CourtListener 10809350•People v. Phillips CA2/6
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Filed 3/16/26 P. v. Phillips CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337616
(Super. Ct. No. TA130215)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
KEVIN PHILLIPS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Kevin Phillips appeals after the trial court denied his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1
Appellant contends he is entitled to relief because the jury
instructions, including those on aiding and abetting, allowed the
jury to convict him “on an overly broad or improper theory of
imputed malice.” We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
“In 2014, a jury convicted [appellant], [Marvin] Vital, and
[Christopher] Ladd of the first degree murder of [Markice] Brider
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189 [count 2]) and found true the special
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
circumstance allegation that the murder was intentionally
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(22)). The jury also found true allegations that a principal
discharged a firearm causing death and that the murder was
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(A), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)). [Appellant] was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus 25 years to
life.” (People v. Phillips (Jan. 27, 2022, B308806) [nonpub. opn.],
fn. omitted.)
On appeal, we struck appellant’s parole revocation fine and
remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to
strike his section 12022.53 enhancement in light of Senate Bill
No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). (People v. Phillips (June 20,
2018, B272498 [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court declined to strike
the enhancement, and we affirmed the judgment on appeal.
(People v. Phillips (Mar. 10, 2020, B297896) [nonpub. opn.].)
In September 2020, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1170.95 (subsequently renumbered
section 1172.6). The trial court denied the petition, and we
affirmed on appeal. (People v. Phillips, supra, B308806.)
In February 2024, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court initially took
no action. Following a motion for reconsideration, the court
issued a memorandum of decision denying the petition on the
merits.
DISCUSSION
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 “altered the
substantive law of murder in two areas. First, with certain
exceptions, it narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule
. . . . Second, [it] imposed a new requirement that, except in cases
of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
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‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.’ (Ibid.) One effect of this [second]
requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as an aider and
abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449 (Curiel).)
Section 1172.6 sets forth the procedure for defendants
convicted under prior law to petition for relief. (§ 1172.6.) Under
that section, “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime” may file a petition.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) One condition for section 1172.6 relief “is
that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder
or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.’ ([§ 1172.6], subd. (a)(3).)”
(People v. Medrano (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1254, 1261.)
The section 1172.6 process “begins with a facially valid
petition that entitles petitioner to counsel, continues with asking
whether petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, and, if
so, proceeds to an evidentiary hearing on the ultimate question of
whether petitioner should be resentenced.” (People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 562 (Patton); § 1172.6, subds. (a)-(d).)
The prima facie inquiry is “‘limited.’” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 562.) As in the analogous habeas corpus context,
“‘“‘the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and
makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if [those] factual allegations
were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause.’”’” (Id. at p. 563.)
“‘“However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
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determination adverse to the petitioner.’”’” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 563.) The Court has cautioned that “‘[i]n reviewing
any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a
trial court should not engage in “factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.”’” (Ibid.) “‘If
the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the
defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition.’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 450.)
“We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage.” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
Appellant is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. The record
of conviction conclusively establishes the jury found appellant
intended to kill and convicted him as a direct perpetrator or
direct aider and abettor—not based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any other theory imputing malice based
solely on participation in a crime. Thus, the trial court properly
denied the petition at the prima facie stage.
The jury was instructed on both express and implied
malice. (CALCRIM No. 520.) The jury was instructed “[t]he
defendants are guilty of first degree murder if the People have
proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he intended to
kill. . . .” (CALCRIM No. 521.) As to the gang special
circumstance, the jury was instructed, inter alia, that the People
must prove “[t]he defendants intentionally killed” the victim.
(CALCRIM No. 736.)
The jury was not instructed on felony murder. Although
the jury was instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, that instruction did not encompass count
2, the only count on which the jury convicted appellant. The
court did instruct on direct aiding and abetting. (CALCRIM Nos.
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400, 401.) Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
murder liability. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462.) Thus,
whether the jury convicted appellant as a direct aider and abettor
or direct perpetrator, it convicted him on a theory still valid after
Senate Bill No. 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189. The
record of conviction conclusively refutes appellant’s allegation
that he could not presently be convicted of murder due to those
changes. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
Citing People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi)
and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, appellant
argues the jury may have imputed malice. Langi reversed after
determining the standard aiding and abetting instruction
“creates an ambiguity under which the jury may find the
defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder
without finding that he personally acted with malice.” (Langi, at
p. 982; see also Maldonado, at pp. 1266-1267 [following Langi].)
Other cases have disagreed with Langi. (See, e.g., People v.
Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936.) Our Supreme
Court may resolve the conflict in People v. Lopez (Oct. 4, 2024,
F085300) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Jan. 15, 2025, S287814.
We need not wade into the dispute. The jury convicted
appellant of first degree murder and found true the gang special
circumstance, both of which necessitated an intent to kill finding.
Where, as here, justification and excuse are not at issue, “[a]n
intent to kill is the equivalent of express malice . . . .” (People v.
Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 547.) Thus, the jury
“necessarily found” appellant “personally harbored intent to kill
or express malice . . . .” (Ibid.) Langi is inapposite.
Relying on Curiel and other cases, appellant argues “[a]n
intent to kill finding based on a gang murder special
circumstance allegation does not itself conclusively establish
ineligibility because intent to kill is only one element of murder
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and does not by itself establish a valid theory of murder.” In
Curiel and those other cases, however, the jury was instructed on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 446; In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 576;
People v. Campbell (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 350, 369.) Here, as we
have explained, the jury was not instructed on that doctrine as to
count 2, and appellant was convicted on a still-valid theory.
Curiel does not prevent the intent to kill finding from negating
appellant’s imputed malice claim under Langi. (Curiel, at p. 471
[Curiel’s holding “does not necessarily apply to other cases where
the jury found intent to kill . . . . The jury instructions . . . might
be materially different, and they might therefore have required
different factual findings . . . .”].)
Appellant’s argument under People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981 likewise fails. The defendant in Reyes was convicted
of second degree murder, and the opinion dealt with the contours
of implied malice murder. (Id., at p. 984.) Here, the jury found
intent to kill, the equivalent of express malice, as to not only
appellant but both codefendants. Reyes is inapplicable.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J. BALTODANO, J.
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Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Kieran D.C Manjarrez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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