People v. Sorrells CA2/3

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Filed 3/16/26 P. v. Sorrells CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337480

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XNOMA042980

KEVIN DRATTON SORRELLS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert G. Chu, Judge. Appeal dismissed
and petition for writ of habeas corpus granted.

Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Kevin Dratton Sorrells appeals after the trial court
increased his sentence by several years to correct a purported
error by the original sentencing court more than a decade earlier.
We conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the
sentence and dismiss the appeal on that ground. However,
to avoid a manifestly unjust result, we construe the appeal
as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, grant the petition, and
direct the trial court to vacate its order modifying the sentence
and reimpose the original sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2008, the People charged Sorrells with a number of
crimes related to a series of domestic violence incidents. The
People presented evidence at trial showing Sorrells committed
domestic violence against five successive female partners. The
charges concerned only two of those victims. The jury convicted
Sorrells of assault with a firearm, criminal threats, dissuading
a witness, false imprisonment by violence, child abuse, assault
by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and two counts
of corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant. (Pen. Code, §§ 245,
subd. (a)(2), 422, 136.1, subd. (b)(3), 236, 273a, subd. (a), 245,
subd. (a)(1), 273.5, subd. (a).)1 The jury found true firearm
allegations on some counts (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and Sorrells
admitted a prior serious felony conviction that qualifies as
a strike.
The trial court sentenced Sorrells to an aggregate term of
41 years in prison, which included upper terms on the base count
and the firearm enhancements. On the dissuading a witness
count, the court imposed eight months for the offense (one-third

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code.

2
the middle term of two years), doubled for the prior strike,
plus three years and four months for the firearm enhancement
(one-third the upper term of 10 years). On the assault with
a firearm count, the minute order states the court imposed a
10-year enhancement under “section 667.6(C).” The abstract of
judgment states the enhancement was under section “667.5(C).”
A different panel of this court affirmed the judgment in 2013.
(See People v. Sorrells (Feb. 22, 2013, B226997) [nonpub opn.].)
In 2018, a California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) case records analyst sent the trial court
a letter alerting it to possible errors in the abstract of judgment
and minute order. The letter noted the court imposed one-third
the middle term on the dissuading a witness count, but section
1170.15 generally requires a full consecutive term when the
defendant commits a dissuading offense and another felony
offense against the same victim. The letter also noted the
abstract of judgment stated the court imposed a 10-year
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (c), but that
section is not an enhancement. The letter asked the court
to review its file to determine “if a correction is required.”
The court took no action in response to the letter.
In 2023, Sorrells filed a petition asking the court to
resentence him under section 1172.1. Sorrells asserted the court
had discretion to resentence him based on a different CDCR
letter. Sorrells attached to his petition a letter from a CDCR
correctional officer who had personally observed Sorrells for
two years and believed he no longer poses a safety risk. Sorrells
also attached to his petition “letters of commendation and
recognition,” which he asserted prove he is a “model inmate
who has shown immense rehabilitation, growth, and remorse.”

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The People opposed Sorrells’ request. The People noted
the 2018 CDCR letter did not recommend the court resentence
Sorrells to a lower sentence. Instead, it asked the court to modify
the minute order to correct possible sentencing errors. The
People asserted that, although the court should not resentence
Sorrells under section 1172.1, it should correct the sentence and
impose a full consecutive term on the dissuading a witness count.
The trial court considered the issues at a hearing on
March 8, 2024. Sorrells did not personally appear, but he
was represented by counsel. After argument from the parties,
the court declined to resentence Sorrells under section 1172.1.
The court determined section 1172.1 “does not apply in this case
because neither the CDCR, the Board of Parole, or the District
Attorney’s office are recommending resentencing.” The court
explained that, even if section 1172.1 did apply, it would not
exercise its discretion under it. The court stated it considered
Sorrells’ disciplinary and rehabilitation record, evidence
reflecting any decrease in risk of future violence, and evidence
reflecting changed circumstances. The court found Sorrells
continues to pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,
noting he committed numerous acts of domestic violence over
a long period of time.
After declining to resentence Sorrells under section 1172.1,
the court modified his sentence to correct the errors identified
in the 2018 CDCR letter. On the dissuading a witness count,
the court imposed a consecutive middle term of two years,
doubled for the prior strike, plus one-third the upper term of
10 years for the firearm enhancement. On the assault with
a firearm count, the court imposed a 10-year enhancement under
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), rather than under section 667.5,

4
subdivision (c). The minute order states “[a]ll other terms remain
as previously imposed as to all counts.” After resentencing,
Sorrells’ aggregate sentence was 43 years and eight months.
Sorrells timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Sorrells contends the trial court erred in modifying
his sentence without him being present, imposing upper terms
based on aggravating factors not found true by a jury, and failing
to conduct a full resentencing. The Attorney General does not
contest Sorrells’ arguments on the merits. Instead, he asserts
we must dismiss the appeal because the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to modify the sentence. The Attorney General
suggests that, to avoid an unfair result, we may treat the appeal
as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and direct the trial court
to vacate the modified sentence.
“Under the general common law rule, a trial court is
deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once
execution of the sentence has commenced.” (People v. Karaman
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344.) However, there are limited exceptions
to this rule. (See People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783,
790–791 (Singleton).) For example, “the court has inherent
power to correct a clerical error at any time.” (Ibid.) A court
also may resentence a defendant in connection with a petition
for writ of habeas corpus or under specified conditions provided
in section 1172.1. (Singleton, at pp. 787, 790.)
Here, the trial court made two modifications to Sorrells’
sentence long after execution of the sentence had commenced.
First, the court imposed a 10-year enhancement under section
12022.5, subdivision (a), rather than under section 667.6,

5
subdivision (c).2 A record of the court’s oral pronouncement of
the original sentence could not be produced for this appeal, so it
is not clear if the court misspoke while announcing the sentence,
or if the mistake appeared for the first time in the minute order.
In any event, it is apparent the court intended to impose the
enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), as alleged
in the information and found true by the jury. Therefore, the
error was essentially clerical, which the trial court had inherent
discretion to correct at any time.3 (See People v. Menius (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1294 [court’s inadvertent reference to the
wrong statute at sentencing was a clerical error]; Singleton,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 790–791.)
Second, the trial court modified Sorrells’ sentence to impose
a full consecutive middle term on the dissuading a witness count.
The original sentencing court imposed a consecutive one-third
the middle term on that count, as is generally required under
section 1170.1, subdivision (a). However, the resentencing
court determined section 1170.15 required it to impose a
full consecutive term, presumably because the victim of the
dissuading offense also was the victim of another felony
conviction.4

2 Section 667.6, subdivision (c) concerns sentencing for
certain sex crimes and is not relevant to Sorrells’ convictions.
3 Sorrells does not directly argue he was entitled to a full
resentencing based on this correction or that the court otherwise
erred in correcting the error.
4 Section 1170.15 provides, “if a person is convicted of a
felony, and of an additional felony that is a violation of Section
136.1 . . . and that was committed against the victim of, or a
witness or potential witness with respect to, or a person who was

6
The parties disagree about whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to correct the purported section 1170.15 error.
A court’s failure to impose a full consecutive term under section
1170.15 is a judicial error, not a clerical error. (See Singleton,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 792 [a court makes a judicial error
when it fails to impose the legally required sentence under
section 1170.15].) Nevertheless, Sorrells contends the trial court
had jurisdiction because the error was apparent on the face of the
record and resulted in an unauthorized sentence. The Attorney
General agrees the original sentence was unauthorized.5
However, he contends trial courts do not have inherent
jurisdiction to correct such errors.
Courts of Appeal are split on whether trial courts have
inherent jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence,
i.e., a sentence that “could not lawfully be imposed under
any circumstance in the particular case.” (People v. Scott (1994)

about to give material information pertaining to, the first felony,
. . . the subordinate term for each consecutive offense that is
a felony described in this section shall consist of the full middle
term of imprisonment for the felony for which a consecutive
term of imprisonment is imposed, and shall include the full term
prescribed for any enhancements imposed for being armed with
or using a dangerous or deadly weapon or a firearm, or for
inflicting great bodily injury.”
5 The Attorney General notes the modified sentence also fails
to comply with section 1170.15. The court imposed a consecutive
one-third the upper term for the firearm enhancement attached
to the dissuading count. However, under section 1170.15,
the court must impose “the full term prescribed for any
enhancements imposed for being armed with or using
a dangerous or deadly weapon or a firearm.” (§ 1170.15.)

7
9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) The majority of appellate courts have
concluded they do not. (See People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
629, 633 (King); People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 62–63
(Boyd), review den. Sept. 11, 2024; People v. Hernandez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1122–1124; Singleton, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at pp. 796–797; see also People v. Garcia (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 139, 144–145, review den. Nov. 25, 2025;
but see People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 990
(Codinha); People v. Cervantes (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 825.)
In King, for example, a trial court sentenced the defendant
to the middle term of six years on a forcible rape conviction.
(King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.) The defendant filed
a petition for resentencing decades after the sentence was final.
He argued his sentence was unauthorized because the trial court
was required to impose seven years—rather than six—based on
the jury’s “in-concert” finding. The trial court denied the petition
and the defendant appealed. (Ibid.)
The King court agreed with the defendant that his sentence
was unauthorized. (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.)
Nevertheless, it concluded the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to entertain the defendant’s resentencing motion and dismissed
the appeal on that ground. (Id. at pp. 633, 642.) The court
rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court had
inherent jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence.
It explained the unauthorized sentence rule is a “principle
of waiver rather than jurisdiction . . . . The doctrine does not
itself create jurisdiction for the trial court to rule on a motion
challenging the legality of a sentence.” (Id. at p. 637.) The court
continued, “A motion is not an independent remedy, but
must be attached to some ongoing action. [Citation.] Thus,

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a defendant who wishes to challenge a sentence as unlawful
after the defendant’s conviction is final and after the defendant
has begun serving the sentence must do more than simply file a
motion in the trial court making an allegation that the sentence
is legally infirm.” (Id. at p. 640.) The court noted a defendant
could challenge an unauthorized sentence by filing a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, or the People could do so by seeking
resentencing under a predecessor to section 1172.1. (King,
at pp. 640–641.)
The King court relied on In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119
to reach its conclusion. In G.C., a minor raised a sentencing issue
with a dispositional order for the first time in an appeal of an
unrelated judgment. (Id. at pp. 1123–1124.) The Supreme Court
rejected the minor’s argument that the appellate court had
jurisdiction to consider the issue because it resulted in an
unauthorized sentence. (Id. at pp. 1129–1130.) The high court
explained that, to invoke the unauthorized sentence rule, the
court must have jurisdiction over the judgment, for example,
by way of a habeas petition. (Id. at p. 1130.) The appellate court
lacked jurisdiction because “there was no correlation between
the [sentencing] error and the current judgment on appeal.
The unauthorized sentence doctrine will not serve to remedy
this defect.” (Ibid.)
The court in Codinha disagreed with King and held a
trial court has inherent jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized
sentence if the error appears on the “face of the record.”
(Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 990.) In Codinha, the
trial court sentenced the defendant to a concurrent term on
a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
(Id. at p. 982.) After the judgment was final, the CDCR informed

9
the court that, because the defendant admitted committing
the offense while released on bail, it was required to impose a
consecutive term. (Id. at pp. 982–983.) In response to the letter,
the trial court modified the sentence, increasing it by 16 months.
(Id. at p. 983.) The defendant appealed. (Ibid.)
The Codinha court held the trial court properly exercised
its inherent authority to correct an unauthorized sentence, but it
reversed because the court failed to conduct a full resentencing.
(Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 980–981.) The court
explained the trial court’s jurisdiction arose out of its inherent
power to vacate a judgment that is void on its face, noting
the Supreme Court has described an unauthorized sentence
as being a “ ‘void portion of the judgment.’ ” (Id. at p. 990,
quoting In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412, 414.) The court
concluded, because the sentencing error was “apparent from
an examination of the judgment itself, i.e., the trial court’s
oral pronouncement of sentence,” the trial court had inherent
jurisdiction to correct it at any time. (Codinha, at p. 991.)
The Codinha court distinguished G.C., explaining the
“jurisdiction at issue in [that case] was that of the appellate
court, not that of the juvenile court that made the challenged
dispositional order. The Supreme Court did not consider whether
a trial court in an adult criminal proceeding has jurisdiction
to correct its own unauthorized sentence whenever the error
comes to its attention. It did not disapprove, nor even mention,
the body of case law . . . that acknowledges the existence of
such jurisdiction.” (Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.)
A year later, the court in Boyd noted the split of authority
and elected to follow King. (See Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at p. 67.) It explained the Codinha court failed to cite a single

10
case in which a court relied solely on the existence of an
unauthorized sentence for jurisdiction. (Boyd, at pp. 67–68.)
Moreover, “the availability of habeas corpus relief to correct
unauthorized sentences suggests that trial courts do not have
inherent jurisdiction to correct such sentences, as habeas corpus
relief would be superfluous if a freestanding trial court motion
could at any time achieve the same result without the procedural
limitations that habeas corpus law imposes.” (Id. at p. 68.)
The court in Singleton later applied King and Boyd to facts
that are remarkably similar to this case. In Singleton, a jury
convicted the defendant of dissuading a witness and two other
felonies. (Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 788.) The court
imposed a consecutive one-third the middle term sentence on
the dissuading count, and the CDCR alerted the trial court
that the sentence might be unauthorized under section 1170.15.
(Singleton, at pp. 788–789.) The trial court modified the sentence
to impose the full middle term on the dissuading count, and
the defendant appealed. (Id. at pp. 789–790.)
The Singleton court concluded the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to modify the sentence and dismissed the appeal.
(Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) The court
explained it agreed with Codinha that trial courts have inherent
authority to modify void judgments at any time. (Singleton,
at p. 795.) However, it disagreed that an unauthorized sentence
is void for purposes of that rule. The court suggested a judgment
is void—and may be corrected at any time—only if the underlying
court lacked fundamental jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 797.) When
a court imposes an unauthorized sentence, it has fundamental
jurisdiction but acts in excess of it. (Ibid.) To correct that sort

11
of error, the trial court must have independent grounds for
jurisdiction.6
We need not weigh in on the dispute because, even under
the Codinha rule, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify
Sorrells’ sentence. Under the Codinha rule, a trial court has
jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence only if the error
is “apparent from the face of the record.” (Codinha, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 990.) The Codinha court did not clearly explain
what constitutes the “record” for such purposes. However, the
Boyd court concluded—based on an examination of the cases
upon which the Codinha court relied—that the “record” refers to
the “judgment roll.” (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 68; see
Johnson v. Hayes Cal Builders, Inc. (1963) 60 Cal.2d 572, 576
[the “validity of the judgment on its face may be determined
only by a consideration of the matters constituting part of the
judgment roll”].) The Boyd court noted it is not clear what
documents currently constitute the judgment roll in a criminal
case. (Boyd, at p. 68.) However, former section 1207 stated the
judgment roll consists of “ ‘(1) the indictment or information, and
a copy of the minutes of the plea or demurrer; (2) a copy of the
minutes of the trial; (3) the charges given or refused, and the

6 The Codinha court recognized the general rule that
judgments are void only if the court lacks fundamental
jurisdiction. (See Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 991–
992.) However, it noted some courts have held “ ‘[t]he granting of
relief, which a court under no circumstances has any authority to
grant, has been considered an aspect of fundamental jurisdiction
for the purposes of declaring a judgment or order void.’ ” (Id. at
p. 991.) The Codinha court read the California Supreme Court
decisions to hold unauthorized sentences fall within that category
of error. (Id. at p. 992.)

12
indorsements thereon; and (4) a copy of the judgment.’ ” (People
v. January (1888) 77 Cal. 179, 180, quoting former § 1207.) The
judgment roll in a civil case generally consists of the “pleadings,
all orders striking out any pleading in whole or in part, a copy
of the verdict of the jury, the statement of decision of the court,
. . . and a copy of any order made on demurrer, or relating to a
change of parties, and a copy of the judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 670, subd. (b).)
Here, the trial court’s purported violation of section
1170.15 is not apparent on the face of the documents that have
historically been part of the judgment roll. Sorrells contends
the error is sufficiently apparent because the information
and the judgment show the jury convicted him of dissuading
a witness and other felonies against the same victim on the
same date. Those facts alone, however, did not require the court
to apply section 1170.15. “[S]ection 1170.15 applies only when
a defendant is convicted of a felony (the ‘first felony’) and also
convicted of dissuading or attempting to dissuade the victim
of, or a witness to, the first felony from reporting or giving
testimony regarding the first felony.” (People v. Evans (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 664, 669.) In other words, “section 1170.15
does not apply unless the testimony or reporting with which
the defendant tried to interfere related to the first felony.” (Ibid.)
Here, it is not apparent from the information and judgment that
the dissuading offense was related to the other felony offenses.
Resolution of that issue requires an examination of the evidence
and arguments presented at trial.7 Sorrells does not contend

7 The judge who modified Sorrells’ sentence did not try
the case, and the record does not show whether he reviewed
the trial transcript before modifying the sentence.

13
the trial evidence and arguments are part of the judgment roll,
nor are we aware of any authority suggesting they are. (See
People v. Roth (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 694, 705, fn. 2 [suggesting
a court looks beyond the judgment roll when it examines evidence
presented at trial to determine if a sentence is unauthorized
under section 654].) Because the error is not apparent on the face
of the judgment roll, even under the Codinha rule, the trial court
did not have inherent jurisdiction to modify the sentence. (See
Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 68–69 [determining Codinha
rule did not apply where the only evidence for the sentencing
error came from the probation report, which is not part of the
judgment roll].) Therefore, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal
and must dismiss it. (See King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 633–634, 642.)
To the extent Sorrells suggests the trial court had
jurisdiction under section 1172.1, we disagree. Section 1172.1
provides an exception to the general rule that trial courts lack
jurisdiction to resentence a defendant once execution of the
sentence has commenced. (See Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 790–791.) Here, however, the record is clear that the court
elected not to assume jurisdiction under that statute. The court
expressly stated section 1172.1 does not apply and, even if it did,
it would not exercise its discretion under it.8 Accordingly, the

8 After Sorrells filed his request for resentencing, but before
the hearing on it, the Legislature amended section 1172.1 to
grant trial courts discretion to recall and resentence a defendant
“at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of
original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) The record
suggests the trial court was not aware of this amendment.

14
court could not rely on section 1172.1 for jurisdiction to modify
Sorrells’ sentence.
Although we must dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, we agree with the parties that it would be
manifestly unjust to allow the modified sentence to remain
in place. The Singleton court dealt with a similar issue by
construing the defendant’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, granting the petition, and directing the trial court to
vacate the modified sentence and reinstate the original sentence.
(Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) The Boyd court
took a different approach, exercising its inherent power to vacate
the modified sentence. (See Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 63.)
To err on the side of caution, we will construe the appeal as
a petition for writ of habeas corpus, grant the petition, and direct
the trial court to vacate the modified sentence on the dissuading
a witness count and reinstate the original sentence on that count.
Our disposition is without prejudice to any party seeking relief
in the trial court to address the section 1170.15 issue by way of a
habeas petition, a request for resentencing under section 1172.1,9

We do not consider that issue, however, because Sorrells
did not raise it in his opening brief on appeal.
9 We do not mean to suggest Sorrells has the right to
request relief under section 1172.1. The statute plainly states a
“defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the
court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration
for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (c); see People v. Faustinos (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 687, 696.)

15
or some other authority granting the trial court jurisdiction
to modify the sentence.
DISPOSITION
We dismiss Kevin Dratton Sorrells’ appeal. We deem
the appeal a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which we grant.
We direct the trial court to vacate the order modifying Sorrells’
sentence on the conviction for dissuading a witness and reinstate
the original sentence imposed on that count. The trial court shall
prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified
copy of it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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