a
will and instructed Asif to sign it. In December 2022, decedent gave Asif the
combination to a safe and told him to retrieve the documents stored there in
the event of his death. After decedent’s passing, Asif opened the safe and
retrieved a will. He then took that will to a non-attorney “probate specialist,”
Cheryl Templeton (Templeton). Templeton told him that “in order to submit
the [w]ill to [p]robate it needed to be fully signed and dated by two witnesses
who knew [decedent].”
Having been told that the will was defective because it was not signed
by two witnesses, Asif concluded that “all [he] needed to do to submit the
[w]ill to [p]robate was to get another signature on the [w]ill from a person
who knew [decedent].” He went to Gorgone and asked her to sign the witness
attestation clause and backdate her signature to July 2022. He then took the
signed will to a probate attorney and directed his new counsel to file the
probate petition. At some unspecified time after filing the petition, Asif
“became aware” that Gorgone’s signature was invalid because she did not
witness decedent sign the will as she had attested to. Once he learned this
information, he instructed his counsel to dismiss the probate petition. Asif
claims he did not intend to deceive any of the plaintiffs and would not have
submitted the will to probate court if he had known that Gorgone’s signature
was defective.

B. Plaintiffs’ Opposition
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to strike and submitted several
declarations attempting to establish a probability of prevailing on their claim
for malicious prosecution. The opposition included a declaration from

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Gorgone stating that in May or June of 2023, Asif asked her to sign and
backdate the will. She agreed to do so but only read the first page of the
document Asif gave to her. She admits she did not witness decedent sign the
will, that decedent did not ask her to sign the will, and that she never
discussed decedent’s testamentary intent with decedent before his passing.
She also did not witness Asif sign the will.
Gorgone also stated that in October 2023, she became aware that there
was a legal dispute around the will Asif lodged with his probate petition. At
that time, she contacted Asif and asked him to come forward and admit that
he had instructed her to sign and backdate the will. Between October 2023
and June 2024, she contacted Asif on multiple occasions and “pleaded with
him to come forward and explain what he had done.” Each time, Asif
promised that he would “take care of it.”
Seletskiy submitted a declaration stating that she discussed decedent’s
testamentary intent with him, and he never mentioned that he had prepared
a will, trust, or other estate planning instrument. She claimed the will
submitted by Asif contradicted the statements decedent made to her about
the distribution of his estate.
Pero submitted a declaration stating that shortly after decedent passed
away, Asif approached her and asked her to sign the will as a witness. She
refused to do so.
Plaintiffs’ opposition also included a declaration from Kurt Kuhn
(Kuhn). Kuhn’s declaration detailed his background as a forensic document
examiner and expert witness with years of experience and training in the
field. Kuhn stated that he examined exemplars of decedent’s handwriting
and compared those exemplars to decedent’s purported signature on the will
lodged by Asif. Based on this comparison, Kuhn concluded that “the evidence

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supports the opinion that it is highly probable that the signature appearing
on the [will] was not signed by [decedent].”
Asif responded by filing evidentiary objections to the declarations of
Seletskiy, Pero, Kamran, and Gorgone, principally claiming their testimony
was inadmissible hearsay and lacked foundation. Asif did not file any
objections to Kuhn’s declaration.
The trial court overruled Asif’s evidentiary objections and denied the
motion to strike, concluding that plaintiffs sufficiently established a
probability of success on the merits of their malicious prosecution claim.
Specifically, the trial court pointed to Gorgone’s testimony that Asif asked
her to sign and backdate the will and that she repeatedly urged Asif to tell
the truth about what he asked her to do. The court also noted plaintiffs
presented evidence that decedent’s signature on the will was forged.
Asif timely appealed. On appeal, Asif argues that plaintiffs’ opposition
did not include any admissible evidence establishing that he acted without
probable cause and with malice in filing the probate petition.

DISCUSSION
I. Anti-SLAPP Procedure
The “anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).) A “cause of action against a person
arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special
motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has

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established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, courts conduct a two-
step analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant has met its
“burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’
protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) Second,
if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold showing, the court decides if
the plaintiff “has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
[Citation.] We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.]” (Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 763.)

II. Prong One: Arising from Protected Activity
At the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the moving party must
establish both (1) that its act constituted protected activity; and (2) the
opposing party’s cause of action arose from that protected activity.” (Colyear
v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 119, 130; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887.) “At this stage, the
question is only whether a defendant has made out a prima facie case that
activity underlying a plaintiff’s claims is statutorily protected.” (Wilson, at p.
888.)
Here, the challenged cause of action is malicious prosecution. “‘“The
plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute dictates that every claim of
malicious prosecution is a cause of action arising from protected activity
because every such claim necessarily depends upon written and oral

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statements in a prior judicial proceeding.”’” (Medley Capital Corp. v. Security
National Guaranty, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 33, 43.) “[B]y its terms,
section 425.16 potentially may apply to every malicious prosecution action,
because every such action arises from an underlying lawsuit, or petition to
the judicial branch. By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that
the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [Citation.] Accordingly,
every Court of Appeal that has addressed the question has concluded that
malicious prosecution causes of action fall within the purview of the anti-
SLAPP statute. [Citations.]” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31
Cal.4th 728, 734–735, fn. omitted.)
We therefore agree with the trial court that Asif sufficiently established
that plaintiffs’ claim for malicious prosecution arises from his protected
activity under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

III. Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits
Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need
only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law
Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this
burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally
sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to
sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)5 But, “at the

5 “Although not mentioned in the SLAPP Act, the Code of Civil
Procedure also allows a court to consider, in lieu of an affidavit, certain
written declarations.” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane
Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 941.)
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second anti-SLAPP step, a court ‘does not weigh the credibility or
comparative probative strength of competing evidence.’ [Citation.] It ‘accepts
the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]
‘[W]e resolve conflicts and inferences in the record in favor of plaintiff.’
[Citation.] However, speculative inferences not supported by the evidence
proffered need not be considered.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7
Cal.5th 781, 795 (Monster Energy).)

A. Plaintiffs Established a Probability of Success on the Merits of
Their Malicious Prosecution Claim

To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show
there was a prior underlying action that “(1) was commenced by or at the
direction of the defendant . . . and it was pursued to a legal termination in
plaintiff’s favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated
with malice. [Citations.]” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 204, 213 (HMS).)
On appeal, Asif argues the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs
established a probability of success on their malicious prosecution claim.
Specifically, Asif asserts the plaintiffs failed to put forth sufficient evidence
on the elements of probable cause and malice. We discuss each element
separately.

1. Probable Cause
“An action is deemed to have been pursued without probable cause if it
was not legally tenable when viewed in an objective manner as of the time
the action was initiated or while it was being prosecuted.” (Sycamore Ridge

10
Apartments LLC v. Naumann (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1402.) “The test
is whether, on the basis of facts then known, any reasonable attorney would
have believed that instituting or maintaining the prior action was tenable.”
(Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 589, 599
(Citizens).) “‘A litigant will lack probable cause for his action either if he
relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true, or if
he seeks recovery upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts
known to him.’” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.)
Here, there can be no question that plaintiffs made a sufficient showing
that Asif did not have probable cause to file the probate petition. Asif admits
he signed the attestation clause before he presented the will to Gorgone. He
was therefore aware that, by its own express terms, the attestation clause
could only be validly signed by someone who (1) witnessed decedent sign the
will, (2) signed the attestation clause in the presence of the decedent, and (3)
was requested by decedent to sign the clause. Gorgone did not satisfy any of
these requirements. Similarly, Probate Code section 6110, subdivision (c),
provides that a will “shall be witnessed by being signed, during the testator’s
lifetime, by at least two persons each of whom (A) being present at the same
time, witnessed either the signing of the will or the testator’s
acknowledgment of the signature or of the will and (B) understand that the
instrument they sign is the testator’s will.”
At the time Asif’s probate petition was filed, he knew that Gorgone
could not satisfy the representations made in the attestation clause nor the
requirements of the Probate Code. Given such facts, no reasonable attorney
would believe the will had been properly witnessed by at least two people. In
the absence of a validly witnessed will, Asif’s probate petition was objectively
untenable.

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We note the trial court did not have to rely on any inadmissible
testimony to reach this conclusion. The evidence establishing Asif’s lack of
probable cause largely comes from his own declaration, which was further
corroborated and elaborated on in Gorgone’s declaration. Nothing in the
record indicates any party objected to Asif’s declaration below, nor does Asif
argue on appeal that his declaration is inadmissible in deciding his anti-
SLAPP motion. Asif has also not shown that the relevant aspects of
Gorgone’s testimony were inadmissible. While Asif asserts in his appellate
briefing that Gorgone’s declaration was inadmissible, he does so only in a
conclusory and perfunctory fashion without any detailed analysis or
argument. “Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or
authority other than general abstract principles do not properly present
grounds for appellate review. The court is not required to make an
independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error. The point is
treated as waived and we pass it without further consideration.”
(Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.)
We conclude the trial court properly overruled Asif’s objections to the
relevant portions of Gorgone’s testimony. For example, Gorgone testified in
her declaration that Asif directed her to sign and backdate a document that
he represented was decedent’s will. Asif objected to these statements,
claiming they lacked foundation and constituted inadmissible hearsay. On
appeal, Asif does not explain how Gorgone lacked the foundation to testify
about a conversation she personally had with him. We also note that
Gorgone’s testimony about Asif’s statements was not inadmissible hearsay as
“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when
offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party in either his

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individual or representative capacity, regardless of whether the statement
was made in his individual or representative capacity.” (Evid. Code, § 1220.)
As Asif’s statements in Gorgone’s declaration are being offered against him in
an action in which he is a party, those statements are not inadmissible
hearsay.
Further, Gorgone’s testimony about Asif’s statements is only made
inadmissible under the hearsay rule if it “is offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Gorgone’s testimony would
thus be inadmissible hearsay if it were offered to show that Asif was telling
the truth when he represented that the document he wanted Gorgone to sign
was decedent’s will and not a forgery. But Gorgone’s testimony was not being
offered for that purpose, rather it was offered to show that Asif asked her to
falsely represent that she had witnessed decedent sign the will he wanted to
file in probate court. Therefore, Gorgone’s testimony is not rendered
inadmissible by the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1200.
We conclude that plaintiffs carried their burden to show there was
minimal merit to the claim that Asif lacked probable cause in initiating the
probate action.

2. Malice
“The malice element of the malicious prosecution tort goes to the
defendant’s subjective intent . . . . It is not limited to actual hostility or ill
will toward the plaintiff.” (Sierra Club Foundation v. Graham (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 1135, 1156–1157.) The element of malice may range from open
hostility to indifference, and may be satisfied by proof of a defendant’s
subjective intent to deliberately misuse the legal system for personal gain at
the expense of the other party. (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.) “A lack

13
of probable cause is a factor that may be considered in determining if the
claim was prosecuted with malice [citation], but the lack of probable cause
must be supplemented by other, additional evidence. [Citation.]” (HMS,
supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 218.) “Since parties rarely admit an improper
motive, malice is usually proven by circumstantial evidence and inferences
drawn from the evidence. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
On appeal, Asif argues plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence
that he acted with malice to establish a probability of success on the merits of
their malicious prosecution claim. Asif’s declaration states that (1) he
subjectively believed—based on his conversation with Templeton—that
Gorgone could validly witness the will months after decedent’s death; (2) he
did not intend to deceive any of the plaintiffs; and (3) was simply trying to
give effect to the intentions decedent expressed while he was alive as to how
to distribute his estate upon his death.
In essence, Asif argues that plaintiffs have failed to rebut these
representations with any direct evidence that he acted with malice in filing
the probate petition. To survive an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, plaintiffs
are not required to conclusively prove that Asif acted with malice. Nor are
they obligated to come forward with direct evidence of malice. Instead,
plaintiffs can meet their burden by presenting circumstantial evidence,
which, if accepted as true, would support a judgment in their favor. (Soukup,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.) In determining whether plaintiffs have carried
this burden, we resolve all conflicts and inferences in the record in plaintiffs’
favor. (Monster Energy, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 795.)
We also disregard Asif’s evidence unless it defeats plaintiffs’ claims as a
matter of law. (Monster Energy, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 795.) Asif does not
argue that his self-serving declaration claiming he did not act with malice is

14
alone sufficient to defeat plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim as a matter of
law. Accordingly, his testimony regarding his intent in filing the probate
petition is irrelevant to the question of whether plaintiffs carried their
burden in presenting circumstantial evidence that he acted with malice.
On appeal, Asif repeatedly refers to plaintiffs’ evidence as lacking
credibility because it contradicts the representations made in his declaration.
In resolving Asif’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike, we do not weigh the
credibility or comparative strength of conflicting evidence. (Monster Energy,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 795.) Asif’s belief that his declaration provides a more
credible version of events than plaintiffs’ competing declarations is therefore
irrelevant to this appeal. Further, such conflicts in the evidence presented by
the parties suggest that there are disputed material facts concerning the
merits of plaintiffs’ claims. In a summary judgment-like procedure such as
an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, the existence of disputed material facts is
cause to deny the motion. (See, e.g., Citizens, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 602
[anti-SLAPP motion to strike properly denied where defendants’ evidence
established only that material facts were in dispute].)
In determining whether plaintiffs carried their burden on the element
of malice, we begin by acknowledging that the evidence establishing Asif’s
objective lack of probable cause also circumstantially suggests he acted with
malice by asking Gorgone to falsely attest to having witnessed decedent sign
the will when he knew that she did not do so.
Plaintiffs have also presented additional circumstantial evidence
suggesting Asif acted with an improper purpose in filing the probate petition.
For example, plaintiffs presented testimony from Seletskiy that she discussed
decedent’s testamentary intent before his passing, and he never mentioned
that he had prepared a will, trust, or other estate planning instrument. She

15
also testified that the will submitted by Asif contradicted the statements
decedent made to her about how his estate would be distributed upon his
death. Specifically, the will submitted by Asif gave Asif a greater share of
decedent’s estate than decedent had indicated to Seletskiy.
We can also infer malice from the fact that Asif directed Gorgone to
backdate her signature on the attestation clause to July 5, 2022. If, as Asif
asserts, he was operating under a good faith belief that the will could be
made valid by having a witness falsely sign it after the decedent’s death, then
there would be no reason for Asif to instruct Gorgone to backdate her
signature to July 2022. Asif’s instruction to Gorgone to backdate her
signature instead suggests that Asif wanted to conceal the fact that
Gorgone’s signature was obtained after decedent’s death. This too is
circumstantial evidence that Asif knew the will was invalid and filed the
probate petition to deprive decedent’s other heirs of their intestate share of
decedent’s estate.
Plaintiffs also submitted expert testimony from Kuhn indicating that
decedent’s signature on the purported will was likely a forgery. It is true that
Kuhn did not opine that Asif was the one who forged decedent’s signature or
offer any direct evidence that Asif was aware that decedent’s signature had
been forged. But such a showing is not required to defeat an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike. Here, Kuhn’s testimony that decedent’s signature was
forged, when coupled with evidence that the will benefited Asif at the
expense of decedent’s other heirs, is sufficient to give rise to an inference that
Asif filed the probate petition with the intent to deprive plaintiffs of their
intestate share of decedent’s estate.6

6 On appeal, Asif for the first time argues that Kuhn’s declaration was
inadmissible. Asif has forfeited any claim of error as to the admissibility of
16
Additionally, malice can be shown by “evidence that a party pursued, or
continued to pursue, a case after learning it was untenable.” (Jenkins v.
Brandt-Hawley (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1357, 1384.) On this point, plaintiffs
submitted Gorgone’s testimony that on multiple occasions beginning in
October 2023, she urged Asif to come forward and admit that she had falsely
signed the attestation clause in the will. Yet, the record establishes that Asif
took no action to dismiss the probate petition until June 2024, despite his
repeated assurances to Gorgone that he would “take care of it.” This too is
circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer that Asif acted with
malice in continuing to prosecute the probate petition for eight months.
This circumstantial evidence, taken cumulatively, is sufficient to carry
plaintiff’s burden to show their malicious prosecution claim has the minimal
merit necessary to survive Asif’s anti-SLAPP challenge.
Asif has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in
overruling his evidentiary objections to this evidence. On appeal, Asif does
not acknowledge or attempt to rebut the authority cited by the trial court in
overruling his evidentiary objections. His appellate briefing does not refer to
the provisions of the Evidence Code concerning hearsay, nor does he attempt
to distinguish the case law cited by the trial court. Asif has therefore failed
to establish any abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling his
objections. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [an
“‘order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and

Kuhn’s testimony by failing to object to it in the trial court. (Leonardini v.
Shell Oil Co. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 547, 584 [“questions relating to the
admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a
specific and timely objection”].) We therefore do not address Asif’s claims of
error concerning the admissibility of Kuhn’s testimony and treat his
testimony as properly before the trial court.

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presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is
silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general
principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine
of reversible error’”].)
For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to deny
Asif’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike plaintiffs’ cause of action for malicious
prosecution.

DISPOSITION
The order denying Asif’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike is affirmed.
Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions is denied. Plaintiffs are awarded costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.

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