Turns v. Turns CA1/1

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Filed 3/12/26 Turns v. Turns CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SEAN LIEF TURNS,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A172695
v.
(City & County of San Francisco
HIKMET MELIS TURNS, Super. Ct. No. FDI-24-799222)
Defendant and Respondent.

In this dissolution, the trial court ordered Sean Lief Turns to pay
attorney’s fees to Hikmet Melis Turns.1 On appeal, Sean contends the court
abused its discretion, made unsupported findings, and violated his due
process. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The parties married in 2017, had a child in 2022, and Sean filed a
petition for dissolution in February 2024. Hikmet asked the trial court to
issue orders concerning custody and visitation, child and spousal support,
and attorney’s fees. She averred she was unemployed, financially reliant on
Sean, and left unable to access joint accounts, while he “earn[ed] a significant

1 We recite only those facts and procedural history necessary to resolve

the limited issues before us. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847,
851.) For clarity, we use the parties’ first names, intending no disrespect.
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 2024.
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income.” Sean opposed the fee request, explaining he had no money left over
after paying “ ‘all expenses including huge community debt.’ ” His income
and expense declaration indicated he was employed as a PG&E line worker,
with $15,407 in average gross monthly income and $22,000 in average
monthly overtime income. But he also reported $30,855 in average monthly
expenses, including installment payments on more than $450,000 of debt.
Hikmet’s income and expense declaration indicated she was unemployed,
with no income. She reported monthly expenses of $7,225—towards which
her father was contributing—and a loan from family for attorney’s fees.2 The
parties also submitted lengthy declarations and other evidence concerning
their financial resources and needs.
In September, after considering pleadings, declarations, and other
evidence, the trial court issued temporary orders regarding custody and
visitation, child support, and spousal support. It found Sean “earned over
$317,000 through August of this year,” he contributed an average of $1,029
into his 401(k) each month, and Hikmet had no income at that time. The
court continued her request for attorney’s fees to November 26, ordering Sean
to file a copy of his 401(k) account balance and Hikmet’s attorney to file a
declaration of counsel.
On November 21, Hikmet’s counsel filed a declaration. It averred—
citing attached exhibits—that there was an income disparity, noting Sean
had approximately $90,000 in his 401(k), had purchased an $11,000
engagement ring for his fiancée, and was giving his fiancée $2,000 per month.
It also noted his 2023 W2 reflected earnings of $658,728. On November 25—

2 Sean and Hikmet went to Turkey in January when her father became

ill. Sean returned home weeks later, but Hikmet stayed in Turkey with their
child. The parties dispute why Sean returned alone.
2
the day before the hearing—Sean filed a declaration, attaching his 401(k)
statement, and Hikmet’s attorney filed another declaration, with exhibits
reflecting Sean’s $289,897 annuity and his spending. The trial court issued a
tentative decision the same day, ordering Sean to pay $45,000 in attorney’s
fees, to be paid over three months.
At the November 26 hearing, Sean’s counsel objected to the tentative
decision, arguing Sean could not pay the fees. He reiterated Sean had
approximately $500,000 in debt—with large monthly minimum payments—
and noted the court assumed monthly earnings of $35,000 when it made child
support orders. Sean spoke, addressing his inability to withdraw funds from
his annuity. For her part, Hikmet’s counsel argued there was an income
disparity, noting Sean’s income, his 401(k) and annuity, and his “lavish
lifestyle.” Without an award of fees, counsel argued Hikmet would be “left
with no counsel” and “unable to continue litigation.”
After hearing from the parties, the trial court noted they had not
contested its previous support orders. It then adopted its tentative ruling,
finding there was a disparity in access to funds and the requested fees were
reasonable. After the court issued its oral ruling, it explained it had to
conclude the hearing because it had to finish other matters before the lunch
break. After both counsel thanked the court, Sean asked if he could “have
one more minute.” The court said no, explained that his counsel spoke “at
length,” and it had made its decision. Its written order also contained
findings that an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate, and Sean had or
was likely to have the ability to pay for both parties’ legal representation.

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DISCUSSION
Sean contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to
pay attorney’s fees and made findings that were unsupported by substantial
evidence. We are unpersuaded.
A trial court must ensure each party has access to legal representation
“by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one
party . . . to pay to the other party . . . whatever amount is reasonably
necessary for attorney’s fees.” (Fam. Code3 § 2030, subd. (a)(1).) If fees are
sought, the court must find whether an award “is appropriate, whether there
is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is
able to pay for legal representation of both parties.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “If the
findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall
make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” (Ibid.) We review a
section 2030 fee award for abuse of discretion—only reversing when,
“ ‘considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order,
no judge could reasonably make the order made.’ ” (In re Marriage of Smith
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 532.) We review factual findings for substantial
evidence. (Ibid.) But we will not reweigh the evidence. (In re Marriage of
Nakamoto & Hsu (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 457, 470 (Nakamoto).)
Sean contends the trial court failed to make required findings before
issuing its order. Not so. Section 2030 requires a court to make findings on
whether (1) a fee award is appropriate, (2) there is a disparity in access to
funds to retain counsel, and (3) one party is able to pay for the representation
of both parties. (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) The court made all three findings. As
Sean acknowledges, it issued a tentative order on November 25. The

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code unless

otherwise indicated.
4
tentative order indicated the court found an “award of attorney’s fees and
costs is appropriate,” “there is a demonstrated disparity between the parties
in access to funds to maintain counsel,” and Sean “has or is reasonably likely
to have the ability to pay for legal representation for both parties.” The court
adopted its tentative ruling at the end of the November 26 hearing, and the
required findings were reflected in its written order.
Next, Sean contends the trial court’s findings were not supported by
substantial evidence. Viewing the record most favorably in support of the
order, we disagree. (Nakamoto, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 470.) For
example, the finding that there was a disparity in access to funds was
supported by evidence that, while Hikmet was unemployed and using family
loans to pay for her attorney, Sean earned $317,000 through August; had
$90,000 in his 401(k), from which he could borrow $35,000 or withdraw
$18,000; had $289,897 in an annuity; and spent $11,000 on an engagement
ring, was giving his fiancée $2,000 per month, and was spending thousands
of dollars on dining and hotels. The same evidence also supports the
determination that Sean had sufficient assets to pay for both parties’
representation.
The trial court’s finding that the requested fees were reasonable and
necessary was also supported by substantial evidence. Hikmet’s counsel
provided evidence of her firm’s billing rates and the amount billed so far, and
she explained the fees were necessary to litigate issues concerning custody
and visitation, child and spousal support, and division of the parties’ assets
and debts. There was also evidence that the fees were incurred in part due to
Sean’s conduct and litigation tactics. (In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 380, 394 [court can consider litigation tactics in awarding section
2030 fees].) That Sean contends one could draw different inferences from the

5
record concerning the court’s findings misapprehends our role on appeal.4
(Nakamoto, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.)
Sean also argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider the totality of circumstances before issuing its order and instead
focused solely on whose income was higher. Drawing all inferences in favor
of the court’s order, we disagree. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 822, 828.) Both parties submitted numerous declarations
and exhibits concerning their respective financial resources and challenges.
Sean averred he was “struggling to pay” the significant amount of existing
“community debt”—which he described in detail—discussed his income, and
indicated he had limited ability to withdraw funds from his 401(k). At the
hearing, Sean and his counsel addressed Sean’s ability to access the money in
his annuity, and Sean’s counsel argued any disparity in access to funds
favored Hikmet. Contrary to Sean’s assertion, the record demonstrates the
court considered the totality of circumstances before issuing its order.
Nothing suggests it based its decision solely on the fact that Sean earns more
than Hikmet.
Finally, Sean contends the trial court violated his right to due process
by denying him the right to testify at the hearing. Sean mischaracterizes
what occurred at the hearing. Neither Sean nor his attorney asked the court
to allow Sean to testify. Instead, both parties submitted multiple

4 The trial court also found Sean failed to comply with its order to file a

copy of his PG&E 401(k) with “the balance of the account from 1/1/2024-
current.” Sean—noting he filed his most recent monthly statement the day
before the hearing—contends the finding was not supported by substantial
evidence. As he implicitly concedes, he did not fully comply with the court’s
order. Moreover, even if the finding was incorrect, Sean fails to establish it
affected the court’s decision. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164
Cal.App.4th at p. 822.)
6
declarations and many exhibits concerning the relevant issues, and Sean’s
counsel focused on that evidence. (In re Marriage of Binette (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 1119, 1127 [right to live testimony can be forfeited where parties
rely solely on declarations], disagreed with on another ground in In re
Marriage of Pasco (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 585, 591, fn. 3.) And Sean ignores
the fact that he spoke at the hearing and addressed his ability to withdraw
money from the annuity. Indeed, he did not express a desire to speak further
until after the court announced its ruling and explained it had to call other
matters before the lunch break. On this record, we cannot conclude the court
denied a request to present live testimony or deprived Sean of his right to
testify during the hearing. (Mendoza v. Ramos (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 680,
687 [no violation of right to testify where party fails to request testimony].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Hikmet Melis Turns shall recover her costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
HUMES, P. J.

_________________________
BANKE, J.

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