CourtListener 10807365•People v. Salinas CA2/8
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Filed 3/11/26 P. v. Salinas CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B344478
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA084808)
v.
PEDRO MARTINEZ SALINAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tiosha Nichole Butler, Judge. Reversed.
Mher Cholakhyan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
Pedro Martinez Salinas appeals from an order denying his
Penal Code section 1473.7 motion to vacate his conviction.
(See Pen. Code, § 1473.7, subd. (g) [authorizing such appeals].)
He asserts he was prejudicially misled about his plea’s
immigration consequences and that section 1473.7 entitles him to
relief. The People agree. We reverse.
In 2011, according to a police report, officers pulled Salinas
over for minor Vehicle Code violations, obtained consent to search
his car’s trunk, and discovered 0.41 grams of cocaine. The People
filed a lone charge accusing Salinas of possessing a controlled
substance and specifying that substance was cocaine. (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Salinas pleaded not guilty.
Salinas, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident
of the United States, had been living in this country for over 20
years at the time of this prosecution. He arrived in 1990 at the
age of 16. Salinas had a wife and three children, all United
States citizens, and was employed. Given this, Salinas told his
defense lawyer to prioritize an immigration-neutral resolution to
his case, even if it resulted in more jail time. Salinas would have
risked a jury trial before agreeing to a resolution that
compromised his status in the United States.
Accommodating Salinas’s concerns, the People amended
the charging document against Salinas to add a new, purportedly
immigration-neutral count. This second count alleged a violation
of the same Health and Safety Code provision as the first but no
longer named the substance involved. The People then offered a
plea bargain in which Salinas would plead guilty, under People v.
West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, to the second count in exchange for
being put on probation and placed into the Deferred Entry of
Judgment (DEJ) program (see former Pen. Code, §§ 1000-1000.4).
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(See People v. Orozco (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 726, 731 [describing
DEJ at the time of Salinas’s prosecution].)
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor stated if Salinas
completed all the terms and conditions of probation, “after 18
months the court will dismiss the case as if you were never
convicted.” But the prosecutor warned Salinas of the
consequences of violating those terms and conditions. These
included having to stand convicted of the crime and having to
serve up to a three-year term of incarceration, as well as having
to face immigration consequences such as deportation, the denial
of reentry, or the denial of a chance to become a naturalized
citizen.
The court accepted Salinas’s plea on the second count,
dismissed count one, and placed Salinas into the DEJ program.
Salinas successfully completed DEJ, and the court, in 2013,
dismissed the matter pursuant to Penal Code section 1000.3.
In 2024, Salinas moved to vacate his conviction under
Penal Code section 1473.7, which allows those no longer in
custody to vacate a conviction if it is “legally invalid due to
prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of [the]
conviction.” (Pen. Code, § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1); see People v.
Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316.)
The superior court denied Salinas’s motion. It concluded
Salinas’s prosecution had no adverse immigration consequences
because the charge Salinas pleaded to did not name cocaine as
the controlled substance. It also concluded that because Salinas
completed DEJ and achieved a dismissal, there was no conviction
left to vacate.
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On appeal, both the People and Salinas agree the trial
court erred. The People now concede, and we agree – applying
independent review on a record without an evidentiary hearing
(see People v. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319) – that
Salinas’s conviction was not immigration neutral, that he
suffered prejudice, and that he is entitled to relief under Penal
Code section 1473.7.
DEJ proceedings from Salinas’s time are now a known
hazard for non-citizen defendants. The Legislature has found
that its “statement in Section 1000.4, that ‘successful completion
of a deferred entry of judgment program shall not, without the
defendant’s consent, be used in any way that could result in the
denial of any employment, benefit, license, or certificate’
constitutes misinformation about the actual consequences of
making a plea in the case of some defendants, including all
noncitizen defendants, because the disposition of the case may
cause adverse consequences, including adverse immigration
consequences.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.43, subd. (a)(1).) The
Legislature was so concerned about this misinformation that a
court, upon request, shall permit any defendant who completed
DEJ and had a case dismissed under Penal Code section 1000.3,
like Salinas, to withdraw a guilty plea and shall dismiss the
complaint or information. (Pen. Code, § 1203.43, subd. (b).) (No
request under this provision, however, is at issue here.)
DEJ issues aside, a conviction of Health and Safety Code
section 11350 involving cocaine can have adverse immigration
consequences. (Lazo v. Wilkinson (9th Cir. 2021) 989 F.3d 705,
714.) And in federal immigration tribunals and the Ninth
Circuit, a police report forming the factual basis of a plea can
furnish details, otherwise missing from charging documents, that
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allow the imposition of adverse immigration consequences. (See
Matter of Milian-Dubon (B.I.A. 2010) 25 I. & N. Dec. 197, 201,
citing United States v. Almazan-Becerra (9th Cir. 2008) 537 F.3d
1094, 1097–1100 and Suazo Perez v. Mukasey (9th Cir. 2008) 512
F.3d 1222, 1226; In re Sanudo (B.I.A. 2006) 23 I. & N. Dec. 968,
975, citing Parrilla v. Gonzales (9th Cir. 2005) 414 F.3d 1038,
1044; United States v. Ramos-Medina (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3d
932, 939–940.)
Salinas, his lawyer, and the People all labored under the
mistaken belief that they – by selecting DEJ and by fashioning a
charge that did not expressly specify cocaine as the substance at
issue – were achieving an immigration-neutral result when they
were not. Further, Salinas has stated he would not have
accepted an immigration-unsafe plea and would sooner have gone
to trial. These statements, which, again, the People accept, are
supported by objective evidence of Salinas’s strong ties to the
United States at the time of his prosecution. Under the totality
of circumstances in this conceded case, we agree with the parties
that the misinformation Salinas received regarding his plea was
prejudicial and that reversal to ensure prompt relief under Penal
Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), rather than remand, is
appropriate. (See People v. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp.
321, 325–326; People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 559.)
Given this, we need not, and do not, address the parties’
contentions regarding whether a presumption under Penal Code
section 1473.7, subdivision (f)(2) aids Salinas in this case.
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DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment. The superior court shall enter
an order vacating Salinas’s conviction pursuant to Penal Code
section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1).
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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