CourtListener 10810020•People v. VelascoHernandez CA4/3
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Filed 3/17/26 P. v. VelascoHernandez CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065009
v. (Super. Ct. No. 24HF1464)
EUGENIO OPINION
VELASCOHERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Walter P. Schwarm, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
* * *
Defendant Eugenio VelascoHernandez appeals from the trial
court’s order requiring that he register as a sex offender for the rest of his
life, as a result of his conviction for violating Penal Code section 288.3,
subdivision (a) (section 288.3(a)).1 We conclude lifetime registration was
required under the plain language of section 290, subdivision (d)(3)(C)(xi)
(section 290(d)(3)(C)(xi)), and the trial court did not err. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2024, defendant communicated by messages on social
media and text with a police officer. Defendant believed the officer was a 13-
year-old boy. In these communications, defendant expressed an intent to
engage in lewd conduct with the “boy.” Defendant was arrested at a park
where he had arranged to meet the “boy.”
A jury convicted defendant of contacting a minor with the intent
to commit a crime. (§ 288.3(a).)2 The trial court suspended imposition of
sentence, placed defendant on two years’ supervised probation, and ordered
defendant to register for life as a sex offender. (§ 290(d)(3)(C)(xi).) Defendant
filed a timely notice of appeal.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The jury found defendant not guilty of meeting a minor with the
intent to engage in lewd conduct (§ 288.4, subd. (b)), and the lesser included
offense of arranging a meeting with a minor for lewd purposes (id.,
subd. (a)(1)).
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DISCUSSION
Defendant raises a single issue on appeal: Whether the trial court
erred by ordering lifetime registration as a sex offender. This court reviews
the trial court’s order that a defendant register as a sex offender under
section 290(d)(3)(C)(xi) for abuse of discretion. (People v. Smyth (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 22, 27; People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433.) To the
extent we interpret section 290 or other statutes as part of our analysis, our
review is de novo. (People v. Smyth, at p. 27.)
Under section 290(d)(3)(C)(xi), lifetime registration as a sex
offender is required if a defendant is convicted of violating section 288.3(a),
“unless committed with the intent to commit a violation of subdivision (b) of
Section 286, subdivision (b) of Section 287 or former Section 288a, or
subdivision (h) or (i) of Section 289.” (§ 290(d)(3)(C)(xi).)
In this case, defendant was convicted of violating section 288.3(a),
with the intent to commit a violation of section 288.3 This crime is not
included as an exemption from registration under section 290(d)(3)(C)(xi),
3 The jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 1124 and 1110.
CALCRIM No. 1124 instructed the jury that the People were required to
prove defendant attempted to contact or communicate with a person the
defendant believed was a minor; and that when he did so, he intended to
commit a violation of section 288, subdivision (a). CALCRIM No. 1110
instructed the jury that to prove defendant intended to commit a violation of
section 288, subdivision (a), the People must prove defendant intended
willfully to touch “any part of a child’s body either on the bare skin or
through the clothing,” or to “cause[ ] a child to touch his own body, the
defendant’s body, or the body of someone else, either on the bare skin or
through the clothing,” and defendant intended to commit the act “with the
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual
desires of himself or the child”; and the child in question was under 14 years
of age. Defendant does not argue there was insufficient evidence of each
element of the crime of which he was convicted.
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and under the plain language of section 290, the exemption from lifetime
registration does not apply to defendant. The trial court therefore did not
abuse its discretion in requiring lifetime registration as a sex offender for
defendant.
Defendant argues the lifetime registration order must be vacated
because the trial court failed to make findings that defendant “had the intent
to commit one of the [crimes] that would have exempted him from the
lifetime registration requirement.” As explained ante, defendant was
convicted of violating section 288.3(a) with the intent to violate section 288.
Nothing in section 290(d)(3)(C)(xi) or the relevant case law requires the
People to prove or the trial court to find that defendant did not have the
intent to violate a different statute.
Defendant also argues the conduct described in the sections of the
Penal Code that exempt a defendant from registration under section
290(d)(3)(C)(xi), similarly violates section 288, subdivision (a). This is not
accurate. Section 288, subdivision (a), includes as an element that the act be
committed with the intent to arouse, etc., and also includes a requirement
that the victim be under 14 years of age. Neither of these is an element of a
violation of section 286, subdivision (b), section 287, subdivision (b), former
section 288a, subdivision (b), or section 289, subdivision (h) or (i).
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BANCROFT, J.*
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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