Raposas v. Stewart CA6

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Filed 3/17/26 Raposas v. Stewart CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DOLORES RAPOSAS, H052529
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22CV404046)

v.

CONNIE STEWART,

Defendant and Respondent.

Dolores Raposas sued Connie Stewart and Wayne Lammer1 for
negligence on the basis of premises liability, alleging that inadequate lighting
in front of Stewart’s residence created a dangerous condition that caused
Raposas to fall when leaving the residence late one evening. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Stewart after deciding that Raposas
had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Stewart had actual or
constructive knowledge of the asserted dangerous condition on the property.
On appeal, Raposas contends that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment for three reasons: the court based its decision on its

1 By stipulation of the parties, Raposas dismissed Lammer from the

case before Stewart filed the motion for summary judgment at issue on
appeal.
misidentification of the location of the fall, the court ignored fundamental
issues of material fact regarding the lighting conditions and whether such
conditions were “open and obvious,” and the court impermissibly relied on an
argument Stewart did not advance.
For the reasons explained below, we decide that Raposas has not
established reversible error as to the challenged order and affirm the
judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Facts
Stewart and her husband, Michael Wheeler, reside in Milpitas. There
is a porch “[i]mmediately outside” the front entrance to Stewart’s residence.
The front porch has a light fixture that is activated by a motion sensor.
A set of stairs comprising five steps descends from the porch; the stairs
have a railing on one side. At the base of the porch stairs, a paved walkway
begins and extends out towards the sidewalk. The paved walkway ends in a
single step down that leads to a paved landing. The paved landing is parallel
to the residence’s driveway and provides access to both the driveway and
four, tiered stone discs that descend towards the sidewalk. The driveway and
the path created by the stone discs are parallel to one another.

2 We draw the facts recited here from the record that was before the

trial court when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment (Gonzalez v.
Interstate Cleaning Corp. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1034 (Gonzalez);
Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037), including the
parties’ separate statements of undisputed material facts. (See Kim v.
County of Monterey (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 312, 316, fn. 1.) We liberally
construe the evidence in support of Raposas, as the party opposing summary
judgment, and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in her favor.
(Gonzalez, at p. 1034; Yanowitz, at p. 1037.)
2
In the six years prior to Stewart’s fall, Raposas regularly visited
Stewart’s residence—approximately twice a month—and used the front
walkway, including “at nighttime during the hours of darkness.” At times,
Raposas would leave Stewart’s residence “with bags of leftovers.” Each time
Raposas did so, she would use the paved walkway to reach the driveway. She
would then walk down the driveway to the sidewalk, rather than using the
path created by the stone discs.
Prior to this incident, Raposas had “never in the past had any trouble
navigating” either the porch stairs or the walkway (with or without leftovers),
no one (including Raposas) “had ever complained” about the adequacy of the
walkway’s lighting conditions, and the motion-sensor-activated front porch
light had never failed to illuminate while Raposas was traversing the
walkway.
On the evening of October 30, 2021, Raposas visited Stewart at
Stewart’s residence. Raposas left at approximately 11:45 p.m. carrying bags
of leftovers in both hands. Wheeler accompanied Raposas to the door.
Raposas expected the front porch light to illuminate, but it did not. Although
the porch light was not on, Raposas began walking down the porch stairs and
the walkway rather than waiting for the light to come on or asking Wheeler
to turn on or activate the light. There was no pressing reason for Raposas to
continue walking down the pathway rather than wait for the porch light to
come on; she “was just heading home.”
When she was about halfway down the walkway, Raposas turned
around because Wheeler said the front porch light was not illuminating.
Wheeler began waving his arms to activate the motion sensor. Although the
front porch light still did not turn on, Raposas continued to walk down the
walkway. Raposas fell on the single step at the end of the walkway “because

3
she misstepped.” Raposas alleged that the front porch light illuminated
sometime after she fell.
B. Procedural Background
On September 2, 2022, Raposas filed a complaint against Stewart and
Lammer,3 alleging that, as a direct and proximate result of the defendants’
“negligence in failing to ensure inter alia, adequate lighting on or about the
[p]remises,” Raposas fell at Stewart’s residence. Raposas further alleged
that, as a result of the fall, she sustained “and is certain in the future to
sustain” unspecified “disabling, serious and permanent injuries, and pain,
suffering and mental anguish” and “maybe in the future be unable to pursue
her vocation of choice, and therefore, will suffer in the future loss of earnings
and earning capacity.” Raposas sought relief in the form of, inter alia,
damages, special damages for medical expenses, loss of earnings and earning
capacity, prejudgment interest, and costs. Stewart filed an answer denying
the allegations and asserting various affirmative defenses.
Following discovery, Stewart moved for summary judgment. Stewart
argued that she did not breach her duty to provide adequate lighting
conditions, had no actual or constructive knowledge that, at the time of
Raposas’s fall, the lighting conditions were dangerous,4 and, to the extent the
walkway was unlit at the time Raposas was traversing it, Raposas
“unnecessarily encountered an open and obvious hazard,” thereby relieving
Stewart of her duty. Raposas opposed the motion. After considering the

3 According to Stewart’s deposition testimony, Lammer purchased the

residence where Stewart lived.
4 Stewart also argued that, to the extent Raposas was challenging the

safety of the walkway (despite not identifying the walkway as a dangerous
condition in the complaint), the undisputed evidence demonstrated the
walkway was not unsafe.
4
partes’ respective arguments and evidence, the trial court granted the motion
for summary judgment in a written order.
The trial court concluded that Stewart had met her burden at the first
step of the summary judgment analysis, and Raposas had failed in the second
step of the analysis to show there was a material issue of disputed fact. The
court reasoned that, if the motion-sensor light “was off the entire time before
Raposas’s fall,” as per Raposas’s sworn testimony, the asserted dangerous
condition (darkness) was open and obvious. Because Raposas nonetheless
“continued knowingly to walk down the stairs in the dark,” Stewart could not
be held liable for Raposas’s subsequent fall. In addition, the court found
Stewart had met her burden of demonstrating that she had neither actual
nor constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition (the darkness
resulting from the motion-sensor light not coming on), and Raposas offered no
evidence to create a triable issue of material fact on this question. Indeed,
Raposas had admitted that there had been no complaints about insufficient
illumination prior to her fall on October 30, 2021.
In ruling on the parties’ evidentiary objections, the trial court stated
that Stewart had “not object[ed] to the one material fact of Raposas’s that the
court [] relied on.” The court overruled Raposas’s objections to those of
Stewart’s undisputed material facts on which the court relied to reach its
decision, “which [we]re based solely on the [undisputed material facts] being
‘argumentative.’ ” Raposas does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings.
On July 30, 2024, the trial court entered judgment for Stewart. The
judgment attached and incorporated by reference the court’s June 13, 2024
written order. It stated that the order held “in pertinent part that” Stewart
had met her burden of proof regarding actual or constructive knowledge and

5
Raposas had failed to demonstrate there was a triable issue of fact regarding
notice.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Raposas challenges the trial court’s decision on three
grounds. First, she contends that the court misidentified the location of her
fall as the last step of the porch stairs rather than the step between the
walkway and the landing and therefore failed to consider the adequacy and
obviousness of the lighting conditions where she actually fell. Second,
Raposas maintains that there are triable issues of fact regarding whether the
front porch light was illuminated as she traversed the path from Stewart’s
front door to the sidewalk and, thus, whether the danger was open and
obvious enough to render unreasonable her decision to continue along the
path. Third, Raposas asserts that Stewart did not adequately develop in her
motion for summary judgment her argument that Stewart lacked actual or
constructive notice of the challenged lighting condition. Raposas further
maintains that because Stewart could have discovered the dangerous
condition if she had inspected the lighting, Stewart failed to meet her burden
to demonstrate there was no triable issue of material fact on the question of
notice and the court impermissibly granted summary judgment on that basis.
Stewart disputes Raposas’s contentions of error.
A. Legal Principles
Whether the trial court erred in granting a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is a question of law we review de novo. (Samara v.
Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338.)
Summary judgment is warranted where there are no disputed
questions of material fact and the issues raised by the pleadings may be

6
decided as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc.,5 § 437c, subd. (c).) “In
determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the
papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and
sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence.” (Ibid.) However, the trial court shall not grant summary
judgment “based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if
contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to
any material fact.” (Ibid.)
When reviewing an appeal after a motion for summary judgment has
been granted, “we conduct the same procedure employed by the trial court.
We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the elements of the claim, (2) the
motion to determine if it establishes facts justifying judgment in the moving
party’s favor, and (3) the opposition—assuming movant has met its initial
burden—to ‘decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the
existence of a triable, material fact issue.’ ” (Oakland Raiders v. National
Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.)
“The appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons for
its ruling on the motion, as the appellate court reviews only the ruling and
not its rationale.” (Bed, Bath & Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Village
Square Venture Partners (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 867, 873, citing California
Aviation, Inc. v. Leeds (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 724, 730–731.) The reviewing
court “ ‘may affirm a summary judgment on any correct legal theory, as long
as the parties had an adequate opportunity to address the theory in the trial

5 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.
7
court.’ ” (California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
16, 22; Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 932, 948.)
Stewart, as the party moving for summary judgment, bears the burden
of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that she is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) To meet its burden, the party
requesting summary judgment has an initial burden of demonstrating that a
cause of action lacks merit because one or more elements of the cause of
action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of
action. (§ 437c, subd. (o); Aguilar, at p. 850; Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 101.) The moving party “must ‘support[]’ the
‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions,
answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’
must or may ‘be taken.’ ” (Aguilar, at p. 855, citing § 473c, subd. (b).)
If the moving party makes a prima facie showing that justifies
judgment in its favor, the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate
the existence of a triable issue of one or more material facts as to the cause of
action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.)
In determining whether the parties have met their respective burdens,
we “ ‘consider[] all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers
except that to which objections were made and sustained.’ ” (State Dept. of
Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1035.) “There is a
triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

8
“ ‘[O]ur review is governed by a fundamental principle of appellate
procedure, namely, that “ ‘[a] judgment or order of the lower court is
presumed correct,’ ” and thus, “ ‘error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”
[Citation.] Under this principle, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
error on appeal, even though defendants had the burden of proving their
right to summary judgment before the trial court.’ ” (Gonzalez, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at p. 1034.)
B. Analysis
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are
the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause
resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158;
see also Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)
To prevail on her motion for summary judgment, Stewart, as the
moving party, only needs “to ‘show[] that one or more elements of the cause of
action . . . cannot be established’ by the plaintiff. [Citation.] In other words,
all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at
least one element of the cause of action—for example, that the plaintiff
cannot prove element X. Although he [or she] remains free to do so, the
defendant need not himself [or herself] conclusively negate any such
element—for example, . . . prove not X.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
pp. 853–854, fn. omitted.) After reviewing the record de novo, we decide
Stewart has demonstrated that Raposas cannot prove the element of breach.6
“Generally speaking, a property owner must have actual or
constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition before liability will be

6 Because we decide that Raposas cannot prove the breach element of

her premises liability claim, we do not reach her other contentions on appeal.
9
imposed.” (Getchell v. Rogers Jewelry (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 381, 385.)
Here, the breach element turns on lack of notice.
As a threshold matter, we address Raposas’s contention that Stewart
failed to adequately “develop[]” in her motion for summary judgment her
argument that the undisputed material facts demonstrated Stewart lacked
the notice necessary to cure the asserted dangerous condition and Stewart
thus failed to meet her burden. We disagree with Raposas’s reading of
Stewart’s motion.
Stewart asserted that, “taking [Raposas’s] version of events” and based
on the undisputed facts, the asserted failure of the motion-activated front
porch light to illuminate had never previously occurred and Raposas
continued to proceed down the stairs and along the pathway in the dark
rather than notifying Stewart that the porch light had not illuminated.
Stewart argued that, because there is no evidence in the record that Stewart
had either actual or constructive knowledge that the lighting conditions in
front of Stewart’s residence presented a dangerous condition, there was no
triable issue of material fact regarding Stewart’s notice of the alleged
condition. We discern no error in the trial court’s consideration of Stewart’s
notice argument.
A property owner’s “actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition is a key to establishing [his or her] liability. Although the owner’s
lack of knowledge is not a defense, ‘[t]o impose liability for injuries suffered
by an invitee due to [a] defective condition of the premises, the owner or
occupier “must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the
condition, which if known to him [or her], he [or she] should realize as
involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his [or her] premises.” ’ ”

10
(Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206 (Ortega); Joshi v. Fitness
International, LLC (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 814, 832–833 (Joshi).)
“Actual knowledge is defined as ‘ “express information of a fact,” ’ while
constructive knowledge is that ‘ “which is imputed by law.” ’ ” (Jones v. Awad
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1208.) “The plaintiff need not show actual
knowledge where evidence suggests that the dangerous condition was present
for a sufficient period of time to charge the owner with constructive
knowledge of its existence.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206; Jones, at
p. 1209 [“[A] landowner cannot be charged with constructive notice without a
showing of some overt feature surrounding the dangerous condition, which
would notify the landowner of its existence.”]; Joshi, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 833.)
We decide the trial court properly concluded that Raposas failed to
raise a triable issue of material fact with respect to Stewart’s actual or
constructive knowledge of the adequacy of the illumination of the path from
Stewart’s front door to the sidewalk.
Stewart presented to the trial court undisputed material facts that,
prior to the subject incident, Raposas had been to Stewart’s residence many
times (approximately twice per month over the course of six years), Raposas
had frequently left Stewart’s residence “during the hours of darkness” using
the paved walkway to reach the driveway and had had no difficulty
navigating that path, the motion-activated front porch light had never
previously failed to illuminate, no one (including Raposas) had ever
complained that the lighting conditions in the area of the walkway were
inadequate, and Raposas expected the front porch light to illuminate when
she exited onto Stewart’s porch.

11
There is no evidence that Stewart had any knowledge of the status of
the light as Raposas exited Stewart’s residence that night. In both her
opening and reply briefs on appeal, Raposas maintains that Raposas and
Wheeler were “the only two eye-witnesses to the circumstances surrounding
[the underlying] incident.” The record contains no evidence to support a
conclusion that Stewart had actual or constructive knowledge of the asserted
dangerous condition caused by alleged inadequate lighting on the evening
Raposas fell. Therefore, Stewart made a prima facie showing that the
evidence did not support a triable issue of fact with respect to notice, shifting
the burden to Raposas.
Raposas contends that because Stewart failed to demonstrate that she
had inspected the adequacy of the lighting conditions prior to the incident on
October 30, 2021, Stewart could not meet her burden of proving there was no
triable issue of fact with respect to whether Stewart had notice of such
conditions. Raposas does not cite any legal authority to support her
contention. When an appellant asserts a point without providing supporting
legal authority, “ ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no
discussion by the reviewing court.’ ” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396,
408.) Furthermore, Raposas does not point to any evidence in the record that
would demonstrate the existence of a triable material fact as to notice.
We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Stewart.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to her reasonable
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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______________________________________
Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H052529
Raposas v. Stewart

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